Harrison (Trustee), in the matter of Purcell (Bankrupt) v Purcell
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1467
•29 August 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Harrison (Trustee), in the matter of Purcell (Bankrupt) v Purcell [2025] FedCFamC2G 1467
File number(s): SYG 2491 of 2025 Judgment of: JUDGE D HUMPHREYS Date of judgment: 29 August 2025 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Ex Tempore – bankrupt failed to file a statement of affairs – trustee application under s 146 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – pseudolegal argument - where the applicant alleges assents to legislation and appointments by the sovereign are invalid – application granted Legislation: Australia Act 1986 (Cth)
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) Part VI, Division 5, s 146
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
Royal Styles and Titles Act 1973 (Cth)
Cases cited: Pitter & Baier (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 197
Planck & Planck [2024] FedCFamC1F 341
Re Nimmitabel Waters Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 300
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 19 Date of hearing: 29 August 2025 Place: Parramatta Solicitor for the Applicant: Ms Odgers, SLF Lawyers Solicitor for the Respondent: Self-represented Litigant ORDERS
SYG 2491 of 2025 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF DELMONT ELEANOR PURCELL
BETWEEN: BRETT RICHARD GEOFFREY HARRISON AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF DELMONT ELEANOR PURCELL
Applicant
AND: DELMONT ELEANOR PURCELL
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
29 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Order under section 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy) that the Applicant is justified in declaring and distributing dividends amongst the creditors of the bankrupt estate of Delmont Eleanor Purcell in accordance with Part VI, Division 5, of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
2.Order pursuant to s 146 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that the distribution of dividends amongst creditors who have proved their debts in the bankrupt estate of Delmont Eleanor Purcell shall proceed in accordance with Part VI, Division 5 of the Act as if the Bankrupt had filed a Statement of Affairs and those creditors had been stated to be creditors in it.
3.The Applicant give notice of these orders by ordinary post and (or) by email to the nominated email address for the Respondent and each of the Respondent's creditors and persons claiming to be creditors of the Respondent, within 3 business days of the making of these orders.
4.The Respondent is not entitled to any surplus funds remaining after payment of the dividends to creditors until she has lodged her duly completed Statement of Affairs in the required form in the office of the Official Receiver and the Applicant has dealt with the claims of any further creditors disclosed in the Statement of Affairs.
5.Costs be made as assessed or agreed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(EX TEMPORE, AS REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
INTRODUCTION
This is an application by Brett Richard Geoffrey Harrison as trustee for the bankrupt estate of Delmont Eleanor Purcell. The applicant in this matter seeks orders pursuant to s 146 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’) which reads as follows:
Where a bankrupt has failed to file a statement of his or her affairs as required by this Act, the Court may, on the application of the trustee, upon such terms as it thinks fit, order that distribution of dividends amongst the creditors who have proved their debts shall proceed in accordance with this Division as if the bankrupt had filed a statement of his or her affairs and those creditors had been stated to be creditors in it.
CONSIDERATION
The evidence before me consists of an Affidavit of Brett Harrison, sworn 15 July 2025, together with some additional documents that are an exhibit to that Affidavit. First , I am satisfied that the applicant is the trustee in bankruptcy for the bankrupt estate of Ms Purcell. Second ,I am satisfied that a sequestration order was made by this Court on 4 April 2024. I am satisfied that the trustee has proceeded to deal with this matter in accordance with their responsibilities under the Act.
I am also satisfied, based on the affidavit evidence, that on 24 May 2024, the respondent was issued with a letter asking that she complete her Statement of Affairs. The applicant responded on 26 May, and she said, "I do not accept any bankruptcy. You are not the trustee. Everything you represent is unlawful." There was a further similar letter issued to her.
I am further satisfied that the trustee has carried out their duties, as required under the Act and that the matter has now reached a stage where it is appropriate that orders be sought under section 146 of the Act. Section 146 simply provides a method by which the trustee can deal with funds without the respondent filing a Statement of Affairs. I am satisfied that no statement of affairs has been filed. I am satisfied the trustee has done all things necessary to advise the respondent of her obligations under the Act to the respondent and has properly advised creditors to prove any debts. I am satisfied it is appropriate in circumstances where the respondent has not filed a Statement of Affairs to consider making an order under s 146.
I am advised that there are sufficient funds to pay all creditors and that there would be a surplus payable to the respondent of $1,062,421.32, less any legal costs that may have been incurred along the way.
The respondent, Ms Purcell, disputes and opposes the making of the orders that are sought. Ms Purcell has appeared before the Court today, and the Court appreciates the way that she has appeared and the way that she has conducted herself.
Ms Purcell disputes the authority of this Court and makes certain claims that are attached in her Affidavit. These include that the Federal Court has been corporatised as a foreign corporation registered under the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Ms Purcell says that all laws made since 1973 have been unlawful and unconstitutional. There is no Queen of Australia, she does not exist, an Act styling her as such was not put before the people in a referendum, and the Royal Styles and Titles Act 1973 (Cth) is unlawful in trying to implement this change. Ms Purcell alleges that the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) is also invalid, unlawful and unconstitutional, never having gone before the people of Australia to make changes. Ms Purcell concedes that the Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is valid, as this properly was agreed to by the people, but any other amendments to the Constitution not agreed to at a referendum make them invalid, unlawful and unconstitutional.
Ms Purcell claims that she had no contract with any third-party administrators and contractors and that, in fact, there has been theft, and unlawful taking of her property, being a unit that belonged to her and her brother in a block of units that was built by her parents many years ago. Ms Purcell disputes that the Real Estate Agent, who is the Strata Title Manager, has acted properly and alleges that they have acted fraudulently. Ms Purcell says that none of our state laws are properly assented to, and the other parties have not replied to her subpoena to show how the laws they are attempting to rely upon have been properly assented to, and therefore are invalid and unconstitutional. Ms Purcell says the bankruptcy proceeding is invalid and void because they are based on unlawful and unconstitutional state law in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which is also invalid, unlawful and unconstitutional.
Ms Purcell says that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Financial Security Authority are nothing more than quangos and are unlawful corporate bodies, and that the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) is fraudulent. There are various assertions made as to Australia being flooded by immigrants. She relies upon a US case of Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which overturns the 1984 case of Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Ms Purcell disputes the fact that I am properly authorised or lawfully sworn in and that I have no authority. There were various attachments to that affidavit including a purported United States Securities and Exchange Commission notice of effect in the state of 5 February 2010, which registers the Commonwealth of Australia as a body under the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
The issues of whether or not this Court is properly constituted have been considered on a number of occasions. In Planck & Planck [2024] FedCFamC1F 341 (Planck & Plank), which is a judgment of Division 1 of this Court sitting in the family law jurisdiction but otherwise binding on me as a Division 2 Judge . Riethmuller J set out in great detail, various matters that had been put to him in relation to whether or not this Court was properly constituted. In Planck & Plank at [12](a), his Honour set out the objections taken by the applicant in that matter, which are broadly similar to the matters that are put to me here today, and he said:
First, there is a general presumption of regularity. … If the applicant seeks to challenge the validity of the legislation and appointments of the judges, he bears the onus of raising an evidentiary basis for the claim. It is not open to him to attempt to place himself in the position of arbiter by demanding that the Court prove its authority to him.
And then in Planck & Plank at [12](b), Riethmuller J said:
Secondly, there is an element of sophistry in how the applicant frames the argument as it is apparent that he would never be satisfied of any proof provided. On his approach, he will always be able to demand further proof: for example, any witness other than the sovereign would simply be asked to prove their authority, and if the sovereign appeared, no doubt the applicant would require that the sovereign prove his identity and sovereignty.
I note that the Queen, regrettably, has passed away, and we now have a sovereign King.
In Planck & Plank at [12](c), Riethmuller J said:
Thirdly, it appears from the form of the application that the applicant effectively arrogates to himself the power to issue the ancient writ of quo warranto. Section 75(v) of the Constitution vests original jurisdiction in the High Court in any matter in which a writ of prohibition and mandamus or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.
At [12](c), Riethmuller J goes on to say that:
The applicant’s argument has the effect that no currently sitting judge in Australia is validly appointed, it is unclear to which court he would need to address his request for the issue of such a writ (presumably either the King or the High Court of England).
I would add the Privy Council if no court of Australia is validly constituted.
Riethmuller J then went on to deal with the issue of letters patent and assents to legislation by Queen Elizabeth are invalid because of the change of “Our Sign Manual and Signet” to “Our Sign Manual and Great Seal” and various other changes. His Honour sets out in great detail the various arguments that have been put forward. They are commonly referred to, and I do not use this phrase by making any aspersion on the respondent in this matter, as Sovereign Citizen arguments. They are arguments which have been described as pseudo law.
In Plank & Plank, Reithmuller J found that none of those arguments have any effect and that this Court is properly constituted and is able to make orders as sought. I am satisfied that the judgment of Plank & Plank is binding upon me. His Honour also made a similar ruling in the matter of Pitter & Baier (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1A 197. I also note that Black J of the New South Wales Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in the matter of Re Nimmitabel Waters Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 300 (Nimmitabel Waters).
Whilst the judgment of Nimmitabel Waters is not binding upon me because I am a Federal Judge, and that is a judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, it is certainly very persuasive. In my view, it similarly comes to a correct conclusion that the arguments that are put forward in relation to Sovereign Citizen arguments are simply untenable as a matter of law, I agree and am bound to apply that logic..
DETERMINATION
In my view, it is appropriate that I make the orders sought in the application.
I certify that the preceding nineteen (19) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D HUMPHREYS. Associate: HM
Dated: 4 September 2025
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