Hashmi & Mamund
[2025] FedCFamC2F 833
•20 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Hashmi & Mamund [2025] FedCFamC2F 833
File number(s): DGC 2412 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE JENKINS Date of judgment: 20 June 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – leave out of time – sufficient likelihood of success – hardship – delay – hardship to wife outweighs any prejudice to the husband – leave granted. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 44(3), 79 Cases cited: Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 11
Biltoft & Biltoft (1995) FLC 92-614
Cahill & Cahill (2006) FLC 93-253
Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154
Hardwick & Hardwick [2022] FedCFamC1A 179
Hickey & Hickey & Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FamCA 395
Jabour & Jabour [2019] FamCAFC 78
Jacenko & Jacenko (1986) FLC 91-776
Lee Steere & Lee Steere [1985] FamCA 57
Omacini & Omacini [2005] FamCA 195
Sahrawi & Hadrami (2018) FLC 93-857
Skelton & Lindop (2022) 64 Fam LR 617
Division: Division 2 Family Law Number of paragraphs: 84 Date of hearing: 6 June 2025 Place: Dandenong – via Microsoft Teams Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Whitchurch Solicitor for the Applicant: RRR Lawyers Representative for the Respondent: Appearing in person ORDERS
DGC 2412 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MS HASHMI
Applicant
AND: MR MAMUND
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE JENKINS
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant wife be granted leave to issue property proceedings out of time pursuant to section 44(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
2.The matter otherwise be listed before a Judicial Registrar on a date to be fixed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE JENKINS:
This is an application by the applicant wife Ms Hashmi (“the wife”) to proceed with a property application out of time. The respondent husband Mr Mamund (“the husband”) opposes that application.
The parties divorced in 2022. The wife filed her application for a property division in July 2024, although she did not seek leave out of time until she amended that application in May 2025.
The wife was about 15 months out of time when she filed her original application.
If successful, the wife seeks to join the husband’s parents whom she alleges own property in which the parties have an interest. I shall refer to them as the father-in-law and mother-in-law for ease of reference.
BRIEF BACKGROUND
The wife was born in India, and the husband in Country B.
The husband moved to Australia in late 1998.
The parties met on a dating website in or about late 2014, when the wife was still living in India.
The wife’s evidence is that the husband proposed in early 2015 but it was not until she visited him in Australia in late 2015 that she agreed to marry him.
The parties married in Melbourne, Australia, in 2016.
The wife has a daughter C (“C”) from a previous relationship, now aged 13 years old.
The husband has a daughter D (“D”) from a previous relationship who is now aged 15 years old. I understand that during the parties’ relationship that D lived with her mother and spent alternate weekends with the parties.
The parties in this matter have no children together.
At the time of the marriage, the wife was working as a professional in India.
In early 2016, the wife returned to India with C – she says she “still had pending work in India.”[1] In any event, the wife did not appear to have had the requisite visa to remain in Australia at that time.
[1] Wife’s affidavit filed 10 July 2024 at [33].
The wife and C moved to live in Australia in early 2017. The wife ceased paid employment on immigrating to Australia.
The husband says the parties separated under the one roof in 2018.
It is common ground the parties physically separated on 2 March 2020.
The parties were divorced in 2022.
The wife filed her application initiating these proceedings on 10 July 2024.
THE CONDUCT OF THESE PROCEEDINGS
This matter proceeded by way of submissions and was heard using Microsoft Teams.
Unfortunately, there were numerous disruptions to the proceedings, primarily due to the husband’s internet “bandwidth.” Ultimately, the matter had to proceed with the husband participating by way of audio only. The husband still appeared to have difficulties connecting to the hearing. However, in the end, I am satisfied that this did not affect the fair running of the hearing.
DOCUMENTS RELIED UPON
The wife relied upon the documents set out in her outline of case filed 3 June 2025, being:
·her further amended initiating application filed 9 May 2025;
·her affidavit filed 9 May 2025;
·her affidavit filed 3 September 2024;
·her affidavit filed 10 July 2024; and
·her financial statement filed 10 July 2024.
The husband relied upon:
·his response to initiating application filed 22 January 2025;
·his affidavit filed 22 January 2025; and
·his affidavit filed on 29 May 2025.
During the proceedings, reference was also made to the husband’s financial statement filed 22 January 2025.
Otherwise, the parties relied upon pages 94 and 96 of a tender bundle provided to the court. I have not read any other documents within that tender bundle.
THE LAW
Applications seeking an interlocutory order under section 44(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) are generally dealt with on the basis that the applicant’s evidence is presumed to be correct “unless it is inherently unbelievable or contradictory,” per Jacenko & Jacenko (1986) FLC 91-776 at [14].
For the most part, the husband’s submissions concerned matters he disputed rather than matters in the wife’s evidence that were inherently unbelievable or inconsistent. The inconsistencies he did rely upon were not such that I formed the view her evidence as a whole was not reliable. For example, he pointed out that the wife said the parties cohabited from their marriage in 2016, yet she simultaneously says she returned to India after the marriage and did not permanently relocate until early 2017. I am prepared to infer from this, that the wife’s reference to cohabitation was that the relationship commenced from that point, rather than the parties lived together consistently from that time. I also noted other obvious inconsistencies in the wife’s affidavit, such as the wife asserts that E Street, Suburb F (“the Suburb F property”) remains in the father-in-law’s name whilst also stating it was in the mother-in-law’s name,[2] and that G Street, Town H (“the Town H property”) was purchased in the father- in-law’s name but later says it was bought by the family trust.[3] I have given careful consideration to these inconsistencies, however, I am not of the view I ought to reject the wife’s evidence entirely.
[2] Wife’s affidavit filed 9 May 2025 (“Wife’s May affidavit”) at [110] and [144].
[3] Wife’s May affidavit at [110] and [144].
THE LEGISLATION
Section 44 of the Act states as follows:
Limitation on applications relating to certain maintenance and property proceedings
(3) Where, whether before or after the commencement of section 21 of the Family Law Amendment Act 1983:
(a) a divorce order has taken effect; or
(b) a decree of nullity of marriage has been made;
proceedings of a kind referred to in paragraph (c), (caa), (ca) or (cb) of the definition of matrimonial cause in subsection 4(1) (not being proceedings under section 78 or 79A or proceedings seeking the discharge, suspension, revival or variation of an order previously made in proceedings with respect to the maintenance of a party) shall not be instituted, except by leave of the court in which the proceedings are to be instituted or with the consent of both of the parties to the marriage, after the expiration of 12 months after:
(c) in a case referred to in paragraph (a)—the date on which the divorce order took effect; or
(d) in a case referred to in paragraph (b)—the date of the making of the decree.
The court may grant such leave at any time, even if the proceedings have already been instituted.
…
(4) The court shall not grant leave under subsection (3) or (3A) unless it is satisfied:
(a) that hardship would be caused to a party to the relevant marriage or a child if leave were not granted; or
(b) in the case of proceedings in relation to the maintenance of a party to a marriage—that, at the end of the period within which the proceedings could have been instituted without the leave of the court, the circumstances of the applicant were such that the applicant would have been unable to support himself or herself without an income tested pension, allowance or benefit.
….
(Emphasis added)
The Full Court in Hardwick & Hardwick [2022] FedCFamC1A 179 (“Hardwick”) identified the two competing principles of public policy under section 44 of the Act at [23]:
The first is that the Commonwealth Parliament has stated that, ordinarily, such proceedings should be commenced within 12 months of the date of the divorce. The second is that relief from the operation of s 44 of the Act should nonetheless be granted out of time in order to avoid hardship to a spouse or a child of the relationship.
At [27] of Hardwick the court identified:
The applicant for relief’s prospects of success in the proceedings, if leave is granted, is relevant to both the question of hardship and the second task undertaken by the Court, which is to consider matters going to the exercise of discretion generally. This is because “[if] the probable result of the hearing on the merits is that hardship is not likely to be alleviated, then the Court cannot be satisfied that the applicant would suffer hardship if leave were not granted”: V and S [2006] FCWA 2 (“V and S”), per Thackray J at [6].
The Full Court subsequently at [28] affirmed the reasoning of Austin J in Skelton & Lindop (2022) 64 Fam LR 617 as to the test to apply in determining prospects of success, namely, that there is a “sufficient likelihood of success” to prove hardship.
In terms of the discretionary matters, the Full Court in Hardwick said at [29]:
…in addition to prospects of success, other potentially relevant considerations to the exercise of discretion may include the following:
•The extent of the delay and the reasons (or absence of reasons) for the delay: Althaus & Althaus (1982) FLC 91-233;
•The extent of the hardship the applicant would experience if leave were not granted: Carlon & Carlon (1982) FLC 91-272; and
•The extent of the prejudice that would be caused to the respondent if leave were granted.
SUFFICIENT LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
To determine the wife’s likelihood of success, I must turn to the legislative pathway to be followed when considering whether there ought to be an order for a property division.
The relevant legal principles governing any application for property settlement are set out in Part VIII of the Act. Section 79(1) of the Act authorises the court to make such orders between the parties as it considers appropriate. Section 79(2) of the Act makes it clear that the court cannot make an order for property settlement unless it is just and equitable to do so.
Earlier Full Court authorities have identified a four-step process that can assist the court in reaching a just and equitable decision: see Lee Steere & Lee Steere [1985] FamCA 57; Hickey & Hickey & Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FamCA 395; and Omacini & Omacini [2005] FamCA 195.
The court must identify the parties’ legal and equitable interests in the assets arising from their relationship, together with their liabilities. The court should then assess each party’s contributions during the relationship in accordance with sections 79(4)(a), 79(4)(b) and 79(4)(c) of the Act.
The third step requires the court to consider the range of factors set out in sections 79(4)(d), 79(4)(e), 79(4)(f) and 79(4)(g) of the Act, including the future needs factors identified in section 75(2) of the Act. The court should also then consider its findings and, if the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so, make orders adjusting the parties’ property interests.
The Full Court in Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 11, in the joint judgment of Bryant CJ and Thackray J, reminded trial judges that the four-step process is not legislatively mandated. Rather, it provides a structured process towards the ultimate requirement which is to ensure that a property settlement order is only made when the court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so, and that the terms of the order itself are also just and equitable.
THE ASSET POOL
The wife’s evidence concerning the asset pool is as follows:
The Suburb K property
The wife says the husband purchased vacant land at J Street, Suburb K (“the Suburb K property”) in or about mid-2015. The wife says that during the relationship she maintained the land including clearing bushes, removing stables and spraying weeds.
The wife says the husband transferred the property to Mamund Family Superannuation Pty Ltd on 3 March 2022. It appears, based on the husband’s submissions, that the Mamund family established a self-managed superannuation fund (“the super fund”), and that Mamund Family Superannuation Pty Ltd is the trustee, although this was certainly not made clear in the evidence. The wife makes a number of references in her evidence to a “family trust” which appears to be reference to the super fund. The husband told the court there is no family trust.
The Suburb F property
The wife says the husband and father-in-law purchased the Suburb F property on a date in 2007, and that in February 2016, the husband transferred this property to the father-in-law to avoid the property falling into the hands of the husband’s ex-wife, as they had not yet finalised their property division in this court.
The Suburb M property
The wife says the husband purchased a property at L Street, Suburb M (“the Suburb M property”) in her name in late 2016, and that she was told it was a gift to her for the marriage, and to give her some security. Despite this, the wife says the property was sold in early 2018.
The Town O property
The wife says a property at N Street, Town O (“the Town O property”) was purchased by “the family trust” in early 2018. This property was comprised of land and a farmhouse. The parties moved to live in this property, and the wife says that she maintained the property and the farmhouse. The property was then sold to a third party in mid-2019.
The Town H property
The wife’s evidence is that the father-in-law purchased the Town H property in late 2017 and that it remains in his name, although, as already discussed, she also says the property was placed in “the family trust”.
The Suburb Q property
The wife says a property at P Street, Suburb Q (“the Suburb Q property”) was purchased by “the family trust” in early 2022.
She says the husband had offered to buy her a home at about the time the Suburb Q property was purchased and that she inspected several properties.
The wife’s evidence is that the husband then texted her saying he had purchased the home for C. However, the property was ultimately sold to a third party in mid-2024.
The Suburb S property
The wife’s evidence is that the husband acquired a property in his name at R Street, Suburb S (“the Suburb S property”) post-separation on 22 August 2022. The father-in-law has placed a caveat on the property. The husband says this property was purchased entirely from borrowed funds.
The Suburb U property
The father-in-law purchased a property at T Street, Suburb U (“the Suburb U property”) in 2008. The property remains in his name. The wife’s evidence is that the husband said he had “some ownership” in the property.
The super fund
The husband’s evidence is that in 2023, he was forced to roll his benefit in the super fund into Super Fund 1, as the wife was making the running of the fund impossible due to placing caveats over the real property in that fund. The husband says the value of his Super Fund 1 fund account is now $711,103.
Other property
The husband asserts that the wife has substantial assets hidden in India, including gold. He has provided no evidence to support this assertion.
ASSESSMENT OF THE POOL
Even taking the wife’s case at its highest, it is difficult to say with any certainty how big the pool may be. The wife makes various inconsistent statements about the ownership of property, and does not particularise how she has an interest in properties that are owned by third parties. However, taking a conservative approach to the asset pool (and excluding day to day bank accounts and items such as household contents, laptops, and tools) I assess the pool to be as follows:
The Suburb S Property $430,000 The husband’s Motor Vehicle 1 $2,000 The husband’s superannuation $711,103 The wife’s Motor Vehicle 2 $30,000 The wife’s superannuation $2,000 TOTAL $1,175,103
I note this does not include various debts claimed by the husband, who bears the onus of proving that these liabilities exist and are referrable to the marriage.[4] In this regard, the husband has filed no evidence to support the existence of such debts, and his version of events in his affidavits is inconsistent. For example, in the husband’s first affidavit, he asserts that he purchased the Suburb S property using funds borrowed from his father.[5] However, in his second affidavit he says he borrowed from “family/friends.”[6]
[4] See authorities such as Biltoft & Biltoft (1995) FLC 92-614; Sahrawi & Hadrami (2018) FLC 93-857 at [39]; and Cahill & Cahill (2006) FLC 93-253 at [54]).
[5] Husband’s affidavit filed 22 January 2025 (“Husband’s January affidavit”) at [38].
[6] Husband’s May affidavit at [9].
Contributions
On the wife’s evidence, the parties were married for about four years before their physical separation.
The wife’s evidence is that during the relationship the husband was the primary income earner and the wife was the homemaker and carer of the children.
The wife says that the husband discouraged her from working, and ultimately did not allow her to work during the period of cohabitation. Although, it is difficult to reconcile this with the wife’s evidence that the husband and his business partner enrolled her in a course to complete her qualifications, and later enrolled her at university.
As already discussed, the wife’s evidence is that she made direct contributions to the Suburb K and Town O properties. On the wife’s evidence she also made indirect contributions to the other properties by way of her role as homemaker and carer of the children. Although, the wife has not made direct contributions to the Suburb S property, or the husband’s superannuation, the authorities make it clear that all contributions are to be taken into account, and there need not be a direct connection between the contribution and the assets available for division.[7]
[7] See authorities such as Jabour & Jabour [2019] FamCAFC 78 and Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154.
Section 75(2) Factors
The wife says she has not worked in her profession since she came to Australia, and that due to the passage of time, she would require significant retraining to be able to return to work as a professional. The wife says that although she was able to obtain a certificate which enabled her to work as a community worker, she had to cease this work due to her car accident. She now works as an educator, however, is on a minimal income and relies on the family tax benefit. Based on the wife’s financial statement, the wife’s current expenses outweigh her income. The wife says that in contrast to her situation, the husband worked as a professional throughout the marriage, and that he continues to have a significantly higher earning capacity through the ability to run his own business.
The husband says he has not earned a significant income for about eight years. He says this was due to his care responsibilities for C during the relationship, and that subsequent to the marriage, despite working “tirelessly,” he has found himself in a “financial struggle,” unable to support himself adequately and only earning between $20,000 and $40,000 per year.[8] However, it is unclear why, since 2020, the husband has only attempted to work as a handyman rather than in his profession. I also note that the husband failed to disclose in his financial statement that he is currently receiving rent from the Suburb S property (which he conceded he was receiving during this hearing) and that the financial statement is also inconsistent with his affidavit filed in January 2025, in which the husband says the property has always been rented out.[9]
[8] Husband’s January affidavit at [50].
[9] Husband’s January affidavit at [38].
The husband also says that he has various health issues, including several medical conditions and mental health issues, which have “profoundly diminished the [husband’s] ability to lead a normal life, let alone maintain any meaningful employment”. [10] The husband relied on medical records from his GP however there was nothing in this material which corroborated his inability to obtain “meaningful employment.”[11]
[10] Husband’s January affidavit at [48].
[11] Husband’s January affidavit at [48].
The husband’s evidence is that as a result of his lack of income, since 2020 he has lived in his van. Although when asked about this during the hearing, the husband said that for a period he did board with his parents and now lives in a shed. Leaving aside the inconsistencies in his assertions, the husband offered no explanation as to why he could not still board with his parents or obtain more suitable accommodation.
ASSESSMENT AS TO LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
The husband argues that the wife does not have a sufficient likelihood of success in this matter as the relationship was very short, on his case from April 2017 until separation under the one roof in 2018, and that the marriage was for visa purposes only. Furthermore, he says he has already paid her $80,000 and it would not be just and equitable to make any further payments.
However, even on the husband’s evidence there is reason to believe there was more to the marriage than just to obtain a visa. I note the husband says that he treated C as his own child, both during the relationship and after separation. The husband also states that “after seeing the attitude of Applicant, the respondent decided to disolve [sic] future with applicant and dispose and pay off loans etc. The balance of all proceeds went to superannuation.”[12] This appears to suggest that the husband considered, at least at one point, that the parties had a future together.
[12] Husband’s January affidavit at [36].
On the limited evidence available and taking a conservative approach to the wife’s contributions, I am of the view that there is a sufficient likelihood the court would make orders for a property division, and that she would receive at least 10 per cent of the pool based on her contributions, and another 10 per cent for future needs, being 20 per cent in total. Based on the current pool, this would equate to about $235,020.60, less the wife’s car and superannuation of $32,000, meaning that her entitlement would be $203,020.60.
If the husband’s house in Suburb S were to be fully encumbered, then the wife would be entitled to $149,020.60, less her car and superannuation of $32,000, being $117,020.60.
In all of the circumstances, I find the wife would suffer hardship if she was deprived of the opportunity to obtain such a property division.
DISCRETIONARY MATTERS
Delay
As the parties were divorced in 2022, the wife had until April 2023 to bring her application for property division. She initiated the proceedings in July 2024, being about 15 months out of time.
The wife says that in 2020/2021 she was not in a mental state to pursue a settlement with the husband. The wife’s evidence is that she had suffered significant family violence during the marriage, including sexual assault and strangulation. The wife says this led to her taking out an intervention order, which was finalised in early 2021 and lasted three years. Along with this, the wife says she had to find housing and employment, and had no immediate family in Australia to assist her.
Furthermore, in 2021 the wife’s father passed away, which the wife says had a “profound” effect on her.[13] This was compounded by her inability to be at his funeral in India due to COVID restrictions.
[13] Wife’s May affidavit at [25(c)] – [25(d)].
The wife says that in June 2022, she consulted a lawyer who requested disclosure from the husband without success. The wife says the husband’s lack of disclosure hindered her ability to assess her entitlement to bring a property application.
It appears that at the end of 2022 the husband transferred to the wife two sums of money, being $43,000 and $7,000.[14] I note the husband says he gave her assets of approximately $80,000. [15]
[14] Wife’s May affidavit at [174].
[15] Husband’s January affidavit at [40].
The wife’s evidence is that the process of resolving property matters stalled in February 2023, when she was in a serious car accident which resulted in hospitalisation. Thereafter her lawyers wrote to the husband on 18 April 2023, 1 May 2023 and 1 June 2023, although, I note by the time the first letter was sent, the wife was already out of time.
In September 2023, the wife endeavoured to arrange a dispute resolution conference with the husband. In October 2023, the wife’s lawyers engaged V Centre through Victoria Legal Aid to conduct the conference. On 10 November 2023, the wife was told that V Centre had had no response from the husband. On 8 December 2023, the husband advised V Centre that he was unable to attend dispute resolution until January 2024, due to family circumstances. The parties finally attended a mediation in May 2024 which was unsuccessful. The wife issued these proceedings two months later in July 2024.
The husband did not make any submissions that went to the issue of the wife’s delay.
In all of these circumstances, including that the husband participated in the mediation process beyond the time limit and does not appear to have raised the issue of the wife being out of time, I find that the wife’s delay in filing her application was not unreasonable.
Extent of the hardship the wife would experience
As already discussed, on the wife’s evidence she is unable to meet her expenses from her current income and needs to re-train before she could apply for positions, such as a professional, which she performed prior to the marriage of the parties. As a result, the wife is living with her daughter in public housing provided by a charity organisation. She otherwise has no immediate family in Australia on whom she can rely. As a consequence, the wife is likely to suffer significant hardship if she is not permitted to pursue her application for a property division.
Prejudice to the husband
At [30] of Hardwick the court said as follows:
In Frost & Nicholson (1981) FLC 91-051 (“Frost & Nicholson”) at 76,425, Nygh J said that prejudice, in this context, “means that a party is faced with an action which he or she had no reason to expect or had been led to believe would not be brought”. However, in Atwill & Atwill (1981) FLC 91-107 (“Atwill & Atwill”) at 76,794, Nygh J stated that the relevant prejudice would need to be “distinctly observable hardship, such as financial commitments made on the basis that no liability existed”. It appears to us that the extent of any prejudice is simply one of the relevant factors to consider and that Nygh J’s comments in these two cases should be read as descriptive of circumstances where prejudice is likely to be a weighty factor, not a test for the relevance of evidence of prejudice. Additionally, in Atwill & Atwill, his Honour also pointed out that the fact that the respondent will suffer prejudice does not necessarily mean that the discretion will be exercised in their favour.
(Emphasis added)
The husband argued that he would be prejudiced if the wife was permitted to pursue her property division because:
·The wife is far more qualified than he is, as he has only a higher school certificate whilst the wife has tertiary qualifications;
·He has no money and is homeless; and
·He has significant health issues including several medical conditions and mental health issues.
However, leaving aside whether the evidence supports the husband’s assertions, all of these factors appear to have been more or less the same back in 2022/2023, when the wife was not barred from bringing her application.
Furthermore, the husband could not reasonably argue that he went about his life believing that the matter had been resolved. Although he provided the wife with lump sum payments after separation, on his case amounting to about $80,000, he participated in the mediation process beyond those payments. Furthermore, although he now says that payment has left him unable to obtain a lawyer, this would have been no different if the wife issued proceedings immediately prior to April 2023.
The only real prejudice the husband could argue is that the passage of time has affected his ability to run his case. However, the delay is of such short duration that any such prejudice would be outweighed by the hardship that the wife would suffer if she were not permitted to bring her application.
Accordingly, I determine that the wife shall be granted leave to proceed with her application for a property division out of time pursuant to section 44(3) of the Act.
For all the aforementioned reasons, I make the orders as set out at the commencement of this judgment.
I certify that the preceding eighty-four (84) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Jenkins. Associate:
Dated: 20 June 2025
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