Harper and Cotter (No 2)
[2011] FamCA 905
•5 December 2011
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HARPER & COTTER (NO 2) | [2011] FamCA 905 |
| FAMILY LAW – CONTEMPT – Contravention of Court order – section 112AP – Did the mother’s admitted contravention of Court orders constitute a contempt of Court and could the Court in the circumstances of this case be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that such contravention was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court – where the application for contempt was dismissed |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Ibbotson and Wincen (1994) FLC ¶92-496 In the Marriage of Tate (2002) 29 Fam LR 195 LGM v CAM (2006) 35 Fam LR 124 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Harper |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Cotter |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 1928 | of | 2007 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 5 December 2011 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Fowler J |
| HEARING DATE: | 30 May 2011, 17 June 2011 and 27 September 2011 and written submissions |
REPRESENTATION
| APPLICANT: | Mr Harper |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Autore |
Orders
The application of the father, Mr Harper, filed 18 April 2011, that the mother, Ms Cotter, be dealt with for contempt of court pursuant to s 112AP of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for contravening orders in circumstances which mean that such contravention is a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Harper & Cotter is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: SYC 1928 of 2007
| Mr Harper |
Applicant
And
| Ms Cotter |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The proceeding before the Court is an application of the father,
Mr Harper, that the mother, Ms Cotter, be dealt with for contempt of court pursuant to s 112AP of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for contravening orders in circumstances which mean that such contravention is a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. He filed this application on
18 April 2011.
The contempt alleged was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court by reason of the mother’s contravention of the Parenting Orders made by Watts J on 23 February 2009.
The Orders of Watts J provided for the child of the marriage, Ms Harper, born in 2004 and aged 7 years, to live with the mother and spend time with the father on alternate weekends, every alternate Wednesday and half the school holidays. The Orders also provided for telephone contact to occur on Mondays and Thursdays. There were also other provisions.
The father alleges that between the dates of 23 February 2009 and 28 February 2011, the mother contravened Orders 5b, 5d, 5h, 5j, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 16 of the Orders.
The mother conceded the contraventions but denies that such contraventions constitute a contempt of the Court within the meaning of section 112AP.
The Issues
Did the mother’s admitted contravention of Court orders constitute a contempt of Court and could the Court in the circumstances of this case be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that such contravention was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
The Relevant Law
Section 112AP of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that a Court may punish a person for contempt of court where the matter concerns a breach of an order which “constitutes a contravention of an order under this Act and involves a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court”
(s 112AP(1)(b)).
Subsection 112AP(1) operates to limit the application of the contempt power in relation to contraventions of orders made under the Act to those contraventions which also involve a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
The concept of “flagrant challenge” involves conduct of an exceptional, striking or repeated nature. As held by the Full Court in Ibbotson and Wincen (1994) FLC ¶92-496 at p 81,162:
The use of the term ‘flagrant challenge’ ... is intended to underline the exceptional or striking nature of the contravention in question and thus to differentiate it from what might be described as the general run of breaches which are intended to be dealt with under s 112AD ... it is a question of fact and degree whether the stringent terms of
[s 112AP(1)(b)] are satisfied ...
As stated by the Full Court in In the Marriage of Hay (1998) 23 Fam LR 247 at 257, at [56]:
in order to establish a contempt for the purposes of s 112AP(1)(b), it is unnecessary to establish that there has been a deliberate intention on the part of the respondent to breach the relevant court order.
The Full Court also stated at 257, at [55]:
In relation to this question of whether an intention to breach the relevant order is an essential ingredient of s 112AP(1)(b), we are of the view that had Parliament intended to make such a significant change in the law in relation to contempt, it would have expressed its intention far more clearly than has been done in s 112AP(1)(b). We note that the Explanatory Memorandum to the relevant legislation contains no suggestion that such a change was intended in the law in relation to contempt.
The standard of proof applicable in s 112AP proceedings is the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt: In the Marriage of Tate (2002)
29 Fam LR 195.
The respondent must be proved to have known “not only the contents or terms of the order but also their meaning”: LGM v CAM (2006) 35 Fam LR 124.
The onus does not shift from the applicant to the respondent. The mother need only show on the balance of probabilities that she had reasonable excuse for contravening the Orders or that the contravention did not involve a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
Evidence of Dr Akbar F
An affidavit was filed, and evidence was given at the trial by telephone by Dr F in relation to the abuse allegations against the father, and the mother’s reasoning for ceasing contact with the father. Copies of his medical notes were also relied upon.
Dr F is a General Medical Practitioner practising at J Town Family Practice. Dr F also has been admitted to the degree of Master in Psychiatry, has had many years of experience in psychiatry and worked in the field of mental health in D Town for a period of time.
It was his evidence that on 23 November 2010 the mother had told him that the father had been abusing the child, physically and mentally. Dr F provided a referral to Dr H, a child psychologist. Dr H provided advice to Dr F over the telephone that the child did not meet the criteria to receive treatment and to contact the Department of Community Services instead.
On 21 December 2010, it was Dr F’s evidence that the child had complained of the father kicking and hitting her, and locking her out of the house at night. His notes indicated that the child was exposed to the father’s violence and threats causing nightmares, and also that the child was exposed to inappropriate films (referred to in evidence as “Dexter movies”).
It was Dr F’s oral evidence that he had never seen any bruises or evidence of physical beating on the child.
The Alleged Breaches
The breaches are as follows.
Contravention of Order 5(b)
·That on Wednesday, 17 November 2010, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not allow the child to spend time with the father.
It is the father’s evidence that he was running 25 minutes late to collect the child from school and could not call the school to notify them as the telephone network was down. He states that when the school saw that the father was not there they telephoned the mother at 3.25 pm.
The father’s evidence is that he contacted the mother’s legal representative to make arrangements to pick up the child later that day or on a replacement day and that the legal representative advised the father that he would contact the mother and see what could be arranged.
It is also the father’s evidence that at 4.51 pm he attempted to call the mother but she did not answer. He then sent her a text message indicating that he could pick up the child at 5.30 pm and did not receive a response.
In response to this breach the mother stated that she had given the father notice. She stated that the father forgot to pick the child up from school and so she picked her up and took her home.
The mother stated that she never heard from the father or heard that the father had contacted her solicitor that afternoon to arrange contact with the child.
In the circumstances outlined by the mother, whose evidence on this matter the Court accepts, the Court is not satisfied applying the requisite standard of proof that any contravention was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court and the application on this count is dismissed.
Contravention of Order 5(d)
·That on 7 January 2011, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not deliver the child to spend time with the father during the school holidays.
The mother stated in her evidence that she did send a text message to the father, and that she had a reasonable excuse.
She stated that the child had disclosed to Dr F that the father had kicked her and that it was the father, not Mr I (the mother’s current partner), like the father made her say.
The father submits that despite the mother having a fear that the child was at risk of harm she did not file an application until 27 January 2011. The Court finds that such a date of filing is not proof of the necessary flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. The evidence is that the mother on the report of the child formed a view that the child was in danger. The evidence before the Court has not demonstrated in the Court’s view beyond reasonable doubt that the mother did not reasonably form that view.
The Court accepts the evidence of the mother and Dr F and concludes that it is not satisfied on the application of the requisite standard of proof that the failure of the mother to comply with the order constituted a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. It was rather an attempt to protect the child against a perceived danger, and the application that she be dealt with for contempt of Court on this count is dismissed.
·That on 10 July 2010, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother failed to deliver the child at the agreed time for the Term 2 school holiday period.
The father’s evidence is that on 9 July 2010 he informed the mother’s legal representative that changeover would occur at 1.00 pm on 10 July 2010 at D Town Police Station, and that he did not receive a response.
The father stated that he waited for 45 minutes and that the mother did not arrive or contact him.
The mother admitted that the child was not delivered to the father on this day at 1.00 pm, but that she did take the child at 2.00 pm and waited.
The mother stated that the father had told her to be at the police station at
2.00 pm and then sent her a text message to say to be there at 1.00 pm.
The Court accepts the evidence of the mother and finds that this contravention was not demonstrated by the father to be a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court in the circumstances in which it occurred.
·That on 3 October 2010, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not arrive with the child at the time agreed for the Term 3 school holiday period.
The Court finds that it is not satisfied in the context of this case that the mother’s late arrival was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
·That at 9.00 am on 19 July 2009, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not arrive to pick up the child at the agreed time. The father waited at D Town Police Station for 30 minutes with the child before leaving. At no time did the mother contact the father about her not arriving.
It is the father’s evidence that the mother’s legal representative informed him that the changeover was to occur at 9.00 am. He states that the mother sent him a text message at 2.12 pm asking for a time to pick up the child. The changeover was rescheduled to 1.00 pm on 20 July 2009.
It is the father’s evidence that he arrived at 1.03 pm on 20 July 2009 and that the mother was not there, and was informed by one of the police officers that the mother was running late. The father asserts he sent several text messages to the mother with no response and waited 35 minutes before leaving. The father also asserts that he told the mother to notify him when she arrived.
It is the father’s evidence that at no time did the mother attempt to contact him or responded to any of his text messages that he had sent to her.
The mother stated that if that happened it was a result of confusion, and that her previous legal representative used to send calendars and dates and times to avoid such confusion with the father.
The mother stated that she recalls one of the father’s workers telling her that changeover would be at 4.00 pm, only to find out that the father was there at 1.00 pm.
The mother stated in her evidence that she did not recall this incident of 20 July 2009. She stated that she has not broken any other order until recently on purpose, that she has always been fearful to break the orders, and has complied as best as she could.
The Court finds that the evidence adduced on this assertion does not satisfy it beyond reasonable doubt that the contravention of the orders made in this regard constitutes a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court and the application to have the mother dealt with for contempt in relation to this matter is dismissed.
·That at 9.00 am on 11 October 2009, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not arrive to pick up the child as arranged. The father and child waited 30 minutes before leaving. The father asserts that he received no notice from the mother about her not arriving.
The mother asserts that she was not informed of the time to pick up the child.
The mother stated that the times and arrangements to meet at the D Town Police Station were always confused. She asserts that the father used to give her previous legal representative different times and that the father always confused the situation.
The mother also asserts that the father did not make arrangements with her directly, but that it was usually through her legal representative, and that the confusion usually occurred when the child was in the father’s care.
The Court accepts the mother’s evidence and finds that the evidence does not satisfy the Court to the requisite standard of proof that the contravention which did occur was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. The application to have the mother dealt with for contempt of Court in relation to this contravention is dismissed accordingly.
·That on 22 January 2010, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not make the child available for her to spend the remainder of the school holidays with the father as arranged.
The mother asserts that it was agreed that the child wanted to come home early, and that she thought three weeks with the father was too long. The mother states it was agreed that the child would go back and forth between the mother and father during this period.
Where parties seek to vary orders by agreement (and the Court accepts the mother’s assertion that there was such an agreement) a party cannot be heard to complain thereafter that the order in its unamended form has not been complied with. The evidence given in relation to this matter does not satisfy the Court applying the requisite standard of proof that the contravention constituted a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. The application that the mother be dealt with for contempt of Court in relation to this matter is dismissed.
Contravention of Order 5(h)
·That on 25 December 2010, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother did not allow the child to spend time with the father.
It is the father’s evidence that he arrived at D Town Police Station at 2.00 pm and waited 20 minutes before leaving. He states that he sent a notice to the mother’s legal representative which was ignored.
The father stated that he received a text message from the mother at 2.30 pm stating that the child was unwell and would not be spending time with the father that day.
The mother admitted to breaching this order and asserts she did so as the child had told the doctor that the father had kicked her, among other disclosures, and so she was concerned for the child’s safety in the father’s care.
The mother asserts she spoke to Dr F at this time and that he advised her that it was best for the child not to see the father as it was obviously causing her distress, and so she ceased contact with the father.
It was the mother’s evidence that contact ceased with the father as she was concerned for the child’s safety, health and wellbeing.
It is the father’s submission that although the mother believed the child was at risk of harm she did not file an application until 27 January 2011.
The Court finds that having regard to the evidence there existed a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the order or alternatively that the father has not discharged the onus upon him to satisfy the Court that the contravention constituted a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. The application that the mother be dealt with for contempt of court in relation to such
non-compliance is dismissed.
Contravention of Order 8
·That on 23 November 2010, 21 December 2010 and 8 February 2011 the mother took the child to see Dr F at the J Town Medical Centre (now known as J Town Family Practice) without notifying the father.
·That on 15 November 2010 and 15 December 2010 the mother took the child to see Dr K at the J Town Medical Centre without notifying the father.
The Order stipulates that the parties are to advise each other in writing of any medical practitioner, treatment provider or hospital that the child sees in their care and provide any necessary authorisation for the medical practitioner, treatment provider or hospital to provide information to the other parent.
It is the father’s evidence that the mother has not notified him about the appointments and has not authorised the J Town Medical Centre to allow access to the child’s file.
The mother asserts that she was not aware that she had to inform the father when taking the child to see a general practitioner.
The mother also states that she has told Dr F that he can provide the father with details of the child’s consultations.
The mother asserts that the father has a doctor’s certificate with respect to the 23 November 2010, 21 December 2010 and 8 February 2011, and that this was provided to her legal representative to pass on to the father.
It is the father’s submission that the mother’s excuse is not reasonable and that it is reasonable to assume that a parent should be notified of any medical attention given to their child. He asserts that ignorance is no excuse for this contravention.
The Court however finds on the evidence that the father has failed to establish that the contravention of the order was one which in the circumstances constituted a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court and the application that the mother be dealt with for contempt of Court in relation to this contravention is dismissed.
Contravention of Order 9
·That the mother has not provided the father with details of sporting events that the child is involved in.
The mother asserts that the child does not participate in any sport while in her or her father’s care. She stated that the child has been enrolled to go back to swimming but that this had not commenced at the time, but that the father is aware of her swimming lessons.
The Court, on the evidence of the mother which it accepts, does not find that there has been any contravention of the order and the application of the father that the mother be dealt with for contempt of court in relation to a breach of the order is dismissed.
Contravention of Order 10
·That the mother did not provide the father’s contact details on the child’s school enrolment card.
No evidence was adduced from the mother in cross-examination with regard to this breach. In any event the Court finds that the breach is not demonstrated to be a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court and is dismissed.
·That the mother has denigrated the father in the presence of the child, including making the following comments:
“Tell him to get over it and tell him to grow up.”
“Mummy says that you always record me.”
“Don’t listen to him and don’t worry about anything he says.”
“He’s recording the call, I suppose.”
“He might get angry will he?”
The father relied on recordings of conversations he had with the child in December 2009 to prove that the mother had denigrated the father on the phone to the child. The DVD of recordings became Exhibit 2 in the proceedings, and incomplete transcripts of the conversations were included in the father’s affidavit of 30 March 2011.
The conversations between the mother and the child when the child was at the father’s residence do not reveal any insight in either parent into the needs of the child and the necessity for either parent to remove the child from the dispute between them.
Indeed, each of the parents seems to be seeking to provoke the other either by recording the conversation and in the case of the father seeking to encourage the child to terminate it with the mother seeking to encourage the child to discuss with her father early return to the mother.
Each of the parents also seems to be attempting to prove to the other parent that the child wishes to live with them. For example, the father is heard asking the child whether she likes staying with him while on the telephone to the mother, as if to prove to the mother that she does not want to return to the mother. In the mother’s case she seeks to gather from the child that the child only tells the mother that she enjoys staying with the father because the father is telling her to say that.
The mother and the father are insensitive to the needs of the child not to be put into that conflict which clearly distresses her. The child’s reaction is as if she sees herself as responsible for either of the parent’s views and is seeking to mollify each of them.
The mother questions the child about issues which should not be matters for the child and this is clearly not in her interest or to her benefit. The mother at times uses language which is crude and should not be used in conversation with the child.
The mother refers to the father by his Christian name which in turn encourages the child to refer to the father by his Christian name. The mother is also heard referring to her partner Mr I as “dad” or “daddy”. It was the mother’s evidence that she does not call the father “daddy” but that she does refer to him as “Daddy [Christian name]” and refers to Mr I as “Daddy [Mr I]”.
The mother seeks to retain the child on the phone at times beyond the child’s desire to continue the conversation and also in circumstances where the child has admitted being very tired.
It was the mother’s evidence that she does not swear in front of the child as a habit. She admitted that she may have used crude language whilst on the phone to the child as she was angry with the father for telling the child that she could not go home to the mother, and because the father had called her three times previously and abused her.
The mother’s evidence was also that the child tells her that the father records every conversation that she has, and that he records the telephone conversations between the mother and the child.
The mother denies calling the father a “dickhead” and denies using such language with the child. She also denies denigrating the father with the child. The mother did admit to possibly saying, “Can you tell him to stop recording”.
The Court finds the behaviour of both parents lacking in parenting skill and insight into the child’s needs.
The Court finds that, despite the above, the evidence adduced does not satisfy it beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a contravention of the orders with flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
·That for the period from 23 February 2009 to 11 January 2011, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother has not removed the child from the presence of other persons who have denigrated the father directly to the child or within the presence of the child.
It was the mother’s evidence that all the people around her are positive people and no-one talks about the court proceedings with the child. The mother asserts that when the child comes home after being in the care of the father she talks about what she has heard.
The mother also asserts that the child has told her that the father makes her say things about the mother.
It was the mother’s evidence that the father has used that type of language and has used it in the presence of the child.
In relation to the comment, “Mummy said you’re a scumbag”, the mother stated that she has never said this to the child, but she may have said it to the father. She asserts that it is possible that the child got this from the father.
The mother asserted that the child has said things that she believes the father has made her say, such as “Daddy told me to say it was [Mr I] that kicked me”.
The mother denied saying anything to the child to have her report “Mummy said you’re a liar and you took [Mr I] to court”, “Mummy said you tried to hurt her and choke her”, “Mummy said you stole her phone”, “She told [Mr I] you’re a cunt” and “Mummy always calls you a dickhead dad again”.
It was the mother’s evidence that the father told the child about the incidents related to the comments “Mummy said you lit [Mr L’s] truck on fire” and “Mummy said you yelled and carried on at [Mr L] and [Mr I]”.
With regard to the comment made by the child that “Mummy said she’s going to change my name to [B M]”, the mother denied this and stated that the child had asked whether her name could be “M”.
The mother denies saying “Fuck off you scumbag or I’ll get an AVO on you”.
The mother denies saying anything to the child along the lines of, “Mummy said that you used to hurt her. She said you grabbed her throat”.
The mother admits to saying to a friend on the phone, “He needs a fucking bullet mate. That’s what he needs. He’s the biggest fucking liar, fucking piece of shit. He’s a fucking animal…” but denies ever saying this to the child or in the presence of the child.
The Court finds that the evidence adduced on this assertion does not satisfy it beyond reasonable doubt that there has been contravention of the orders made in this regard which constitutes a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court.
Contravention of Orders 13, 14 & 15 – Phone Access
·In the period between 23 February 2009 and 28 February 2011, without notice or reasonable excuse, the mother has not facilitated the phone contact between the father and the child.
It is the father’s evidence that the contact phone has been turned off on most occasions.
The father stated that he has attempted to send text messages to the mother to facilitate telephone contact with the child but that these messages have not been responded to.
The mother stated that she does not use the phone anymore because half the time it never came back or it had been damaged with water. She also indicated that she did not like being recorded and that it caused continual problems.
The mother also asserted that the phone was usually with the father and that she probably has it four months out of the whole year.
The Court accepts the mother’s evidence and finds that the evidence does not satisfy the Court to the requisite standard of proof that the contravention which did occur was a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. The application to have the mother dealt with for contempt of Court in relation to this contravention is dismissed accordingly.
Contravention of Order 16
·The mother has failed to return the communication book on two occasions. On the first occasion the father replaced the book, on the second occasion the father notified the mother about this and also about the contact phone needing repair. The mother did not respond to the father in relation to this.
The mother denied this contravention.
It was the mother’s evidence that she replaced the communication book because it did not come home with the child the first time, and that after the second occasion she never saw the new book again either.
The Court finds that the father has not on the application of the appropriate standard of proof satisfied his obligation to demonstrate in relation to these matters that the mother has contravened the orders in circumstances where it could be said that such contravention is a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court. Accordingly his application to have her dealt with for contempt of Court in this regard is dismissed.
The Submissions
It is the father’s submission that the mother had ample opportunity to file an application for a change of the Orders but failed to do so, that she intentionally ignored the Orders and has shown a flagrant disregard of the Court Orders with every contravention.
The father submits that while the mother states that the child was at risk of harm she did not file an application until 27 January 2011, more than two months after the contravention.
It is the father’s argument that the mother has not demonstrated that the child is at risk of harm. He asserts that the mother’s evidence was generalised hearsay and largely unsupported. This is irrelevant to a finding that she had a belief formed on reasonable grounds that there was a risk of harm to the child.
With respect to Dr F’s evidence, the father submits that his evidence was hearsay and that the child was clearly prompted by the mother when the disclosures were made. He also states that the Department of Community Services chose not to intervene in the matter and made submissions on
27 September 2011 confirming they had no concern for the child whilst in the father’s care.
It is the father’s submission that the mother acted on doctor’s advice after the child presented with injuries to Dr K on 15 November 2010, yet she did not have enough concerns for the welfare of the child to stop contact when she became aware of the alleged injuries.
The mother asserts that she conceded to certain events and breaches of the orders but states that she gave an explanation as to her reasons which clearly went to the safety and wellbeing of the child. The mother submits that her actions were a protective mechanism to protect the child from the alleged actions of the father.
It is submitted by the mother that at all times she had a reasonable excuse as to the circumstances which arose out of the incident on 26 November 2010 when the child complained to her and the doctor about being injured by the father.
The mother’s submission is that Dr F’s evidence supports the conclusion of the reasonableness of the mother’s explanation in that she was concerned about the child’s safety and well-being in the period of November and December 2010.
It is also submitted that the evidence of Dr F supports and strengthens the evidence for the mother’s assertion that she was concerned for the child’s welfare and safety and this led the mother to a heightened sense of anxiety and concern for the safety of the child.
The mother submits that there was nothing in Dr F’s evidence which could lead the Court to form a view that the child’s evidence had been corrupted by the mother during the medical interview.
It is also submitted by the mother that the Court should accept the evidence from Dr F which supports the child’s disclosures about her treatment whilst in the care of the father.
The mother’s submissions are that whilst there is evidence before the Court that the mother was aware of the Orders made on 23 February 2009, there is no evidence acceptable at the appropriate standard of proof that the mother has flagrantly breached them.
It is submitted by the mother that there is no prima facie case for the mother to answer in relation to the contraventions and no prima facie case for the mother to answer in relation to the contempt. It is thus submitted that the father’s application should be dismissed.
Conclusion
The onus of proof lies with the father. The onus is to prove beyond reasonable doubt according to the criminal standard.
For the reasons set forth above the Court makes the findings set out and the father’s application is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding one-hundred and fourteen (114) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Fowler delivered on 5 December 2011.
Associate:
Date: 5 December 2011
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