Hearst Corporation v FinancialCare Group Pty Ltd

[2008] ATMO 75

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Hearst Corporation to registration of trade mark application 1090039(36) - Smart Money Ed - in the name of FinancialCare Group Pty Ltd.

Delegate:	Michael Kirov
Representation:	Opponent: Trevor Stevens of Davies Collison Cave, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys Applicant: No appearance but did file written submissions
Decision:	2008 ATMO 75

Background

1. This is an opposition brought by Hearst Corporation (“the Opponent”) pursuant to s.52 Trade Marks Act 1995 (“the Act”) to registration of the trade mark Smart Money Ed, subject of application number 1090039 in the name of FinancialCare Group Pty Ltd (“the Applicant”).

2. Details of the opposed application are as follows:

   Application Number:             1090039
   Priority Date:    20 April 2004

   Services:Class 36: Financial services but excluding buying and selling of securities

   Trade Mark:  Smart Money Ed

3. The Opponent filed its Notice of Opposition (“the Notice”) on 22 September 2006.  It is a given that the Opponent bears the onus of establishing one or more grounds of opposition on the balance of probabilities[1].

   [1] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Limited (1999) 45 IPR 411

4. The parties lodged Evidence in Support, Evidence in Answer and Evidence in Reply as set out below:

   Evidence in Support
   ▪Statutory Declaration by Joseph Rosenfeld made 15 February 2007, with Exhibits JR-1 to JR-5

   Evidence in Answer
   ▪Statutory Declaration by Deborah Rognlien made 17 December 2007, with Exhibits DR-1 to DR-10

   Evidence in Reply
   ▪Statutory Declaration by Joseph Rosenfeld made 31 January 2008, with Exhibits JR-1 to JR-3

5. The matter was heard before me as delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks on 21 July 2008 in Sydney.  Trevor Stevens of Davies Collison Cave, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys appeared for the Opponent.  The Applicant had earlier advised it would not be attending the hearing, but did send written submissions it wished to be taken into account to the Trade Marks Office in letters dated 9 February 2008 and 30 May 2008.  Mr Stevens confirmed that the Opponent had not previously been copied with these letters and copies were accordingly given to him immediately prior to the hearing.

6. Accompanying the Applicant’s letter of 30 May 2008 was a table headed “2008 Survey of Newsagents RE: SmartMoney Magazine – USA”, also copied to Mr Stevens immediately prior to the hearing, which identifies 13 newsagents in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia.  Ms Rognlien, the “director and sole owner” of the Applicant, claims in the 30 May 2008 letter that this is evidence “demonstrating that the SmartMoney magazine published in the USA is not available for sale in a number of newsagents and has never been heard of by a number of newsagents”.  I mention at this point that I have not found the information contained in this letter, nor indeed any of the Applicant’s claims regarding use of the trade mark “SmartMoney” by other parties, relevant to my decision.

   Grounds of Opposition

7. The Notice lists nine specific grounds corresponding to various provisions of the Act, in addition to a general ground requesting exercise of the Registrar’s discretion in the Opponent’s favour. By letter dated 11 July 2008, however, Mr Stevens wrote to the Applicant (and copied IP Australia) indicating the Opponent would only be pressing those grounds based on sections 43, 44 and 60 of the Act. At the hearing itself Mr Stevens pressed the ground based upon s.44 of the Act only and limited his submissions accordingly. The s.44 opposition ground is discussed below. The remaining grounds listed in the Notice are of course not established.

   Discussion

8. The ground based on section 44 is indicated in the Notice as follows:

   The trade mark is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to one or more trade marks including, but not limited to, 615465, 615464 and 846243, in respect of similar goods and/or services or closely related goods and/or services and for which the priority date is earlier than that of the trade mark the subject of the application and therefore its registration would be contrary to Section 44 of the Act. The trade mark has not been used by the applicant to satisfy the requirements of Section 44(3) and/or 44(4) and there are no other circumstances which make it proper for the Registrar to accept the application

9. Section 44 of the Act is reproduced below:

   Identical etc. trade marks

   44.(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant's goods) must be rejected if:

   (a) the applicant's trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

   (i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or
   (ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and

   (b) the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.

   Note 1:  For deceptively similar see section 10.

   Note 2:  For similar goods see subsection 14(1).
   Note 3:  For priority date see section 12.

   (2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of services (applicant's services) must be rejected if:

   (a) it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

   (i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar services or closely related goods; or
   (ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar services or closely related goods is being sought by another person; and

   (b) the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's services is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar services or closely related goods.

   Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.

   Note 2:  For similar services see subsection 14(2).
   Note 3:  For priority date see section 12.

   (3) If the Registrar in either case is satisfied:

   (a) that there has been honest concurrent use of the 2 trade marks; or
   (b) that, because of other circumstances, it is proper to do so;

   the Registrar may accept the application for the registration of the applicant's trade mark subject to any conditions or limitations that the Registrar thinks fit to impose. If the applicant's trade mark has been used only in a particular area, the limitations may include that the use of the trade mark is to be restricted to that particular area.

   Note:  For limitations see section 6.

   (4) If the Registrar in either case is satisfied that the applicant, or the applicant and the predecessor in title of the applicant, have continuously used the applicant's trade mark for a period:

   (a) beginning before the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of:

   (i) the similar goods or closely related services; or
   (ii) the similar services or closely related goods; and

   (b) ending on the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark;

   the Registrar may not reject the application because of the existence of the other trade mark.

   Note 1:  An authorised use of the trade mark by a person is taken to be a use of the trade mark by the owner of the trade mark (see subsection 7(3)).

   Note 2:  For predecessor in title see section 6.
   Note 3:  For priority date see section 12.

10. At the hearing Mr Stevens indicated that in addition to the three registrations mentioned in the Notice itself the Opponent was also relying on registration 758942.  The four registrations, all of which are for the trade mark SMARTMONEY and owned by the Opponent’s associate, a New York based partnership named Smartmoney, are detailed below:

Regn No.	Priority Date	Class	Goods and/or Services
615464	5 November 1993	16	Periodicals magazines, books and printed matter
615465	5 November 1993	9	Interactive, multi-media compact discs featuring financial news and information; pre-recorded audio and video tapes featuring financial news and information
758942	3 April 1998	41	Television entertainment including production of television programs
846243	15 August 2000	9, 42	Class: 9 Computer programs Class: 42 Providing access to an interactive computer database in the field of investment, business and financial news and information by means of a global computer network, providing access to computer bulletin boards and electronic bulletin boards in the field of investment, business and financial news and information

1. The priority dates of the four registrations relied upon by the Opponent, being 5 November 1993, 5 April 1998 and 15 August 2000, are all earlier than the 20 April 2004 priority date of opposed application 1090039. To establish its section 44 ground the Opponent therefore needs to establish on the balance of probabilities that:

   • the opposed application covers similar services to the services covered by registrations 758942 and/or 846243 and/or covers services closely related to the goods covered by registrations 615464, 615465 and/or 846243; and

   • the Smart Money Ed trade mark subject of the opposed application is substantially identical or deceptively similar to the SMARTMONEY trade mark subject of Smartmoney’s registrations 615464, 615465,758942 or 846243 (“the Opponent’s Trade Mark”).

2. I mention that in assessing whether the services covered by the opposed application are similar to the services covered by registrations 758942 and/or 846243, or are closely related to the goods covered by registrations 615464, 615465 and/or 846243, I must assume use of the respective trade marks in a “normal and fair manner” for any of the goods or services covered by the application and the various registrations[2].  It is the statutory rights granted by registration that must be compared and not the actual use (or lack thereof) that may have been made of the respective marks in the past.

   [2] Smith Hayden & Co. Ltd’s Application (1946) 63 RPC 97 (Ch D); Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Limited (op cit)

3. Section 14(2) of the Act defines “similar services” as follows:

   For the purposes of this Act, services are similar to other services:

   if they are the same as the other services; or

   if they are of the same description as that of the other services.

4. It is apparent none of the services covered by the opposed application are the same as any of the services covered by the registrations relied upon by the Opponent.

5. Do registrations 758942 or 846243, which cover services in Classes 41 and 42 respectively, include services of the same description as the “financial services but excluding buying and selling of securities” covered by the opposed application? The term “of the same description” is not defined in the Act and, unlike “goods of the same description”, the expression “services of the same description” has not received a great deal of reported judicial attention. Noting this in MID Sydney Pty Ltd v Australian Tourism Co Ltd (1998) 42 IPR 561 (“the Chifley Tower case”), the Full Federal Court (Burchett, Sackville and Lehane, JJ) accepted (at 567) that “subject to any necessary modification” the principles applicable to whether two sets of goods were goods of the same description also applied in relation to services.

6. The factors I must consider, then, would include such things as the nature of the respective services, what the services are normally used for and whether the services are ones which one might reasonably expect one trader to provide under the same trade mark.  In assessing the issue and “subject to any necessary modification” I should bear in mind the words of Lord Evershed MR in Re Lyons & Co Ltd’s Application [1959] RPC 120 (at 128), quoted with approval by the Full Court in the Chifley Tower case:

   By the trade marks legislation parliament has provided that a registered proprietor of a mark, to be used by him in the course of his trade, has a monopoly right to that mark as an indication of the trade source or origin of the goods … The question whether goods are or not goods of the same description must therefore (I think) be one to be answered in the context of that purpose; and having regard to that context, the cases cited … lend some support to the view that the phrase “goods of the same description” ought not to be given too restrictive a construction — not, at all events, so as to be limited to goods substantially analogous in kind, or commonly used as mere substitutes or alternatives the one for the other.

7. Registration 758942 covers “television entertainment including production of television programs” in Class 41.  On the face of it such services are quite different in kind from financial services in Class 36.  While “television entertainment” might conceivably include the broadcasting of financial information, this is obviously not its essential purpose.  Television entertainment services would be aimed at a different class of consumer and would, generally speaking, be made available to the consumer through entirely different means.  I accordingly find none of the services covered by the opposed application is of the same description as the services covered by registration 758942.

8. As for registration 846243, this covers, inter alia, the provision of access to an interactive database and to computer and electronic bulletin boards, all “in the field of investment, business and financial news and information”.  As mentioned, it is the notional scope of the services covered by registration 846243 which I must consider, (that is, assuming use of the SMARTMONEY trade mark in a “normal and fair manner” for any of those services), not the particular use, if any, the trade mark owner may have made of its registered mark in the past.  Notwithstanding the survey of newsagents accompanying the Applicant’s letter of 30 May 2008 was apparently conducted well after the relevant 20 April 2004 priority date of opposed application 1090039 in any event, this is a further reason why I have taken no account of the survey evidence in question in determining this matter.

9. Likewise, in assessing the range of services covered by the opposed application’s claim to “financial services but excluding buying and selling of securities” I must consider not only what use the Applicant may have made, or intend to make, of the opposed trade mark, but what use the Applicant could make if registration were to take place[3].  Notwithstanding the exclusion of “buying and selling securities”, the opposed application’s claim to all other “financial services” would still for example embrace such services as[4] “financial analysis” and the “[provision of] financial information”.  These particular “financial services” are clearly very close to the particular Class 41 services explicitly covered by registration 846243.

   [3] Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v Bali Co Inc (1973) 129 CLR 353 (at 362)

   [4] according to the International Classification of Goods and Services, 8^th edition, published by the World International Property Organisation and adopted by IP Australia

10. Further, some guidance as to how the opposed trade mark could be used is in fact provided in this case in the Applicant’s own evidence in answer.  The relevant details are contained in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the Rognlien Declaration, where Ms Rognlien states:

    (11) The trade mark SMART MONEY ED is used by Rognlien in relation to its financial services by way of a newsletter that provides information in the field of finance.  The aim of the newsletter is to keep clients of Rognlien up to date with financial strategies.

    Now exhibited to me and marked “DR-5” is a copy of the summer 2003 edition of SMART MONEY ED.

    (12) The SMART MONEY ED trade mark is also used in relation to its financial services by way of a seminar series offered by Rognlien which focuses on providing information relating to finance.

    (13) The SMART MONEY ED trade mark is also used on the company’s website in relation to its financial services at and has done so from around 2004 and also on my business card from around 2004. (sic)

11. A scanned copy of Exhibit DR-5 (which I note consisted of a photocopy of the cover page only of the “summer 2003 edition of SMART MONEY ED” and not the magazine itself) is reproduced below:

12. Particularly bearing in mind the manner in which the Applicant has up to now provided its financial services under the Smart Money Ed trade mark, I am satisfied a broad range of the services covered by the opposed application are of the same description as those covered by registration 846243.

13. Does the opposed application cover services closely related to the goods covered by registrations 615464, 615465 and/or 846243?  It will be recalled registration 615464 covers “Periodicals magazines, books and printed matter” in Class 16, which description would on the face of it embrace such material in the financial field.  Indeed it might also include printed material which is effectively an alternative to, or complements, a range of financial services.  The provision of printed material containing investment or financial planning advice, risk management information or tax minimisation strategies come to mind.  It would not be surprising if printed matter of this kind found its market amongst the same category of consumer as would the Applicant’s financial services.  Moreover I consider the distribution of financial news and information via printed publications would reasonably be contemplated by consumers as coming from a provider of “financial services”.

14. I would make similar observations regarding registration 615465, which covers “Interactive, multi-media compact discs featuring financial news and information; pre-recorded audio and video tapes featuring financial news and information” in Class 9, although in this case the media concerned are in fact specified as “featuring financial news and information”.  Again, such material may in principle effectively provide essentially similar information to the same class of consumer as would a provider of financial services.  Again, I consider the distribution of financial news and information via such means would reasonably be contemplated as coming from a provider of “financial services”.

15. For its part registration 846243 covers “Computer programs” in Class 9.  Generally speaking one would not expect those who dealt in computer programs to also be purveyors of financial services.  While it is possible to imagine specific computer programs which might complement certain financial services in Class 36, I would accordingly hesitate to characterise financial services as “closely related” to computer programs per se.

16. Further, it seems to me that the essence of services in the financial field is that they can be tailored to suit prevailing circumstances.  Similarly one might expect printed matter or pre-recorded media “featuring financial news and information” to be published on a regular and frequent basis taking into account changing economic, legislative or investment conditions.  Computer programs, on the other hand, tend to be designed for a specific purpose and on a more or less one off basis.  For this reason also I believe the better view in this case is that the financial services covered by the opposed application should not be considered closely related to the “Computer programs” covered by registration 846243.

17. To summarise, I have found that some of the services covered by opposed application 1090039 are services of the same description as the services covered by registration 846243 and/or are closely related to the goods in Classes 9 and 16 covered by registrations 615465 and 615464.  It may accordingly be argued that there remain some services falling within the description “financial services but excluding buying and selling of securities” which are not of the same description as, or closely related to, the services and goods covered by the relevant registrations.

1. I am nevertheless satisfied there is sufficient nexus between those (arguable) services and the goods and services of registrations 615464, 615465 and 846243 for it to be inappropriate in this case for me to try and identify precisely what those services might be.  Nor do I believe it would be in the public interest to do so.  As mentioned, Lord Evershed MR’s view, cited with approval by the Full Federal Court in the Chifley Tower case in connection with interpreting the words “services of the same description” (and quoted in paragraph 14 above), was that the phrase “goods of the same description” ought not be given too restrictive a construction.  In this regard I am also influenced somewhat by the Applicant’s own evidence as to what it considers the financial services it offers entail.  I thus now turn to the question of whether the Smart Money Ed and SMARTMONEY trade marks are “substantially identical” or “deceptively similar”.

2. The generally accepted test for assessing substantial identity is as set out by Windeyer, J in Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd (1963) 1B IPR 523, where his Honour said at 528:

   In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential feature of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison.

3. In arguing the trade marks should be considered substantially identical Mr Stevens noted that there were two main differences between them, namely that the words “SMART” and “MONEY” are separated in the Applicant’s trade mark and that the Applicant’s trade mark contains the additional element “ED”.  I agree with his contention that whether or not the words “SMART” and “MONEY” are rendered as “SMARTMONEY” or “SMART MONEY” (or “Smart Money”) is a trivial matter that should not be given significant weight in assessing whether, as wholes, the opposed trade mark and the Opponent’s Trade Mark are substantially identical.[5]

   [5] See for example Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Sitmar Cruises Ltd (1994) 31 IPR 375, per Gummow, J at 391

4. The addition of the element ED is more problematic.  Mr Stevens submitted that according to the Macquarie Dictionary “ed” was an abbreviation for “edited” or “edition” and thus that it was wholly descriptive in the context of the services covered by the opposed application.  While I do not agree the element ED is necessarily “wholly descriptive” in relation to financial services in Class 36, I do accept what inherent distinctiveness it may possess is arguably diluted in the context of the Smart Money Ed trade mark as a whole.  This is manifestly the case if the Applicant’s usage shown in Exhibit DR-5 (reproduced at paragraph 21 above ) is considered.  In this Exhibit the words SMART and MONEY dominate the masthead of the Applicant’s newsletter, with the word ED rendered as a small superscript immediately following the Y of the word MONEY.  Indeed the word ED is barely visible in the reproduction in paragraph 20 above.  Whether this particular manner of use is in fact a “normal and fair use” of the Smart Money Ed trade mark in the form applied for under the opposed application is nevertheless clearly open to question.

5. That said, I am obliged to consider the question of substantial identity in terms of Windeyer, J’s formulation quoted above and this requires a side by side comparison of the Smart Money Ed trade mark as applied for and the Opponent’s Trade Mark as registered.  When such a side by side comparison is made it does seem to me that the element ED is, in Windeyer, J’s terms, an “important” addition in that it readily allows the two trade marks to be distinguished one from the other, both visually and aurally.  Taking this into account I accordingly conclude the opposed trade mark is not substantially identical to the Opponent’s Trade Mark and turn to the issue of whether the marks are deceptively similar.

6. Section 10 of the Act defines the expression “deceptively similar”. The opposed mark must so nearly resemble the earlier mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths (1999) 45 IPR 411 French J said of deceptive similarity:

   In Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592 at 594-5, which concerned the 1905 Act, Kitto J set out a number of propositions which have frequently been quoted and applied to the 1955 Act. The essential elements of those propositions continue to apply to the issue of deceptive similarity under the 1995 Act. Applied also to service marks and absent the imposition of an onus upon the applicant they may be restated as follows:

   (i) To show that a trade mark is deceptively similar to another it is necessary to show a real tangible danger of deception or confusion occurring.  A mere possibility is not sufficient.

   (ii) A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source.  It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt.  It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source.

   (iii) In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration.  These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services.

   (iv) The rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application.

   (v) The question of deceptive similarity must be considered in respect of all goods or services coming within the specification in the application and in respect of which registration is desired, not only in respect of those goods or services on which it is proposed to immediately use the mark.  The question is not limited to whether a particular use will give rise to deception or confusion.  It must be based upon what the applicant can do if registration is obtained.

   In respect of the last proposition, Mason J observed in Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc (1973) 129 CLR 353 at 362:

   “...the question whether there is a likelihood of confusion is to be answered, not by reference to the manner in which the respondent has used its mark in the past, but by reference to the use to which it can properly put the mark. The issue is whether that use would give rise to a real danger of confusion.”

7. In order to assess the question of deceptive similarity the trade marks should not be compared side by side.[6]  Rather, they are to be considered by their look and sound, with due allowance for imperfect recollection.  The Opponent’s Trade Mark is wholly contained within the opposed trade mark, with the additional element ED being the sole feature distinguishing the opposed trade mark from the earlier trade mark.  I do not however believe this additional, arguably non-distinctive, material is sufficient to obviate a real tangible risk of a number of persons being caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the relevant goods and services dealt with under the two trade marks come from the same source.  I thus have little hesitation in finding the opposed trade mark deceptively similar to the Opponent’s Trade Mark.

   [6] Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v F.S. Walton & Co (1937) 58 CLR 641 (at 658); Shell Co of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd (1961) 109 CLR 109 (at 415)

8. In summary, I have found that the opposed trade mark is deceptively similar to the Opponent’s Trade Mark and that the opposed application covers services of the same description as, or closely related to, services and goods covered by registrations 615464, 615465 and 846243. The Opponent has accordingly established its section 44 ground.

9. Notwithstanding the Opponent has established its s.44 ground I turn now to whether the Applicant’s use of the opposed trade mark as indicated in its evidence is sufficient to make out a case for coexistence on the Register because of either “honest concurrent use” or “other circumstances” (under s.44(3) of the Act) or because of “prior continuous use” (under s.44(4) of the Act).

10. I understand from the Applicant’s evidence that the opposed trade mark “was first conceived by Rognlien in or around September 2001” (Rognlien declaration, paragraph 10). Further, Ms Rognlien states at paragraph 36 of her declaration that “[the Applicant] has continuously used and applied the SMART MONEY ED trade mark since the time of adoption”. I am unsure whether conception and adoption occurred at roughly the same time because precisely when actual use commenced and the actual services for which first use was made are not mentioned in the evidence. The earliest specific use attested to or documented in the Applicant’s evidence is (a photocopy of the cover of) the “summer 2003 edition” of the Applicant’s newsletter forming Exhibit DR-5 (reproduced in paragraph 21 above). The newsletter may have been distributed to up to 500 people, although it is impossible to say from the evidence when this circulation was in fact achieved. The priority dates of the registrations relied upon by the Opponent all pre-date conception of the opposed trade mark by the Applicant by several years and clearly therefore the Applicant has not made out a case for coexistence under s.44(4) based on prior continuous use. Nor do I consider the Applicant’s evidence shows sufficient use prior to the 20 April 2004 priority date of the opposed application, or indicates any other relevant circumstances, which might qualify the opposed trade mark for registration under s.44(3) of the Act.

    Decision

11. Section 55 of the Act provides:

    Unless the proceedings are discontinued or dismissed, the Registrar
    must, at the end, decide:

    (a)  to refuse to register the trade mark; or
                  (b)  to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or  limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then
      specified in the application;

    having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the
    application was opposed has been established.
    Note: For limitations see section 6.

12. I have found the opposition to be successful on the ground raised pursuant to section 44 of the Act. I accordingly refuse to register trade mark application number 1090039.

    Costs

13. Mr Stevens requested an award of costs in the Opponent’s favour.  As the successful party, the Opponent is entitled to its costs and I accordingly award costs against the Applicant as per Schedule 8 of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995.

    Michael Kirov
    Hearing Officer
    Trade Marks Hearings
    28 August 2008