HAYDON & HAYDON - [2011] FamCA 750

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HAYDON & HAYDON

[2011] FamCA 750

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Determining matrimonial asset pool – husband’s superannuation interest not included in matrimonial pool with non-superannuation assets

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Contributions – significant disparity in initial contributions of parties at start of cohabitation – husband was primary income earner and wife primary homemaker and carer of children during cohabitation – renovations to former matrimonial home funded by husband’s parents – following separation the husband continued to pay outgoings on the former matrimonial home occupied by the wife – proportional division of 60 to 40 per cent in favour of husband

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Adjustments – net pool of property and resources relatively modest – necessary to express adjustment as a lump sum rather than as a percentage – the children presently live with the husband - no evidence of wife’s engagement in employment over the last five years – husband older than wife and in good health – no evidence on wife’s state of health – husband in paid employment – the husband is not the biological father of eldest child – throughout parties cohabitation no child support was paid by the biological father of eldest child and eldest child was supported by husband – substantial weight given to husband’s contributions with respect to the eldest child – adjustment in favour of husband at about 25 per cent of the non-superannuation assets – husband to retain his superannuation interest

FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – Just and equitable orders - principal asset is former matrimonial home occupied by wife – sale of matrimonial home necessary – no orders made for husband to be appointed as wife’s attorney for the purposes of the sale of the matrimonial home – orders for wife to occupy home until 21 days in advance of completion of sale of the property

Family law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, 106A

Coghlan v Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220
Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143
Marriage of Clauson (1995) FLC 92-595
Marriage of Robb (1995) FLC 92-555
Parrott v Public Trustee of NSW (1994) FLC 92-473
Phillips v Phillips (2002) FLC 93-104

APPLICANT:

Mr Haydon

RESPONDENT:

Ms Haydon

FILE NUMBER:

NCC

945

2010

DATE DELIVERED:

29 September 2011

PLACE DELIVERED:

Newcastle

PLACE HEARD:

Newcastle

JUDGMENT OF:

Austin J

HEARING DATE:

2 September 2011

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Not Applicable

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Fox, Attwaters

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Not Applicable

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Not Applicable

Orders

The parties shall do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be necessary to forthwith list the real property and improvements comprised in Folio Identifier …, being the property more commonly known as … B Street, Town E, NSW (“the property”), for sale by private treaty.

For the purposes of implementing Order 1 hereof:

(a)The husband’s solicitors shall act on behalf of the parties in respect of the sale.

(b)The listing agent shall be the agent chosen by the husband.

(c)The listing price for the property shall be as agreed between the parties, and in default of agreement, the price nominated by the listing agent.

(d)In the event of the property not being sold within 3 months from the date of its listing for sale then it shall be put to sale by public auction on the following terms:

i) The auctioneer shall be the auctioneer chosen by the husband.

ii)The auction shall take place within 6 weeks of the deadline date for sale by private treaty.

iii)The reserve price shall be as agreed between the parties, and in default of agreement, the reserve price nominated by the auctioneer.

(e)In the event the property is not sold by auction, or private negotiation within a further 7 days, then it shall be submitted to successive auctions within further 6 weeks periods until sold, otherwise upon the same terms and conditions as applied to the first auction.

Upon completion of the sale of the property pursuant to Orders 1 and 2 hereof, the proceeds of sale shall be applied by the parties as follows:

(a)Firstly, to pay all costs, commissions, and expenses of the sale, and to pay any Council and water rates and maintenance levies outstanding in respect of the property.

(b)Secondly, to discharge any encumbrance registered over or affecting the property.

(c)Thirdly, to pay the sum of $10,000 to the wife.

(d)Fourthly, to pay the balance then remaining to the husband’s solicitors on behalf of the husband.

Pending completion of the sale pursuant to Orders 1 and 2 hereof, the parties are restrained from charging, mortgaging, or otherwise encumbering the property.

The wife may occupy the property, to the exclusion of the husband, until the date 21 days in advance of completion of sale of the property pursuant to these Orders, provided she maintains the property in a reasonable state of repair and facilitates inspection of the property by the listing agent and prospective purchasers.

The husband is declared the sole legal and beneficial owner (as between the parties) of, and the wife shall execute all such documents as may be necessary to transfer to the husband all legal and equitable title in, the following items of property:

(a)The Commonwealth Bank accounts of which he is the nominated account holder.

(b)The furniture and personal effects in his possession.

The wife is declared the sole legal and beneficial owner (as between the parties) of, and the husband shall execute all such documents as may be necessary to transfer to the wife all legal and equitable title in, the following items of property:

(a)The Mitsubishi car

(b)The furniture and personal effects in her possession.

The husband shall indemnify, and keep indemnified, the wife in respect of any debt allegedly owed by the parties, or either of them, to the husband’s parents, or either of them.

Unless otherwise provided:

(a)Each party shall be the sole legal and beneficial owner (as between the parties) of all other assets in their respective possession as at the date of these orders, and for that purpose bank accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person named as the account holder and superannuation entitlements are deemed in the possession of the superannuant.

(b)Each party shall be solely liable for and shall indemnify the other against any and all debts attaching or relating to the property in their respective possession, and any debts in their respective sole names.

In the event of either party refusing or neglecting to sign within 7 days of a written request to do so any document necessary to implement the terms of these orders the Registrar of the Family Court of Australia at Newcastle is empowered to execute such documents on behalf of the parties pursuant to s.106A of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth).

Any and all outstanding applications are dismissed.

Notation

(A)In the event of the need for consequential orders to facilitate implementation of or to enforce these orders, any Application filed by the husband shall be listed urgently before Austin J for consideration.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Haydon v Haydon is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT NEWCASTLE

FILE NUMBER: NCC 945 of 2010

Mr Haydon

Applicant

And

Ms Haydon

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

The applicant husband and respondent wife are at odds over the division of their assets following upon the disintegration of their marriage.
The principal asset of the parties is the former matrimonial home, in which the wife continues to reside. The wife steadfastly refused to countenance any outcome which would entail the need for her to vacate the property, even though its sale was a necessary component of the property adjustment process.
The wife chose to address the problem by refusing to participate in the proceedings and by disrupting them where possible.

Short history

The parties first met in about November 1997 but did not cohabit until their marriage in September 1999.[1]
[1] Initiating Application, pars 25-26; Husband’s first affidavit, pars 4 &13.
The wife bore a child to another relationship in August 1998, but that child has always been treated as a child of the marriage.[2]
[2] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 10-11.
One child was born to the parties in April 2000.[3]
[3] Husband’s first affidavit, par 12.
The parties separated following an argument between them on 22 December 2009.[4]
[4] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 24-25.
The husband commenced proceedings before the Federal Magistrates Court for parenting orders relating to the two children on 14 April 2010.[5] Final orders were made on 15 April 2011, providing for the husband to have sole parental responsibility for the children and for the children to live with the husband. The Court deliberately declined to make any order providing for the children to spend time with the mother.[6]
[5] Husband’s first affidavit, par 31.
[6] Husband’s first affidavit, par 41.
The current proceedings for adjustment of property interests were commenced by the husband in this Court on 25 May 2011.

Proposal and evidence of the husband

The husband pressed for the orders set out within his Initiating Application filed on 25 May 2011, the effect of which were to require:
a)Sale of the former matrimonial home and payment of the whole of the net proceeds of sale to him (Order 1), and to facilitate that outcome, the husband be solely responsible for the sale (Order 3), the wife vacate the property within 28 days of the orders (Order 5), and the wife keep the property in proper condition pending her departure (Order 7); and
b)Retention by the parties of items of personal property already in their possession (Order 2).
In support of his application the husband relied upon:
a)His Financial Statement filed on 25 May 2011;
b)His affidavit filed on 26 July 2011 (the “first affidavit”);
c)His affidavit filed on 29 July 2011 (the “second affidavit”);
d)His affidavit filed on 19 August 2011 (the “third affidavit”);
e)The affidavit of the husband’s father, Mr J, filed on 26 July 2011; and
f)The affidavits proving service of the above documents upon the wife, being the affidavits of:
i)Mr M, filed on 8 June 2011;
ii)Mr C, filed on 29 July 2011;
iii)Ms S, filed on 17 August 2011; and
iv)Ms T, filed on 2 September 2011

Position of the wife

Despite her knowledge of the husband’s Application and the affidavit evidence upon which he relied, the wife declined to usefully participate in the proceedings. The wife adopted a similar attitude in relation to the prior parenting and divorce proceedings.[7]
[7] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 32-36 & 40-42.
The husband’s Application was returnable before the Registrar on 27 June 2011. The mother then appeared without a legal representative. The orders and notations made by the Registrar that day recorded the wife’s refusal to participate in the case assessment conference, other than to object to the validity of the proceedings, which were therefore listed for undefended hearing before a judge on 1 August 2011.
The trial on that date was adjourned until 2 September 2011 to ensure procedural fairness was extended to the mother by her service with all material relied upon by the husband to establish his case.
The wife appeared unrepresented at the intervening Court events on 1 and 26 August 2011, but on each occasion departed the Court shortly after the Court convened and prior to procedural orders being made.
The wife again appeared unrepresented at the trial on 2 September 2011, but as before, departed after only several minutes, making comments expressing her dissatisfaction with the litigious process.
The wife failed to file any Response or affidavit in the proceedings.
Every opportunity was extended to the wife to participate in the proceedings and be heard about the just and equitable property adjustment orders that should be made, but she did not avail herself of that opportunity. Consequently, it became necessary to determine the case by reference to only the evidence adduced by the husband, which remained unchallenged.

Process of property adjustment

In determining the property adjustment orders that should be made between spouses the Court follows a recognised four-step process (see Hickey & Hickey & Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia (Intervener) (2003) FLC 93-143 at [39]).
Firstly, the Court should identify and value the matrimonial pool of property, comprised of assets, liabilities and financial resources at the date of the hearing.
Secondly, the Court should identify and assess the contributions of the parties within the meaning of ss 79(4)(a)-(c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), and determine the contribution based entitlements of each party as a percentage of the matrimonial pool of assets.
Thirdly, the Court should identify and assess the relevant matters referred to in ss 79(4)(d), (e), (f) and (g), and s 75(2), and determine the adjustment, if any, which should be made to the contribution based entitlements of the parties.
Finally, the Court should consider the effect of those findings and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances of the case.

Pool of property and resources

On the available evidence, I find the matrimonial pool of property comprises the following assets and liabilities (rounded to the nearest dollar):

No.	Assets	Party	Value	Total
1	Former matrimonial home	joint	310,000[8]
2	CBA account [… 0]	H	1[9]
3	CBA account [… 8]	H	1[10]
4	Household contents	H	19,000[11]
5	Household contents	W	4,000[12]
6	Mitsubishi car	W	4,000[13]
Sub-total	337,002	337,002
Liabilities
7	Mortgage over home	joint	202,632[14]
8	Council rates on home	joint	3,423[15]
9	Water rates on home	joint	1,537[16]
10	ANZ mastercard	H	9,185[17]
11	CBA mastercard	H	1[18]
Sub-total	216,778	120,224
Net	120,224

[8] Husband’s financial statement, par 35.

[9] Husband’s financial statement, par 37.

[10] Husband’s financial statement, par 37.

[11] Husband’s financial statement, par 42.

[12] Husband’s financial statement, par 42.

[13] Husband’s financial statement, Part O.4; Husband’s first affidavit, par 29.

[14] Husband’s financial statement, par 46; Husband’s first affidavit, Annexure G.

[15] Husband’s third affidavit, Annexure A.

[16] Husband’s third affidavit, Annexure C.

[17] Husband’s financial statement, par 51.

[18] Husband’s financial statement, par 51.

The husband deposed to the existence of debts due to his parents, and separately to his father, amounting collectively to $27,800.[19] However, the husband also adduced evidence from his father, which evidence clearly inferred the husband’s parents do not perceive the husband’s liability to them as a consequence of financial accommodation afforded by them to him in the past.[20] In submissions, the husband’s solicitor readily and fairly conceded the apparent contradiction and contended the alleged debts should be excised from the matrimonial pool of property, but that the advancement of monies by the husband’s parents for the benefit of the spouses should be taken into account as indirect financial contributions by the husband. I accept that submission.
[19] Husband’s financial statement, pars 50 & 53.
[20] Affidavit of Mr J, par 9.
Apart from the assets and liabilities, the husband also has accumulated superannuation entitlements approximating $62,354 held with First State Super.[21]
[21] Husband’s financial statement, par 45; Husband’s first affidavit, Annexure F.
The Court is generally exhorted to assess the parties’ contributions to superannuation entitlements separately from those made in respect of assets (see Coghlan v Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220 at [57]–[68])). It is appropriate in this case not to include the husband’s superannuation interest in the matrimonial pool with the non-superannuation assets. The evidence does not reveal the amount of the entitlements already accumulated by the husband at the commencement of cohabitation, nor the quantum of the accumulated entitlements at the time of separation, so it is not possible to determine what proportion of the entitlements were accumulated during cohabitation. The accumulated superannuation is instead taken into account in the third-stage adjustment.

Assessment of contributions

The commencement of the parties’ cohabitation coincided with their marriage. At that time the husband had household furniture and chattels, savings of $28,300, and an undisclosed amount of accumulated superannuation entitlements.[22] The wife then had household furniture and chattels, but also debts amounting to about $16,000.[23] Consequently, there was significant disparity in their initial contributions.
[22] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 5, 8 & 56.
[23] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 7 & 9.
The husband’s parents gave the parties gifts of cash amounting to $2,000 in 2000 and 2001.[24]
[24] Husband’s first affidavit, par 15.
In March 2002 the parties purchased the former matrimonial home, situated at B Street, Town E, NSW. They did so by using their savings, the first home owners grant, and a bank loan secured by mortgage over the property.[25]
[25] Husband’s first affidavit, par 16.
The property was later improved by renovations, which cost about $21,500 and were funded by the husband’s parents. The husband’s father also laboured on renovations to the property, for which he was not remunerated.[26]
[26] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 19-21; Affidavit of Mr J, pars 4-8.
Throughout cohabitation the husband was in full-time employment in the information technology field.[27] But for a short period of months, he was the sole breadwinner for the family. The wife was initially a full-time student,[28] but she held casual work in an information management role during the latter half of 2006.[29] I draw the inference the wife was the primary homemaker and carer for the children during cohabitation, but was assisted by the husband.
[27] Husband’s affidavit, pars 5 & 44.
[28] Husband’s first affidavit, par 7.
[29] Husband’s first affidavit, par 46.
The wages earned by the husband not only supported the family but also paid for tuition fees incurred by the wife in the pursuit of her tertiary education.[30]
[30] Husband’s first affidavit, par 70.
The children remained living with the wife following separation in December 2009, while the husband lived with his parents.[31] It was not until about a year later on 23 December 2010 that the children began living with the husband on a full time basis.[32]
[31] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 24-25
[32] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 41 & 49.
Following separation and his departure from the matrimonial home, the husband continued to meet the mortgage repayments and some utility costs incurred in respect of the property. The husband continues to make interest-only repayments on the mortgage, and payments of rates and the insurance premiums, which enables the wife to continue living alone in the former matrimonial home.[33]
[33] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 27-28 & 47.
The husband’s solicitor submitted the contributions of the parties should reflect in a distribution ratio of 2:1 in favour of the husband. I do not accept that submission. I do not accept the husband’s contributions should be regarded as double those of the wife. I do however consider that a proportional division of 60/40 in favour of the husband is justified on the evidence.

Adjustment

The husband is now 40 years of age and in good health.[34]
[34] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 2 & 57.
The wife is now 36 years of age.[35] Her state of health is unknown.
[35] Husband’s first affidavit, par 3.
The husband holds employment in the information technology field. He earns $1,318 gross per week. I impute he will likely hold employment of that ilk until his retirement. I also infer that with a continuing salary of that amount his superannuation interest will continue to grow only at modest increments for the remainder of his working life.
Of course, the husband’s current superannuation interest, valued at $62,354, is noteworthy but not substantial, even though the wife has no superannuation interest at all.
The husband has no responsibility to support any person other than the two children of the marriage.[36] Other than for carer allowance, family tax benefit, and rent assistance,[37] the husband is not eligible to receive any pension, allowance, or benefit.[38]
[36] Husband’s first affidavit, par 60.
[37] Husband’s first affidavit, par 45.
[38] Husband’s first affidavit, par 61.
There is no evidence about the wife’s engagement in employment since 2006. It is unknown whether she currently holds employment. Nonetheless, the evidence discloses the wife has held employment in an information management role in the past, and has acquired skills in various information management practices through further education.[39] I therefore conclude the wife has the capacity for gainful employment, even if it is not currently being utilised.
[39] Husband’s first affidavit, pars 46 & 70.
The eldest child has had no relationship with her biological father. The husband has always been her father figure. She calls the husband “Dad” and now lives exclusively with the husband, which arrangement was ratified by parenting orders made by the Court between the parties in April 2011. Throughout the parties’ cohabitation the husband contributed with the mother to the financial, physical and emotional support of the eldest child. No child support was paid for that child by her biological father.[40] The husband’s past contribution of that nature to the eldest child is a consideration of substantial weight under s 75(2)(o), pursuant to s 79(4)(e) of the Act (see Marriage of Robb (1995) FLC 92-555 at 81,542, 81,546, 81,547).
[40] Husband’s first affidavit, par 10.
The eldest child is still only 13 years of age. In all likelihood, by reason of the parenting orders made in April 2011 the husband’s contribution to her financial, physical and emotional support will remain much superior to that of the wife for the remainder of the child’s minority.[41] That also is a consideration of substantial weight.
[41] Husband’s first affidavit, par 65.
The wife currently pays child support to the husband, in respect of both children, of only $42.50 per fortnight.[42] I impute it is improbable the wife’s future child support contributions will increase much beyond annual adjustments consonant with the cost of living.
[42] Husband’s first affidavit, par 46.
Although the husband likely has a superior income earning capacity to the wife, the wife is younger and likely has a slightly longer period within which to earn income and acquire superannuation entitlements. The wife does not have the responsibility of the day-to-day care of the children, the youngest of whom is still only 11 years of age, and so the economic and emotional burden of that will fall principally upon the husband.
The circumstances justify, in my view, an adjustment in favour of the husband. Ordinarily I would assess that adjustment in this case in the vicinity of 10 per cent. However, an adjustment of that quantum would result in a monetary adjustment of only some $12,000, which is inadequate to reflect the differential between the parties by reference to features recognised under ss 79(4)(d)-(g) of the Act.
As was pointed out by the Full Court in Marriage of Clauson (1995) 18 Fam LR 693 at 710, when referring to an adjustment warranted by factors under s 75(2) of the Act:
…it is the real impact in money terms which is ultimately the critical issue.
The overall property adjustment between the parties must be just and equitable, not just the underlying percentage division of the net value of the parties’ assets (see Phillips v Phillips (2002) FLC 93-104 at [60] – [70]). In cases where the net pool is relatively modest it is often preferable to express a third-stage adjustment as a lump sum rather than as a percentage (see Parrott v Public Trustee of NSW (1994) FLC 92-473 at 80906 - 80907). This is a case in which such a course is justified.
The wife’s contribution-based entitlement to matrimonial property is measured at 40 per cent, which extrapolates to a monetary value of $48,090. She will retain her personal effects and an aged car, valued collectively at $8,000, meaning she would likely receive a cash sum of around $40,000 upon sale of the former matrimonial home.
It was submitted for the husband that the portion of the wife’s second-stage entitlement which represents her share of the sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home should be entirely allocated to the husband as a proper third-stage adjustment in his favour.
I do not accept that would be a just and equitable outcome of the property adjustment process. However, I am satisfied that the husband should receive a third-stage adjustment which exceeds 10 per cent.
Receipt by the wife of a cash sum of $10,000 from the sale of the former matrimonial home, in addition to her retention of her personal effects and the car, would mean she received assets worth $18,000, which approximates 15 per cent of the non-superannuation assets.
That would equate to the husband receiving approximately 85 per cent of the non-superannuation assets. Accordingly, since the husband has a contribution-based entitlement of 60 per cent, the effective third-stage adjustment in his favour would be measured at about 25 per cent of the non-superannuation assets, together with his retention of the superannuation interest.

Just and equitable orders

A just and equitable result requires the wife’s receipt of a cash sum from the sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home, which would enable her to acquire alternate accommodation for herself. Left with only a car of meagre value and some personal effects the wife would be virtually destitute. The cash sum of $10,000 the wife receives from the sale proceeds of the former matrimonial home could conceivably be used as a bond on secure rental accommodation or, if she has or obtains reliable employment, possibly as part of a deposit on her purchase of a modest residential property with borrowed funds.
Regrettably, the matrimonial pool is relatively small. Sale of the former matrimonial home is an unavoidable consequence of division of the pool of property between the parties and the circumstances warrant the wife’s receipt of only a fraction of it.
The unwillingness of the wife to co-operate in the conduct of these proceedings leads me to conclude that the orders providing for the sale of the former matrimonial home should be fashioned so as to avoid the potentiality for further conflict. Accordingly, to expedite the process, the husband’s solicitors shall act for the parties on its sale and the husband’s choice of real estate agent and auctioneer shall prevail.
I decline to appoint the husband as the wife’s attorney for the purposes of achieving the sale, as proposed by the husband.[43] In the event the wife refuses to sign the real estate agent’s agency agreement, the contract for sale, or other documents necessary to effect the sale, the husband will need to avail himself of the order made under s 106A of the Act appointing the Registrar to execute documents when required.
[43] Initiating Application, Order 3.
The husband also proposed the wife vacate the former matrimonial home within 28 days.[44] I decline to make such an order. The wife will be permitted to occupy the property until 21 days in advance of completion of the sale of the property. The husband adopted such a proposal in final submissions, recognising that an order in those terms would permit sufficient time for him to approach the Court to seek an order enforcing the wife’s removal from the property prior to any purchaser completing the purchase and taking vacant possession, should the wife refuse to vacate voluntarily.
[44] Initiating Application, Order 5.
The chance of that eventuality is sufficiently significant that the husband should have the opportunity to bring the matter back before me with minimal delay for any consequential orders needed. A notation to that effect is made.
Of course, the wife’s continued occupation of the former matrimonial home until the need for her to vacate it in order to complete the contract for sale is conditional upon her facilitating the advertisement and display of the property for sale. She will need to co-operate with the listing agent and prospective purchasers.
The husband made application for the return to him by the wife of certain chattels,[45] about the identity of which he gave evidence.[46] However, the evidence disclosed only that those chattels were in the possession of the wife at the time of separation nearly two years ago. There is no evidence that the chattels, or any of them, are currently in the wife’s possession. The husband recognised the impracticality of soliciting a Court order for the wife to deliver up chattels that she no longer has. Even if the chattels remain in the wife’s possession, unless she is willing to deliver them up voluntarily, the prospect of the husband proving the wife’s current possession and refusal to surrender them in contravention of such an order is negligible. The husband therefore sensibly abandoned his application for such an order.
[45] Initiating Application, Order 1.3.
[46] Husband’s first affidavit, par 66.
Although the husband resiled from any contention in these proceedings that he or the wife were liable to his parents, or either of them, in respect of monies loaned to him or them during their cohabitation, an order should still be made that the husband indemnify the wife against any such liability.
I am satisfied the orders represent a just and equitable outcome on the evidence adduced.

I certify that the preceding sixty four (64) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin delivered on Thursday, 29 September 2011.

Associate:

Date: 29 September 2011