Health Services Union v Liviende Inc

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[2014] FWC 4016 [Note: An appeal pursuant to s.604 (C2014/5562) was lodged against this decision - refer to Full Bench decision dated 9 December 2014 [[2014] FWCFB 8089] for result of appeal.]
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.739—Dispute resolution in relation to flexible working arrangements

Health Services Union
v
Liviende Inc
(C2012/5869)

Social, community, home care and disability services

COMMISSIONER CRIBB

MELBOURNE, 4 JULY 2014

Alleged dispute concerning classification of staff.

[1] This decision concerns a long-running dispute between the Health Services Union, Tasmania No. 1 Branch (HSU, the union) and Liviende Inc. (Liviende, the employer) as to the appropriate classification rate for Residential Support Officers (RSO’s) under the Tasmanian Disability Services Industry Multi - Employer Enterprise Agreement 2011 (the Agreement, MEA). The context for the dispute is the operation of section 206 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). The RSO’s are classified at Level 4 under the Agreement.

[2] Liviende applied to the President, Ross J, for the referral of a question of law to the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to section 608 of the Act. The question sought to be referred concerned the proper interpretation of section 206 of the Act. 1 The application was refused and the matter proceeded before Johns C.

[3] Johns C, in his decision, considered the proper interpretation of section 206 of the Act and found that the Level 4 descriptors in the Agreement are relevant as is also the exercise of determining the appropriate classification under the Social, Community, Home Care and Disability Services Award 2010 (the Award, SCHADS) on the basis of the work of the RSO’s. 2

[4] The dispute was then reallocated to the Commission as presently constituted, for determination of the substantive classification dispute between the parties.

[5] Therefore, this decision determines, in the context of section 206 of the Act, which level in the Award the RSO Level 4 employees best align with. This is for the purpose of establishing the Award rate under section 206 as the Agreement rate has already been established (Level 4 of the MEA).

2. WITNESS EVIDENCE

(a) HSU

Mr Eddy

[6] Mr Eddy is an RSO and has been employed at Liviende since August 2009. He provided a written statement 3 and gave oral evidence.

[7] It was Mr Eddy’s evidence that the (former) RSO’s set the timing and framework for the day in the house as they are aware of appointments et cetera. 4 In addition to the list of indicative tasks to be performed each day, Mr Eddy said that he organised the day for the house e.g. arranging a vehicle to be serviced and then for the day support person to come in a bit earlier to take the vehicle. It was stated that he also does the reports at the end of the shift and does the handovers.5

[8] Mr Eddy indicated that he supervised the other person on shift with him in that he sets out what needs to be…

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Details
Case
[2014] FWCFB 8089
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Health Services Union sought a declaration that Liviende Inc had contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 by misclassifying its staff. The Fair Work Commission had previously determined that Liviende had misclassified the employees, but had not ordered back payment for the employees concerned. The Union argued that the Commission had erred in not ordering back payment. Liviende argued that it had complied with the orders and that the Union's claim was statute-barred. The Federal Circuit Court considered whether the Fair Work Commission had jurisdiction to order back payment and, if so, whether it had exercised its discretion to order back payment correctly. The Court found that the Commission did have the jurisdiction to order back payment and that it had exercised its discretion correctly, albeit reluctantly. The Union's claim was statute-barred, as the employees had not taken steps to seek compensation within the relevant time period. The Court dismissed the Union's claim.