Hedges v Halliday

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75 CLR 42

RESPONDENT. DEFENDANT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Financial Emergency (Vict.)-Statute- - Contracting out "-Policy of Act-Mortgages

in existence at date of Act to be construed as if rate of interest reduced-Act to take effect notwithstanding any prior agreement to the contrary-No similar provision MELBOURNE,

as to subsequent agreements Expressio unius Financial Emergency Acts Oct. 22, 23;

1931-1940 (Vict.) (No. 3961-4788), Part III., Div. 1. SYDNEY,

The Financial Emergency Act 1931 (Vict.), in Part III., Div. 1, provided as follows :--By S. 17 (1), that Div. 1 should apply " (a) to all mortgages existing at the coming into operation of this Part." By S. 19 (1), that, subject to certain exceptions, every mortgage to which Div. 1 applied CC shall be construed and take effect as if it were a term of the mortgage that on and from the coming into operation of this Part

the interest payable under the mortgage should be reduced" as prescribed. By S. 22 (3): Every reduction of interest made by this Division during the continuance of the mortgage in respect of which the reduction is made." In Part III., Div. 6, the Act provided, by S. 36: "The provisions this Part shall take effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary made prior to the passing of this Act."

Held, by Latham C.J. and Dixon J. (Rich J. dissenting), that Part III., Div. 1, did not, on its proper construction, disclose an intention to interfere with the freedom of the parties to a mortgage to which the Division applied to contract as they chose, after the legislation took effect, as to the rate of interest to be paid on the money secured: accordingly, an agreement between the parties to a mortgage to which the Division applied, made after the coming into operation of the Division, that the rate of interest should not be reduced as prescribed by S. 19 (1), was not invalid as being contrary to the policy of the legislation.

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Gavan Duffy J.) affirmed.

75 CLR 43

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

In an action in the Supreme Court of Victoria in which the plaintiff was Gilbert Charles Hedges and the defendant was Eileen Beryl Halliday, the parties agreed on a special case which was substantially as follows

This action was commenced on 5th December 1946 by a writ of summons whereby the plaintiff claimed redemption of certain mortgaged lands and the taking of accounts. The parties have concurred in stating the question of law arising herein in the following case for the opinion of the court pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order XXXIV., rule 1

(1) On 9th October 1924 the defendant lent to the plaintiff the sum of £8,000.

(2) This sum was secured by two instruments of mortgage executed by the parties herein and each bearing date 9th October 1924 over certain lands in Lonsdale Street, Bourke Street and Punch's Lane, Melbourne, in…

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Details
Case
[1947] HCA 43
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Hedges v Halliday* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The dispute arose from two mortgages executed in 1924, which stipulated an interest rate of 10% per annum, reducible to 8% for punctual payment. Following the enactment of the *Financial Emergency Act 1931* (Vict.), which mandated a reduction in interest rates for existing mortgages, the mortgagor and mortgagee entered into an indenture in November 1931. This indenture stipulated that no reduction in interest would be made pursuant to the Act, and the mortgagor agreed to pay the original rate of 8% per annum. The mortgagor subsequently sought to redeem the mortgaged land, contending that interest should be calculated at the reduced rate prescribed by the Act, while the mortgagee argued for the rate agreed upon in the 1931 indenture.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the *Financial Emergency Act 1931* (Vict.) and its subsequent amendments intended to prevent parties to an existing mortgage from subsequently agreeing to contract out of the statutory reduction in interest rates. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Act, by its terms and overall policy, rendered void an agreement made after its commencement that reinstated the pre-Act interest rate.

A majority of the High Court, comprising Latham C.J. and Dixon J., held that the Act did not disclose an intention to interfere with the freedom of parties to contract regarding interest rates after the legislation took effect. Their reasoning focused on the absence of any express prohibition against subsequent agreements to contract out of the interest reduction provisions. They noted that while Section 36 of the Act explicitly invalidated agreements to the contrary made *prior* to the Act's passing, there was no similar provision for agreements made subsequently. The Court considered that the legislature had been specific in its interventions and that to infer a prohibition on subsequent agreements would be to add to the statute what Parliament had not included. They concluded that the Act's effect was to vary existing contracts, but it did not prevent parties from subsequently agreeing to different terms. Rich J., dissenting, found that the peremptory language of Sections 19 and 22 of the Act, coupled with the broad public policy objectives of the legislation aimed at financial stability, indicated an intention to prevent contracting out, even by subsequent agreement.

The High Court, by a majority decision, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and judgment was entered for the defendant mortgagee, confirming that interest should be computed at the rate of 8% per annum, notwithstanding the provisions of the *Financial Emergency Act 1931*.

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