Harrison v ERIKSSON
[2015] FCCA 2963
•12 November 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HARRISON v ERIKSSON | [2015] FCCA 2963 |
| Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Review of Registrar’s decision – issues regarding service including orders by Registrar for substituted service – long delay by debtor filing review application – alleged negligence in advice provided to debtor about prescribed time within which to lodge review application. |
| Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966, ss.43, 52 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999, s.104(2) |
| Grundy v Wattyl Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1480 Mosman Municipal Council v Kelly (2011) 9 ABC (NS) 254; [2011] FCA 1166 Napiat Pty Ltd v Salfinger (No.7) (2011) 202 FCR 264 O’Meara v Hitwise Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 518 Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 107 Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193 Re Vincent ex parte State Bank of NSW Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 58 |
| Applicant: | RACHEL HARRISON |
| Respondent: | CHRISTOPHER ERIKSSON |
| File Number: | CAG 60 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Neville |
| Hearing date: | 19 March 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 9 April 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Canberra |
| Delivered on: | 12 November 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Self represented |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Dr D Hassall |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Capital Lawyers, Canberra |
ORDERS
The extension of time Application be refused.
The Application to Review be dismissed.
The Applicant is to pay the Respondent costs out of the bankrupt’s estate.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA |
CAG 60 of 2014
| RACHEL HARRISON |
Applicant
And
| CHRISTOPHER ERIKSSON |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This matter is utterly disproportionate – in every respect. The amount being pursued by the petitioning creditor is for a sum of $6,127.00 (plus interest), pursuant to orders made against Ms Harrison in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal on 18th March 2013.
In making such a comment at the outset, or at any other time, is not to indicate that debts should not be paid, or that creditors ought not pursue debtors. Rather, for such a sum, the volume of material filed and the obvious labour expended by the petitioning creditor (or rather his lawyers and Counsel) has been extraordinary, and disproportionate. As well, the affidavit and oral evidence costs associated with an expert witness from Sydney (Mr Klein), an expert in “digital forensic examination, electronic discovery … and related services” I surmise by themselves would likely be close to if not would exceed the amount in issue between the parties.
Likewise, the petitioning creditor’s highly experienced Counsel’s submissions were extensive, and therefore would likely not have been a cheap exercise: the primary submissions (single spaced) ran to 19 pages, while the submissions in reply (also single spaced), ran to a further 8 pages.
For her part, Ms Harrison filed a further (and extensive) affidavit on 13th February, and 3 separate sets of submissions, on 17th, 19th and 26th March 2015.
A [primary] Court Book was provided (by the Respondent creditor), which contained copies of documents filed, including 30 affidavits, together with a Supplementary Court Book, which contained copies of a further seven (7) filed affidavits. The Court Books are contained in five (5) separate binders.
It might be said that, in the light of the amount of paper used in the small to modest mountain of documents filed, this was not an ecologically-friendly case. But that is not an issue before the Court.
In a perhaps related way, the responses by the debtor, respectfully, often bordered on the fanciful. By and large, Ms Harrison contended that she had not been properly served with the bankruptcy notice, and or the creditor’s petition (subject to what is said later in these reasons). Much of her argument depended upon highly technical arguments regarding what was, and what was not, her email account, relevant email address, and actual address. It was precisely because of the arguments pressed by the Applicant regarding email correspondence that the services of an expert in “digital forensic examination” were deemed necessary by the Respondent to the Application.
The Application for Review
The principal Application before the Court is to review a decision of the Registrar, dated 17th April 2014, to make a sequestration order under s.43 of the Bankruptcy Act1966 (“the Act”). The Application for Review was not filed until 26th September 2014.
Section 104(2) of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 provides for the review of powers exercised by a Registrar. The Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules2006, (r.2.03) provides that such applications for review are to be made within 21 days of the making of the order that is to be reviewed.
The Applicant here, Ms Harrison, is out of time with her Application to Review by some five (5) months. She seeks an extension of time for her Application, as well as an order that the sequestration order made by the Registrar on 17th April 2014 be set aside. The Respondent opposes all of the orders sought by the Applicant.
For the reasons that follow, (i) the extension of time application is refused, and to the degree necessary in the light of the refusal of time extension, (ii) the Application to Review must otherwise be dismissed. An order for costs as proposed by the Respondent – that they be paid out of the bankrupt’s estate in the Respondent’s favour – should also be made.
Procedural History
A creditor’s petition was filed on 13th January 2014, together with an affidavit of service. That affidavit confirmed that service was effected by sending the petition and supporting affidavit to an email address styled “[email protected]”
The same affidavit of service confirmed that the debtor, Ms Harrison, was identified by
(a)sending the bankruptcy notice (BN 165295) to her by email dated 23rd October 2013,
(b)on that same dated receiving a response from Ms Harrison,
(c)also on the same date (23rd October 2013), confirming by email to Ms Harrison that she had been served as a result of her communication.
The email chain just referred to is annexed to this affidavit of service; the email chain also was formally tendered, and became Exhibit A.
In fact, the email chain referred to contains the reply from Ms Harrison to the Respondent’s solicitor (Ms MacDonald) but from a “hotmail” address, rather than an “optusnet” address. I should also note however that the original email letter from Ms MacDonald to Ms Harrison was in fact sent to the “hotmail” address of Ms Harrison, namely “[email protected]”.
Ms Harrison denies ever receiving the email from Ms MacDonald, dated 23rd October 2013, enclosing the bankruptcy notice.[1]
[1] In this regard, see Ms Harrison’s affidavit, filed 13th February 2015, par.5.
Similarly, she denies ever sending the email reply, also dated 23rd October 2013, to Ms MacDonald which said:
“Dear Jessica,
We are unsure what the current status of the ACT Magistrates Court enforcement proceeding is as the correspondence ceased back in August 2013.
I have engaged a lawyer to represent me and negotiate with you regards to this matter.
I have sent all correspondence to my lawyer and he is looking at the case.
Regards
Rachel Harrison”
On 17th February 2014, the Respondent (creditor) filed an Application (and detailed supporting affidavit) seeking orders that personal service be dispensed with, and providing for service of the Creditor’s Petition via a number of alternative means, including (a) service by email to the “hotmail” address otherwise set out above and which was used on 23rd October 2013, (b) leaving it at a nominated address in the Canberra suburb of Belconnen, and (c) by sending it by pre-paid ordinary post to a specified post-box at the University of Canberra. As well, orders were sought for notification to be given to Ms Harrison by a text (SMS) message, again at a nominated mobile telephone number.
The orders as sought by the petitioning creditor were made by the Registrar on 7th March 2014.
On 9th April 2014, Ms MacDonald filed an affidavit in which she confirmed that each of the orders regarding service on Ms Harrison made by the Registrar on 7th March had been complied with, and how each step had occurred.
On 16th April 2014, Ms MacDonald filed a further affidavit in which she confirmed service on Ms Harrison of the listing of the creditor’s petition on 17th April.
On 17th April 2014, the Registrar made a sequestration order against the estate of Rachel Harrison.
The Applicant’s Evidence & Submissions
As earlier noted, the Applicant filed an Application for Review on 26th September 2014, some 5 months out of time. In her affidavit in support, she deposed (summarily stated) that:
(a)She had never been served with the bankruptcy notice;
(b)In relation to the orders for service made by the Registrar on 7th March 2014, she outlined various factual matters she said made compliance with those orders inappropriate (e.g. that she did not reside at the Belconnen address).[2] Most relevant and particular for the purposes of the current Application and these reasons is that she said that she had not “received any e-mail from the applicant’s solicitor regarding service of documents.”
(c)Ms Harrison also noted that her mobile telephone number had changed in July 2013, which therefore meant that she received no SMS message as prescribed in the Registrar’s orders.
[2] There is an affidavit of service by Ms Andrews, sworn 24th March 2014, in which she deposed leaving a copy of the creditor’s petition at the address specified in the Registrar’s orders of 7th March, namely 2/45 Totterdell Street, Belconnen. Ms Harrison provided a copy of an affidavit from Dr Marchesi, affirmed 18th September 2014, confirming that at that time of service he had leased this residential address and has no recollection of any parcel or letter being affixed to his residence, as deposed to by Ms Andrews. Dr Marchesi was not made available for cross-examination; nor was the original of his affidavit provided.
In the light of these factual matters to which she deposed, Ms Harrison sought to have the Court make orders “to dismiss the creditor’s petition.”
In a later affidavit, filed 13th February 2015, (as summarily as possible) Ms Harrison deposed as follows:
(a)Her address at the relevant time was in the Canberra suburb of Barton (spelt “Burton” in the affidavit) (not Belconnen);
(b)She had never received any email from the creditor’s solicitor, Ms MacDonald; and further, upon making inquiry of Microsoft Corporation (in December 2014), which company are said to have confirmed that no email was ever received in her “Hotmail” inbox on 23rd October 2013;
(c)Similarly, Ms Harrison deposed that she had never received [further] emails from Ms MacDonald on 14th March 2014 enclosing a copy of the Registrar’s Orders for substituted service and the creditor’s petition. As with earlier email claims, Ms Harrison said that she inquired of Microsoft Corporation about receipt of any email from Ms MacDonald on or about 14th March 2014, to which the answer (and copies of relevant “screen-shots” provided and annexed to her affidavit) was “no”;
(d)She further challenged service of relevant documents at her University of Canberra post box, saying that she had never received any correspondence at that post box, and that she did not use that post box after she moved from the Belconnen address on 27th September 2013;
(e)The Applicant debtor further deposed that she never received any txt/SMS message from Ms MacDonald, saying that the last message that she had received on the mobile telephone number set out in the Registrar’s orders was on 9th September 2013, after which that pre-paid mobile number was disconnected;
(f)She also denied ever receiving a copy of the Notice of Re-Listing that was sent by the creditor’s lawyers to the Belconnen address on 14th March 2014 (and likewise a txt/SMS message regarding notice of the same listing);
(g)Ms Harrison then deposed that she first learnt of the bankruptcy proceeding(s) in the course of a telephone call to the Registry of the Court. She deposed that this telephone conversation took place on 27th May 2013 [sic]. If she is to be consistent with the rest of her affidavit, this date, according to her version of events, must be taken to be 27th May 2014. At the same time, in par.11 of this affidavit, Ms Harrison deposed that she received the Respondent creditor’s documents, opposing her Application for Review, from her then solicitors Hill & Rummery, on 23rd October 2014;
(h)Next she deposed to various telephone conversations and email correspondence she said she had with solicitors, O’Connor Harris & Co on 27th May, 6th June, 4th July, 10th July and 15th August, in which she said that she sought to have this firm represent her in the Application to Review. I do not need to detail these exchanges, other than to note that Ms Harrison says, in effect, that this firm ultimately was not able to represent her and referred her to a nominated person at Hill & Rummery;
(i)The contact with Hill & Rummery formally began on 18th August. Other contact with Mr Carroll of that firm took place by various means on 20th and 28th August, and on various occasions between 1st and 11th September 2014;
(j)Ms Harrison deposed also to being engaged in legal studies at the University of Canberra between mid-February and December 2014, which occupied much of her time;
(k)She deposed to still suffering certain stress from criminal and family law proceedings in the ACT Magistrates Court (and on appeal to the ACT Supreme Court) between December 2012 and October 2013. She provided certain medical certificates which attested to her various states of malaise there set out;
(l)Finally, Ms Harrison said (para.32) that two nominated solicitors from the firms mentioned had never advised her of the prescribed time of 21 days of the Registrar’s sequestration (dated 17th April 2013) within which to file the Application for Review.
Respectfully, and subject to what is set out below, the Applicant/debtor’s submissions were, to a significant degree, little more than a recitation of the matters to which she had deposed in her affidavits, which I have outlined earlier.
In addition to the matters mentioned in her affidavit, she challenged or objected to (a) the Respondent Creditor being able to rely on the expert report from Mr Klein, and (b) in the event that Mr Klein’s evidence was admitted, the substance and findings of the report were, she said, undermined by evidence from Mr Iliev (per an email from him to Mr Klein dated 13th March 2015) in which he said that there was no evidence of correspondence between the debtor’s email address and the creditor’s solicitor. I simply note here that Mr Klein challenged this claim by Mr Iliev.[3]
[3] Mr Iliev is a forensic examiner with a firm in the ACT. He filed an affidavit, on behalf of the Respondent, on 16th March 2015. Mr Iliev is employed by a firm which provides IT services to the Respondent’s lawyers. Pursuant to requests from the Respondent’s lawyers, Mr Iliev was responsible for extracting certain data relating to Ms Harrison’s and Ms MacDonald’s emails, which he forwarded to Mr Klein.
The remainder of her submissions concerned matters of law, and in particular, that (a) a review application is a hearing de novo, (b) she had provided reasons to explain the delay in filing the Application, and (c) Rule 16.01 of the “Bankruptcy Regulations” governed service of the bankruptcy notice (Ms Harrison relied upon the decision in Mbuzi v Favell (No.2) [2012] FCA 311 in relation to the strict requirement of proof of service).
The Applicant debtor’s final written submissions were by way of reply to those of the Respondent creditor. Much of these submissions concerned the evidence and the provenance of it from the Microsoft Corporation, particularly in the light of the evidence of Mr Klein (who not only provided a detailed report but also was very briefly cross-examined by the Applicant in the course of the hearing).
For completeness, I should note that the Applicant debtor wrote to the Court on 31st March 2015 by way of further submission, to which the Respondent creditor’s solicitor responded by letter dated 2nd April. Both letters contain various assertions regarding evidence and submissions before the Court. She also filed an affidavit on 9th April (to which the Respondent objected). In my view, none of these later filings take the matter further in any relevant respect.
Respondent Creditor’s Evidence and Submissions
For current purposes, other than the multiple affidavits of service (and similar formal affidavits of debt and the like), particularly by Ms MacDonald – noting also that Ms MacDonald was never called for the purposes of cross examination – it is sufficient to note very briefly the following comments by Mr Klein. His affidavit, which annexed his report dated 16th March 2015, was filed on that date. Although not formally attached to his affidavit, he deposed to having read the Practice Note issued by the Federal Court of Australia CM7, and Rules 23.12 and 23.13 of that Court’s Rules in relation to expert evidence.
Most relevantly, Mr Klein concluded that the screen shots provided by Ms Harrison (Annexures B & C to her affidavit filed 13th February 2015) and said by her to be from Microsoft Corporation are “not authentic communications from that corporation.” (Report, pp.6 & 12). Mr Klein explains in detail, which I need not recount here, the reasons for coming to this conclusion.
At p.7 of his Report, Mr Klein stated that the screen shots provided by Ms Harrison at Annexure B of her affidavit of her [email protected] account “clearly show many email messages across September, October and November 2014; many months after the account was allegedly closed and should have been permanently deleted.”
Given the tenacity with which this matter has been contested, and the amount of material filed, there is no evidence from anyone to suggest that Ms Harrison’s email account was “hacked” or otherwise used by anyone else. In this regard, the Court simply observes that it is one thing simply to deny ever receiving or sending emails from a particular address; but there is no evidence, or even a suggestion, that someone else was or had been using the same email address illegally or otherwise. There is simply no evidence that the email address “[email protected]” was ever used by anyone else.
At pp.9-10, and again at pp.17-19, of his Report, Mr Klein noted various “unusual features” of the screen shots provided by Ms Harrison at annexure B of her affidavit filed 13th February 2015. Again I need not detail any of the observations made there.
For present purposes, it is unnecessary to detail any further matters from Mr Klein’s report, other than to note that at pp.14-17, he concluded:
I believe it is … reasonable to conclude that the original email message, to which this email message responds, being the email message from Jessica MacDonald to Rachel Harrison attaching the bankruptcy notice, was received at the email address [email protected] on 23 October 2013.
Mr Klein was only very briefly cross examined by Ms Harrison. In no relevant respect did she challenge the conclusions set out in his Report.[4]
[4] See Transcript (19th March 2015) pp.73-75.
Before moving to consider the Respondent’s submissions, I note again that as part of the documents formally tendered by the Respondent (Exhibit A) was a collection of emails, all dated 23rd October 2013, [purportedly] between Ms Harrison and Ms MacDonald, which otherwise are attached to earlier filed affidavits on behalf of the Respondent, and to which reference has been made earlier in these reasons.
Notwithstanding the immense amount of documents filed by the Respondent, in my view I need only note the following by way of summary:[5]
[5] In providing such a brief summary, it is not intended to reflect adversely on the detail of the submissions.
(a)The fact that the Applicant sought advice from at least two solicitors, while attending to other things (including the disposition of a property), tells against Ms Harrison not being able to file the Application to Review at a much earlier point in time. On this basis alone, the application for an extension of time should be refused;
(b)The Applicant has not filed a statement of affairs, nor paid any funds to the Trustee;
(c)Service of the bankruptcy notice was duly effected on 23rd October 2013, as was the creditor’s petition in accordance with the Registrar’s orders. Accordingly, the requirements of s.52 of the Bankruptcy Act1966 have been complied with, and the sequestration order was regularly made (Mosman Municipal Council v Kelly (2011) 9 ABC (NS) 254; [2011] FCA 1166);
(d)The bankruptcy notice was regularly served by email on 23rd October 2013, which conclusion is supported by, among other things, the [unchallenged] evidence of Mr Klein. Further, it was submitted that the evidence provided by Ms Harrison was insufficient to cast doubt on the service otherwise regularly effected;
(e)Whether or not the bankruptcy notice or the creditor’s petition in fact came to the Applicant’s attention is not to the point; it is sufficient that a document or process either comes into that person’s hands, or to that person’s knowledge, in which case that person did, or could have if so disposed, become acquainted with it or them. Moreover, given how long ago the matter was filed and served, the debtor has long been acquainted with the detail of the petition;
(f)The Respondent went further and submitted that the Applicant had in fact actively sought to evade service;
(g)Otherwise, the Respondent submitted that the debtor’s evidence was poor and her explanations (such as in relation to the delay in filing the review application) were inadequate; as well, she showed no urgency in her application to the Court;[6]
(h)The Applicant’s contention that it is a requirement that she be personally served, or at least that there is some formal acknowledgement that she is actually aware of the bankruptcy proceedings, is misconceived and not in accordance with authority;
(i)For the purposes of the de novo hearing, the submission was that all reasonable steps had been taken to effect service and otherwise to bring to the debtor’s attention the bankruptcy proceedings;[7]
(j)The creditor also challenged the debtor’s evidence generally both in relation to its inconsistency and as to her credibility;
(k)Further, on the authority of Re Vincent ex parte State Bank of NSW Ltd where service of a petition was carried out using a number of means pursuant to an order for substituted service, in the circumstances the Court was satisfied that the petition had come to the notice of the debtor and the failure to serve in a third mode was treated as a formal defect which would not thereby invalidate service.[8]
[6] Among other authorities relied upon, see Grundy v Wattyl Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 1480, where an extension of time was refused.
[7] In this regard, it is sufficient simply to note the discussion regarding such hearings in O’Meara v Hitwise Pty Ltd (2007) 160 FCR 518, and Totev v Sfar (2008) 167 FCR 193.
[8] Re Vincent ex parte State Bank of NSW Ltd (1966) 71 FCR 58.
Consideration & Disposition
Notwithstanding the volume of material filed, as well as the copious submissions, in my view, the Application before the Court may be disposed of relatively simply.
First, the Applicant’s own evidence in relation to her attempts to seek legal advice is sufficient, in my view, to reject the application for an extension of time. Her evidence showed no relevant urgency to deal with the bankruptcy proceedings once (on her account) she became aware of them. Whatever of the advice either firm of solicitors did or did not give to her, in my view,
(a)any reasonable person would have done everything possible at least to notify the Court and the other party of the intention to challenge the orders made in the bankruptcy proceedings, and to file at the earliest possible time an application for review, and
(b)the claim that she was given incorrect or inadequate advice is something which, strictly speaking, should be taken up with either or both firms of solicitors, if not also the Law Society. If there is any issue regarding the nature or kind of advice given to the Applicant debtor, it is not something which should be visited upon the Respondent in the current proceeding. And, in any event, absent any relevant evidence from either or both firms, it is difficult for the Court to consider the extraordinary claim that two firms were both so negligent, as claimed by the Applicant, as to not give her advice about time limits in bankruptcy proceedings;
(c)accordingly, the application to extend time must be and is refused.
Secondly, even if the exercise of the Court’s discretion not to extend time is put to one side, in my view, the bankruptcy notice and the creditor’s petition were both regularly served. I say that for the following reasons.
In my view, the bankruptcy notice was regularly served. Service was effected by the email from Ms MacDonald to the Applicant debtor on 23rd October 2013. I note the email reply from Ms Harrison of the same date. Other than her frequent denials of ever having received the email, and also that she did not send the reply which bears her name, there is no relevant evidence to challenge the evidence of Ms MacDonald regarding service of the bankruptcy notice.
Further, I accept the evidence of Mr Klein. His findings were not, in my view, relevantly challenged by Ms Harrison regarding receipt of the said email.
I accept the submission of the Respondent to the effect that the Applicant misconceives the law in relation to service. It is not the law that she must in fact be served. In addition to the “modes of service” and any “formal defects” regarding same as identified by Hill J in Re Vincent ex parte State Bank of NSW Ltd noted earlier in these reasons, the law is clearly stated in two recent decisions of the Federal Court of Australia.
In Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd, the Full Court of the Federal Court (Sundberg, Finkelstein & Hely JJ) said, at [27] - [29]:[9]
[9] Skalkos v T & S Recoveries Pty Ltd (2004) 141 FCR 107.
[27] Two issues arise under this ground. The first is whether a bankruptcy notice that is required by s 40(1)(g) of the Act to be served on the debtor can be served under reg 16. If it can, the second question is whether the notice was sent by post to the appellant’s last-known address.
[28] The appellant submitted that reg 16 was not available because a "contrary intention appears" within the opening words of reg 16.01(1). The contrary intention is said to arise from a combination of the following factors:
(a) non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice is an act of bankruptcy available to found a bankruptcy petition;
(b) a “last-known address” is “something likely to be inaccurate” since people, especially those under considerable financial pressure, regularly change their addresses;
(c) a business address is even more likely to change by reason of financial stress;
(d) an alleged debtor who did not receive the notice would not become aware of it until served with a petition, at which stage it would frequently be too late to do anything;
(e) an act of bankruptcy must be specifically and clearly proved;
(f) there is no requirement in reg 16 that if the letter is returned marked “Not known at this address” or “Return to sender,” that fact must be disclosed to the court;
(g) the regulation does not distinguish between a last-known address that is relatively current and one that is long out of date;
(h) the effect of the regulation is that once the letter is posted the onus is on the debtor to prove that he did not receive it, an onus that may be difficult to discharge;
(i) the issue on a bankruptcy petition based on a bankruptcy notice is whether the debtor has failed to pay the debt notwithstanding having been given a last chance, and should not become a credit issue as to whether or not the notice ever came to the notice of the debtor.[29] … In our view, the fact that in some cases reg 16.01 can produce harsh results, which is what the combination of the factors relied on is directed to establishing, does not constitute a contrary intention for the purposes of reg 16.01(1). Factors (d), (h) and (i) assume that it is open to a debtor to prove non-receipt of the notice. As we have said, this assumption is ill-founded.
Then at [32] – [37], after an extensive discussion, the Full Court confirmed that the trial Judge’s decision in that case, namely that service be effected on the debtor at that person’s “last known address” was open to him.[10] Just so here. The evidence of Ms MacDonald in relation to service of the creditor’s petition should be accepted.
[10] See further the additional comments by Foster J in Napiat Pty Ltd v Salfinger (No.7) (2011) 202 FCR 264 regarding service in the light of the decision in Skalkos.
In addition to what I have already said, otherwise I should be taken to accept the Respondent’s submissions more generally.
In my view the Applicant debtor has provided insufficient evidence relevantly to challenge the orders made by the Registrar on 17th April 2014.
Having regard to all the evidence, for the reasons given, (a) the application for an extension of time must be refused, and (b) the Application for Review must also be dismissed. An order for costs in the Respondent’s favour also should follow, and should be paid out of the Applicant debtor’s estate.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Neville
Associate:
Date: 12th November 2015
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