Hartland and Repatriation Commission (Veterans’ entitlements)

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Hartland and Repatriation Commission (Veterans’ entitlements) [2016] AATA 452 (30 June 2016)

Division

VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION

File Number(s)

2014/6589

Re

Geoffrey Hartland

APPLICANT

And

Repatriation Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal

Deputy President Dr P McDermott RFD
Member Dr Sullivan

Date 30 June 2016
Place Brisbane

We affirm the decision under review.

............................[sgd]............................................

Deputy President Dr P McDermott RFD

CATCHWORDS

VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – defence service – major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder – not satisfied conditions were defence-caused – decision affirmed under review

LEGISLATION

Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) ss 68, 70, 120, 120B
Military Compensation Act 1994 (Cth)

CASES

Youngnickel v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1691

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Statement of Principles Concerning Depressive Disorder, No. 28 of 2008 (as amended)

Statement of Principles Concerning Depressive Disorder, No. 84 of 2015
Statement of Principles Concerning Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, No. 6 of 2008

Statement of Principles Concerning Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, No. 83 of 2014

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President Dr P McDermott RFD
Member Dr Sullivan

30 June 2016

INTRODUCTION

  1. Mr Geoffrey Hartland (“the applicant”) served in the Australian Army between 7 January 1970 and 26 August 1974 and later between 27 July 1976 and 8 December 1993. He has also had some reserve service. Section 68 of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that “defence service” for the purpose of the Act is continuous full-time service rendered as a member of the Defence Force on or after 7 December 1972 and before the terminating date. The terminating date is 7 April 1994, that being the date on which the Military Compensation Act 1994 (Cth) commenced. We have to determine whether the applicant’s conditions of major depressive disorder and post-traumatic distress disorder (“PTSD”) are regarded as defence-caused for the purposes of s 70 of the Act.

    EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICANT

    Evidence-in-chief

  2. The applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing about incidents that he says he experienced at various times and confirmed that each of the statements he lodged were true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

    March 1972

  3. The applicant stated that he was involved in the recovery of the body of a deceased female who had fallen off a cliff in Malaysia. He was involved with wrapping the body in a blanket. The applicant remarked:

    “Well, we went out to do a recovery of a girl falling off a cliff.  She ended up dying.  So then it was more than a recovery.  When we got to the scene there was no visual marks on her, but then a young digger, I had to look at her face.  So I looked at her face, and it did have an impression on me.  But I just got on with the job and we wrapped her up in a blanket and then use a rope and pivot her out to the boat and we took her back to… the rest of her people. And then I just got on with soldiering”.

    April 1973

  4. The applicant referred to an incident…

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Details
Case
[2016] AATA 452
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Geoffrey Hartland against a decision of the Repatriation Commission concerning his entitlement to veterans' benefits. Mr Hartland, who served in the Australian Army between 1970 and 1993, sought to establish that his conditions of major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were defence-caused. The dispute centred on whether specific incidents experienced during his service qualified as stressors under the relevant legislative framework.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was to determine whether Mr Hartland's conditions of major depressive disorder and PTSD were reasonably satisfied as being defence-caused, pursuant to section 70 of the *Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986* (Cth). This required an assessment of whether the applicant's claimed stressors, namely the recovery of a deceased female in Malaysia in March 1972 and an encounter with armed Chinese National soldiers during Exercise King Cobra in April 1973, constituted events that could lead to the onset of his conditions during his defence service. The Tribunal also considered evidence relating to an incident in Koh Samui in 1989.

The Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence regarding the recovery of the deceased female, noting that while the event was impactful, it was not satisfied that there was clinical onset of his conditions at that time, particularly as he was not undertaking defence service as defined by the Act at that precise moment. Regarding the Exercise King Cobra incident, the Tribunal found that the applicant was undertaking defence service, but was not reasonably satisfied that the encounter with Chinese National soldiers constituted a Category 1A or 1B stressor under the relevant Statements of Principles (SoPs). This conclusion was based on the evidence that neither side made threatening gestures and that the applicant was not experiencing a life-threatening event. The Tribunal also gave no weight to the Koh Samui incident, as it had not been discussed with the applicant's treating psychiatrist.

Ultimately, the Tribunal was not reasonably satisfied that Mr Hartland's conditions of major depressive disorder and PTSD were defence-caused. This conclusion was influenced by expert opinion suggesting the clinical onset of these disorders occurred after the terminating date for defence service under the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Geoffrey Hartland (“the applicant”) served in the Australian Army between 7 January 1970 and 26 August 1974 and later between 27 July 1976 and 8 December 1993. He has also had some reserve service. Section 68 of the Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that “defence service” for the purpose of the Act is continuous full-time service rendered as a member of the Defence Force on or after 7 December 1972 and before the terminating date. The terminating date is 7 April 1994, that being the date on which the Military Compensation Act 1994 (Cth) commenced. We have to determine whether the applicant’s conditions of major depressive disorder and post-traumatic distress disorder (“PTSD”) are regarded as defence-caused for the purposes of s 70 of the Act.EVIDENCE OF THE APPLICANTEvidence-in-chief The applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing about incidents that he says he experienced at various times and confirmed that each of the statements he lodged were true and correct to the best of his knowledge. March 1972 The applicant stated that he was involved in the recovery of the body of a deceased female who had fallen off a cliff in Malaysia. He was involved with wrapping the body in a blanket. The applicant remarked: “Well, we went out to do a recovery of a girl falling off a cliff. She ended up dying. So then it was more than a recovery. When we got to the scene there was no visual marks on her, but then a young digger, I had to look at her face. So I looked at her face, and it did have an impression on me. But I just got on with the job and we wrapped her up in a blanket and then use a rope and pivot her out to the boat and we took her back to… the rest of her people. And then I just got on with soldiering”.April 1973 The applicant referred to an incident in Malaysia at a time of long range reconnaissance patrolling during Exercise King Cobra. The applicant stated it was his first week on patrol at the time of the incident and he was fairly new within this patrol and only had blank ammunition. The applicant said that his patrol came across armed Chinese National soldiers in the jungle. The applicant remarked: “We were in a position which was untenable. We felt helpless because I only had blank ammunition. The Nationals, they had the high ground, and they also had us covered. Our weapons were facing out because they were on my right, and I’m a right hander, so my left was facing out to the left. So therefore I felt pretty helpless at the time.” He added: “I estimated they were probably about four or five metres away from me. When I looked up they were instinctively standing, in other words they were actually covering us with their weapon systems. I’ve been taught how to shoot instinctively. I’m actually instructed on instinctive fire, and it’s all to do with the body alignment. Their bodies were aligned - well, the one I was looking at, he was aligning on to me, and instinctively he was aiming at me”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The difficulty that is faced by the applicant is that the evidence from Dr Milad upon which we rely is his provisional opinion that there was the clinical onset of both PTSD and major depressive disorder after the terminating date.[3][3] Veterans’ Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth) s 68.CONCLUSION We are not reasonably satisfied that the applicant’s conditions of major depressive disorder and PTSD are defence-caused. We affirm the decision under review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The SoPs for Depressive Disorder are Instrument No. 28 of 2008 (as amended) and Instrument No. 84 of 2015. The SoPs for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder are Instrument No 6 of 2008 or Instrument No 83 of 2014.CONSIDERATION At the outset of the hearing the applicant clarified that this case rested on the defence service undertaken by the applicant and that this application did not involve operational service under the Act. In his report of 30 March 2015 Dr Jenkins expressed an opinion that the applicant has PTSD with depression and that the date of clinical onset was in the mid-1970s. At that time there were two stressors: the first in March 1972 when the applicant was involved with the recovery of a body of the deceased female in Malaysia; and the second in April 1972 when the applicant was patrolling during Exercise King Cobra. In evidence before this Tribunal Dr Jenkins related how he was informed by the applicant that he had images of the dead female. At this time the applicant was not undertaking defence service which would have commenced on 7 December 1973. However, the Tribunal is not reasonably satisfied that there was clinical onset at this time of the recovery of the deceased female. The state of the evidence before this Tribunal does not enable such a finding to be made having regard to the observations of Bennett J in Youngnickel v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1691 at [28]. The Tribunal also observes that the applicant had a successful career with promotions after this time. Certainly, at the time of Exercise King Cobra in 1973 the applicant was undertaking defence service under the Act. However, the Tribunal is not reasonably satisfied that the encounter with the Chinese Nationals constituted either a Category 1A stressor or a Category 1B stressor under the SoPs. The applicant was not then experiencing a life-threatening event. During the hearing the applicant took issue with the description of Mr Valentine as being the section commander (which Mr Valentine described himself as) and rather described him as the patrol commander. Nevertheless the evidence of the applicant was that Mr Valentine was seasoned in jungle warfare and was responsible for the members of the patrol. The evidence of Mr Valentine that “neither side made any threatening gestures” is relied upon by the Tribunal to find that the applicant was not then “experiencing a life-threatening event”. The state of the evidence does not enable the Tribunal to find that there was clinical onset of any of the claimed conditions at this time. During the hearing the applicant gave evidence of the Koh Samui incident of 1989. The applicant has at no time discussed these events with his treating psychiatrist who he had been consulting for two years. In these circumstances the Tribunal cannot be reasonably satisfied that these events have significance in having contributed to the condition of the applicant. In evidence Dr Jenkins has quite properly confirmed that his opinion as to the Koh Samui incident having contributed to the condition of the applicant was “hypothetical”.