Harrison v The State Transport Authority - [1991] HCATrans 63

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Adelaide No A24 of 1990
B e t w e e n -
PETER LINDEN HARRISON

Applicant

and
THE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

Respondent

Application for special
leave to appeal

DAWSON J

McHUGH J

Harrison

8/3/91

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 8 MARCH 1991, AT 3.33 PM

DAWSON J:	Mr Harrison, you appear in person, do you?
MR P.L. HARRISON:	Your Honour, I am the applicant in this

matter.

DAWSON 0:

You are appearing for leave to appeal against the order made by Justice Brennan, is that not so?

MR HARRISON:

Yes, Your Honour.

What I would like to do,

Your Honour, is present three arguments why I
consider that the solicitor should remain on the

record. Then after that, Your Honour, my basic
reason is I contend I hold a cause of action and
then, if the Court permits, maybe you would allow
me to go into that matter.

DAWSON J: That will not be relevant on this application, Mr

Harrison. What you have to show is at least a
prima facie case that Justice Brennan was in error
in making the order which he did. That is really
the only question to which you can usefully address
yourself.

MR HARRISON: Right. With respect to paragraphs (a), (b),

(c) and (d) at pages 26 and 27 of the notice of
appeal, the sealed order of His Honour
Chief Justice Mason dated 24 August 1989 applied to
two separate applications made by the solicitor on
22 August 1989 and 23 August 1989 under Order 7
rule 7(1) of the rules by way of separate
summonses. His Honour in making the finding on the
application dated 22 August 1989, on 23 August 1989
dismissed the second application dated
23 August 1989 on 24 August 1989 on the basis that
a finding had been entered on the first application
dated 22 August 1989.
In effect, by His Honour's ruling, the first

application dated 22 August 1989 acted as an
estoppel to the second application dated 23 August

1989 rendering Order 7 rule 7(1) of the rules

inoperative for the second application. As a
consequence His Honour's ruling on the first
application dated 22 August 1989 and the subsequent
sealed order dated 24 August 1989 acted as an
estoppel to all further applications, including the
present application dated 20 August 1989.

DAWSON J:

Can I stop you there, Mr Harrison.

The reason

why His Honour refused to make an order that the
solicitor's name be removed from the record was
that there was inadequate material before the Court
at that time. Is that not so?

MR HARRISON:

No, the order was made, Your Honour, as I

understood.

Harrison

8/3/91

DAWSON J: This is the order of the Chief Justice made on

24 August?

MR HARRrSON:

Yes.

It was a defective service.

DAWSON J'":

The order was that…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Harrison v The State Transport Authority

Details

AGLC: Harrison v The State Transport Authority [1991] HCATrans 63
Case: [1991] HCATrans 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, brought by Peter Linden Harrison against the State Transport Authority. Mr Harrison sought to appeal an order made by Justice Brennan.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Justice Brennan erred in making his order. Mr Harrison contended that a prior order made by Chief Justice Mason acted as an estoppel, preventing Justice Brennan's subsequent decision. The Court was required to determine if the principle of estoppel applied in this context, or if Justice Brennan was entitled to consider the application before him on its own merits and the material presented.

Dawson J clarified that the application before Justice Brennan was a fresh one, distinct from the earlier application before Chief Justice Mason. His Honour explained that Chief Justice Mason had dismissed the initial application due to inadequate material to satisfy the Court that the solicitors had ceased to act. In contrast, Justice Brennan had made an order on the subsequent application because the material before him was sufficient to establish that the solicitors had indeed ceased to act. Therefore, Dawson J indicated that there was no estoppel, as Justice Brennan had dealt with a new application based on different evidence.

Orders