IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P21 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
GERARDUS GERRIT HEIJNE
Applicant
and
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
BELL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON THURSDAY, 21 OCTOBER 2010, AT 12.29 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D. GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR S. VANDONGEN for the applicant. (instructed by Michael Tudori and Associates)
MR B. FIANNACA, SC: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia)
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Grace.
MR GRACE: Your Honours, firstly could I just deal with an administrative matter. Could I hand up to your Honours a replacement page for page 1 of the application book because the copy of the indictment that was contained at page 1 was in fact the incorrect document and you will see in the replacement document that the alternative of murder was pleaded.
Your Honours, the crucial issue for the Court of Appeal to determine was to conclude whether or not the jury could be satisfied that the only rational inference that could be drawn from all the evidence was that the applicant intended to do the deceased some grievous bodily harm at the time he compressed the deceased’s neck. That process of determination is conducted in the context of the definition contained in section 1 of the Criminal Code (WA) that defines “grievous bodily harm” as:
any bodily injury of such a nature as to endanger, or be likely to endanger life, or to cause, or to be likely to cause, permanent injury to health -
The error that the Court of Appeal fell into was in adopting an approach that examined whether the evidence was capable of giving rise to proof beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to do some grievous bodily harm. What the court ought to do, in our submission, was to have considered whether a rational inference on all the evidence could be excluded beyond reasonable doubt, namely that the applicant compressed the deceased’s neck in the context of a struggle in an effort to incapacitate the deceased without any intent to do grievous bodily harm.
Could I invite your Honours to turn to page 78 of the application book. At paragraph 56, his Honour the Chief Justice stated the confines of the challenge to the conviction, and you will see at line 39, his Honour said:
the ground is focused only upon the adequacy of the evidence to sustain a finding of intention to cause grievous bodily harm.
At paragraph 60 on page 79 his Honour correctly stated the test that the court was required to apply. At paragraph 70 on page 82 at line 31, his Honour said this:
The sustained application of a significant degree of compressive force to the neck…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 278
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the offence created by section 112(1) of the *Environmental Protection Act 1986* (WA) was one of strict liability or required proof of fault on the part of the accused. Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the phrase "all reasonable and practicable measures" indicated an intention by the legislature to impose strict liability, or if it implied a requirement for the prosecution to prove a failure to take such measures.
Gummow and Bell JJ, in their joint judgment, held that the offence was not one of strict liability. Their Honours reasoned that the inclusion of the words "reasonable and practicable" indicated that the legislature intended to impose a standard of conduct that was objectively assessed. This meant that the prosecution would need to prove that the measures taken, or not taken, by the occupier fell short of what was reasonable and practicable in the circumstances. The Court drew upon established principles of statutory interpretation, noting that offences are generally presumed to require proof of mens rea unless the language of the statute clearly indicates otherwise, or the subject matter points to strict liability. The Court found that the language used in section 112(1) did not displace this presumption.
The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi