Hawdon v Tasmania
[2022] TASCCA 4
•29 March 2022
[2022] TASCCA 4
| COURT: | SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL) |
| CITATION: | Hawdon v Tasmania [2022] TASCCA 4 |
| PARTIES: | HAWDON, Grant-Lee Michael |
| v | |
| STATE OF TASMANIA | |
| FILE NO: | 2152/2021 |
| DELIVERED ON: | 29 March 2022 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Hobart |
| HEARING DATE: | 9 March 2022 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Estcourt J, Jago J, Martin AJ |
| CATCHWORDS: |
Criminal Law – Appeal and new trial – Appeal against sentence – Grounds for interference – Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate – One count of armed robbery and one count of attempted aggravated armed robbery – Robbery at a bottle shop and attempted robbery at newsagency, disguised and armed with a knife – Two sentences imposed – Sentence of seven years' imprisonment with a non-
parole period of half that term and a sentence of four years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of
half that term to be served concurrently with the first term held to be manifestly excessive –
Resentenced.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3521]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: R Mainwaring Respondent: M Figg
Solicitors:
Appellant: Tasmanian Legal Aid Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
| Judgment Number: | [2022] TASCCA 4 |
| Number of paragraphs: | 35 |
Serial No 4/2022
File No 2152/2021
GRANT-LEE MICHAEL HAWDON v STATE OF TASMANIA
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL ESTCOURT J JAGO J MARTIN AJ 29 March 2022 |
| Orders of the Court: |
1 Appeal allowed.
2 The sentence of imprisonment of seven years, with a non-parole period of half that term and the sentence of four years' imprisonment to be served concurrently with the first term, with a non-parole period of half that term is set aside.
3 In lieu thereof a single sentence of five and a half years' imprisonment backdated to 3 February 2020 is imposed and it is ordered that the appellant be eligible for release on parole after serving half of that sentence.
Serial No 4/2022
File No 2152/2021
GRANT-LEE MICHAEL HAWDON v STATE OF TASMANIA
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL ESTCOURT J 29 March 2022 |
| The appeal |
1 The appellant Grant-Lee Michael Hawdon appeals to this Court against a sentence of seven years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of half that term and a sentence of four years' imprisonment to be served concurrently with the first term.
2 The two sentences were imposed by Marshall AJ on 24 August 2021, upon the appellant's pleas of guilty to one count of armed robbery, contrary to s 240(3) of the Criminal Code 1924 and one count of attempted aggravated armed robbery, contrary to s 240(4) of the Code. His appeal is on the ground that the learned sentencing judge erred in law in that he imposed a sentence which was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances of the case.
3 At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal, the notice of appeal was amended to add a second ground, namely "[t]hat the sentence is disparate with the sentence imposed upon the co-accused, Rachelle O'Brien, so as to give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance." Ultimately however, this ground was not pursued.
4 During the course of the hearing of the appeal the notice of appeal was further amended to add a third ground, namely "[t]hat the learned acting judge erred in imposing a sentence to commence on 7 February 2020 instead of 3 February 2020". That ground of appeal was not contested and accordingly must be upheld.
5 The task of this Court on an appeal of this nature needs to be borne steadily in mind. It has been explained many times in this Court and in others. A relatively recent restatement of the relevant
principles is to be found in Hall v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 6 where Pearce J said at [51]–[52]:
"51 To succeed in an appeal on the ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive the appellant must show that the sentencing discretion must have miscarried and the sentence is definitely outside the appropriate range of sentences for the crime: Everett v The Queen [1994] HCA 49; (1994) 181 CLR 295, per McHugh J at 306. It must be established that the sentencing order is so manifestly wrong that it could only be the result of some undefinable error in the exercise of the judicial discretion: Bresnehan v The Queen [1992] TASSC 55; (1992) 1 Tas R 234 at [13]. Manifest excess must be plainly apparent: Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, per Gleeson CJ and Hayne J at [6]. The sentence must be 'unreasonable or plainly unjust': House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505.
52 The appellate court may not substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing judge merely because it would have exercised the sentencing discretion in a different way: Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 at [15]. A wide measure of latitude should be accorded sentencing judges: Postiglione v The Queen [1997] HCA 26; (1997) 189 CLR 295 per Kirby J at 336. There is no single correct sentence and a sentencing judge 'should be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is consonant with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime under which the sentencing is effected': Johnson v The Queen [2004] HCA 15; (2004) 78 ALJR 616 at [26], cited with approval in Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [25]; Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520 at [58]."
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6 In the decision of the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Taylor v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 72, McLure JA at [27]-[31] made the following observations, which also touch upon the relevance of the totality principle in cases of multiple offences:
"Legal principles
27 This court can only intervene if the sentencing judge made an express or implied material error of fact or law. A claim of manifest excess relies on the implication of error. The sentence must be shown to be unreasonable or plainly unjust, it being outside the range of a sound sentencing discretion.
28 In determining whether an implied error has been made, regard is had to the maximum sentence for the offence, the standards of sentencing customarily observed, the place which the criminal conduct occupies on the scale of seriousness and the personal circumstances of the offender.
29 Sentences imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases both reveal and reflect.
30 Manifest excess applies to an individual sentence. The totality principle applies
to the total effective sentence for multiple offences. A breach of the totality principle is
also a claim of implied error.
31 The first limb of the totality principle is that the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally."
7 In Coles v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 9, I set out two passages from decisions considering the totality principle. At [26]-[27] I noted as follows:
"26 Gaudron and McHugh JJ observed, obiter, in Griffiths v R (1989) 167 CLR 372
at 393:'It is well established that in sentencing a person in respect of multiple offences regard must be had to the total effect of the sentence on the offender: Reg v Smith (1983) 32 SASR 219, at pp 220, 221, 222; Boyle and Allen, Sentencing Law and Practice (1985), p 282; Hall, Sentencing in New Zealand (1987), p 195. This may be done through the imposition of consecutive sentences of reduced length with or without other sentences to be served concurrently or through the imposition of a head sentence appropriate to the total criminality with all other sentences to be served concurrently.'
27 In Attorney-General v Tichy (1982) 30 SASR 84, Wells J said at 92 - 93:
'It is both impracticable and undesirable to attempt to lay down comprehensive principles according to which a sentencing judge may determine, in every case, whether sentences should be ordered to be served concurrently or consecutively. According to an inflexible Draconian logic, all sentences should be consecutive, because every offence, as a separate case of criminal liability, would justify the exaction of a separate penalty. But such a logic could never hold. When an accused is on trial it is part of the procedural privilege to which he is entitled that he should be made aware of precisely what charges he is to meet. But the practice and principles of sentencing owe little to such procedure; what is fitting is that a convicted prisoner should be sentenced, not simply and indiscriminately for every act that can be singled out and brought within the compass of a technically
3 No 4/2022
identifiable conviction, but for what, viewing the circumstances broadly and reasonably, can be characterised as his criminal conduct ...'."
The crimes
8 The learned sentencing judge set out the relevant facts as follows:
"The particulars of count one are that at West Hobart on 8 December 2019, Mr Hawdon robbed Raymond Willshire of a quantity of cash and at the time of the robbery was armed with a knife. The particulars of count 2 are that at Derwent Park on 23 December 2019, in the company of Rachelle O'Brien, Mr Hawdon attempted to rob Glenn Commane, and at the time of the attempted robbery was armed with a knife. The knife referred to in each case was in fact a sword, though nothing turns on that fact as it may be considered to be a large knife. A photograph of it was tendered in evidence at the sentencing hearing, and it looked intimidating.
On 8 December 2019, Mr Hawdon entered the Thirsty Camel bottleshop at the Marquis Hotel in West Hobart wearing a backpack. He was disguised with a piece of black material covering his face and a hood over his head. He was armed with a large sword. He approached a staff member, Raymond Willshire and said "give me your money". He gestured towards the counter with the sword, waived it at Mr Willshire and told him to hurry.
Mr Hawdon moved behind the counter and placed the weapon very close to Mr Willshire who opened the till. Mr Hawdon then moved back to the front of the counter. Mr Willshire removed $980 in cash from the till and gave it to Mr Hawdon. Mr Hawdon placed the cash in his backpack and left the bottleshop.
At about 6.30am on 23 December 2019, about a fortnight after the West Hobart incident, Mr Hawdon and Ms O'Brien, with whom he was in a relationship, travelled to the Derwent Park Newsagency. Both were disguised. Mr Hawdon entered the newsagency ahead of Ms O'Brien who walked behind him. Mr Hawdon was carrying the same sword used at the West Hobart incident. He walked up to the counter where Glenn Commane was standing and holding the sword said 'give us your money'. Bravely, Mr Commane retrieved a wooden baseball bat from beneath the counter. He shouted at Mr Hawdon, saying 'how dare you''. He then chased Mr Hawdon and Ms O'Brien from the newsagency. Police located Mr Hawdon in the Hobart CBD at 1.50pm that afternoon and interviewed him about the Derwent Park incident. He denied being at the newsagency and told police he was home in bed at the time..."
9 The learned sentencing judge then turned to the appellants personal circumstances and antecedents. He noted the following:
"Mr Hawdon was 44 years old at the time of the West Hobart incident and 45 years old at the time of the Derwent Park incident. He is now 46 years old, turning 47 in December. He has an extensive criminal history in three jurisdictions; Tasmania, Queensland and New South Wales, but especially in his original home state of Queensland. In 2010, Mr Hawdon pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary. That offence involved taking his daughter to the complainant's home, to assist with a combination for a safe. It also involved stealing a substantial amount of cash and jewellery from the safe partially in order to fund the abortion of the pregnancy of his then partner. An appeal against a sentence of six years for burglary which was imposed by the District Court at Gladstone was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland and on 2 September 2011 the Full Court affirmed that sentence in R v Hawdon [2011] QCA 219. The leading judgment of White J at [5] referred to Mr Hawdon being 35 years old at the time of that offence. Her Honour said:
'He has a very extensive criminal history including numerous offences of breaking and entering and other offences of dishonesty, drug offences, arson and breaches of bail.'
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Not long after his release from prison in Queensland, Mr Hawdon commenced offending in Tasmania, including a common assault on a female in August 2018. Earlier in June and July 2018, Mr Hawdon committed three stealing offences and two motor vehicle stealing offences. The current offences occurred just short of eighteen months' later. It appears that the six year term of imprisonment in 2011 was not a sufficient deterrent for Mr Hawdon."
10 His Honour then made the following comments on passing sentence:
"The current offences are particularly serious given that both were premediated and disguises were used. The first offence involved a deal of planning, including the placement of a getaway car accessed by a laneway. The use of a large intimidating
sword was also an aggravating feature of the crimes …
The crimes of armed robbery and that of attempted aggravated armed robbery justifiably cause significant concerns in the community. Workers at retail establishments should be able to go about their employment without lawless thugs intimidating them and robbing the places where they work. This type of offending often causes psychological damage to employees and owners of such establishments as well as family members. People are entitled to feel safe at their workplace. These crimes are particularly serious and the victim at West Hobart would have rightly feared for his safety, as would the victim at Derwent Park despite his reaction. Although no victim impact statements were tendered, I infer that the experience of both complainants, especially Mr Willshire was not good for the mental health of either gentlemen.
I convict Mr Hawdon of the crimes to which he has pleaded guilty, being count 1 and 2 of the indictment. Despite his very late plea of guilty to these crimes, a sentence reflecting personal deterrence is required. The sentence must also take into account the need for general deterrence and the vindication of the two complainants, as well as denunciation of the crimes. I sentence Mr Hawdon on the charge on count 1 to 7 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of half that term. I further sentence Mr Hawdon to 4 years' imprisonment on count 2 to be served concurrently with the term of imprisonment on count 1, given the short period of time between the two offences. The period of imprisonment of 7 years' is backdated to 3 February 2020. This takes into account a period of time when Mr Hawdon was not in custody as he was on bail. In arriving at that period of imprisonment, I have had regard to the substantial criminal history of Mr Hawdon as evident from the above discussion concerning his relevant prior convictions. He should be aware that any further transgression of this sort will likely lead to even longer terms of imprisonment in the future and little likelihood of spending his twilight years as a free man. On the other hand he has shown some late remorse in the instructions he has given to his counsel as to the reason for his late change of pleas, including his desire to overcome his addiction to drugs."
Sentences for armed robbery
11 The crime of armed robbery was considered by this Court in Streets v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 13. Pearce J with whom Tennent and Wood JJ agreed, said at [12]-[14]:
"12
This Court has repeatedly emphasised the seriousness of the crime of aggravated armed robbery: R v McFarlane [1993] TASSC 161, 2 Tas R 201 per Crawford J (as he then was) at 210 and Zeeman J at 221; Walsh v The Queen [1996] TASSC 59, 6 Tas R 70 per Wright J at 86. It calls for a sentence of deterrence, both general and personal, and denunciation: McFarlane per Cox J (as he then was) at 205. Courts must make clear to those who may be minded to commit such crimes that they will be visited with immediate and substantial terms of imprisonment: R v Everett and Phillips [1994] TASSC 39, 72 A Crim R 422 at 427 per Zeeman J at 441.
13
Sentences for armed robbery and aggravated armed robbery have been the subject of a number of recent appeals to this Court: Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1; Crosswell v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 1; DPP v Burns [2012] TASCCA 11; Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris [2013]
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TASCCA 5 and Director of Public Prosecutions v CSS [2013] TASCCA 10. In Braslin and Cowen, a case referred to by the sentencing judge, Porter J reviewed the range of sentences for aggravated armed robbery and armed robbery in the last decade or so prior to that decision. Porter J said, at [26]:
'For aggravated armed robbery and armed robbery there are 16 sentences of between three and six years, mostly in the lower end of that range, and almost invariably involving commercial premises, relatively large sums of money, and offenders with significant criminal histories.' (Emphasis added.)
14 Porter J's review in Braslin and Cowen was referred to by Evans J in the
following passage from his judgment in Burns at [56]–[57]:
'Sentencing ranges for the crime of aggravated armed robbery in this jurisdiction are detailed in Prof Kate Warner's text, Sentencing in
Tasmania, 2nd ed. Table 22 at 332 shows that for the period 1990 –
2000 for a single count of aggravated armed robbery the median sentence was 18 months' imprisonment. Table 24 at 335 deals with multiple counts of the same crime for the same period. It shows that the median sentence for two counts was two years and nine months, and this increased to three years for all sentences in relation to two or more counts.
In Braslin and Cowen v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 1, Porter J at [26] refers to his assessment of the sentences imposed in this jurisdiction for aggravated armed robbery and armed robbery since the abovementioned period. His Honour said of his analysis that the outcome was somewhat inconclusive, but might suggest that a more punitive approach to this type of crime had been taken in the most recent decade, compared to the decade that preceded it. In the same decision at [21], his Honour said of statistics with regard to sentences for the two crimes mentioned, that whilst showing nothing dramatic, they bear out an increase of some reasonable proportion in the number of cases of aggravated armed robbery and armed robbery coming before the Court.'"
12 Having noted those comments, it is as well to bear in mind what was said by Wood J in Connelly v Tasmania [2015] TASCCA 15 at [5], namely:
"By considering the circumstances that have given rise to the sentence, unifying principles may be discerned. Previous sentences encapsulate the 'accumulated wisdom and experience of first instance judges and appellate courts': Hili at [48]-[54], quoting Simpson J in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194; (2010) 79 NSWLR 1 at [303]. Sometimes a history of sentences can establish a range of sentences. Even if there is an established range, that history does not mean that the range is the correct range, or that the upper or lower limits are the correct upper and lower limits: see Hili at [48]-[54], again quoting Simpson J in DPP (Cth) v De La Rosa at [303]-[304]."
13 In Daley v Tasmania [2016] TASCCA 10 at [42], Brett J said:
"… apart from crimes in respect of which a sentencing range can appropriately be
established, an appeal court will have regard to comparable decisions for the purpose of identifying 'unifying principles'. However, there is little to be gained by embarking on what is in reality a misconceived quasi-mathematical exercise of comparing individual sentences, adjusting for aggravating or mitigating factors which may or may not appear in the sentences under comparison, weighting same and then arriving at a position that a sentence was too high or too low by reference to such comparison. Such a process cannot possibly account for the variation in the multiple individual factors and their relative significance that appear in each case, or the need and reality of an individualised approach by the sentencing judge. Ultimately, sentencing is an intuitive process in which the discretion is exercised within wide parameters, proportionate to
6 No 4/2022
the circumstances of the offence and the offender in the particular circumstances of the
case."
14 In my view, in the case of armed robbery and aggravated armed robbery it can be said that a history of sentences can establish a range of sentences but that is something different to saying that a sentencing range can appropriately be established.
15 There is nothing approaching a tariff for these crimes in my assessment. In this regard I agree with what was said in Director of Public Prosecutions v Fletcher-Jones [2018] TASCCA 9, 28 Tas R 49 by Martin AJ at [36]. There his Honour noted that the information provided to the Court by the parties suggested that between 2001 and 2014 sentences ranged from as low as a few months to eight years.
Was the sentence manifestly excessive?
16 Counsel for the respondent, Ms Figg, accepts that the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge was "a high one", but submits it was not erroneously so.
17 Counsel for the respondent submits that there were a number of aggravating features to these
crimes, namely:
That the crimes were planned and premeditated. The appellant prepared himself by dressing in a hooded top, scarf or other face covering and in the case of the Derwent Park Newsagency robbery, a pair of gloves. In relation to the Marquis Hotel robbery, he had arranged for a "getaway" vehicle and driver to be positioned in a secluded location accessible by a walkway between Faraday Street and Lansdowne Crescent. The appellant wore face coverings to disguise himself, an act that tends to exacerbate the fear
felt by the victims of the crime. The knife used was waved at staff, and menacing comments were made. In relation to the Marquis Hotel robbery, the appellant moved behind the counter and pointed
the knife extremely close to the complainant's body, almost touching him. The crimes were committed in a confronting and intimidating way. The robbery occurred in a public place at a time when members of the public could have been
present, particularly in relation to the Marquis Hotel robbery. The robberies were committed in commercial premises, where employees are vulnerable to
robbery. The appellant involved another person in the commission of both crimes. No money was recovered from the Marquis Hotel robbery. Although the second crime was not completed, it involved a second person being disguised and
entering the shop with the appellant.18 Counsel for the respondent submits that by imposing a head sentence of seven years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of three and a half years the total criminality of the offending is reflected and that the imposition of the shortest possible non-parole period takes into account the appellant's prospects for rehabilitation. In the circumstances, she submits the effect of the sentencing orders is a sentence that is not crushing.
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19 Counsel for the appellant, Ms Mainwaring, submitted that whilst there is no tariff as such for armed robbery (see Wood J in Director of Public Prosecutions v Harris [2013] TASCCA 5, 22 TAS R 448 at [15] and Martin AJ in Director of Public Prosecutions v Fletcher-Jones (above) at [36]), the appellant's crimes, whilst serious, were not comparable to more serious examples which received lesser sentences.
20 Counsel for the respondent canvassed the cases that the respondent handed to the learned sentencing judge as guidance and submitted that all three of them involved far more serious offending than the appellant had engaged in.
21 The first case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Fletcher-Jones (above), involved an armed robbery of a hotel with a sawn-off shotgun. The respondent in that, wearing a face covering stood on a bar counter and pointed a firearm into the face of a complainant and aggressively counted down a demand for money. It was noted by a customer that he held his finger on the trigger and hand on the barrel of the weapon whilst in the hotel. He deliberately fired a shot in the direction of the counter and told another staff member to hurry. An amount of $2,500 was stolen.
22 There was a marked difference in that the respondent in that case was significantly younger than the appellant in the present case. However, counsel for the appellant argued, it involved premeditation, a loaded firearm which was directed at people and discharged involving great risk of harm to others. It was noted that the use of a loaded firearm was a particularly aggravating circumstance. The court on appeal in that case set aside the original sentence of three years' imprisonment with a non- parole period of two years and sentenced him to five and a half years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of half.
23 The second case of Streets v Tasmania (above), involved two counts of aggravated armed robbery. Pharmacies were the premises in question. Knives were used. There were two appellants, one was disguised, and one was involved as a lookout on both occasions. On the first count, one appellant approached the pharmacist, walking around the counter showing a knife and demanding drugs, removing them himself. On the second occasion, that appellant, again disguised, approached the pharmacist with a knife demanding drugs. He went behind the counter, moved the pharmacist to the safe and made physical contact with that pharmacist by pushing the knife into his kidney region.
24 The learned sentencing judge in that matter noted that whilst the robbery of a pharmacy whilst armed with a knife in pursuit of drugs of addiction are grave crimes, sentences at the upper end of the range described by Porter J in Braslin v Cowen [2010] TASCCA 1, were not called for. His Honour's single sentence of five years imprisonment with a non-parole period of half for both of those crimes was not considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal to be manifestly excessive.
25 The third case, Hall v Tasmania (above) involved a conviction following a trial on one count of aggravated armed robbery and a plea of guilty to one count of armed robbery.
26 On one count there were two accused wearing disguises and with knives. It involved a hotel and the appellant jumped the bar. Bartenders were confronted and over $8,000 was taken. Civilians had knives pointed at them. The bartenders suffered great emotional and psychological symptoms.
27 The other count involved a newsagency where the appellant again jumped the counter and lunged at an attendant with a knife held over his head pointing it downwards at her. When the owner intervened, he cut him with the knife through two layers of his clothing to his chest. He lunged at him again on a second occasion cutting his clothing over his stomach region.
28 The sentence in that case of seven years and three months with a non-parole period of three years and nine months was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal not to be manifestly excessive.
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Disposition
29 None of the aggravating features pointed to by counsel for the respondent and set out above are, to my mind, unique to the appellant's crimes. Indeed they are often seen as the very hallmarks of armed robbery or aggravated armed robbery.
30 It is true that the appellant had a bad record of relevant prior convictions however, he was not to be sentenced for his record, but simply on the basis that his crimes were not instances of uncharacteristic aberrant conduct.
31 In all of the circumstances I can see no reasonable basis for a sentence of seven years imprisonment in respect of the first armed robbery. Nor can I see any reasonable basis for an overall effective sentence across both crimes of seven years' imprisonment. The setting of an overall non-parole period of three and a half years, (whether the sentencing order was irregular or not), does not, in my view render the sentences any less unfair.
32 These were not the worst of cases. In my view, even bearing in mind what has been said by this Court in cases like Streets v Tasmania (above), Director of Public Prosecutions v Fletcher-Jones (above), and Hall v Tasmania (above) as to the seriousness of the crime of armed robbery of vulnerable premises, the sentences imposed in the present case by the learned sentencing judge were, in my view, in totality, manifestly excessive.
33 For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and set aside the sentence of imprisonment of seven years, with a non-parole period of half that term and the sentence of four years' imprisonment to be served concurrently with the first term, with a non-parole period of half that term. In lieu thereof I would impose a single sentence, for both crimes, of 5 ½ years' imprisonment backdated to 3 February 2020 and order that the respondent be eligible for release on parole after serving half of that sentence.
9 No 4/2022
File No 2152/2021
GRANT-LEE MICHAEL HAWDON v STATE OF TASMANIA
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL JAGO J 29 March 2022 |
34 I have had the benefit of reading the draft judgment of Estcourt J. I agree the appeal should be allowed for the reasons expressed therein. I also agree with the sentence proposed by Estcourt J.
10 No 4/2022
File No 2152/2021
GRANT-LEE MICHAEL HAWDON v STATE OF TASMANIA
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL MARTIN AJ 29 March 2022 |
35 I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Estcourt J. I also agree with the sentence proposed by Estcourt J.
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