Heidi Ward v Legal Services Commission - [2025] QCA 171

[2025] QCA 171

COURT OF APPEAL

BODDICE JA
BROWN JA
BLEBY AJA

Appeal No 1309 of 2025
SC No 12253 of 2024

HEIDI WARD Applicant

LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION Respondent

BRISBANE

MONDAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 2025

JUDGMENT

BROWN JA: The applicant, Ms Ward, seeks an extension of time to appeal a decision of Justice Crowley granting an interim injunction under section 703, subsection (4) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) (LPA) in the terms outlined in the order of 24 September 2024, which, in simplified terms, restrained Ms Ward from engaging in legal practice in the State of Queensland, representing or advertising that she is entitled to engage in legal practice and requesting or receiving considerations for the provision of legal services. The Legal Services Commissioner alleges that Ms Ward has engaged in the provision of such services contrary to section 24, subsection (1) and section 25, subsection (1) of the LPA. That matter has not been finally determined.
Ms Ward’s application for an extension of time was filed on 31 March 2025, more than five months out of time, the appeal period being 28 days after the decision. An appeal can only be made outside that time by an order of the Court of Appeal under rule 748 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). Ms Ward has not filed an application applying for an extension of time but has raised the need for an extension in her affidavit. The Legal Services Commissioner has indicated it is willing to treat that indication in her affidavit as an informal application. On this occasion only, the court is also willing to do so. To the extent that Ms Ward has, in her latest written submissions, sought to contend that the Legal Services Commissioner has proceeded on the basis that leave was granted, that is contrary to the Legal Service Commissioner’s submissions.

In considering whether to grant an extension of time within which to bring the appeal, the court considers a number of matters, conveniently summarised by Justice Fraser in Quinn v Legal Services Commissioner [2016] QCA 354 at [7]. First, the length of time between when the appeal should have been filed and when the application for an extension of time is sought. Secondly, whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay. Thirdly, any prejudice to the respondent arising out of the delay; and finally, the merits of the appeal. In considering the merits of the appeal, it is relevant that the applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal an interlocutory order of the court. In the case of matters involving practice and procedure, this court will generally only interfere to overturn a decision of that kind if there is shown to be an error and the decision appealed from will work a substantial injustice to one of the parties: see Yao v Fang [2025] QCA 86 at [55].

In her affidavit, the applicant offers, by way of explanation for delay, that it took her a great deal…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2025] QCA 171
Decision Date: 15 SEPTEMBER 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Heidi Ward versus the Legal Services Commission, the applicant seeks an extension of time to appeal an interim injunction order granted by Justice Crowley under section 703, subsection (4) of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). The injunction restrains Ms Ward from engaging in legal practice in Queensland, representing or advertising that she is entitled to do so, or requesting or receiving consideration for providing legal services. The Legal Services Commissioner alleges that Ms Ward has contravened sections 24 and 25 of the LPA. The appeal period has expired, and Ms Ward has not formally applied for an extension but has indicated her need for an extension in her affidavit. The Legal Services Commissioner has agreed to treat this indication as an informal application, and the court does the same.

The court was required to decide whether to grant an extension of time for Ms Ward to appeal the interim injunction order. The factors considered included the length of the delay, an acceptable explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the appeal. The merits of the appeal were assessed in light of the interlocutory nature of the order, which is typically only overturned if there is a demonstrated error causing substantial injustice. Ms Ward argued that her delay was due to her efforts to understand the legislation and her decision to pursue a strike-out application, which was unsuccessful. However, the court found her explanation unsatisfactory, particularly as she delayed seeking an extension while pursuing another application. The Legal Services Commissioner did not claim to be prejudiced by the delay.

The court examined the merits of the proposed appeal grounds, including Ms Ward's contention that her conduct did not constitute "engaging in legal practice" and that the injunction was unnecessary. The primary judge had carefully considered the definition of "engage in legal practice" and found there was a serious question to be tried, with the balance of convenience favouring the injunction. The court found no demonstrable legal error in the primary judge's decision and no substantial injustice suffered by Ms Ward. The interim injunction merely restrains Ms Ward from actions prohibited under the LPA, pending a final determination. Given these circumstances, the court was not persuaded that an extension of time should be granted.

The Court of Appeal, consisting of Boddice JA, Brown J, and Bleby AJA, agreed that the application for an extension of time should be refused. The court's orders were that the application for leave for an extension of time to appeal be refused and that there be no order as to costs. The decision will be published once the transcript is revised.

Orders