Harper and Pint (No. 2)

[2013] FamCA 423

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HARPER & PINT (NO. 2) [2013] FamCA 423

FAMILY LAW – ORDERS – Contravention – For those contraventions that were proved sanctions are reserved until family report published.

APPLICANT: Mr Harper

RESPONDENT: Ms J Pint

INTERVENOR:

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms S Wunderich

FILE NUMBER: MLC 8349 of 2009

DATE DELIVERED: 26 March 2013

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Bennett J

HEARING DATE: 25 and 26 March 2013

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: In Person

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: In Person

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER Mr G Combes

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER Agricola Wunderlich & Associates

Orders

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1.Counts 7 and 9 of the father’s contravention application filed on 7 January 2013 be, and are hereby, dismissed.

2.In relation to count 10, in which it is alleged that on 24 November 2012 the mother without reasonable excuse did not send the communication journal to accompany the children and did so in contravention of paragraph 9 of the Order made on 2 October 2012 (“the Primary Order”), I find that count proved and adjourn the further hearing of this matter for consideration of what sanction (if any) ought to be imposed to the adjourned date provided for in paragraph 11 of this Order (“the adjourned date”).

3.In relation to count 11, in which it is alleged that on 24 November 2012 the mother without reasonable excuse did not send the communication journal to accompany the children and did so in contravention of paragraph 9 of the Primary Order, I find that count proved and adjourn consideration of sanctions to the adjourned date.

4.In relation to count 22, in which it is alleged that on 9 December the mother without reasonable excuse failed to provide the family report and children and parent’s issues assessment in this matter to the children’s psychologist and did so in contravention of paragraph 18 of the Primary Order, I find that count proved and adjourn consideration of sanctions to the adjourned date.

5.In relation to count 23, in which it is alleged that on 19 October 2012 the mother without reasonable excuse did not provide written permission to D Medical Practice to discuss the children’s medical matters with the father and did so in contravention of paragraph 19 of the Primary Order, I find that count proved and adjourn consideration of sanctions to the adjourned date.

6.I reserve further consideration of sanctions on the contraventions until following the publication of a family report and hearing submissions.

7.A full family report be prepared to assist the Court to determine whether parenting arrangements should be varied (s.70NBA(1)(b)).  For that purpose the parties and children B born … October 2008 and A born … March 2010 attend upon a Family Consultant nominated by the Director of Child Dispute Services in the Melbourne Registry of this Court for the purposes of the preparation of a Family Report to be made available to the Court and the parties. The parties to comply with all reasonable directions as to attendance upon the said Family Consultant as and when required by the said Family Consultant.  Such report to be commenced on 23 April 2013 and be released on 3 May 2013 AND IT IS NOTED THAT an earlier report has been prepared by Dr E.

8.The family report deal with the following matters:-

a)      The extent (if any) to which either parent may benefit from any individualised psychological treatment in terms of enhancing her/his capacity to parent and to interact with one another constructively;

b)     Whether either or both parents ought to be psychiatrically assessed;

c)      Whether a continuation of the current parenting arrangements is in the best interests of the children (or either of them);

d)     Whether the children would benefit from further face to face time with the father and, if so, what further time;

e) The matters set out in s60CC of the Family Law Act;

f)      An assessment of the capacity of the parents to cooperate with one another in relation to day to day parenting matters as well as long term parenting issues in the context of equal shared parental responsibility (if that was to be ordered); and

g)      Recommendations as to how the matters in issue between the parties and/or arising out of the proceedings, may be resolved in the children’s best interest to the greatest extent possible.

9.IT IS REQUESTED THAT the family consultant have regard to all documents on the Court file after folio 124 (the contravention application filed on 7 January 2013) notwithstanding that some of that material related to alleged counts of contravention of orders which were alleged but dismissed. These documents include my reasons for decision and any documents filed by a parent in accordance with paragraph 12 of this Order.

10.The Independent Children’s Lawyer facilitate such conference (including a conference by telephone) between any expert witnesses as she considers appropriate and in respect of which she provides the other parties with prior written notice.

11.The following issues be adjourned:-

a)      the issue of sanctions on the contraventions proven; and

b)     any variation of parenting order;

to 11 June 2013 at 9.00 am subject to any further direction ordered by me.

12.The parents may file and serve any further evidence or applications upon which they propose to rely in relation to a variation to current parenting orders prior to the assessment by the family consultant as follows:-

a)      the mother by 12.00 noon on Tuesday 9 April 2013;

b)     the father by 12.00 noon on Tuesday 16 April 2013.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Harper & Pint (No. 2) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 8349 of 2009

Mr Harper

Applicant

And

Ms J Pint

Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. On 7 January 2012 the applicant father filed a contravention application in which he alleged that the mother had contravened a parenting order on 2 October 2012 as to 23 counts.  Ultimately, the father pressed only six counts. 

2. On 19 March 2013 the father filed and served a further contravention application in which he alleged that the mother had contravened the primary order as to two further counts.  This application was dismissed in its entirety. 

3. These reasons deal with my determination of the six contested counts with which the father did seek to proceed all of which were denied by the mother. 

4. Section 70NAC(a) provides that a person is taken to have contravened an order under this Act affecting children if, and only if, the person is bound by the order and he or she has intentionally failed to comply with the order or made no reasonable attempt to comply with the order.

5. Section 70NAE provides that a person may be taken to have had a reasonable excuse for contravening an order under the Act affecting children in circumstances including, but not limited to, where the respondent contravened the order because or substantially because he or she did not at the time of the contravention understand the obligations imposed by the order and the court is satisfied that the respondent ought to be excused in respect of the contravention or the respondent believed on reasonable grounds that not allowing the children to spend time with the person was necessary to protect the health or safety of a person (including the respondent or the children or the child) and the period during which the contravention occurred was not longer than was necessary to protect the health and safety of the person.

6. In this case the mother maintains that she has complied with the relevant orders and did not seek to make out a case based on reasonable excuse in relation to her lack of understanding of her obligations under the order or on the health or safety of any person. 

7. The standard of proof to be applied in determining this application is proof on a balance of probabilities. 

8. Statements of fact are findings of fact. 

9. Each of the parents were self-represented.  Mr Combes of counsel appeared on behalf of the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  At an earlier mention of this matter, I made clear that the re-appointment of the Independent Children’s Lawyer was with a view to what, if any, amendment may be required to the parenting orders on an ongoing basis to best serve the interests of the children.  I was assisted by Mr Combes.  The Independent Children’s Lawyer has a longstanding history in this matter, as do I. 

Count 7

1. Paragraph 2(a) of the primary order provides that the mother have sole parental responsibility for the children, B, born in October 2008 and A, born in March 2010 except that the mother shall advise the father of all decisions in respect of health, education and the names of the children. 

2. By count 7 the father alleges that on 11 December 2012 the mother, without reasonable excuse, did not advise him of which kindergarten B would attend in 2013. 

3. The father deposed to having contacted the local Council on 11 December 2012 and having asked for details of the four year kindergarten in which the parties’ eldest child, B, was enrolled to commence in 2013.  The father has annexed emails to his affidavit the contents of which are admitted by the mother to be accurate.  They disclose that at 8.33 pm on 10 December 2012, the mother wrote:

   You still refuse to discuss what education and therapy you want for [B] and [A] in 2013.  They now have no therapy appointments at all booked.  They are on no wait lists.  They are booked into [F School] which you still have not bothered to do a tour of.  [A] cannot get into kinder. [B] cannot get into funded 15 hour program.  [B] can attend kinder for seven hours per week only if I sign her up tomorrow.  Both girls will continue to be homeschooled in preparation to be completely homeschooled when they reach school age. 

4. The father responded at 9.41 pm on the same evening making clear his objection to home schooling and stating, inter alia:

   The girls should have been enrolled or at the very least placed on wait lists at centres of your choosing mid year when enrolments were open.  Your responsibility is to then inform me of your decisions.  This has not occurred to the apparent detriment of our children.  Please as a priority to our daughter’s education make the necessary inquiries to have the girls put on wait lists if not enrolled in kindergarten.  Please advise me once this is done where they are on lists.  I will make contact with some kinders in the meantime to ascertain their position on late enrolments/placements with special needs children if there is any priority given their diagnosis. 

5. The mother responded at 9.50 pm on 10 December 2012 but did not advise the father of any decision that she had made in relation to B. 

6. In her oral evidence, the mother clarified that she had said that the children were to be ‘homeschooled’ merely to provoke some interest in the father so that he sought further information.  The mother gave evidence that, some 12 months previously, she had placed B’s name on an enrolment list for one of the council kindergartens but was yet to be allocated a place. 

7. The mother’s point, in defence of the allegation that has contravened this order, is that the order imposed upon her an obligation to advise the father of “decisions” as opposed to enrolment status or waiting lists. The mother contends that, as at 10 or 12 December 2012, she had not made any “decision” in respect of education of B or A and that any such decision was not made until late January 2012, which was after the father had filed the contravention application.  The mother says that, promptly upon making the decision to send B to a particular kindergarten, she advised the father in writing.  The father did not contest the fact that he was advised of the name of the kindergarten after he had filed his contravention application and at approximately the same time as the mother indicated in her evidence.

8. Clearly, it would have been reasonable for the mother to advise the father of the status of the children’s enrolment in kindergarten or like institutions but the primary order refers to “decisions” rather than status.  Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the order imposed upon the mother an obligation to advise the father of information other than decisions and it follows that the mother has not contravened her obligations under the primary order, as alleged by the father.

9. This count will be dismissed.

Count 9

1. Paragraph 4(b) of the primary order made on 2 October 2012, provides that the father spend time and communicate with the girls from 12 noon to 4.30 pm each Thursday for seven sessions commencing Thursday, 11 October 2012 for the purposes of the father attending with the children for their counselling of the K Therapy Group in Suburb U. 

2. It was common ground that the sessions were to commence, as ordered, on 11 October 2012 but that the first session did not occur.  It is also common ground that there were only six occasions on which the mother presented with the children at the K Therapy Group at Suburb U.

3. It is alleged that, on 13 December 2012, the mother did not make the children available.  She alleges that there was no therapy session booked for that day.  The therapy session was to commence at 12 noon. 

4. Email communications annexed to the father’s affidavit, the accuracy of which is admitted by the mother, disclose at 12.19 pm, the father wrote to the mother saying: “I have attended the child care centre to pick up the girls for therapy and they are not there which is a breach of the orders”.  Some 19 minutes later, the mother responded to the father, “[Ms V] [the therapist] was informed weeks ago that the girls were not attending this week as they both have an appointment in Melbourne.  Last week was the last week re orders except YOU missed the first week.  If you want to take the girls, I will drop them off at therapy and you make sure you attend at 1 pm and drop them back to child care”.

5. The father said he could not make a journey to the therapist’s rooms within the time suggested by the mother, to which the mother responded (at 12.46 pm) “Why did you not text at 12 when you assumed access started?” 

6. In communication from the therapist to the father, which is in evidence, it is apparent that the therapist had doubts as to whether the mother would deliver the children on 13 December 2012. 

7. I am satisfied that the first session of therapy, scheduled for 11 October 2012, did not take place.  I cannot, however, be satisfied that the seventh session of such therapy as did commence was agreed to take place on 13 December 2012.  Accordingly, I do not find that the mother has contravened the order as alleged by the father. 

8. This count will be dismissed.

Count 10

1. Paragraph 9 of the primary order provides that the father forthwith establish and both parties use a communication journal and record in the journal, for the information of the other, issues that are limited to the children’s care and the communication journal shall accompany the children between the parents’ homes. 

2. It is alleged by the father that, on 24 November 2012, the mother without reasonable excuse, did not send the communication journal to accompany the children.  It is common ground that changeover for time spent was at X Changeover Centre in Suburb O.  It is common ground that the father last had the communication book on 15 November 2012 and that he did not pass it back to the mother with the children at the conclusion of the time spent on that day.

3. It is common ground that the father provided a new communication book on 22 November 2012 but the mother refused to use the new communication book. 

4. Annexed to the father’s affidavit are a number of emails, the accuracy of which is admitted by the mother.  They disclose that, on 19 November 2012, at 4.59 pm, the father wrote the mother, “[The mother’s first name], this week can you please make sure the new communication book is with the girls when I pick up the girls for therapy on Thursday” to which the mother responded, at 5.24 pm:

   You have the communication book!  The manager of the child care confirms she saw it given to you and you never returned it to them.

5. By the mother’s evidence, it was apparent that she refused to use anything but the original communication book and specifically refused to use the replacement communication book provided by the father. 

6. I am satisfied that the mother was required to use the communication book provided by the father from time to time.

7. Whereas she may have had good reason for wanting a record of previous communications, that does not excuse her from the obligation to use the communication book as provided from time to time. 

8. I am satisfied on the evidence to the appropriate standard that the mother contravened paragraph 9 of the primary order, as alleged by the father.

Count 11

1. This count relates again to paragraph 9 of the primary order.

2. The father alleges that on 29 November 2012, the mother again, without reasonable excuse, did not send the communication journal back to him.  This related to the third communication book which was provided by the father, being the second replacement communication book. 

3. The mother’s evidence on the point was evasive.  She said that she did take the book back at the end of the session, but found that the father did not need it, and there was a communication book provided by the centre which he could have completed, although she conceded that the centre’s communication book could not be removed from the premises.

4. Interestingly, the mother’s oral evidence was at odds with her affidavitory evidence, in particular, paragraph 66 of the affidavit affirmed by the mother on 6 March 2013, in which the mother deposed:

   On this day, I made sure that my mother took the communication book with her for changeover at the childcare centre.  However, for some reason my mum left it in the car and did not realise until that evening.  As you can understand, trying to get two autistic children out of the car by yourself, carry two schoolbags, and put in a code into the childcare gate can be hard to do on your own, and my mum forgot the book in the car as she had her hands full.  Again, this should not have been a big deal.  If the father needed to tell me anything, he could have sent a text message or an email.

5. I am satisfied, on the evidence, that the mother made no reasonable attempt to use the communication book provided by the father, and accordingly, she was in contravention of paragraph 9 of the primary order.  I find this ground to – this count to be proved.

Count 22

1. Paragraph 18 of the primary order provided that:

   The family report dated 19 January 2011 and the children and parents’ issues assessment dated 5 July 2012 be supplied by the mother to any paediatrician and other relevant professional treating the children.

2. It is alleged in count 22 that on 9 December 2012, the mother, without reasonable excuse, failed to provide the family report or the children and parents’ issues assessment to any paediatrician or other relevant professional treating the children, in particular, to Ms BB, the psychologist of K Therapy Group.  It is common ground that Ms BB, psychologist, is a relevant professional treating the children, as contemplated by paragraph 18 of the primary order.

3. In paragraph 78 of the mother’s affidavit, she affirms, inter alia:

   To the best of my knowledge, I have provided the reports to everyone.  If I have missed anyone, then I am sure [the father] has provided them with the reports already because in approximately July 2012, I started receiving numerous phone calls from the all the girls’ doctors/therapists/teachers stating that [the father] had posted ‘wads’ of paper to them, and have included a letter he was asking them all to sign and send back to him confirming that I had not provided certain documents to him.  (One of these calls was from [Ms BB], so she had already received the paperwork from the father!).  This behaviour was outright embarrassing, and nothing more than a waste of time for everyone involved.

1. There was no evidence to suggest that the mother was sure that the wads of paper that had been sent by the father to various professionals included the two reports.  In the cross-examination of the mother, she said that she had discussed the contents of the report with Ms BB, the psychologist, in circumstances where she believed that Ms BB had the report in front of her, and so it must have been provided by the father.  Indeed, the father may well have provided the reports to health professionals. However, paragraph 18 of the primary order cast an obligation on the mother to do so, and on the evidence, I am satisfied that she failed to comply with this order. 

2. Accordingly, I’m satisfied that the mother has contravened paragraph 18 of the primary order, and I find this count to be proved.

Count 23

1. Paragraph 19 of the primary order provides that the mother at all reasonable times provide the father with the names and telephone numbers of all treating professionals for the children and inform such professionals in writing that they have permission to discuss all matters and to provide all reports or documents to the father (at his expense, if any) that relate to the children (save for the payments made by the mother to the professionals), which information may only be sought three times per year.

2. By count 23, the father alleges that on 19 October 2012, the mother, without reasonable excuse, failed to provide written permission to D Medical Practice to discuss the children’s medical matters. In particular, that D Medical Practice was not authorised to discuss the condition of B when she presented to the centre on 19 October 2012 with injury. 

3. It is common ground that the child was injured on 19 October 2012 and was taken by the childcare facility to D Medical Practice.  It is common ground that the mother was not in attendance at the centre.  It is common ground that the centre is a medical – that the children had previously been to the medical centre, but that this was not their regular current centre.

4. In emails annexed to the father’s affidavit (the accuracy of which was admitted by the mother), it is apparent that at 1.03 pm, the mother emailed the father saying:

   [B] has been injured at childcare and requires stitches or glue.

5. To which the father responded with questions as to how she was hurt, was she in need of stitches, and where was she being treated at 2.34 pm.  One minute later, the mother responded:

   I have not seen [B].  The childcare says she fell off a chair.  She has gone to [D Medical Practice] to get stitches or glue.

6. To which the father responded at 2.45 pm and 3.08 pm asking whether he could attend with B, and asking what treatment B was receiving.  The mother responded at 3.09 pm, saying:

   I’ve been in a medical appointment myself!  Be patient, it’s not life-threatening.

7. In her viva voce evidence, the mother said that she was being treated for complaint about her wisdom tooth at the same time. 

8. There was a further exchange of texts, and at 3.21 pm, the father wrote:

   Have you provided written permission to [D Medical Practice] to discuss matters about the children as per order 19?

9. To which the mother responded, one minute later:

   What do you mean?  I am not at [D Medical Practice], how could I provide written permission?

10. One minute later, the father responded:

    Let me know when you have provided the written permission for that information.

11. To which the mother responded three minutes later:

    Did you need written permission to go to their other doctor?  No?  So why are you wasting my time!!!  If you read my messages, I have more things happening right now than worrying about you being told by a doctor, ‘Yes, [B] has a cut on her chin’.  Please grow up!

12. Two minutes later, the father responded to the mother’s message saying:

    I only ask because I have already called the doctors and asked about [B].  They said they could not discuss anything with me as there was NO written information to do so.

13. To which the mother responded four minutes later:

    You need to take the court order in showing you are her parent and a Medicare card.  Obviously you could be anyone!  Maybe go and see them.  I am not able to see them today, and it is not her regular doctor.  They put some glue on a cut.  Your ridiculous demands will make me think twice about telling you anything not life threatening.  It’s a cut for fuck’s sake.  Take the childcare to court and sue them.  Stop pestering me for trivial things.

14. The mother’s oral evidence was that she had some time previously told the medical centre that they could provide the father with any information other than her residential address.  There was no evidence to the effect that she had, however, provided them with authority in writing as is required by paragraph 19 of the primary order. 

15. Whilst the fact that this medical centre was not B’s regular doctor service, and so the mother may not have been able to anticipate that B could be taken there in the event of an emergency, I note that the mother did nothing subsequently to authorise the medical centre to provide the information to the father as sought by him.  In my view she was under an obligation to do so as part of her responsibility to take all reasonable steps to comply with the order, that is, once she was aware that the child had been taken there for medical treatment and she was herself not being treated medically, she was free to attend the centre and provide any written authority for the centre to speak with the father or to do so even by electronic means.

16. I am satisfied that the mother has contravened her obligations under paragraph 19 of the primary order. 

17. I find this ground to be proved.

Disposition

1. Most significantly, the Independent Children’s Lawyer says that something must be done to protect the children from further disruptions such as the father’s allegations and proved counts of contraventions indicate that the children are subject. The mother in her lengthy affidavit in response set out orders which she seeks be made by way of further parenting orders. 

2. The submission of the Independent Children’s Lawyer was that some of these orders, and particularly the one that requires any questions that the father wants to ask of third parties or treating professionals to be asked through her, represent a high water mark in the mother’s attempts to marginalise the father in the lives of the children.  This is particularly so given that the mother does not complain that she is put to any extra expense or any extra obligation by virtue of the father speaking to treating health professionals. 

3. I had earlier discussed with all parties that in the event that I was satisfied that there needed to be some reportable assessment in relation to the appropriateness of the primary order on an ongoing basis, there was a reportable assessment available with Dr E that could be commenced on 23 April 2013 and released in report form by 3 May 2013.  Dr E has previously prepared a quite extensive children and parents’ issues assessment of the parties and the children. 

4. The mother’s lengthy affidavit included 16 or so pages of narrative about her life and work with the children and her general criticisms of the father.  I made it clear to the parties that whereas certain of the counts alleged by the father in his applications were to be dismissed, that if Dr E was to look at the matter from the context of assessing the parties in relation to the viability of the primary into the future, he would do so looking at all of the material that they had filed with these contravention applications and in response thereto.  Both parties indicated they wanted an opportunity to put further material before the court in relation to variation of the orders or in response to what the other party had said or might say. 

5. I discussed in detail with the Independent Children’s Lawyer and then with the mother whether she preferred to wait for sanctions/penalties to be imposed after the reportable assessment or sought that they be imposed now. 

6. Initially, the mother sought that these sanctions be imposed now “so I can know whether I have any ability to afford to have the children go to their various therapy appointments into the future” (or words to that effect).  However, after a break in proceedings, the mother indicated that she was prepared to have the reportable assessment run its course and then be followed by my determination as to sanctions. 

7. For the sake of clarity I mentioned to the mother that in adopting that course she may feel constrained about being entirely frank during the assessment process but it appeared not to worry her.  It is fair to say that she appeared to be somewhat shaken by the findings that there had been contraventions and appeared rather dismayed. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that the understood the difference between having sanctions decided now and having sanctions decided with the benefit (or otherwise) of a psychologist’s assessment and she chose the latter.

8. Accordingly, I will make orders that provide for the reportable assessment, provide for the parents to file further material in anticipation of it.  It is my expectation that Dr E will read the court file from folio 124 to date.  I would also expect him to read these reasons for decision and the affidavits which the parents may subsequently put in before they have their appointment with him on 23 April. 

9. I hope that all those documents are not too much to read.  However, having read all of the material myself in the context of these proceedings, I am satisfied that the material discloses a flavour which leaves me very disturbed about dysfunctionality within this family is growing and, in fact, being nutured and fed. 

10. At this juncture, it appears to me that the best interests of the children require that the current negative behaviour between the parents not continue.  I would be assisted if Dr E, who I note is a psychologist, could comment on the psychological profile of each party and form a preliminary assessment as to whether either is likely to benefit from psychiatric or psychological treatment.  I understand that Dr E is not qualified to diagnose psychiatric illness but I am satisfied that he will have good insight into the parties and has the professional qualifications and experience to be able to identify behaviours which may be symptomatic of psychiatric disturbance or indeed, psychological disturbance, the latter of which is his area of expertise.

11. I do not know and seek expert opinion as to whether the vulnerabilities of these two girls who have been diagnosed with autism make them more vulnerable or sensitive to the high level of conflict between their parents than I would expect of children who have no autistic characteristics.  Alternatively, autism may make them oblivious to some of the high conflict.  I have reservations as to whether the latter is the case. I suspect that autistic children might most closely model themselves on how their parents appear to them, rather than be able to receive and process verbal cues and conversational directions which, in turn, could lead them to behave better than their parents.

12. In short, I want to know what can be done for the parents and to the parents and by the parents to make life better for these children because I can not see a reasonable life for the girls into the future if their parents continue to act as they have to date.

13. This case demonstrates how easy it is for parents, who are not willing to act cooperatively and in the interests of children, to sabotage virtually any order of the court.  That is how parents, who are unwilling or unable to recognise the effect of their behaviour on the children in the immediate, medium and long term, can jeopardise the children’s emotional development and emotional functioning by indulging in their dislike of the other parent and their desire to disrupt the other parent’s entitlements under orders of the court.  It is in these respects that I seek the expert evidence and will consider modification of the orders in aspects including very significant aspects.  Dr E should not feel constrained to recommend a parenting arrangement which involves something other than sole parental responsibility or primary residence to the mother.  He should approach the matter afresh and provide expert evidence based on the family as it presents to him now, with a view to securing the best future which is available for the girls. In any event, that is what I seek.

I certify that the preceding seventy-four (74) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett delivered on 26 March 2013.

Associate: 

Date:  4 June 2013