Hasnat v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hasnat v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 181

Appeal from: Hasnat v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2560
File number(s): NSD 1214 of 2015
Judge(s): MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 3 March 2016
Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 2011 r 35.13
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2 cl 572.223, Sch 5 cl 5A405(1)(a)

Cases cited: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Date of hearing: 18 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Sophie Given, Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 1214 of 2015
BETWEEN:

MOHAMMED ABUL HASNAT

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

3 MARCH 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for extension of time and leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 24 September 2015 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondents costs

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for extension of time and leave to appeal from a judgment and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) given and made on 24 September 2015 dismissing the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the then Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal): Hasnat v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2560 (Hasnat).

  2. The order of the primary judge dismissing the proceedings was made pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (FCCA Rules). Accordingly it is interlocutory and, pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the applicant requires leave of the Court to appeal.

  3. The time within which an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment must be filed is 14 days from the date of judgment or order: see r 35.13 of Federal Court Rules 2011 (FC Rules). Any application for leave to appeal should have been filed by 8 October 2015. The applicant filed his application for leave to appeal on 12 October 2015 which is 4 days out of time. Accordingly the applicant also needs an order extending the time to seek leave to appeal: see r 35.15 FC Rules.

    BACKGROUND

  4. The applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh.  He applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa on 2 August 2010.  On 14 September 2010, a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refused to grant the visa. 

  5. The applicant then applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision.  A Tribunal (differently…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hasnat v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the applicant, Hasnat, challenging a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia regarding his visa application. The primary judge had dismissed Hasnat's application for judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal, which had refused to grant him a subclass 572 visa due to his failure to meet the financial capacity requirements under cl 5A405 of Schedule 5A. Hasnat sought an extension of time and leave to appeal the primary judge's decision. The legal issues before the court included whether there was sufficient doubt about the primary judge's decision to warrant reconsideration on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused.

The court considered the applicant's explanation for the delay in filing his application for leave to appeal, noting that Hasnat had made an error regarding the time period but had filed his application within 21 days instead of the required 14 days. The court found that the explanation for the delay was adequate, especially since the delay was brief. Additionally, the Minister did not demonstrate any prejudice from the short delay, but argued that the application was without merit and that the primary judge's decision did not contain jurisdictional error. The court examined the grounds of appeal and found them to be insufficiently particularised or substantiated, particularly as the primary judge had considered the available evidence during the hearing.

The court concluded that the applicant's application for an extension of time and leave to appeal should be dismissed. It found that the explanation for the delay was reasonable and that the application did not meet the criteria for reconsideration on appeal. The court also ordered that Hasnat pay the costs of the first respondent. This decision underscores the importance of timely filings and the necessity for clear and specific grounds of appeal in immigration matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for extension of time and leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia given on 24 September 2015 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondents costs

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Division 2 of Sch 5A sets out a number of requirements including, at cl 5A405, requirements relating to financial capacity. The primary judge summarised those requirements as they relate to the applicant at [5] of his judgment:Clause 5A405 of Schedule 5A to the Regulations prescribed certain requirements relating to financial capacity for assessment level 4. Relevant to the application before the Court are the requirements specified in paragraph 1(a) of cl 5A405. That paragraph required the applicant to provide evidence that the applicant has “funds from an acceptable source” that are sufficient to meet three classes of expenses for the first 36 months, these being course fees, living costs, and school costs. Also relevant is paragraph 1(b) of cl 5A405 which required the applicant to provide evidence that the applicant had funds from an acceptable source that are sufficient to meet travel costs. The expressions “course fees” for an applicant in relation to a period is defined in cl 5A101 to mean “the fees for each course proposed to be undertaken by the applicant in the period, as indicated by the proposed education providers in a letter or other document”. The expression living costs in relation to assessments other than levels 1, 2, and 3 is defined in cl 5A104 to mean, among other things, an amount specified by the Minister in an instrument in writing for that clause (the basic rate). The relevant instrument is IMMI 09/138, which commenced on 1 January 2010. It specified AUD18,000 as the basic rate. The expression “funds from an acceptable source” is defined in subclause 5A405(2) to mean, among other things, “a money deposit that an acceptable individual has held for at least 6 months before the date of the application”. The expression “acceptable person” is defined to mean, among other things, the applicant or the applicant's parents.THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal identified the applicant’s assessment level for subclass 572 as assessment level 4 and relevantly identified that the evidentiary requirements for that assessment level were set out in Pt 4 of Sch 5A. The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant met the requirements of cl 5A404(a) relating to English language ability. The Tribunal then considered the requirements of cl 5A405(1)(a) relating to financial capacity. By cl 5A405(1)(a), the applicant had to demonstrate that he had “funds from an acceptable source” sufficient to meet the specified expenses for the first 36 months of the visa. The term “funds from an acceptable source” included a money deposit that an “acceptable individual” has held for at least 6 months immediately before the date of the application. An “acceptable individual” was defined to include, among others, an applicant’s parents or siblings. The Tribunal discussed the relevant expenses at the time of the hearing with the applicant by reference to an assessment of remaining course fees, living costs and travel costs. Based on the evidence provided by the applicant the Tribunal found that:(1)the funds held by the applicant’s father were no longer available;(2)the funds held in bank accounts by the applicant’s mother and sister and by the applicant were insufficient to meet the relevant expenses. That was so even if they were combined with the father’s funds which were no longer available.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant has not provided a draft notice of appeal nor has he filed any written submissions. When invited to do so at the hearing, the applicant declined to make any oral submissions in support of his application. CONSIDERATION A grant of leave to appeal will be made where it is established that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal and where substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision of the primary judge to be wrong: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at [398]-[399]. In relation to the question of the grant of an extension of time for the filing of the application for leave to appeal the Court will consider the explanation for the delay and whether the test to which the Court has regard in relation to the application for leave to appeal has sufficient prospects of being satisfied to warrant granting the extension. As a practical matter, the consideration of the test for leave to appeal and the question that arises in relation to the merits of the proposed appeal for an extension of time are no different. The explanation advanced by the applicant for the delay is that he made a mistake about the period within which he had to file his application for leave to appeal believing it to be 21 days, rather than 14 days. The applicant is not represented and, given that he filed his application within the 21 day period, in my view the applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the delay. Further, the delay is for a short period of 4 days. The Minister cannot point to any prejudice caused by an extension of time but submits that the application is sufficiently without merit as to not warrant leave being granted. The Minister also submits that the Court is unlikely to be satisfied that sufficient doubt attends the decision of the primary judge to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal. I turn then to a consideration of the grounds raised by the applicant in his application for extension of time and leave to appeal and in his affidavit affirmed on 5 October 2015. The ground included in the applicant’s application asserts error on the part of the primary judge in finding that there was no jurisdictional error in the decision of the Tribunal. It does not specify the nature of the error. In the absence of particulars, this ground cannot be sustained. The first ground raised by the applicant in his affidavit suggests that the primary judge did not give any weight to the supporting documents which the applicant provided to the Court. A copy of the transcript of the hearing before the primary judge has been filed with the Court. In relation to the material that was before the primary judge at the hearing of the applicant’s application the following exchange took place:HIS HONOUR: ….So in terms of the documents, you have filed an application.Mr HASNAT: Yes.HIS HONOUR: And there is an affidavit, which simply attaches the decision of the – is it just the Migration, or the Migration Review Tribunal. Now, in terms of the documents you have filed, that’s it, isn’t it? You have filed no other documents?Mr HASNAT: No. I’m – it’s - - -HIS HONOUR: All right. Now, the Minister has prepared a bundle of documents headed Court Book.Mr HASNAT: This one. Yes.HIS HONOUR: And do you have any objections to my receiving the documents in the court book into evidence?Mr HASNAT: No.HIS HONOUR: All right. So the court book will be marked exhibit CB.HIS HONOUR: Now, is there any other material you wish to put to the court today, apart from - - -Mr HASNAT: No.HIS HONOUR: - - - submissions you wish to make?Mr HASNAT: That’s all.HIS HONOUR: All right. Now, Ms Given, that’s the evidentiary material, isn’t it?Ms Given: That’s so.