Hartmann v Chief Executive, Department of Lands
[1996] QLC 61
•17 May 1996
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BRISBANE
17 MAY 1996
In the matter of an appeal against a valuation.
Valuation Roll No. 854/37400
Local Government: Caloundra (AV95-259)
Ingrid Hartmann
v.
Chief Executive, Department of Lands
(Hearing at Maroochydore)
D E C I S I O N
This is an appeal under the Valuation of Land Act 1944 following the disallowance of an objection against the valuation of the Chief Executive in the amount of $63,000. The valuation is as at 1 January 1995. The appellant included a figure of $56,700 in the form of appeal to the Land Court, however, did not lead evidence expressly to this figure saying in evidence that the figure was included simply to satisfy the requirements of the appeal form and that the question of value in the end was a matter for the Court on the evidence presented.
Ms Ingrid Hartmann appeared on her own behalf and gave evidence, whilst Mr Andrew Dale Grams, a registered valuer employed by the Department of Natural Resources (which includes the former Department of Lands) provided a written valuation in support of the Chief Executive’s figure.
The subject property, having an area of 567 m2, is situated at 33 Coonang Crescent, Warana, in the Parish of Mooloolah. The land is a regular shaped allotment and access onto the property is easy. Coonang Crescent is a bitumen sealed road with concrete kerbing and channelling. The property is at road level and has a gentle fall to its frontage.
The subject land is approximately 150 metres from the beach, about 420 metres from local shopping and approximately 2 km from district shopping and state school. The land has a residence constructed on it, and it was valued by the Chief Executive as single unit residential land.
It is useful at this stage to make reference to some matters of general principle and law which guide certain important aspects of my considerations. Section 45(4) of the Valuation of Land Act provides with respect to a notice of appeal:"Such notice shall state the grounds of appeal and the appeal shall be limited to the grounds so stated and the burden of proving any and every such ground shall be upon the owner." (emphasis added)
Section 3(1)(b) of the Valuation of Land Act provides a definition of “unimproved value” which is applicable in the subject case:
“in relation to improved land - the capital sum which the fee simple of the land might be expected to realise if offered for sale on such reasonable terms and conditions as a bona fide seller would require, assuming that, at the time as at which the value is required to be ascertained for the purposes of this Act, the improvements did not exist.”
The manner in which improvements are to be treated on a piece of land to be valued for the purposes of the then New South Wales Legislation which included provisions similar to s.3(1)(b) mentioned above is expressed in Toohey’s Ltd v. Valuer-General (1925) AC 439. At page 443 of this case the Privy Council said:
“Now, what he (that is, the valuer) has to consider is what the land would fetch as at the date of the valuation if the improvements made had not been made. Words could scarcely be clearer to show that the improvements were to be left entirely out of view. They are to be taken, not only as non-existent, but as if they had never existed.”
Having regard to the law that I have outlined above, I am to proceed as if the subject house was not there and in fact had never been there and to consider the appeal and the value of the notionally vacant or unimproved land on that basis. I must, however, consider the environment in which the subject land is located, both in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of that environment.
A significant part of the environment in which the subject land is located is an adjoining property. There is a house on that property which was recently modified by the erection of a second storey which includes, amongst other things, a window which overlooks the subject land. Ms Hartmann explained that the window affords her neighbour a direct view into her bedroom and en suite. As a result, she is unable to rest on the bed without drawing the curtains in the bedroom and is unable to take a shower without closing the window which provides the only ventilation for the bathroom.
Mr Grams accepts Ms Hartmann’s evidence concerning the reduction in privacy of the residence constructed on the subject land and that the presence of a highset house adjoining the subject land is a relevant consideration in assessing the unimproved value of that land. Mr Grams referred to two sales each having highset houses constructed on neighbouring properties with windows overlooking the sale blocks and in reference to these Mr Grams suggested that the unimproved value of the subject land at $63,000 was appropriate. He tendered photographs of the subject land and one basic property which I found to be useful in considering the matter.
Whilst Mr Grams was not expressly asked whether the improved value of the subject land may have been negatively affected by the modifications to the adjoining house, I can say that in my understanding of the evidence this may well have been the case. The task that I have been given, however, is not one of considering the subject land in its improved state at the relevant date, but is one of viewing the land unimproved, that is of assuming that the subject house was not there. In doing this, I find that it would take little ingenuity to design a house on the subject land which would take advantage of its features yet would avoid the particular disability to which Ms Hartmann refers. Having done this, there would still be the presence of the highset house next door, however, I accept Mr Grams’ evidence in reference to the two sales that I have mentioned above, that in such an environment the value of the subject land unimproved is $63,000.
Mr Grams referred to a third sale with an applied value of $56,000 which indicated, in his opinion, values of land further removed from the beach than the subject. This sale was included to demonstrate that Ms Hartmann’s suggested figure of $56,700 for the subject land was too low. I agree with this but as I have noted above, Ms Hartmann did not pretend to have any particular support for the figure contended for.
In the result the appeal is disallowed and the valuation of the Chief Executive is affirmed.
RP SCOTT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT
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