Hedges v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hedges v Commissioner of Taxation [2022] FCA 1389   

File number: NSD 44 of 2021
Judgment of: CHEESEMAN J
Date of judgment: 23 November 2022
Catchwords: INCOME TAX – capital gains tax – appeal from decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where Tribunal affirmed decision of the Commissioner of Taxation to disallow the taxpayer’s objection to an assessment of discounted capital gain from disposal of goodwill in a partnership – where taxpayer is a retired partner of a law firm – where terms of partnership deed provided for the offsetting of moneys payable to and due from the retiring partner upon retirement – whether the relevant capital gain crystallised before or after amounts offset – Held: appeal dismissed with costs.
Legislation:

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) ss 116-20(1), 103-10

Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) ss 19, 39

Cases cited:

Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) v Dick Smith Electronics Holdings [2005] HCA 3; 221 CLR 496; 79 ALJR 550

Commissioner of State Taxation v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 43; 242 CLR 508

Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 52
Date of last submissions: 29 October 2021
Date of hearing: 10 December 2021
Counsel for Applicant: Mr M Bersten
Solicitors for Applicant: Walker Hedges & Co
Counsel for Respondent: Ms J Gatland
Solicitors for Respondent: ATO Review and Dispute Resolution

ORDERS

NSD 44 of 2021
BETWEEN:

MR BRENT HEDGES

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHEESEMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 NOVEMBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHEESEMAN J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Brent Hedges appeals from the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm the objection decision of the Commissioner of Taxation, in which the Commissioner disallowed Mr Hedges’ objection to his assessment of Mr Hedges’ income for the 2009 tax year: Hedges and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2020] AATA 5307 (23 December 2020).

  2. This appeal is brought pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and is confined to a question of law. There have been a series of delays in the history of the matter which are detailed in the Tribunal’s reasons. These are not revisited here, save to note that there was no suggestion by the Commissioner that Mr Hedges was being elusive or, by the time of the hearing, that he was being obstructive or unco-operative.

  3. Mr Hedges is a retired solicitor who relevantly practiced as a partner of the Curwoods Lawyers Partnership. On his retirement from the Partnership at the end of 2008, he became entitled to a receipt for the disposal of goodwill under cl 25 of the Partnership Deed dated 25 September 2006. Under cl 26 of the Partnership Deed, the Partnership was entitled to…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1389
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Hedges v Commissioner of Taxation, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered the proper characterisation of a capital gain for tax purposes arising from the retirement of a partner from a law firm. The central issue was whether the capital gain crystallised before or after the amounts payable to the retiring partner were offset against the amounts he owed to the firm. The Tribunal had previously held that the capital gain was properly calculated using the amounts receivable before any offsets were applied, a decision which was upheld by the Full Court. The Court found that the capital proceeds for the purposes of the capital gains tax legislation included the amounts receivable by the retiring partner under the terms of the partnership deed before any offsets were applied.

The Court was required to interpret the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, specifically section 116-20, which defines "capital proceeds" as the money received or to be received in respect of a capital gains tax event. The Court also needed to consider the terms of the Partnership Act and the partnership deed in determining the timing of the capital gain. The key legal issue was whether the offset provisions in the partnership deed affected the timing of the capital gain for tax purposes.

The Court held that the capital gain was properly assessed based on the amounts receivable before any offsets were applied. The Court reasoned that the offset provisions in the partnership deed did not alter the amounts receivable by the retiring partner for the purposes of calculating the capital gain. The Court found that the capital gain crystallised when the retiring partner became entitled to receive the amounts under the partnership deed, regardless of the subsequent application of those amounts to offset the partner's debts. The Court concluded that the offset provisions were relevant only to the payment of the amounts and did not affect the calculation of the capital gain. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 19 of the Partnership Act provides:The mutual rights and duties of partners, whether ascertained by agreement or defined by this Act, may be varied by the consent of all the partners, and such consent may be either expressed or inferred from a course of dealing.AGREED FACTS The parties have conducted the appeal with a high degree of co-operation. A comprehensive statement of facts has been agreed. The capital gain in issue on this appeal is calculated at the time of the relevant CGT event giving rise to the tax liability. Mr Hedges acknowledges that the disposal of his interest in the Partnership on retirement is the relevant CGT event, and that the event occurred on about 30 September 2008 when he executed the Retirement Deed. Therefore, any capital gains liability is payable in the 2009 tax year. Before the Tribunal, there was some debate as to whether the relevant CGT event occurred on 30 September 2008 (the date of the execution of the Retirement Deed) or 31 December 2008 (the date Mr Hedges’ retirement took effect). On appeal, it was common ground that the CGT event occurred on 30 September 2008. The Tribunal was correct in noting that whether the event occurred on 30 September 2008 or 31 December 2008 made no practical difference. Upon his retirement, Mr Hedges became entitled to receive a number of payments, including, relevantly, in respect of his proportionate share of goodwill, which were subsequently paid in instalments during the 2009, 2010 and 2011 tax years. Mr Hedges’ Partnership Interest was 12.57%: Recital C and Sch 1, Partnership Deed. The Partnership Deed provided for payment in instalments: cl 27. The Retirement Deed subsequently amended the instalment regime: cl 3.8. Also upon his retirement, Mr Hedges was required to repay to the Partnership $197,126 in order to make good a shortfall in his capital account. The shortfall and its cause is not in issue in the appeal. The repayment of the capital account also occurred over the same three-year period. It is agreed that the final payments were recorded as follows: On 10 September 2014, the Commissioner issued default assessments to Mr Hedges for his 2009, 2010 and 2011 years of income. Relevantly, the Commissioner assessed Mr Hedges’ taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2009 to include a discount capital gain from the disposal of the goodwill in the Partnership’s business in the amount of $91,314 (as mentioned above, calculated as capital proceeds of $182,629, less cost base of $0, and applying a 50% CGT discount).THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION On the first day of the Tribunal hearing, Mr Hedges was granted leave to amend his grounds of objection, relevantly, as follows: The 2009 assessment is excessive because:1. the capital gain included in assessable income is based on an overstatement of the “capital proceeds” (for the purposes of s116-20(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cwth) [sic] (ITAA97) from the disposal of the Applicant’s interest in the [Partnership] and in particular the goodwill asset. Under s116-20(a) the capital proceeds comprises “the money you have received, or are entitled to receive, in respect of the event happening.” The Applicant says that the amount of “money” comprises the amount calculated by Curwoods Lawyers to be attributable to be goodwill less the debit in the Applicant’s capital account upon retirement as required by clauses 25 and 26 of the [Partnership Deed].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Relevantly, the Commissioner assessed Mr Hedges’ taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2009 to include a discount capital gain from the disposal of the goodwill in the Partnership’s business in the amount of $91,314 (as mentioned above, calculated as capital proceeds of $182,629, less cost base of $0, and applying a 50% CGT discount).THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION On the first day of the Tribunal hearing, Mr Hedges was granted leave to amend his grounds of objection, relevantly, as follows: The 2009 assessment is excessive because:1. the capital gain included in assessable income is based on an overstatement of the “capital proceeds” (for the purposes of s116-20(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cwth) [sic] (ITAA97) from the disposal of the Applicant’s interest in the [Partnership] and in particular the goodwill asset. Under s116-20(a) the capital proceeds comprises “the money you have received, or are entitled to receive, in respect of the event happening.” The Applicant says that the amount of “money” comprises the amount calculated by Curwoods Lawyers to be attributable to be goodwill less the debit in the Applicant’s capital account upon retirement as required by clauses 25 and 26 of the [Partnership Deed]. The Tribunal found that (at [19] to [20]): 19. … the terms and effect of the partnership deed are clear enough. Clause [25.1] says the quantum of the various payments shall be determined and those amounts ‘shall be paid’. The reconciliation contemplated in Clause [26] does not occur until after the amounts payable under Clause [25] have already crystallised. At that point, those amounts become the capital proceeds from the CGT event (i.e., disposal of the goodwill) within the meaning of s 116.20. The fact the amounts might thereafter be applied towards settling a debt does not matter: s 103.10 points out you are deemed to receive monies for present purposes where those monies are applied for your benefit.20. Clauses [25] and [26] do not operate in the way suggested by the taxpayer. The capital proceeds from the disposition of the goodwill are determined pursuant to Clause [25] and it is that figure which is relevant for present purposes. The reference to “Clause [25.1]” at paragraph [19] is a slip – the Tribunal should have referred to the chapeau of cl 25. Subclauses 25.1 to 25.4 are each addressed to particular categories of payment to the Outgoing Partner. Subclause 25.4 provides for payment of a proportionate amount in respect of the value of the goodwill of the Partnership. Nothing turns on the slip. THE GROUND OF APPEAL By the time the appeal was heard, it had reduced to a single issue, namely, what were the capital proceeds which Mr Hedges was entitled to receive for the purpose of s 166-20 of the ITAA 1997. In his notice of appeal, Mr Hedges identifies the following question of law:Whether the Assessment was excessive or otherwise incorrect because the amount relating to goodwill that was included in the capital proceeds under s 116-20 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cwth) [sic] (ITAA97) that the Applicant received or was entitled to received, in respect of his disposal of his interest in the Curwoods Lawyers partnership, was excessive?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established