Harrison & Ward
[2017] FamCAFC 99
•30 May 2017
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HARRISON & WARD AND ANOR | [2017] FamCAFC 99 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPLICATION IN AN APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – where the applicant seeks an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal – where the foreshadowed appeal seeks to challenge two orders made by the primary judge – where other orders made by the primary judge are already the subject of challenge in two extant appeals – where the material in respect of the extant appeal is the same as the material which would be required to consider this appeal – where the extant appeals are already listed – where an extension of time is granted – where the extension of time is conditional upon the applicant paying a sum into court – where directions are made to ready the appeal for hearing with the extant appeals. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) |
| Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Harrison |
| FIRST RESPONDENT: | Ms Ward |
| SECOND RESPONDENT: | Mr Kramer |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 4572 | of | 2016 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | NA | 13 | of | 2017 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 30 May 2017 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Kent J |
| HEARING DATE: | 30 May 2017 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 2 November 2016; 20 January 2017 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2016] FCCA 3454; [2017] FCCA 168 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Galloway |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Aejis Legal |
| THE FIRST RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| THE SECOND RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
Orders
As a condition of the grant of an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal provided for in these orders, the Applicant (Mr Harrison) pay into court the sum of $50,000 by close of business tomorrow, 31 May 2017.
Subject to and conditional upon compliance with the terms of Order 1, the time for the Applicant to file a Notice of Appeal (NA13/2017) from the orders made on 2 November 2016 and 20 January 2017 be extended to the close of business tomorrow, 31 May 2017.
That the Appellant in NA13/2017 (Mr Harrison) file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities upon which he wishes to rely in relation to this appeal by 4.00pm on Friday 16 June 2017.
That the Second Respondent in NA13/2017 (Mr Kramer) file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities upon which he wishes to rely in relation to appeal NA13/2017 only by 4.00pm on Friday 23 June 2017.
That the First Respondent in NA13/2017 (Ms Ward) file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities upon which she wishes to rely in relation to the appeal by 4.00pm on Friday 14 July 2017.
The Summary of Argument filed by each party must be prepared in accordance with Rule 22.22 of the Family Law Rules 2004 and Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017.
The List of Authorities filed by each party must be prepared in accordance with Attachment A to these orders and Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017.
That appeal NA13/2017 be listed for hearing together with appeals NA4/2017 and NA6/2017 before the Full Court at Brisbane at Wednesday 19 July 2017 at 10.00am.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
That pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Court approves of and directs the Appeals Registrar to publish these orders and reasons for judgment to each of the Bar Association of Queensland; the Queensland Law Society; and the Family Law Practitioners’ Association of Queensland with a request on behalf of this Court that Ms Ward be considered for legal assistance to be provided by a member or members of those professional bodies in her conduct of the subject appeal proceedings and generally as to her legal rights.
Ms Ward have leave to apply to the Court with respect to the sum of $50,000 paid into Court pursuant to the terms of Order 1.
The obligation upon the applicant to pay a filing fee with respect to NA 13 of 2017 is waived.
IT IS NOTED:
A.Each party must comply with Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017 Conduct of Appeals – full text at Attachment B to these orders.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Harrison & Ward and Anor has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
Appeal Number: NA 13 of 2017
File Number: BRC 4572 of 2016
| Mr Harrison |
Applicant
And
| Ms Ward |
First Respondent
And
Mr Kramer
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EX TEMPORE
By an application in an appeal filed on 3 April 2017 Mr Harrison applies for time to be extended to allow him to appeal from orders made by Judge Vasta in the Federal Circuit Court on 2 November 2016 and on 20 January 2017 respectively.
The application arises in the following context.
On 18 May 2016 Mr Harrison filed an initiating application in the Federal Circuit Court prepared by his then lawyer, Mr Kramer, the second respondent to this application. I interpolate here that Mr Kramer has apparently elected not to appear or be represented today on this application despite having notice of it. The initiating application was expressed to seek orders “by way of alteration of property interests pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (C’th)” despite Mr Harrison and the named respondent, Ms Ward having never been married. Within the application the “de facto relationship jurisdiction – financial causes” was identified as being engaged so it would seem that the orders were actually sought pursuant to s 90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). In his affidavit in support of this application filed on 3 April 2017, Mr Harrison expresses his belief that he and Ms Ward were in “a de facto marriage … between 9 December 2012 and 9 February 2015”.
Prior to that initiating application being filed, or indeed any legal proceedings being instituted between Mr Harrison and Ms Ward, Mr Harrison had caused a caveat to be registered upon the title of the residential premises Ms Ward solely owned in Western Australia, a property she had owned since before the relationship alleged by Mr Harrison had commenced. It seems that in order to settle the sale of her property on 8 May 2015, and to secure Mr Harrison’s agreement to the necessary withdrawal of the caveat for that to occur, Ms Ward had acquiesced in Mr Harrison’s requirement, pending resolution of their financial issues, that the available nett proceeds of sale of Ms Ward’s property, amounting to $197,133.17 were to be deposited to the trust account then operated by Mr Kramer via his legal practice, an account styled “[Kramer] Law Practice Trust Account”. It is not in issue that payment of that amount into that trust account was made upon settlement of the sale.
It would also not appear to be in issue that at all material times, Mr Kramer was the principal of the legal practice “Kramer Law” and the trustee of the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account. He was thus a “trustee” of “trust money” with respect to the deposited funds within the meaning of these terms in each of the Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) and the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld).
It would not appear to be open to any doubt that when Ms Ward’s sale proceeds of $197,133.17 were deposited to the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account, Ms Ward had made no concession that the funds were other than hers or that Mr Harrison had any beneficial entitlement to the funds. Mr Harrison had not established, via any cause of action or judgment of any court, any entitlement to those funds. It would also not appear open to any doubt that at all material times, Mr Kramer was well aware, as Mr Harrison’s solicitor and as trustee of the relevant trust account, that the source of the subject funds was the sale of property solely owned by Ms Ward and that she maintained that she was solely beneficially entitled to the funds. The sole purpose of the funds being held upon trust was for the funds to be held pending any claimed entitlement by his client, Mr Harrison, being established. Put another way, it was well within Mr Kramer’s means of knowledge that Ms Ward had a beneficial entitlement in the subject trust monies unless and until Mr Harrison legitimately established any entitlement of himself to any part of these funds.
Following the initiating application filed by Mr Harrison on 18 May 2016, it became apparent that the existence or otherwise of a de facto relationship was in dispute between the parties and that discrete issue was set down for determination on 2 November 2016.
On 2 November 2016 his Honour, Judge Vasta, made a declaration pursuant to s 90RD of the Act that there was no de facto relationship between Mr Harrison and Ms Ward and his Honour further ordered “[t]hat the sum of $197,266.77 held in the trust account of [Kramer] Law be released to [Ms Ward] within seven (7) days”. Additional arrangements were made to facilitate the transfer of these monies and the exchange of bank details through his Honour’s associate. The balance of Mr Harrison’s application was dismissed. That is, Mr Harrison’s claim or entitlement to any of the subject funds was rejected by the court’s determination.
Notably, given subsequent events to be referred to, that application had sought an order with respect to the subject funds that Mr Harrison receive $150,000 of the fund, with the balance to be returned to Ms Ward. As noted though, Mr Harrison’s application for that order was dismissed by his Honour.
It would appear that at some time after the sale proceeds of $197,133.17 were deposited to the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account, Mr Kramer determined to cease operating that trust account. The funds were withdrawn from that account and were placed into a trust account operated by the company Kramer Tax Pty Ltd, being a company conducting an accounting firm. It is asserted that Mr Harrison gave the instructions for this to occur.
The stark difficulty with that is that no consent or authority was ever given by Ms Ward to Mr Kramer for withdrawal of the trust monies held in the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account. That is, Ms Ward did not authorise or consent to the withdrawal of the funds nor did she authorise or consent to the funds being deposited into a non-legal firm trust account. Indeed it would seem these events transpired without her knowledge.
Relevantly, s 8 of the Trust Accounts Act 1973 (Qld) strictly confines the purposes for which a trustee is permitted to withdraw monies from a trust account. Section 8 provides:
8 Purposes for which money may be withdrawn from trust account
(1) A trustee shall not withdraw any moneys from a trust account except for the purpose of –
(a) making a payment to the person entitled thereto or in accordance with the directions of that person; or
(b)making a payment to himself or herself for professional costs, statutory duties and charges and other proper outlays which payment shall be supported by authorisation in writing by the person for or on whose behalf the moneys were received or are held; or
(c) making a payment that is otherwise authorised by law.
Maximum penalty – 100 penalty units or 1 year’s imprisonment.
(2)No withdrawal of moneys from a trust account for the purpose of investment howsoever of such moneys (including but without limiting the generality hereof, a deposit in the nature of an investment) or the loan thereof to any person whomsoever shall be made unless the trustee has first obtained the authorisation in writing of the person entitled to those moneys but this subsection shall not apply to the withdrawal of moneys from a trust account for the purposes of paying for any land, chattels or livestock for the purchase in the name of the client of which the moneys in question were paid into the trust account.
Maximum penalty – 100 penalty units or 1 year’s imprisonment.
Part 3.3 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) also regulates trust money and trust accounts operated by a law practice. Amongst many other provisions of relevance, s 249 specifically governs the holding, disbursing and accounting for trust money in the following terms:
249 Holding, disbursing and accounting for trust money
(1) A law practice must –
(a)Hold trust money deposited in a general trust account of the practice exclusively for the person on whose behalf it is received; and
(b)Disburse the trust money only under a direction given by the person.
(2) Maximum penalty – 50 penalty units.
(3)Subsection (1) applies subject to an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, division 2A or as otherwise authorised by law.
Subject to division 2A, the law practice must account for the trust money in the way prescribed under a regulation.
Maximum penalty – 50 penalty units.
As it seems to me, even if it be contended that within the meaning of these relevant statutory provisions, Mr Kramer via the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account was initially holding trust money on behalf of both Ms Ward and Mr Harrison pending the outcome of Mr Harrison’s claim, it could not be suggested that Mr Harrison had any authority on behalf of Ms Ward to give instructions with respect to the withdrawal or disbursal of funds from the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account.
I have outlined these events in some detail as it seems to me that aside from the appeal proceedings arising out of this matter, which will be discussed, Ms Ward would seem to have a case worthy of investigation concerning a potential claim upon the Legal Practitioner’s Fidelity Guarantee Fund administered by the Queensland Law Society pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), apart from any other claims she might have at law with respect to what has occurred. It is my general recollection (which may be incorrect) that there are potential time limitations on the making of such a claim and thus there may be some urgency about this aspect being addressed. I intend to authorise publication of these reasons for judgment to each of the Bar Association of Queensland, the Queensland Law Society and the Family Law Practitioners’ Association in the hope that Ms Ward, who has self-represented throughout the proceedings to date, might be availed of some legal assistance with respect to what are potentially complex legal issues, both with respect to the subject appeals and moreover with respect to her legal rights more generally.
Judge Vasta delivered ex tempore reasons on 2 November 2016 and, as noted, apart from declaring that no de facto relationship existed between the parties, made an order for the trust funds to be released to Ms Ward within seven days of his order. Both Mr Harrison and Mr Kramer, his then lawyer, were present in court when the primary judge delivered reasons for judgment and made orders.
It would seem clear enough from the form of order made by the trial judge that his Honour was not cognisant of the feature that the trust funds had been removed from the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account and placed in the Trust Account of Kramer Tax Pty Ltd. Whilst there is reference to that entity in Mr Harrison’s initiating application, it would not seem on the material before me that his Honour (or indeed Ms Ward) was specifically made aware during the hearing on 2 November 2016 of what had occurred with respect to the removal of the funds from their initial placement in the Kramer Law Practice Trust Account.
On 3 November 2016, Mr Kramer sent the following email to his Honour’s associate:
Dear Associate, we refer to the following hearing for this matter and to the final orders proposed by his Honour. After reviewing the file, we note the amount provided by the applicant to his Honour is incorrect. The amount held in the third party trust account and to be paid to the respondent is $199,673.97. This practice does not operate a trust account and did not have the correct information from the third party until today. The applicant deposited the funds into [Kramer] Tax Proprietary Limited trust account. Could you please correct his Honour’s final orders to reflect this? We apologise for the inconvenience and thank you for your assistance. Yours faithfully, [Mr Kramer].
The reference by Mr Kramer to the “third party trust account” in his email is curious. An ASIC search of “[Kramer] Tax Pty Ltd” which appears as Annexure “DW-7” to Ms Ward’s affidavit filed on 14 December 2016 in the Federal Circuit Court indicates that the sole director and shareholder of that entity is Mr Kramer.
Later on 3 November 2016, a further email was received from Kramer Law which recorded:
We refer to our earlier email today and the amount was incorrect. Please find the attached corrected email.
…
…We refer to the following hearing for this matter and to the final orders proposed by his Honour. After reviewing the file, we note the amount provided by the applicant to his Honour is incorrect. The amount held in the third party trust account and to be paid to the respondent is $184,673.97.
This practice does not operate a trust account and did not have the correct information from the third party until today. The applicant deposited the funds into [Kramer] Tax Proprietary Limited trust account. Could you please correct his Honour’s final orders to reflect this? We apologise for the inconvenience and thank you for your assistance.
His Honour’s associate responded observing that no alteration would be made to the terms of the order in circumstances where counsel who acted for Mr Harrison at the hearing confirmed the amount was as recorded in the order and no evidence had been presented in support of the reduced amount.
I observe that it seems no explanation was ever provided for the difference of $12,459.20 between what was said to be held in the trust account in the later email of 3 November 2016 and what was initially deposited into the trust account.
On or about 8 November 2016, Kramer Law ceased acting for Mr Harrison and, remarkably as it seems to me, the funds then held in the KramerTax Pty Ltd trust account were withdrawn from that account and transferred to a personal account of Mr Harrison. Annexed to Mr Kramer’s affidavit filed 18 January 2017 as Annexure “AK1” is what Mr Kramer refers to as the “withdrawal” notice signed by Mr Harrison on 8 November 2016 (only six days after the subject orders were made) addressed to the secretary of “[Kramer] Tax Pty Ltd” purporting to authorise the release of the trust funds to a private account held by Mr Harrison. Notably, whilst that notice is addressed to Kramer Tax Pty Ltd it nominates as the address of that entity what is noted to be the residential address of Mr Kramer, as shown on the ASIC search earlier referred to, as opposed to the registered business address of that entity.
On 10 November 2016, Mr Kramer emailed his Honour’s associate in the following terms:
I refer to your email of 4.11.16. We no longer hold instructions to act for [Mr Harrison]. Please direct inquiries to him. As he has domestic violence complaints against [Ms Ward] with police, we are unable to provide his contact details. Thank you for your assistance. Yours faithfully, [Mr Kramer].
On 6 December 2016, Ms Ward filed an application in a case seeking that Kramer Tax Pty Ltd be joined as a party to the proceedings. She also sought orders restraining the trustee of the Kramer Tax Pty Ltd trust account from releasing the funds held in their trust account to Mr Harrison and that such money be released to her plus interest. In the event that the funds had already been released to Mr Harrison, Ms Ward sought orders requiring Mr Harrison to pay to her the sum of $197,133.17 plus interest. That application was listed for hearing on 14 December 2016. Mr Kramer did not appear on that occasion. Orders were made by Judge Vasta joining Kramer Lawyers and Accountants as a party to the proceedings and requiring Mr Kramer to show cause as to why he should not be dealt with for contempt.
Following a further failed appearance on 19 December 2016, his Honour set the matter down for further mention on 20 January 2017.
On 20 January 2017, “upon the court finding that [Mr Harrison] and [Mr Kramer] are jointly and severally liable for the payment of $197,266.77 to [Ms Ward]” Judge Vasta made orders requiring Mr Harrison and Mr Kramer to pay the sum of $197,266.77 to Ms Ward by 27 January 2017. The matter was listed for mention on 31 January 2017 in the event that the monies had not been repaid. The 20 January 2017 orders were amended on 31 January 2017 by which amendment, the entity of Kramer Law Lawyers and Accountants, which was previously named as the second respondent, was replaced by Mr Kramer personally.
Mr Kramer filed an appeal against the 20 January 2017 orders, which appeal was allocated number NA 4 of 2017. An amended notice of appeal was filed on 20 April 2017. Curiously, the amended notice of appeal does not make reference to the 20 January 2017 orders in their amended form.
As it transpired, the monies were not repaid and the matter was further heard by Judge Vasta on 31 January 2017. His Honour delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment ([2017] FCCA 168) and made orders directed to the Marshal of the Court to make an application that each of Mr Harrison and Mr Kramer be dealt with for contempt of the court orders of 2 November 2016. His Honour also dismissed an oral application by each of Mr Harrison and Mr Kramer to stay the 20 January 2017 orders.
Mr Harrison filed an appeal against the orders of 31 January 2017 within time which appeal was allocated number NA 6 of 2017. An amended notice of appeal was filed on 19 April 2017.
Each of Mr Kramer’s appeal from the orders made on 20 January 2017 (as amended) (appeal NA4/2017) and Mr Harrison’s appeal from the orders made on 31 January 2017 (appeal NA6/2017) are listed to be heard together by the Full Court of this Court on Wednesday 19 July 2017.
The application in an appeal
By his Application in an Appeal, filed 3 April 2017, Mr Harrison now seeks leave to extend the time for him to file an appeal against the orders made on 2 November 2016, being the orders and declarations that there was no de facto relationship and requiring the release of the proceeds of sale held in trust to Ms Ward. The draft notice of appeal asserts the following errors:
a)The declaration was made summarily in circumstances where the claims of the parties required a trial or a hearing sufficient to test the affidavit and oral evidence of the parties;
b)In the circumstances there was no or no proper hearing on the issue of whether a de facto relationship ever existed between Mr Harrison and Ms Ward;
c)Mr Harrison was, accordingly, not afforded natural justice;
d)The learned trial judge gave no, or no sufficient reasons for the declaration made;
e)The order for the release of funds from “the trust account of [Kramer] Law” was ultra vires;
f)In the circumstances where there had been no claim by the respondent for any consequential orders following the making of the declaration she sought, there was no jurisdiction to make any order concerning funds held on trust;
g)Alternatively, the associated jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court was not invoked by any process;
h)Mr Harrison was not heard in respect of the order releasing money to Ms Ward;
i)His Honour gave no reasons for making the order releasing the money to Ms Ward;
j)When regard is had to the asserted errors in respect of the declaration and the release of the funds, “the learned trial judge erred in dismissing the application of [Mr Harrison]”; and
k)His Honour “was otherwise wrong in law”.
Ms Ward has not filed any response to this application in an appeal and has not appeared at the hearing of today’s application. It is clear from the file records that on or about 11 April 2017 Ms Ward was notified at her nominated point of communication (an email address) that this hearing would occur today.
It is clear that this Court may extend the time that is fixed for the filing of a notice of appeal even if the time for its compliance has passed (r 1.14, Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)).
It is also clear that pursuant to r 1.10, in making orders pursuant to the rules the court may impose terms and conditions on the making of the order. At the outset of the hearing of this application following exchanges between the bench and Mr Galloway of counsel who appeared for Mr Harrison, it was confirmed that Mr Harrison would consent to an order, as a condition of an order extending time to appeal, to pay into court the amount of $50,000 by close of business tomorrow, 31 May 2017. The amount of $50,000 was submitted to be the total remaining funds held by Mr Harrison from the amount paid to him.
As the High Court makes clear in Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479, the grant of an extension of time is not automatic and I may have regard to a number of factors including: the history of the proceedings, whether there is an adequate explanation for the delay or failure to comply, whether there is a substantial issue to be raised on appeal, whether there is any hardship or prejudice caused to the respondent which could not otherwise be remedied by an order for costs, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of granting, or refusing to grant, the application.
In this case, Mr Harrison asserts that he did not know of his right to appeal until he consulted with his current solicitor in late January 2017, at which time the time for filing an appeal from the orders made on 2 November 2016 had already lapsed. I note, however, that while this may explain his delay until late January, it does not explain the time which has passed between receiving this advice and the filing of the current application in April 2017, some additional two months. While I note Mr Harrison’s observation in his affidavit in support of this application that “if I am late in my attempted filing, it is by a matter of a day of [presumably or] two”, it could hardly be said that two months is “a matter of a day or two”.
Mr Harrison further observes that given that the orders of 20 January 2017 are already the subject of appeal by Mr Kramer, there is limited prejudice to Ms Ward. However, I record that this is not entirely accurate when regard is had to the difference in challenges sought to be advanced by each of Mr Kramer and Mr Harrison. Ms Ward would be required to meet a number of additional arguments which are not contained in the appeal of Mr Kramer, specifically an adequacy of reasons challenge and an asserted failure to make a specific finding.
Whilst some of the grounds of appeal advanced by Mr Harrison on the proposed appeal may be lacking in merit (for example the ground which alleges that the court was required to hear and test the evidence and the assertion that there was no, or no proper, hearing on the issue of the existence of a de facto relationship in circumstances where a discrete hearing was set down, took place and counsel who then appeared for Mr Harrison at that time conceded that on the evidence before the court it could not be concluded that a de facto relationship existed between the parties) other grounds, such as those with respect to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit Court to make the order releasing the funds cannot be concluded at this stage to be devoid of any merit.
Whilst I am not satisfied that Mr Harrison has adequately explained his delay in filing the subject appeal nor, as I have indicated, that in respect of many of the proposed grounds of challenge to either of the subject orders there would appear to be any merit, there is at least some potential substance in Mr Harrison’s challenges directed to jurisdiction for the making of the order directed to the trust funds being released to Ms Ward. This is not to say that such grounds would ultimately succeed, rather that there is at least a substantial issue to be raised on appeal. Given the substance of the other appeals which are to be heard on 19 July 2017 and the feature that the challenges in those appeals would appear to inevitably involve related questions as to jurisdiction, this is in my judgment an important discretionary factor on this application. So too is the history of the proceedings out of which these respective orders were made. It may also be noted that the documents which are relevant to the proposed challenges on appeal to the orders of 2 November 2016 and 20 January 2017 have already been included in the appeal books prepared with respect to the other forthcoming appeals, already on foot.
Finally, as an important discretionary consideration, I refer again to the feature that Mr Harrison consents today, as a condition to the grant of an extension of time, that Mr Harrison will pay the sum of $50,000 (the only amount said to be remaining from the original fund) into this court by the close of business tomorrow.
For these reasons I propose to exercise the discretion to grant Mr Harrison’s application to extend time to file a Notice of Appeal in respect of the orders made by Judge Vasta on 2 November 2016 and on 20 January 2017 to the close of business tomorrow and to make directions to facilitate the subject appeal (NA13/2017) to be listed for hearing together with the extant appeals NA4/2017 and NA6/2017 before the Full Court at Brisbane on Wednesday 19 July 2017 at 10.00am.
I make the following orders and directions:
1.As a condition of the grant of an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal provided for in these orders, the Applicant (Mr Harrison) pay into court the sum of $50,000 by close of business tomorrow, 31 May 2017.
2. Subject to and conditional upon compliance with the terms of Order 1, the time for the Applicant to file a Notice of Appeal (NA13/2017) from the orders made on 2 November 2016 and 20 January 2017 be extended to the close of business tomorrow, 31 May 2017.
3.That the Appellant in NA13/2017 (Mr Harrison) file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities upon which he wishes to rely in relation to this appeal by 4.00pm on Friday 16 June 2017.
4.That the Second Respondent in NA13/2017 (Mr Kramer) file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities upon which he wishes to rely in relation to appeal NA13/2017 only by 4.00pm on Friday 23 June 2017.
5.That the First Respondent in NA13/2017 (Ms Ward) file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities upon which she wishes to rely in relation to the appeal by 4.00pm on Friday 14 July 2017.
6.The Summary of Argument filed by each party must be prepared in accordance with Rule 22.22 of the Family Law Rules 2004 and Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017.
7.The List of Authorities filed by each party must be prepared in accordance with Attachment A to these orders and Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017.
8.That appeal NA13/2017 be listed for hearing together with appeals NA4/2017 and NA6/2017 before the Full Court at Brisbane at Wednesday 19 July 2017 at 10.00am.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
9.That pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Court approves of and directs the Appeals Registrar to publish these orders and reasons for judgment to each of the Bar Association of Queensland; the Queensland Law Society; and the Family Law Practitioners’ Association of Queensland with a request on behalf of this Court that Ms Ward be considered for legal assistance to be provided by a member or members of those professional bodies in her conduct of the subject appeal proceedings and generally as to her legal rights.
10.Ms Ward have leave to apply to the Court with respect to the sum of $50,000 paid into Court pursuant to the terms of Order 1.
11. The obligation upon the applicant to pay a filing fee with respect to NA 13 of 2017 is waived.
IT IS NOTED:
Each party must comply with Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017 Conduct
of Appeals – full text at Attachment B to these orders.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Kent delivered on 30 May 2017.
Associate:
Date: 30 May 2017
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