Harts Australia Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police
[1997] FCA 407
•23 MAY 1997
CATCHWORDS
SEARCH WARRANTS - consideration of validity of search warrant issued pursuant to s 3E of Part 1AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) - whether in issuing a warrant under s 3E(1) of the Crimes Act the issuing officer must be satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is at the relevant premises any “evidential material” - whether s 3E(5)(a) of the Crimes Act requires the issuing officer to state expressly in the warrant the offence - whether s 3E(5)(c) of the Crimes Act requires the issuing officer to state in the warrant the kinds of evidential material to be searched for under the warrant - whether the warrant as issued did not so state those kinds of “evidential material”.
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), ss 3(1), 3C(1), 3D(2), 3E(1), 3E(5)(a), 3E(5)(c), 3E(6), 3F(e), 3H(1), 10(1) and Part 1AA
Crimes (Search Warrants and Powers of Arrest) Amendment Act 1994 (Cth)
Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth)
George v Rocket (1990) 170 CLR 104, considered and distinguished
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 141 ALR 618, distinguished
Ozzie Discount Software (Aust) Pty Ltd v Muling (1996) 86 ACrimR 387, distinguished
Leach v Money Watson & Blackmore (1765) 19 State Tr 1001, referred to
Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029, referred to
Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1991) 103 ALR 167, referred to
Dunesky v Elder (1994) 126 ALR 522, referred to
Propend Finance Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1995) 128 ALR 657, referred to
Grollo v Macauley (1995) 56 FCR 533, referred to
The Queen v Tillett (1960) 14 FLR 101, considered
Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334, considered
HARTS AUSTRALIA LTD AND HARTS PTY LTD & ANOR v THE COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE & ORS
QG 209 of 1996
HILL, COOPER & WHITLAM JJ
BRISBANE
23 MAY 1997
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. QG 209 of 1997 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE
OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: HARTS AUSTRALIA LIMITED
HARTS PTY LTD
First AppellantsSTEVEN IRVINE HART
ROBERT THOMAS ADCOCK
ASTION PTY LTD
Second AppellantsAND: THE COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
First RespondentMICHAEL JOHN MORRIS
Second RespondentWILLIAM JOSEPH McKAY
Third RespondentCORAM: HILL, COOPER & WHITLAM JJ PLACE: BRISBANE DATED: 23 MAY 1997
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be dismissed.
The appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) ) QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. QG 209 of 1997 ) GENERAL DIVISION )
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE
OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: HARTS AUSTRALIA LIMITED
HARTS PTY LTD
First AppellantsSTEVEN IRVINE HART
ROBERT THOMAS ADCOCK
ASTION PTY LTD
Second AppellantsAND: THE COMMISSIONER, AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
First RespondentMICHAEL JOHN MORRIS
Second RespondentWILLIAM JOSEPH McKAY
Third RespondentCORAM: HILL, COOPER & WHITLAM JJ PLACE: BRISBANE DATED: 23 MAY 1997
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The appellants, Harts Australia Limited, Harts Pty Ltd, Mr Steven Irvine Hart, Mr Robert Thomas Adcock and Astion Pty Ltd, with leave, appeal from the judgment of a judge of this Court declaring that a search warrant issued on 6 September 1996 by the third respondent, Mr William Joseph McKay, an issuing officer within the meaning of s 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“the Act”), complied with the formal requirements of Part 1AA of the Act and was valid on its face. Leave to appeal was subsequently granted by the learned primary judge on 29 November 1996, subject to certain conditions, which conditions are unnecessary to state.
A copy of the warrant deleting certain explanatory material appended to it, is annexed to these reasons.
THE PROCEEDINGS AT FIRST INSTANCE
Before the learned primary judge the validity of the warrant was attacked on three grounds.
First it was contended that s 3E(1) of the Act, on its proper construction, only authorised the issue of a warrant in circumstances in which the issuing officer was satisfied by information on oath that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that there was, at the premises in question, any “evidential material”, an expression which it was said could only be satisfied where the issuing officer on reasonable grounds believed (as opposed to suspected) that the material in question would afford evidence of the commission of an offence. Because the warrant did not refer to any belief on the part of the magistrate that the material would afford evidence of the commission of stated offences, it was submitted that the warrant was invalid on its face.
In support of the submission, the pivotal decision of the High Court in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104 at 111, a decision on a Queensland provision in terms substantially the same as s 10(1) of the Act, in place of which section the present Part 1AA entitled “Search Warrants And Powers of Arrest” was inserted, was relied upon.
The second submission relied upon before his Honour was that the warrant was invalid on its face because it failed to contain a statement as required by s 3E(5)(a) of the Act of the offence to which the warrant related, notwithstanding that it mentioned offences in the third condition of the warrant.
The third submission was that the warrant failed to comply with s 3E(5)(c) in so far as it did not contain a description of “the kinds of evidential material” that were required to be searched for under the warrant.
The learned primary judge rejected each of these submissions. The first submission his Honour rejected as contrary to the language of the present Part. It was an attempt, his Honour said, to import into the present provisions requirements that had existed in the previous provisions of s10(1), notwithstanding that the language of the legislation had altered.
As to the second submission his Honour was of the view that the warrant made it "clear enough" that the offences described in the third condition of the warrant delineating the evidentiary materials for which permission was given to search, were the offences to which the warrant related. It was not suggested before his Honour, nor before us, that the actual specifications of offences were defective, for example because they lacked detail as to dates of commission, persons involved, and the like. The submission which was rejected was merely that the statement of the offence to which the warrant related had to be express rather than capable of being ascertained by inference.
Finally, his Honour rejected the third submission holding that the warrant did not amount to a general warrant authorising an unlimited search, but did indeed state the kinds of materials of which the warrant authorised search sufficient to comply with the provisions of Part 1AA of the Act.
THE MATTERS ARGUED ON APPEAL
The grounds of appeal as filed dealt additionally with two other matters not raised in the judgment below. These matters were, however, not pressed on appeal.
Nor was the first submission as put to his Honour pressed. In its place there was substituted a submission based upon the expression “evidential material” as used in the warrant. Shortly stated, it was said that the warrant adopted the wrong test of what was “evidential material”, as that expression was used in the Act. It was said that the third condition which formed part of the explanation of the relevant “evidential material” to which the warrant related, referred to “things as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they will afford evidence as to the commission of” certain stated offences. However, material does not, it was submitted, fall within the test of “evidential material” based on reasonable grounds for suspicion that it affords evidence. Rather, it was submitted the material was only “evidential material” if it satisfied the definition of “evidential material” contained in s 3C of the Act, which definition, it was submitted, did not refer to suspicion.
On the appeal the remaining two submissions put to the learned trial judge were repeated to us.
AN EXAMINATION OF PART 1AA OF THE ACT
Part 1AA was incorporated into the Act by the Crimes (Search Warrants and Powers of Arrest) Amendment Act 1994 (No.65 of 1994) which commenced on 30 November 1994. It replaced, as has already been noted, the provisions of s 10(1) of the Act which governed the issue of search warrants prior to the commencement of the 1994 Act.
The 1994 amendment had its origin in the fourth interim report of the Committee established to review Commonwealth criminal law (the Gibbs Committee). That report and the pre-existing law form an essential part of the context relevant to the interpretation of Part 1AA (cf CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 141 ALR 618 at 634).
The relevant statutory provisions can be summarised as follows.
Section 3E(1) of the Act authorises the issue of a warrant to search premises by “an issuing officer”, that being an expression defined in s 3C(1) of the act. Section 3E(1) is in the following terms:
“An issuing officer may issue a warrant to search premises if the officer is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or that there will be within the next 72 hours, any evidential material at the premises.”
The expression “evidential material” is defined in the interpretation section to Part 1AA, s 3C(1), as meaning:
“a thing relevant to an indictable offence or a thing relevant to a summary offence, including such a thing in electronic form.”
The expressions “thing relevant to an indictable offence” and “thing relevant to a summary offence” are then defined in s 3(1) of the Act as follows:
“‘thing relevant to an indictable offence’ means:
(a)anything with respect to which an indictable offence against any law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory has been committed or is suspected, on reasonable grounds to have been committed; or
(b)anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will afford evidence as to the commission of any such offence; or
(c)anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any such offence;
‘thing relevant to a summary offence’ means:
(a)anything with respect to which a summary offence against any law of the Commonwealth or of a Territory has been committed or is suspected, on reasonable grounds, to have been committed; or
(b)anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will afford evidence as to the commission of any such offence; or
(c)anything as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is intended to be used for the purpose of committing any such offence.”
These additional definitions appear to have been overlooked by the appellants in their submissions.
There are also to be found definitions of the words “warrant” and “premises” to be found in s 3C(1).
Section 3E(5) stipulates what the warrant is to state. It is in the following terms:
“If an issuing officer issues a warrant, the officer is to state in the warrant:
(a) the offence to which the warrant relates; and
(b)a description of the premises to which the warrant relates or the name or description of the person to whom it relates; and
(c)the kinds of evidential material that are to be searched for under the warrant; and
(d)the name of the constable who, unless he or she inserts the name of another constable in the warrant, is to be responsible for executing the warrant; and
(e)the period for which the warrant remains in force, which must not be more than 7 days; and
(f)whether the warrant may be executed at any time or only during particular hours.”
There are other matters required to be stated in a warrant in relation to premises set out in s 3E(6) of the Act, but nothing turns upon these provisions for present purposes.
The consequences of the issue of a warrant are set out in s 3F of the Act. Relevantly the executing officer or constable assisting is authorised to enter the premises stipulated and, inter alia, to search them “for the kinds of evidential material specified in the warrant”. The executing officer or constable is authorised to seize things of that kind found at the premises, as well as other things found there which the executing officer or constable assisting:
“(1)(d) believes on reasonable grounds to be:
(i)evidential material in relation to an offence to which the warrant relates; or
(ii)evidential material in relation to another offence that is an indictable offence;...”
but only if the executing officer or constable believes on reasonable grounds that seizure of those things is necessary to prevent their concealment, loss or destruction or their use in committing an offence. Additionally, s 3F(c) provides that the executing officer or constable may seize other things found at the premises in the course of the search that they believe on reasonable grounds to be a “seizable item” (defined in s 3C(1)). Presumably this power was thought necessary to protect the executing officer or constable should it turn out in fact that the items in question were not seizable items.
A copy of the warrant is to be made available to the occupier of the premises to which the warrant relates, or another person who apparently represents that occupier present at the premises: s 3H(1).
Counsel for the appellant, both in written submissions and in oral argument, placed emphasis upon the provisions of Part 1AA being “intended as a code”. If all that is meant by the submission is that the common law does not authorise search warrants so that the validity of a search warrant issued under an Act must be determined by reference to the statutory provisions of the legislation authorising its issue (here, the Act) the submission may readily be accepted. It is, however, clear that Part 1AA is not a code so far as concerns the issue of search warrants. Indeed, s 3D of the Act makes it clear that other laws of the Commonwealth may authorise search warrants, as may indeed the laws of a Territory in respect of offences against a law of that Territory or laws of a State in respect of offences against a law of the State.
For example, the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) authorises the issue of search warrants for the purpose of obtaining evidence under that legislation. It may well be correct to refer to the provisions of Part 9 of that Act as constituting a code in that it is the sole source of the power to issue warrants in respect of that particular subject matter (cf Ozzie Discount Software (Aust) Pty Ltd v Muling (1996) 86 ACrim 387 at 390), although having regard to s 3D(2) of the Act it is possible that there could be circumstances where warrants might be issued either under the Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act or the Act , having regard to the provisions of s 3D(2).
Nothing, however, ultimately turns upon whether the Act is a code. What is important is that effect must be given to the Parliamentary intention as expressed in the language of Part 1AA construed, as has already been mentioned, in accordance with the broad context in which the 1994 legislation was enacted. That context includes the general position at common law that a general warrant could not be issued, exemplified in cases such as Leach v Money, Watson & Blackmore (1765) 19 State Tr 1001 and Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029, as well as the multitude of case law discussing the provisions of s 10(1) of the Act, except so far as the language of the 1994 amendments negate the applicability of the pre-existing law. Thus regard may still usefully be had to George v Rockett (supra at 110) and the many cases decided by Full Courts of this Court including Beneficial Finance Corporation Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1991) 103 ALR 167; Dunesky v Elder (1994) 126 ALR 522; Propend Finance Pty Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police (1995) 128 ALR 657; and Grollo v Macauley (1995) 56 FCR 533, to which reference was made in the course of argument, at least so far as those cases remain unaffected by statutory amendments.
We turn now to consider the three submissions argued.
THE FIRST SUBMISSION
It is apparent from a perusal of the statutory provisions set out above that the definition of “evidential material” is critical to the application of Part 1AA of the Act. It is relevant to the satisfaction which the issuing officer is required to reach before issuing the warrant under s 3E(1) of the Act, as well as to the description of the material for which the search is authorised: see s 3E(5). So, it may be said, that it is a prerequisite to the issue of a warrant that the issuing officer be satisfied of the existence of reasonable grounds for suspecting either that there is “evidential material” as so defined on the requisite premises or that material falling within that description will be in the next 72 hours on those premises.
It was not suggested on the part of the respondents that a warrant would be good which failed to state that the issuing officer had reached the necessary satisfaction stipulated by s 3E(1). By analogy with the law as it had developed under s 10(1) of the Act, three propositions (the authority for all of which is to be found in George v Rockett (supra at 111)) may confidently be stated:
Because a provision such as contained in Part 1AA of the Act authorises the invasion of common law rights, legislation authorising the issue of search warrants must be seen as giving some measure of protection to those whose rights are potentially invaded. Thus the courts will and do insist upon strict compliance with the statutory conditions governing the issue of warrants.
Where the statute imposes upon the person authorised to issue a warrant a duty to be satisfied with a particular matter, the issuing officer must in fact be so satisfied.
Further, the warrant itself must express that satisfaction.
The required satisfaction as set out in s 3(1) of the Act is that there be reasonable grounds for suspicion of the existence of “evidential material” at the premises either at the time of the issue of the warrant or within the 72 hours following. There can be no reason to read into s 3E(1) some additional condition as to belief of the kind discussed in George v Rockett (supra) and required by the repealed s 10(1) of the Act.
The statutory language has now changed. Thus a warrant which states on its face that the issuing officer has been satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is or there will be within the next 72 hours “evidential material”, as that expression is defined in the Act, at the premises stated will comply with the requirement in s 3E(1). However, it would be desirable, if a warrant were so expressed, that it expand the statement so as to make clear to the recipient of the warrant precisely what the definition in the Act of “evidential material” provides. One way of doing this would be to annex a copy of the definition of “evidential material”, including not merely the definition in s 3C(1) but also the definition in s 3(1) of the expressions “thing relevant to an indictable offence” and “thing relevant to a summary offence”.
The warrant in the present case does not take the desirable course of directly referring to the expression “evidential material”, in terms of the definitions which have been set out earlier. It does, however, seek to purport to reach the same result by, in effect, defining “evidential material” by reference to the material the subject of the three conditions in the warrant. Provided that the description of the material in the three conditions is not wider than what would be “evidential material” as defined in accordance with s 3C and s 3(1) of the Act, the warrant will have complied with s 3E(1) albeit indirectly.
It is the third condition in the warrant to which reference is made for the purposes of the submission. That condition speaks of “Things as to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they will afford evidence as to the commission of the following offences against the laws of the Commonwealth”. Those offences are then set out.
It is apparent that the person responsible for drafting the third condition has had regard to the definition of “thing relevant to an indictable offence” or “thing relevant to a summary offence” in the Act, to which reference has already been made.
This is so because the language used in the third condition is identical to the language of para (b) of the definitions “thing relevant to an indictable offence” or “thing relevant to a summary offence”, as the case may be. Thus the documents, because they must meet the third condition, will likewise fall within the definition of “things relevant to an indictable offence” and in consequence the definition “evidential material”. It follows that on its face the warrant sets out the relevant satisfaction which the issuing officer is required to meet before issuing a warrant and accordingly the warrant is not for the reason advanced invalid.
THE SECOND SUBMISSION
The requirement in s 3E(5) of the Act that the offence to which the warrant relates be stated in the warrant is new, in the sense that there was no similar explicit requirement to be found in the language of s 10(1). However, the influential decision of Fox J in The Queen v Tillett (1960) 14 FLR 101 by reference to Canadian authorities and historical matter concluded that there was a requirement that a valid warrant to be issued under s 10 disclose the nature of the particular offence relied upon. The cases on s 10 thereafter revealed some disagreement as to the precision with which the offence was to be stated. The divergent views are discussed in the judgment of Burchett J, with whom Sheppard and Pincus JJ agreed, in Beneficial Finance (supra at 533-543.) What that judgment makes clear is that the requirement to state the offence exists to set bounds to the area of search which the execution of the warrant would involve. So seizure is authorised by reference to a particular offence: see the cases referred to by Burchett J at 534. What was required under s 10 was not the degree of particularity necessary to frame an indictment, nor was it necessary that the description of the offence be such as to permit the persons to whom the warrants were addressed to know “the exact object of the search”, a test that had been suggested by Jackson J in Parker v Churchill (1986) 9 FCR 334 at 348. Rather, a broad approach was directed. What is significant, however, is that the warrant disclose the nature of the offence in question so as to indicate the area of search. As Burchett J (at 543) indicated in Beneficial Finance (at 188):
“The precision required in a given case, in any particular respect, may vary with the nature of the offence, the other circumstances revealed, the particularity achieved in other respects, and what is disclosed by the warrant, read as a whole, and taking account of its recitals ...”.
A somewhat similar broad view of the requirement to stipulate offence was taken by another Full Court in Dunesky v Elder (supra at 537).
The Gibbs Report noted in its summary of the law on search warrants the requirement that a warrant refer to a particular offence (see at 259). The draft Bill accompanying the Gibbs Report contained a clause requiring the officer issuing a warrant
“to specify in the warrant: ...
(a) the offence to which the warrant relates;”.
There is no suggestion in the report itself that it was recommended that the legislature change the law. All the section appears indeed to do is to make explicit what the case law had required since Tillett’s case, namely that the warrant state the relevant offence.
It is, as has already been noted, not suggested here that the description of the offences in the third condition, delineating the items searched, would be an insufficient statement of the relevant offences if accompanied by words that made it clear that these were the offences to which the warrant related. Thus it is unnecessary for us to consider the degree of particularity required by a statutory provision which appears to have been intended merely to codify the common law position.
Ultimately, the matter is one of impression. The third condition refers to specific offences. One can readily enough infer that these must have been the offences to which the warrant related because they form part of the definition of the evidential material relevant to the satisfaction which the issuing officer has stated in accordance with s 3E(1) of the Act.
It was submitted before his Honour, and the submission was repeated before us, that a warrant could describe material to be seized as being material intended to prove that an offence of forgery had been committed by a person when the offence in respect of which the warrant was issued, that is to say the offence to which the warrant related, was an offence of seeking to pervert the course of justice committed by some other person who had put the document before a court as a genuine document knowing it to be forged. A warrant that did not state that it related to the latter offence would not comply with s 3E(5)(a) of the Act. It would also not comply with s 3E(1), which itself would require that the warrant state the relevant satisfaction of the issuing officer by reference to the indictable offence, or summary offence as the case may be, to which the definition of “evidential material” relates.
The requirement in the Act is no more than that there be a statement of relevant offences and that it be in the warrant. It is not necessary that the statement be in any particular part of the warrant. It would put the matter beyond doubt if a warrant expressly stated that the offences referred to in it were the offences to which the warrant related. But the question for decision is whether such a counsel of perfection is necessary.
With some hesitation we have come to the conclusion that, having regard to the statement of the issuing officer’s satisfaction by reference to the third condition, the references to the offences in that condition must be the offences to which the warrant relates and could not be understood in any different way. Accordingly, there is compliance with s 3E(5)(a) of the Act in the present circumstances.
Therefore the warrant is not invalid by reference to a failure to comply with s 3(5)(a).
THE THIRD SUBMISSION
The third submission, as we understood it, was that the warrant was defective because there was no statement in the warrant of the kinds of “evidential material” to be searched for. It is submitted that reference in s 3E(5)(c) to “the kinds of evidential material that are to be searched for under the warrant” required that the warrant specify a list of the kinds of evidential material for which the warrant authorises search to be made.
It will have been observed that the warrant was in the form described in some of the cases as a “three condition warrant”. It is so called because the description of the material for which authorisation to search is given, is presented initially by a list of varying particularity which is then, to use the language of Dunesky (at 535), “refined” by two further conditions. So in the present case the first condition specifies a list of material of such breadth that were it to stand alone it would be almost impossible for the issuing officer to have formed the necessary satisfaction under s 3E(1): cf Rockett at 117 where the Full High Court pointed out that:
“Where the object is identified by description, the broader and less specific the description, the more difficult it is likely to be to satisfy the requirement of reasonable grounds for believing that a thing answering the description will afford evidence of the commission of an offence.”
But the first condition does not stand on its own. It is cut down by the reference to persons, trusts, companies or entities referred to in the second condition, and further cut down by the third condition that the material be such that there are “reasonable grounds” for suspecting that it will afford evidence of the commission of stated offences.
Section 3E does not require the warrant to provide a list of specific documents that are to be searched. This, too, was a matter discussed in the Gibbs Report where it is pointed out that warrants may, in some circumstances at least, be issued at an early stage of an investigation so that the purpose of a search will be to obtain evidence. In such circumstances to require a detailed description of a particular document might well frustrate the purpose of the warrant. The review committee concluded that the legislation make it clear that it was not necessary to describe a particular thing as an object of search, but rather a “kind” of thing. That recommendation finds adoption in the language of s 3E(5)(c) of the Act.
There is, in our view, no room for an argument that the present warrants do not describe the “kinds” of material for which search is authorised. In so far as it might be suggested that the warrants were too wide or uncertain, then that suggestion is answered by Dunesky and the cases which have followed it, namely Propend and Grollo.
We should, however, say that those responsible for the preparation of warrants would do well to recall what was said by the High Court in Rockett at 117, to which reference has already been made above. A warrant framed as a “three condition warrant” will more readily be open to attack on the basis that the issuing officer did not have the relevant satisfaction than would a warrant more carefully and less broadly framed.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and order the appellants to pay the respondents’ costs of it.
I certify that this and the
preceding sixteen (16) pages
are a true copy of the Reasons
for Judgment herein of their
Honours Hill, Cooper & Whitlam JJ
Associate:
Dated: 23 May 1997
Counsel for the First L D Bowden
and Second Appellants:
Solicitor for the First Hawthorn Cuppaidge & Badgery
and Second Appellants:
Counsel for the First P R Dutney QC and P D T Applegarth
and Second Respondents:
Solicitor for the First Australian Government Solicitor
and Second Respondents:
Solicitor for Third Crown Solicitor for the State of
Respondent: Queensland
Date of Hearing: 22 April 1997
Place of Hearing: Brisbane
Date of Judgment: 23 May 1997
Place of Judgment: Brisbane
11
0