He v Minister for Immigration
[2019] FCCA 85
•4 February 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2019] FCCA 85 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Review of Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision – refusal of a partner visa – Tribunal not satisfied that the applicant was in a genuine de facto relationship – whether the Tribunal breached s.360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to disclose an issue in the review of whether the relationship was motivated by business considerations – jurisdictional error established. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.360, 425 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| Cases cited: Hazra & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 688; (2017) 319 FLR 81 |
| Applicant: | CUIYI HE |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1543 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Driver |
| Hearing date: | 17 December 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 4 February 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr N Poynder |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr M P Cleary |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari shall issue, removing the record of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision made on 19 April 2017 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.
A writ of mandamus shall issue requiring the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to redetermine the review application before it according to law.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1543 of 2017
| CUIYI HE |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and background
The applicant, Ms He, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 19 April 2017. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister (delegate) not to grant Ms He a temporary partner visa.
The following statement of background facts is derived from the submissions of the parties.
Ms He is a citizen of China who, on 2 November 2015, lodged an onshore application for a subclass 820/801 visa.[1] Ms He was sponsored by her de facto partner, Danny Liang.[2]
[1] Court Book (CB) 1-84
[2] CB 34-45
On 17 November 2015 the Minister’s Department wrote to Ms He[3] relevantly requesting evidence of her relationship with Mr Liang, and a statutory declaration explaining why she had withdrawn a previous application for a subclass 801 visa.[4]
[3] CB 86-93
[4] the previous subclass 801 visa application is not in evidence, but is recorded in a timeline in the primary decision as having been withdrawn on 4 November 2015: CB 232
Ms He’s migration agent subsequently provided a statutory declaration made by Ms He on 9 December 2015 explaining that the reason for the withdrawal of her previous subclass 801 visa was subject to legal professional privilege.[5]
[5] CB 97. The withdrawal of the previous application was not an issue in the decision of the Tribunal (see [37] of the decision) and requires no further consideration
The solicitor also provided additional evidence of the type commonly found in partner visa applications, including documents relating to the sale of land in Majors Bay,[6] Form 888 statutory declarations evidencing the genuineness of the relationship,[7] evidence of joint travel,[8] photographs,[9] service accounts[10] and joint bank account statements.[11]
[6] CB 98-99
[7] CB 100-105
[8] CB 106-123
[9] CB 124-149
[10] CB 150-194
[11] CB 195-226
On 11 January 2016 the delegate refused Ms He’s application.[12] With reference to the factors in regulation 1.09A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations),[13] the delegate gave “limited weight” and “no weight” to documentary evidence in relation to the financial aspects of their relationship, and “some weight” to the bills and correspondence addressed to Ms He and Mr Liang at their claimed home address in relation to the nature of the household. In relation to the social aspects of the relationship, the delegate considered that the photos “do not constitute convincing evidence of a committed spouse relationship”, and the statutory declarations were given “little weight” since they “do not give any convincing reasons as to why they believe the relationship is genuine and continuing”. In relation to the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, the delegate gave “no weight” to a joint contract for the sale of land because it did not show the agreement date or the vendor’s signature. The delegate also referred to telephone interviews with Ms He and Mr Liang in relation to the previous application, Ms He’s withdrawal of her previous application, her re-lodgement of a fresh application and her refusal to give reasons for this on the grounds of legal professional privilege.
[12] CB 232-236
[13] set out at CB 471
The delegate concluded:[14]
Overall, you and your sponsor have not provided any evidence that you have combined your affairs significantly, nor have you changed the terms of your wills, or superannuation, to show that you see the relationship as a long term one.
I am not satisfied that you see the relationship as a long-term one, there is no evidence that you see the relationship as a long-term one, that you draw emotional support and companionship from each other or that you have a commitment to a shared life together.
[14] CB 235
On review, on 7 December 2016 Ms He’s solicitor provided further supporting documents, including a signed and dated contract for the sale of land in Majors Bay,[15] evidence of the parties’ joint tenancy,[16] service accounts,[17] evidence of joint travel,[18] a contract for the sale of land in Fairfield,[19] evidence of the parties’ joint ownership of two travel companies,[20] taxation documents,[21] joint bank account statements,[22] and photographs.[23]
[15] CB 265-268
[16] CB 277-289
[17] CB 290-318
[18] CB 319-327
[19] CB 328-342
[20] CB 343-349
[21] CB 350-370
[22] CB 371-413
[23] CB 414-433
On 15 December 2016 a hearing was convened which was attended by Ms He, Mr Liang and Ms He’s solicitor.[24]
[24] CB 466 at [7]-[8]
According to the transcript[25], the following relevantly took place at the hearing:
a)the Tribunal identified the issue as being that “the Immigration Department was not satisfied that you provided sufficient evidence for them to conclude that you were in a genuine and continuing spouse relationship”;[26]
b)the Tribunal first questioned Ms He in the absence of Mr Liang.[27] She was asked about her migration history, her previous marriages, her 28 year old daughter, and Mr Liang’s family, including his two children aged 18 and 19;
c)Ms He said that she had come to Australia in 2001 on a business visa leading a tour group,[28] that she had first met Mr Liang in 2004 when she was still married to her previous husband and that she was divorced from her previous husband in November 2005.[29] She said that she had set up her own travel agency in Australia in 2005.[30] She said that she and Mr Liang commenced their relationship in 2011;[31]
d)the Tribunal asked why Mr Liang’s children did not visit their father while Ms He was there, and she said that, “They resisted the fact that their father had another woman”.[32] She said that she has no relationship with Mr Liang’s children[33] although her daughter has a relationship with Mr Liang;[34]
e)the Tribunal then asked Ms He about the financial aspects of their relationship, including their joint and separate real estate holdings[35] and where they lived. Ms He noted that they had lived at 109 Harris Street, Fairfield until April 2014, then they moved to 107 Harris Street, both of which were owned by Mr Liang.[36] The Tribunal also asked Ms He about the whereabouts of Mr Liang’s family, and why there were no statements from them,[37] and the representative said that these can be provided.[38] The Tribunal also asked about their future plans, and Ms He said that they wanted to make some profit out of their properties so they will have funds when they grow old;[39]
f)Mr Liang was asked about the circumstances of his relationship with Ms He, his previous relationships, his children and their apparent rejection of Ms He, his relationship with her daughter and her husband, and his family.[40] He was also asked about his work and income, his property assets, including his ownership of 107 and 109 Harris Street and a property in Ms He’s name in Rhodes. Mr Liang said that this property was in Ms He’s name alone “’Cause I want her to have her own property. You know Chinese emphasise the possessing of the property very much, and I want her to have her own. And, I’ve got my own properties in Fairfield”;[41]
g)Mr Liang was also asked why there were no witness statements from his family; he said that his children and his mother were unhappy with his divorce but Ms He’s family supported the marriage very much, and that he can provide statements if necessary;[42] and
h)when asked about their plans for the future, Mr Liang also said that they wanted to “try our best to earn some money so that there is some guarantee for our life when we get old”.[43]
[25] affidavit of Ms Coomber made on 24 May 2017 and filed on 27 July 2017
[26] page 1:27-30
[27] page 2:34-35
[28] page 3:16-30
[29] page 3:32-45
[30] page 4:28-30
[31] page 4:38-41
[32] page 5:45-6:1
[33] page 6:11-13
[34] page 6:24-26
[35] page 7:33-10:10
[36] page 10:43-11:8
[37] page 12:24-13:45
[38] page 14:8-10
[39] page 14:30-34
[40] pages 17:44-22:21
[41] page 24:3-5
[42] page 24:7-39
[43] page 25:5-7
After the hearing, Ms He’s representative provided further evidence, including a joint statement from five of Ms He’s family members[44] and her daughter[45] and son-in-law,[46] and a joint statement from Mr Liang’s two sisters in the USA.[47]
The decision of the Tribunal[48]
[44] CB 446
[45] CB 453
[46] CB 456
[47] CB 458
[48] CB 464-470
After reciting the application background and evidence the Tribunal at [21], under the heading, “Consideration of claims and evidence”, identified the issue as “whether the visa applicant and the sponsor are in a genuine de facto relationship”, then turned to the factors that require consideration under regulation 1.09A of the Regulations.
In relation to the financial aspects of their relationship, the Tribunal at [26] noted that the parties had provided financial evidence in their joint names and in separate names, including the contract for the sale of a unit, a residential tenancy agreement for Ms He’s property in Rhodes, utility bills, a contract for the sale of land in Harris Street and documents related to that property, tax returns and joint bank account statements. The Tribunal was “satisfied on the evidence submitted that there is a financial relationship between the parties that involves joint ownership of assets and shared financial resources”.
In relation to the nature of the household, the Tribunal at [29] agreed with the delegate that there was evidence of joint Telstra bills but noted that they did not correspond with the bank statements provided. It noted Ms He’s evidence that she had not met Mr Liang’s children even though they live nearby because they had resisted the idea of him being with another woman and that she does not have a relationship with them. The Tribunal also noted the “brief statements” from Ms He’s daughter and son-in-law. The Tribunal, at [30], accepted that there was “some evidence” that the parties shared an address in Fairfield. However, “the Tribunal was not satisfied there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate they share a household as de facto partners in a committed and long term relationship”.
In relation to the social aspects of the relationship, the Tribunal at [32] found it “unusual” that Ms He would not have met Mr Liang’s children “who are now adults and on the evidence of the parties, live nearby and see their father on occasions”, but it accepted her explanation that they do not accept their father’s involvement with another partner. The Tribunal accepted that Ms He and Mr Liang had met and socialised with each other’s friends and some family members.
In relation to the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, the Tribunal at [35] noted the parties’ “identical accounts of the things they do for each other”, their declarations of support and encouragement and that they see the relationship as long term, and their plans to make a profit out of the properties they own so that they have funds for when they are older. The Tribunal then went on:
The Tribunal notes the applicant has spent a lot of time in Australia for business purposes since the early 2000’s and operates a travel company in Australia which gives her an incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency. While a desire to live and work in Australia is not incompatible with a genuine spouse or de facto relationship, in this case, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has a genuine commitment to the sponsor as a de facto partner.
(applicant’s emphasis retained)
On the issue of the parties’ commitment to each other the Tribunal concluded at [36]:
Based on the available evidence, the Tribunal accepts there is a relationship of some sort between the parties and that they are close associates but is not satisfied it is a genuine de facto relationship characterised by commitment to each other, companionship and emotional support. The Tribunal is also not satisfied the applicant and sponsor see the relationship as long term.
The Tribunal concluded at [38]:
Having regard to all the circumstances, on balance, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as partners to the exclusion of all others, or that the relationship was genuine and continuing, and the couple did not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.
The current proceedings
These proceedings began with a show cause application filed on 18 May 2017. Ms He continues to rely upon that application. There is one particularised ground in it:
The second respondent (the Tribunal) failed to comply with its obligation under s.360(1) of the Act, to invite the applicant to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in the decision under review.
Particulars
The Tribunal failed to provide notice to the applicant than an issue arising in relation to the decision under review was whether the applicant had an incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency in Australia for business purposes (see decision at [35]).
In addition to the court book filed on 26 June 2017, I have before me as evidence the affidavit of Ms Coomber made on 24 May 2017, to which is annexed a transcript of the Tribunal hearing conducted on 15 December 2016.
Both the applicant and the Minister filed pre-hearing written submissions and also made oral submissions through their counsel at the trial of the matter on 17 December 2018.
I have been assisted by those submissions.
Consideration
Applicant’s contentions
It is a feature of the decision that the Tribunal expressed generally favourable views of each of the factors which required consideration under regulation 1.09A(3). The Tribunal made very few negative comments about each of these factors and appeared to accept most of what had been said by the parties. The Tribunal at [35] remarked on the consistency of the parties’ evidence about the things that they do for each other.
It was therefore striking when, further on in [35], the Tribunal made reference to a factor that had hitherto gone unremarked throughout the visa application process or on review, namely that Ms He had spent a lot of time in Australia for business purposes and operated a travel company in Australia, “which gives her an incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency”. While the Tribunal sought to minimise this comment by noting that a desire to live and work in Australia is not incompatible with a genuine spouse or de facto relationship, in the very same sentence it went on to state that, “in this case, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has a genuine commitment to the sponsor as a de facto partner”.
Ms He contends that, particularly in the context of a decision where the Tribunal indicated no other firmly held reasoning as to why the relationship between the parties was not genuine, it cannot be said that this issue was not material to the Tribunal’s decision.
Section 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) imposes a duty on the Tribunal to “invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review” (applicant’s emphasis retained). In the absence of any express notification, an applicant is entitled to assume that the “issues arising in relation to the decision under review” will be those upon which the delegate made the decision to refuse the visa. If the Tribunal is proposing to depart from the delegate’s findings it must put Ms He on notice, and a failure to put an applicant on notice that it is proposing such a departure will amount to a failure to comply with its obligation under s.360(1) of the Migration Act.[49]
[49] see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [33]-[36], [40]-[43]
It is apparent from the authorities that an applicant’s supposed motivation for coming to, and remaining in Australia, might be an “issue arising in relation to the decision under review”. In Hazra v Minister for Immigration & Anor[50] the applicant had been refused a student visa because the Minister was not satisfied that she genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia. The applicant had changed courses several times, and in its decision the Tribunal attributed this to a desire of the applicant to obtain employment in Australia. However, this reasoning had not been put to the applicant. Judge Smith found at [64]:
The evidence establishes that the issue concerning the first applicant’s motivation to obtain employment in Australia was not raised at all prior to the Tribunal’s decision. There was no reference to it in any of the correspondence from either the Department or the Tribunal , any of the applicants’ submissions, the questioning at the hearing or the delegate’s reasons. For that reason, there was a breach of s.360(1) of the Act. The provisions of that section enacted the hearing rule aspect of the Tribunal’s obligation to afford the applicants procedural fairness and a breach of those provisions constituted jurisdictional error.
[50] [2017] FCCA 688; (2017) 319 FLR 81
The Tribunal in the present case is said to have made the same error. The suggestion that Ms He may have been motivated by “business purposes” to apply for a partner visa was not put to her at any stage of the application process, nor on review by the Tribunal. It appeared for the first time in the Tribunal’s decision at [35]. As such, Ms He is said to have been denied an opportunity to respond to that suggestion and was therefore denied a fair hearing under s.360 of the Migration Act.
Minister’s contentions
The Minister submits that this ground of review should be rejected for the following reasons.
Contrary to Ms He’s submissions, the finding of the Tribunal at [35] of its decision that Ms He had an "incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency" was not an issue arising in relation to the decision under review. Rather, this statement was part of the Tribunal's thought process or reasoning process or subjective appraisal of the evidence given by Ms He, namely the evidence of her long history of conducting business in Australia. This is said to be evident when the sentence in which the statement is made is read in full. The full sentence reads:
The Tribunal notes the applicant has spent a lot of time in Australia for business purposes since the early 2000s and operates a travel company in Australia which gives her an incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency.
This sentence is said to merely reveal the Tribunal's reasoning when considering the "issue" of the "nature of persons' commitment to each other", being one of the issues identified by the Tribunal as part of its statutory function to determine whether the parties were in a genuine de facto relationship.
In the Full Federal Court decision of SZHKA v Minister for Immigration,[51] Gray J made the following observations about identifying "the issues" arising in relation to the decision under review. At [7] Gray J held that:
…because the Tribunal starts from the position of being unpersuaded by the material already before it, the hearing will inevitably explore the reasons why the Tribunal might not be persuaded by that material; the Tribunal will not perform its function adequately if it does not provide the applicant with the opportunity to satisfy the Tribunal’s specific reservations about the applicant’s case. Thus, to some extent at least, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review will depend upon the view that the ultimate decision-maker takes about the material before the Tribunal, and will therefore be shaped by that person’s thought processes. This is not to say that the Tribunal member must expose all of his or her thought processes to scrutiny by the applicant, as part of the hearing. The High Court recognised this in SZBEL at [38]-[39]. The line between exposing every aspect of the reasoning process and making known to the applicant the issues that the Tribunal member sees as arising may not be easy to recognise in all circumstances, but it does exist.
[51] (2008) 172 FCR 1
Gray J makes it clear in this paragraph that as part of its statutory function under s.425(1) (or s.360(1) in the present case), the Tribunal does not have to expose its thought processes to the applicant. In the present case, the Tribunal accepted that a desire to live and work in Australia was not incompatible with a genuine relationship, but it concluded that the applicant's relationship was not genuine in part because of the applicant's "incentive" to stay for other reasons.
In other words, the statement identified by the applicant in her ground of appeal is said to have been merely part of the Tribunal's reasoning or subjective appraisal relating to evidence given by the applicant in relation to the issue of the "nature of the persons’ committed to each other".
Further, in Minister for Immigration v SZGUR, French CJ and Kiefel J held that:[52]
Procedural fairness requires a decision-maker to identify for the person affected any critical issue not apparent from the nature of the decision all the terms of the statutory power. The decision-maker must also advise of any adverse conclusion, which would not obviously be open on the known material. However, a decision-maker is not otherwise required to expose his or her thought processes or provisional views for comment before making the decision.
[52] (2011) 241 CLR 594 at 599
In the present case the Minister also submits, given the evidence of Ms He to the Tribunal, that the Tribunal's inference at [35] that Ms He had an "incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency" was an obvious inference in the sense described by the High Court in SZGUR. Consequently, the Tribunal was under no obligation under s.360(1) to provide Ms He with any opportunity to comment on this finding in advance of its decision to affirm the delegate's decision.
In her written submissions, Ms He contends that the Tribunal had an obligation to put Ms He on notice of this finding because (in Ms He’s view) "the Tribunal indicated no other firmly held reasoning as to why the relationship between the parties was not genuine". This assertion is said to misrepresent the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal gave several reasons why it considered the relationship between the parties was not genuine.
At [30] the Tribunal was not satisfied there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate Ms He and her sponsor shared a household as de facto partners in a committed and long term relationship. At [36], after setting out its reasoning concerning Ms He’s evidence about her long history of conducting business in Australia, the Tribunal found while Ms He and Mr Liang were "close associates" it was not satisfied there were in a genuine de facto relationship, and that it was not satisfied that Ms He and Mr Liang themselves saw their relationship as "long term".
The Minister invites the Court to reject Ms He’s submission that the Tribunal indicated no other firmly held reasoning regarding the issue of the genuineness of the relationship between Ms He and Mr Liang other than the “reason” identified by Ms He in this ground of review.
Resolution
In her review application, Ms He challenges the findings made by the Tribunal at [35] of its decision.[53] In particular, Ms He asserts that the finding at [35], that Ms He had an "incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency", was an issue arising in relation to the decision under review, and that as the Tribunal failed to provide Ms He with notice of this issue, the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations under s.360(1) of the Migration Act. In support of this argument, Ms He in written submissions relies upon SZBEL.
[53] CB 469-470
At [35][54] the Tribunal stated:
In their original application and sponsorship statements, the parties provided identical accounts of the things they do for each other. They both declared that they support and encourage each other and see the relationship as long term. During the hearing, the applicant said she and the sponsor’s plans are to make a profit out of the properties they own so that they have funds for when they are older. The Tribunal notes the applicant has spent a lot of time in Australia for business purposes since the early 2000’s and operates a travel company in Australia which gives her an incentive to apply for a spouse visa to obtain residency. While a desire to live and work in Australia is not incompatible with a genuine spouse or de facto relationship, in this case, the Tribunal is not satisfied the applicant has a genuine commitment to the sponsor as a de facto partner.
[54] CB 469-470
This aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning followed a finding favourable to Ms He at [26][55] and findings unfavourable to her at [30] and [32]. [56]
[55] CB 468
[56] CB 469
The Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion at [36][57] was based on all of the above considerations.
[57] CB 470
This was not a case where the Tribunal considered that the outcome was clear cut. It was a case in which the Tribunal was called upon to balance various competing factors. At [38],[58] the Tribunal stated:
Having regard to all the circumstances, on balance, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as partners to the exclusion of all others, or that the relationship was genuine and continuing, and the couple did not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.
[58] CB 470
The Tribunal’s reasoning at [35] was somewhat delicately expressed, possibly so that the Tribunal avoided the error of losing sight of the relevant visa criterion. It is clear enough, however, that the Tribunal was concerned that Ms He was motivated more by commercial considerations in relation to her business than by any personal attachment to her sponsor. There was some debate between counsel as to the nature of an “issue” requiring disclosure in order to ensure a fair hearing opportunity for the purposes of s.360. I was taken by counsel for the applicant to the decision of this Court in Hazra.[59] For his part, counsel for the Minister placed emphasis on the decision of the Federal Court in SZJUB v Minister for Immigration.[60]
[59] in particular at [4], [5], [8]-[11], [13], [14], [18], [57] and [64]
[60] [2007] FCA 1486, in particular at [14], [15], [17]-[21], [23] and following and [28]
In my opinion, these are simply examples of decisions where, in the particular factual context of those cases, particular issues were found to be determinative, or not determinative, as the case may be, which in turn answers the question of whether the issue requires disclosure in order to afford a fair hearing opportunity.
In my view, the issue arising from [35] in the Tribunal’s reasons did require disclosure. First, there was no clue from the delegate’s decision that a commercial motivation on the part of Ms He was an issue. Rather, the delegate’s decision turned otherwise on a lack of satisfaction in relation to the visa criteria.
Before the Tribunal, there were a range of considerations but the issue of Ms He’s commercial motivation assumed prominence in the Tribunal’s reasoning at [35], especially when read with [36] where the Tribunal referred to “a relationship of some sort between the parties”. The assumed commercial motivation of Ms He bore critically on the Tribunal’s assessment on the nature of the relationship between Ms He and her sponsor. This was not raised at the Tribunal hearing. The transcript of the hearing is silent on that point. In my view, the applicant is correct that the issue of Ms He’s commercial motivation was a determinative one which should have been raised at the hearing in order for Ms He to understand the issue and respond to it. The failure to disclose the issue as one on which the review would turn amounted to a failure to afford a fair hearing opportunity for the purposes of s.360 of the Migration Act, amounting to jurisdictional error.
Conclusion
Ms He has succeeded in establishing that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error. It is therefore a privative clause decision. She should receive the relief she seeks.
I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding fifty-one (51) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Driver
Associate:
Date: 4 February 2019
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