Hazelwood v Webber

The appellant, Hazelwood, lit a fire on his land to burn stubble, a common farming practice. A stump ignited and smouldered, eventually spreading to the respondent Webber's land during a high wind, causing damage. Webber sued Hazelwood for damages, alleging the fire was lit carelessly and negligently. The jury found no negligence on Hazelwood's part, and a verdict was entered for him. However, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales set aside this verdict and entered judgment for Webber. Hazelwood appealed this decision to the High Court.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the appellant was liable for the damage caused by the fire, and if so, on what basis. Specifically, the court had to determine if the burning of stubble constituted a natural and ordinary use of the land, which would potentially exempt the appellant from liability under common law principles, or if it was a non-natural use for which strict liability applied. The court also considered the effect of relevant New South Wales legislation, including the Careless Use of Fire Act 1912 and the Bush Fires Act 1930, on the common law position.

The High Court held that the burning of vegetation in the open during midsummer, particularly stubble, was not a natural or ordinary use of the land. Consequently, the appellant was liable for the escape of the fire and the resulting damage, independently of any negligence. The Court reasoned that while the Careless Use of Fire Act and the Bush Fires Act provided for penalties and regulated the use of fire, they did not limit the common law liability for damage caused by escaping fires, except to the extent they authorised certain uses of fire. Even in cases of authorised use, liability for damage occasioned by reckless or negligent use was maintained. The Court also affirmed that the Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 was not in force in New South Wales.

The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales was affirmed. The appellant was therefore liable for the damages awarded to the respondent.