DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Haskins v Gold City Council & Anor [2003] QDC 551
PARTIES:
LORRAINE LILLINA HASKINS
Applicant
v
GOLD COAST CITY COUNCIL
First Respondent
And
GREBAB NOMINEES PTY LTD
(ACN 23005166405)
Second RespondentFILE NO:
BD 3853/03
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
9 December 2003
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
21 November 2003
JUDGE:
Robin QC DCJ
ORDER:
Application dismissed
CATCHWORDS:
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 – application by would-be plaintiff (injured December 1999) for relief under s 18(1)(c), s 43(1), s 59(2) and s 77D(2) – plaintiff was out of time under Limitation of Actions Act 1974 – against first respondent she had not even given s 9 notice of claim within 3 years of incident resulting in injury –first respondent acknowledged notice of claim was compliant in March 2003, second respondent had waived further compliance in February 2003 – applicant failed to start any proceeding within the six months allowed thereafter
COUNSEL:
Mr M Horvath for the Applicant
Mr Howe for the 1st Respondent
Mr Liddy for the 2nd RespondentSOLICITORS:
Parker Simmonds for the Applicant
O’Keefe Mahoney Bennett for the 1st Respondent
Barry & Nilsson for the 2nd Respondent
By s 6 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (PIPA), the Act applies in relation to all personal injury arising out of an incident whether happening before, on or after 18 June 2002. The Act, other than s 58 (which precludes jury trials), does not apply to personal injury in relation to which a proceeding was started before that date. Had the applicant started a proceeding in respect of personal injury she says she suffered in a fall on the footpath outside the Miami Newsagency on the Gold Coast at about 7 am on 31 December 1999 by 18 June 2002, she would not have come within the regime of the PIPA. At that date, the common three year limitation period still had a little over six months to run.
Section 4 identifies the main purpose of the PIPA as to assist the ongoing affordability of insurance through appropriate and sustainable awards of damages for personal injury, a purpose to be achieved by, among other things:
(a) providing a procedure for the speedy resolution of claims for damages for personal injury to which the Act applies; and
(b) promoting settlement of claims at an early stage wherever possible;
(c) ensuring the person may not start a proceeding in a court based on a claim without being fully prepared for resolution of the claim by settlement or trial; and also (among other things) minimising the costs of claims.
Various provisions of the PIPA prevent a would-be plaintiff from starting a proceeding in a court based on a claim until certain things have been done. Thus, s 9 requires that a written notice of claim in the approved form must be given to the person against whom the proceeding is proposed to be started – following which the recipient…
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- Case
- [2003] QDC 551
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant could be granted relief under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002, despite being outside the time limits specified by the Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The court needed to examine if the statutory provisions could be applied in light of the applicant's procedural non-compliance, particularly regarding the notice of claim and the initiation of proceedings within the stipulated time frame.
In dismissing the application, the court held that the statutory provisions were not sufficiently flexible to allow the applicant's claims to proceed. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory deadlines and procedural requirements, noting that the legislative intent was to enforce strict compliance. The court found that the applicant had not met the necessary conditions to invoke relief under the relevant sections of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002.
Consequently, the court dismissed the application, affirming that the statutory provisions could not be invoked due to the applicant's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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