Helebrant v Perdic
[2010] VSC 580
•14 December 2010
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMERCIAL AND EQUITY DIVISION
No. 1003 of 2010
| MATO HELEBRANT | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| DENI PERDIC | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | BEACH J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 9 December 2010 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 14 December 2010 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Helebrant v Perdic | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2010] VSC 580 | |
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ADMINISTRATION AND PROBATE – Intestacy – Application for declaration of paternity – Recognition of paternity – Trial on affidavits – No cross-examination of deponents – Status ofChildren Act 1974, ss 7 and 10 – Administration and Probate Act 1958, s 52.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | Ms C.R. McOmish | Arnold Thomas & Becker |
| For the Defendant | Ms P. Carey | Zeljko Stojakovic |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
Mate Prolosico (“the deceased”) died intestate on 29 September 2007. Mato Helebrant, the plaintiff, claims to be the only child of the deceased. In this proceeding, the plaintiff seeks:
(a)a declaration pursuant to s 10(1) of the Status of Children Act 1974, that the relationship of father and child existed between the plaintiff and the deceased;
(b)a declaration pursuant to s 7(1)(b) of the Status of Children Act that paternity was admitted by the deceased during his lifetime; and
(c)an order that subject to the formal requirements of the Registrar of Probates, letters of administration of the intestate estate of the deceased be granted to the plaintiff.[1]
[1]Originally, the plaintiff also sought an order that, for the purposes of this proceeding, the defendant represent the next of kin of the deceased, other than the plaintiff. However, this application was abandoned at hearing.
Deni Perdic, the defendant, is the daughter of Tonka Perdic, who died intestate on 12 April 2008. Tonka Perdic was a niece of the deceased and, according to the defendant, “as far as [she] was aware, his closest relative living in Australia at the time of his death”.
The defendant opposes the orders sought by the plaintiff, and ultimately submits that, subject to any requirement of the Registrar of Probates, letters of administration should be granted to her for the purpose of administering the deceased’s estate and distributing the net funds in accordance with s 52 of the Administration and Probate Act 1958.[2] The defendant’s position is encapsulated in paragraph 5 of her outline of submissions.[3] Paragraph 5 provides:
“The defendant opposes the application and says that the deceased had no children. Further or alternatively, she says that the deceased did not admit paternity. In consequence, she says that the plaintiff has no entitlement on intestacy and the Court ought not grant letters of administration to him.”
However, counsel for the defendant agreed in her submissions that if I found a paternal relationship and that the deceased admitted paternity during his lifetime, then subject to any requirement of the Registrar of Probates, letters of administration should be granted to the plaintiff.
The Status of Children Act 1974
[2]Section 52 of the Administration and Probate Act deals with the distribution of an estate on intestacy.
[3]Undated.
Section 7(1) of the Status of Children Act provides:
“(1) The relationship of father and child and any other relationship traced in any degree through that relationship shall, for any purpose related to succession to property or to the construction of any will or testamentary disposition or of any instrument creating a trust or for the purpose of a claim under Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958, be recognized only if-
(a) the father and the mother of the child were married to each other at the time of its conception or at some subsequent time; or
(b) paternity has been admitted (expressly or by implication) by or established against the father in his lifetime and, if the father is a beneficiary of the child, paternity has been so admitted or established while the child was living.”
Section 10 of the Status of Children Act relevantly provides:
“(1) Any person (the first person) who-
(a)claims that any named person is a parent of the first person's child; or
(b)claims that a relationship of parent and child exists between the first person and any other named person; or
(c) has a proper interest in the result who wishes to have a determination whether the relationship of parent and child exists between two named persons-
may apply to the Supreme Court for a declaration of parentage and if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the relationship exists the Court may make a declaration of parentage whether or not the parent or the child or both of them are living or dead.
(2) Where a declaration is made under subsection (1) after the death of the parent or of the child the Court may at the same or any subsequent time make a declaration determining, for the purposes of paragraph (b) in subsection (1) of section 7, whether any of the requirements of that paragraph have been satisfied.
(3) …”
The first question to be examined is the question of paternity and whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of parentage. However, even if that matter is resolved in favour of the plaintiff, that only takes the plaintiff so far. In order for the plaintiff to be entitled on intestacy, the plaintiff must satisfy the additional requirement in s 7(1)(b) – namely, that paternity was admitted by the deceased in his lifetime (the other alternatives in s 7(1) of the deceased and the plaintiff’s mother being married at or subsequent to the plaintiff’s conception or paternity having been established against the deceased in his lifetime having no application in this case).
As was said by Ormiston J[4] in Anderson v Teboneras:[5]
“The test of paternity under s 10 of the Status of Children Act is much more general than that which must be established for the purposes of s 7 of that Act. Under s 10 it is sufficient that it is proved to the satisfaction of this court that ‘the relationship of father and child exists between two named persons’, to use the language of s 10(1) of the Act. On the other hand, sub-s (1) of s 7 is expressed, for present purposes, in the following terms:
‘The relationship of father and child … shall, for any purpose related to succession to property or the construction of any will or testamentary disposition or of any instrument creating a trust or for the purpose of a claim under Part IV of the Administration and Probate Act 1958 be recognised only if –
(a) …
(b) paternity has been admitted (expressly or by implication) by or established against the father in his lifetime … .’”[6]
[4]As his Honour then was.
[5][1990] VR 527, 543.
[6]Noting the slightly different language in the current version of s 10(1) of the Status of Children Act, from that in the version under consideration by his Honour.
Byrne J described the effect of paragraph (b) of s 7(1) in In re XY; ex parte State Trustees Limited[7] in the following terms:
“Paragraph (b) in effect permits paternity to be established only by admission or otherwise in the lifetime of the supposed father. It would seem that, however conclusive might be a DNA match with a sample taken now from AB, this would not for relevant purposes permit State Trustees to distribute a share to AB as a child of the deceased, at least without evidence of an admission of paternity. Given the relative reliability of modern DNA matching compared with admissions of paternity, this may be a surprising result but it is an inescapable consequence of the words of the statute.”
[7][2001] VSC 89, [16].
The trial of this proceeding
The trial of this proceeding was conducted in the Practice Court. All of the evidence was given on affidavit. No deponent was cross-examined. It was said from the Bar table by counsel for the defendant that this was to save time and costs, having regard to the size of the estate.
The plaintiff relied upon:
(a)affidavits of the plaintiff sworn 12 February 2010, 11 March 2010 and 26 May 2010;
(b)affidavits of the plaintiff’s solicitor, Anne Shortall, sworn 12 February 2010 and 10 November 2010;
(c)an affidavit of Joy Elizabeth Russell, a DNA expert, sworn 5 March 2010;
(d)affidavits of various interpreters who interpreted various Croatian documents and writing;
(e)an affidavit of Stjepan Cosic[8] stating that he met the deceased 35 years ago and that a week or two before the deceased went into hospital before he died, the deceased “told [him] that he had a son and that he wanted to see him before he died”;[9]
(f)affidavits of Luka Gaspar,[10] Anda Kunac[11] and Ivan Kunac,[12] deposing to a relationship between the deceased and the plaintiff’s mother in Croatia in the years leading up to shortly before the plaintiff’s birth; and
(g)other affidavits dealing with attempts to locate other relatives of the deceased in Europe and of service of solicitors’ letters on those who were identified, advising them of this proceeding.
[8]Sworn 23 March 2010.
[9]The balance of this affidavit was (apart from a statement that the deponent and the deceased lived about five houses away from each other in Geelong) inadmissible as hearsay.
[10]Sworn 20 April 2010.
[11]Sworn 27 October 2010.
[12]Sworn 9 November 2010.
The defendant swore affidavits on 11 and 26 May 2010. The defendant did not tender any other evidence.
The plaintiff’s case
The plaintiff was born in Croatia on 20 September 1957. His mother was Mara Kunac, who died in Croatia on 8 May 2005. A translated copy of the plaintiff’s baptism record describes him as “illegitimate”.
In his first affidavit, the plaintiff set out his mother’s account of the de facto relationship she had with the deceased in Croatia in the following terms:[13]
“My mother told me that when she was in her 20s she and her family moved to another small town in Croatia called Kucanci. The deceased moved to Kucanci shortly after my mother and her family moved there. She told me that she had a de facto relationship with the deceased, that she became pregnant to him, and that he left Croatia (then part of Yugoslavia) before I was born. She and the deceased apparently wanted a life better than the one they were experiencing under the Communist regime, and the deceased managed to escape Croatia and get to Italy. The intention was that my mother was to join him after I was born but she gave up trying after she got caught crossing the border to Slovenia three times and was eventually jailed. She told me that she had me with her when she attempted to cross the border but I don’t remember.”
[13]Paragraph 8.
In relation to the fact that the deceased and Mara Kunac lived together in Kucanci, Mara Kunac’s pregnancy and the departure of the deceased from Croatia, this account is corroborated by the evidence of Luka Gaspar, Anda Kunac and Ivan Kunac (noting that whilst Anda Kunac and Ivan Kunac are siblings of the plaintiff’s mother, Luka Gaspar’s connection with the deceased and the plaintiff’s mother was more remote: Luka Gaspar’s sister was married to the deceased’s brother).
The plaintiff, his mother and stepfather migrated to Australia in 1971. In his first affidavit, the plaintiff described his contact with the deceased as follows:[14]
“12. I knew, via the Croatian community, that the deceased was in Australia. Approximately nine years ago I found out from one of my customers, a Croatian lady from Geelong who knew the deceased, that he was living in Geelong. She gave me his telephone number and I telephoned him. I said ‘This is your son’ and he said ‘Yes, I know you’. He then said ‘Why didn’t you look for me earlier’ and I replied ‘Why didn’t you?’ He then said ‘Let’s get together’ and I said ‘I’ll come and see you’, but he said ‘No, I’ll see you in a couple of days’. I got the impression that he knew my address. He told me that he had a copy of my birth certificate that my mother had sent to him.
13 The deceased did not ever come to see me. I went to his home approximately 10 times but he was never there. I wrote to him and sent him some photographs.”
[14]Paragraphs 12 and 13.
The plaintiff’s statement that the deceased told him that the deceased had a copy of the plaintiff’s birth certificate is corroborated by part of the evidence given by the defendant. In the defendant’s first affidavit,[15] the defendant deposes to searching the deceased’s house after he died and finding a copy of a Croatian birth certificate for a person named Mato Kunac, born on 20 September 1957. This was a copy of the plaintiff’s birth certificate, and (if I accept the evidence of the plaintiff as to his conversation with the deceased) probably the copy referred to by the deceased in this conversation.
[15]At paragraph 7.
The plaintiff tendered in evidence photographs of the deceased. He gave evidence about the photographs as follows:
“When I was 7 or 8 years old I saw some photographs my mother had of a man and I asked her who he was. She told me his name and that he was my father, and she told me of her relationship with him and her attempted escape from Croatia in order to join him in Italy. She told me that the deceased wrote to her and sent her photographs.”[16]
[16]Plaintiff’s first affidavit, paragraph 9.
If I accept this evidence, it would appear that the plaintiff’s mother had in her possession (and later the plaintiff had in his possession) photographs of the deceased as a young man (and there was no issue at trial that the photographs tendered were photographs of the deceased as a young man). On the back of one of these photographs there are words written in Croatian. Not all of what is written has been able to be deciphered. The words included the following words:
“This picture you can give to anyone”
“This is a photo of a man, of your husband who has not been forgotten”
“Who is 89 K (in weight)”
“From Italy”
“Who came on 18.2.1957”
“To remember (me) for a long time”.
On the back of another photograph, the following could be deciphered:
“This is for my son for remembrance and long memory …
Dear wife this is for you …
This is for my ‘dove’ for remembrance and long memory from her husband not to forget him …
My heart [picture of heart] Mato
My dear now … goodbye ‘Bog’”.
DNA typing was carried out on samples from the deceased and the plaintiff. No sample was available from the deceased’s mother. Ms Russell’s evidence was that the deceased was 58 times more likely to produce a child with the required alleles than a man drawn randomly from the general population. She said that this equated to a “Relative Chance of Paternity of 98.3%”, and that in the absence of the mother “these figures are always lower”. Whilst the DNA result does not mandate a finding of paternity, it is obviously supportive.
Finally, the plaintiff relied upon a physical similarity between his appearance and the appearance of the deceased as a young man as disclosed in the photographs tendered. Whilst there is an obvious similarity, it is of course to be remembered that such evidence must be treated with great caution.[17]
[17]R v Jenkins; ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277, 292 per Barry J (reversed on appeal, but not on this point).
The defendant’s case
The defendant deposes to being the great niece of the deceased. She swore that her understanding was that all of the deceased’s siblings died before he did and they all remained living in Croatia. She swore:
“[I]t was my understanding, and that of my mother, because she never told me otherwise, that the deceased had never been married and had no children.”
The defendant’s case was really an attack on the plaintiff’s material to support submissions that I should not be satisfied either as to paternity or acknowledgment during the deceased’s life. The defendant contends that whilst the standard of proof in this proceeding is the balance of probabilities, the principle in Briginshaw v Briginshaw[18] should also be borne in mind.
[18](1938) 60 CLR 336.
The standard of proof
In Moszko v Warshall,[19] Smith J had to consider ss 7 and 10 of the Status of Children Act where declarations were sought as to paternity which would affect the distribution of the estate of the deceased in that case. His Honour said:[20]
“Claims against the estate of a deceased person must be scrutinised with great care. Further, in cases of this nature, it is common ground between the parties that while the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities, the Briginshaw v Briginshaw principle must be borne in mind.”
[19]Unreported Supreme Court of Victoria, Smith J, 20 February 1995.
[20]Ibid at p 14.
However, as was noted by Bell J in Farnell v Penhalluriack (No. 2),[21] the High Court held in G v H[22] that where the evidence established that a particular person could be the father of a child, the question of actual paternity should be approached free of restraints inherent in the view that that question involved a grave or serious allegation. Bell J held that the paternity provisions of the Status of Children Act were analogous to the paternity provisions of the Family Law Act considered by the High Court in G v H. With respect, I agree.
[21][2008] VSC 214.
[22](1994) 181 CLR 387.
Counsel for the defendant sought to rely upon the statement of Smith J in Moszko, notwithstanding Bell J’s decision in Farnell. She submitted that Miszko had not been overruled on this point because at paragraph [7] of Farnell, Bell J agreed in Smith J’s analysis of s 5 of the Status of Children Act – without going on to make any criticism of the passage I have set out above. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this argument, in my view, the approach to be taken is that set out by the High Court in G v H. In the present case, I see no basis for approaching the question of paternity as if it involves a grave or serious allegation in the Briginshaw v Briginshaw sense. All of the evidence (save for the defendant’s belief) is one way pointing towards paternity.[23] As was said by Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ:[24]
“Paternity is a serious matter, both for father and for child. However, it is not clear that the question of paternity should be approached on the basis that it involves a grave or serious allegation in the Briginshaw v Briginshaw sense when what is at issue is the maintenance of a child and the evidence establishes that the person concerned is more likely than anyone else to be the father. … [I]t is difficult to see why … [a] child’s rights to maintenance and support should … depend on the biological fact of paternity being established on the basis that, so far as the putative father is concerned, the biological fact involves an allegation in much the same category as an allegation of moral or criminal wrongdoing.”
[23]In saying this, I have not overlooked that the deceased’s name is not on any birth certificate or the defendant’s point (made at paragraph 9 of her second affidavit) that the birth certificate exhibited at paragraph 4 of the plaintiff’s first affidavit contains a statement that the plaintiff’s father was Karlo Helebrant born on 7 July 1927. It is apparent from the additional information inserted on 30 September 2005 into the plaintiff’s mother’s birth certificate, that she married Karlo Helebrant on 12 September 1964. Equally, it is apparent that in the birth records of the plaintiff, his surname was initially recorded as Kunac, and later (by agreement between the plaintiff’s mother and Karlo Helebrant), this was changed to Helebrant.
[24]181 CLR 399.
In further support of her argument, counsel for the defendant relied upon s 140 of the Evidence Act 2008. Section 140 provides:
“(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account-
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.”
It follows from what I have said above that s 140 is of no particular relevance in this case (other than to apply it as one does in every civil case). Whilst the issue of paternity is of undoubted importance and significance, there is no reason in this case to approach the question of paternity as if it was a matter of such “gravity”[25] as to require an analysis of the evidence different from the sort of analysis that would be undertaken in any ordinary civil proceeding. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the consequences of the granting of the declarations sought by the plaintiff under the Status of Children Act dictate that they be taken into account when determining whether one is satisfied of a particular relevant matter.[26]
[25]Cf s 140(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 2008 (see footnote 23 above).
[26]See generally s 140(2)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act.
Has the plaintiff established paternity?
As I have said above, apart from the defendant’s asserted belief (no doubt in part derived from what her mother told her she believed), all of the evidence is one way.[27] Counsel for the defendant submitted that I should be careful in accepting any of the evidence tendered on behalf of the plaintiff because it was “untested”. This was a reference to there being no cross-examination of any of the witnesses. It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that this was a procedure that had been agreed on, in order to save time and expense. So much may be accepted. However, the consequence in this case is that almost all of the material put into evidence by the plaintiff is unchallenged. Further, there is a degree of consistency in the evidence which leads me to be more than comfortably satisfied that the deceased was the plaintiff’s father. If it was necessary to have regard to Briginshaw v Briginshaw considerations, I would still reach this conclusion. Further, in reaching this conclusion, I have paid no regard to the physical similarities between the plaintiff and the deceased as disclosed by the photographs tendered.
[27]Again noting the issue of names in the plaintiff’s birth records, to which I have already referred.
In my view, the evidence supports the conclusion that the plaintiff’s mother and the deceased lived together in a de facto relationship in Croatia until some time in 1957 (before the birth of the plaintiff). The deceased escaped to Italy, from where he went to Australia. Whilst the plaintiff’s mother tried to leave later, she was unsuccessful and gaoled (until eventually migrating with the plaintiff and his stepfather in 1971). Additionally, the DNA evidence (whilst not conclusive) is supportive of the proposition that the deceased fathered the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff was the child his mother was carrying when she and the deceased were both living together in Croatia.
Whilst counsel for the defendant made an attack on the evidence of Anda Kunac on the basis that it contained an inconsistency, I was not persuaded to reject the evidence of Ms Kunac. The inconsistency identified related to Anda Kunac’s evidence concerning the age of the plaintiff’s mother at the time the plaintiff’s maternal grandfather died. Whilst this fact was not specifically sworn to, it seems likely that he died when the plaintiff’s mother was approximately 21 years of age. However, in her affidavit, Anda Kunac swore:
“Mato continued to write to Mara. I know this because Mara was illiterate and I read the letters to her. She had very little formal education and had worked the land from a very young age. There was no choice, we were poor and my father had died when we were still young.”
Counsel for the defendant asserted that the statement “we were still young” was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s mother’s age being 21. However, it is to be remembered that Mara (the plaintiff’s mother) and Anda Kunac were two of five children. It is as likely as not that Anda Kunac was referring to herself, or maybe herself and other siblings when she said “we were still young”. In my view, it would be wrong to reject Anda Kunac’s uncontested (uncross-examined) evidence concerning her sister’s relationship with the deceased merely because of an apparent possible discrepancy in relation to a peripheral fact.
In paragraph 43 of the defendant’s outline of submissions,[28] the defendant submitted:
“An avenue for establishing paternity during the deceased’s lifetime was available to the plaintiff by way of s 10 of the [Status of Children Act]. During the five or six years that elapsed between his alleged conversation with the deceased and the deceased’s death, the plaintiff did not make use of that avenue, despite the fact that it must have become apparent to him that the deceased had no intention of acknowledging him as his son. It was only after the deceased had died that the plaintiff acted to inquire whether the alleged relationship gave rise to any property rights.”
[28]Undated.
It may be that if the defendant had cross-examined the plaintiff on this issue, there might have been some merit in this point. During the course of the hearing, I stated to counsel that I would be prepared to entertain an application to cross-examine the plaintiff. No application was made. In any event, in the absence of cross-examination of the plaintiff (something which the defendant could have insisted upon if she wished), I am not prepared to disbelieve him merely because he did nothing to formally establish paternity during the deceased’s lifetime. There may have been any number of reasons why the plaintiff did not take the steps suggested. Without cross-examination, the matter is no more than idle speculation.
The evidence concerning the defendant finding the plaintiff’s birth certificate amongst the deceased’s papers after he died provides further support for the proposition that the deceased was the plaintiff’s father. Although the evidence I have already referred to is sufficient to justify a finding of paternity, the fact that the deceased had the plaintiff’s birth certificate in the circumstances to which I have already referred, on its own, or coupled with the photographs (one of which acknowledges the existence of a son), all fortifies the conclusion that the deceased was the plaintiff’s father.
The conversation between the deceased and the plaintiff
The defendant submits that the content of the conversation between the plaintiff and the deceased is ambiguous and not supportive of the plaintiff’s case. In the defendant’s outline of submissions, the matter was put as follows:[29]
“The content itself is ambiguous. The plaintiff’s account of the conversation is that he said, ‘This is your son’, and the Deceased said, ‘Yes, I know you. Why didn’t you look for me earlier?’ Those words, even if accepted, do not support the inference that the Deceased was admitting paternity by saying them. They could have meant that the Deceased knew the plaintiff as a person in the Croatian community who had made claims about being his son, or a person whose mother was making such a claim. The follow up question and the alleged subsequent conduct demonstrate suspicion rather than recognition. The Deceased had no other children. On the defendant’s evidence his closest relative was his niece, the defendant’s mother. The defendant’s evidence does not show any likelihood that she or her mother would have criticised the Deceased if he had had a child out of wedlock. He had no obvious reason not to acknowledge the plaintiff.”
[29]Paragraph 27.
So far as the suggested construction of the conversation is concerned, I reject the defendant’s submission. In my view, it is plain that the deceased was acknowledging the plaintiff as his son. The deceased’s statement “Let’s get together” is hardly suggestive of “suspicion rather than recognition”. Similarly, the deceased’s admission that he had a copy of the plaintiff’s birth certificate is an acknowledgement, rather than a denial when seen in context. Whilst the plaintiff’s evidence of his conversation with the deceased must be scrutinised with particular care,[30] I accept that the plaintiff had a conversation with the deceased in the terms sworn to by the plaintiff. Such a conversation is consistent with the balance of the evidence, and in particular the deceased’s possession of the plaintiff’s birth certificate.
[30]See Clune (as Administrator of the Estate of Brett Whiteley (deceased)) v Collins Angus & Robertson Publishers Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 246, 253.
The fact that there was no follow-up contact is obviously not of assistance to the plaintiff’s case. However, again there may be many reasons. In the end, I am not persuaded that the absence of follow-up contact justifies failing to find what the body of evidence tendered in this case demonstrates – namely, that the deceased was the plaintiff’s father.
Was paternity admitted by the deceased in his lifetime?
The requirement in s 7(1)(b) of the Status of Children Act is that paternity be admitted by (or established against[31]) the deceased in his lifetime. The admission can be express or by implication. It follows from what I have said above, that in my view there was at least an admission by implication (if not an express admission) by the deceased that he was the plaintiff’s father during the course of the conversation to which I have just referred.
[31]Not relevant in this proceeding.
In the circumstances, it is not necessary to give specific consideration to the other parts of the evidence which the plaintiff asserts constituted an admission (at least by implication). However, one further point can be made. The photograph of the plaintiff containing reference to his son, when coupled with the conversation between the plaintiff and the deceased, provides further grounds for concluding that the deceased in his lifetime admitted (again, expressly or by implication) he was the father of the plaintiff. There is no suggestion in the evidence of the deceased having any other son.[32]
[32]See also the evidence of Stjepan Cosic, referred to at paragraph [10(e)] above.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, the plaintiff is entitled to:
(a)a declaration pursuant to s 10(1) of the Status of Children Act 1974 that the relationship of father and child existed between the plaintiff and the deceased; and
(b)a declaration pursuant to s 7(1)(b) of the Status of Children Act that paternity was admitted by the deceased during his lifetime.
On the evidence, the plaintiff being the closest living relative of the deceased is also entitled to an order that, subject to the formal requirements of the Registrar of Probates, letters of administration of the intestate estate of the deceased be granted to him.
I will hear the parties on the precise form of orders and any question as to costs.
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