Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Hawes v Dean [2013] NSWSC 2041 Hearing dates: 18 December 2013 Decision date: 18 December 2013 Jurisdiction: Equity Division Before: Brereton J Decision: Application for stay dismissed with costs
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for stay pending appeal - where one ground of appeal is plainly arguable but if successful would not improve applicant's position - where other grounds of appeal marginal - where balance of convenience does not favour the granting of a stay - stay refused Cases Cited: Hawes & anor v Dean & ors (Costs) [2013] NSWSC 1246 Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: David Richard Hawes (first plaintiff/ first cross defendant)
Hawes Investments Pty Ltd (second plaintiff)
Trevor Laurence Dean (first defendant/ first cross-claimant)
T&B Dean Investments Pty Ltd (second defendant/ second cross-claimant)
Hawden Property Group Pty Ltd (third defendant)
Hawden Constructions Pty Ltd (fourth defendant)
Gallwey Pty Ltd (fifth defendant)
Glenside Group Pty Ltd (second cross-defendant)
Warr Pty Limited (third cross-defendant)Representation: Counsel:
G McGrath (plaintiffs)
J Lazarus (defendants)
Solicitors:
Staunton &Thompson (plaintiffs)
JT Law (defendants)
File Number(s): 2009/290891
Judgment - EX TEMPORE
HIS HONOUR: On 3 September 2013 I gave judgment inter alia that the first cross-defendant David Richard Hawes and the second cross-defendant Glenside Group Pty Ltd pay the second cross-claimant Hawden Property Group Pty Ltd the sum of $534,187.23; and also that the first cross-defendant Mr Hawes and the second cross-defendant Glenside Group pay the first cross-claimant Trevor Laurence Dean the sum of $32,801.99 [see Hawes & anor v Dean & ors (Costs) [2013] NSWSC 1246]. Mr Hawes and Glenside Group have appealed against those judgments, and by motion apply for a stay of execution pending the hearing of their appeal. By consent of Mr Hawes and Glenside Group on the one hand and the liquidator of Hawden Property Group Pty Ltd on the other, the first of those orders has been stayed. The balance of the motion which remains to be determined is Mr Hawes and Glenside's application for a stay of the second judgment, in respect of the sum of $32,801.99 payable to Mr Dean. That sum, which will have accrued interest since 14 August 2013, was the result of my acceptance in the judgment of 3 September 2013 that the liability of Mr Hawes and Glenside to Mr Dean in respect of the Clydesdale fee should be set off against the liability of Dean Investments to Hawes Investments under the Galway deed.
On an application such as the present for a stay pending appeal, the starting point is that the successful party is entitled to the fruits of the judgment. Nonetheless, the existence of arguable grounds of appeal is an important consideration, at least in the sense that, absent arguable grounds of appeal, there is no utility in granting a stay; and also that the stronger the grounds of appeal, the stronger the case for a stay.
It was not seriously disputed that the fourth ground of appeal - which concerns…
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- Hawes v Dean [2013] NSWSC 2041
- Case
- [2013] NSWSC 2041
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the application for a stay should be granted, particularly in light of one ground of appeal that was plainly arguable but would not improve the applicant's position if successful. Additionally, the other grounds of appeal were described as marginal. The court had to weigh these factors against the balance of convenience, which did not favour the applicant. The court considered whether the applicant would suffer significant prejudice if the stay was not granted and whether the respondent would suffer significant prejudice if the stay was granted.
The court found that the plainly arguable ground of appeal, which would not improve the applicant's position if successful, did not warrant a stay. Furthermore, the marginal nature of the other grounds of appeal meant that the applicant's prospects of success on appeal were not sufficiently strong to warrant a stay. The balance of convenience also did not favour the applicant, as the respondent would suffer significant prejudice if the stay was granted. Therefore, the court refused the application for a stay, allowing the primary court's decision to stand.
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