Harlor v The Queen - [1956] HCA 50

[HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.]

HARLOR

AGAINST

THE QUEEN.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL OF

NEW SOUTH WALES.

H. C. OF A. Criminal Late—Manslaughter—Culpable driving—Death “ through the impact of a

1956. motor vehicle with any vehicle or other object in, on or near which the person

was at the time of impact . . .”—Whether death of passenger in offending vehicle

Sydney,

caught—Interpretation—Crimes Act 1900-1951 (N./S.IF.), s. 52a (1).

Aug. 28, 30.

Section 52a of the Crimes Act 1900-1951 (N.S.W.) provides ;—“ (1) Where

Dixon C.J.,

Williams, the death of any person is occasioned . . . through the impact of a motor

Fullagor, vehicle wth any vehicle or other object in, on or near which the jierson was

Kltto and

Taylor JJ.at the time of impact and . . . the motor vehicle was at the time of impact

being driven by a person—(a) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of a drug; or (b) at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, the person last-mentioned shall be guilty of the misdemeanour of culpable driving . . .”.

Held, that the provisions of the sub-section do not cover the case where the deceased person was a passenger in a vehicle, which, because it collided with another vehicle or object, brought such person into proximity with that other vehicle or object.

Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, reversed.

Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales.

Henry Alfred Joseph Harlor was on 25th May 1956 arraigned on a charge of manslaughter arising out of the death of a passenger on a motor omnibus of which he was the driver, such death ensuing as a result of a collision between such motor omnibus and a stanchion of the Iron Cove Bridge, Sydney, on 23rd July 1955. At his trial the jury acquitted him of the crime of manslaughter but found him guilty of the misdemeanour of culpable driving, an offence created by s. 52a (1) of the Crimes Act 1900-1951 (N.S.W.).

Harlor appealed against such conviction to the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales (Owen, Herron and Walsh JJ.), which court dismissed his appeal, whereupon he moved the High Court for special leave to appeal against such decision upon the ground that there was no evidence on which he could be convicted of the offence of culpable driving.

The High Court treated the motion for special leave as an appeal, which was forthwith heard.

The provisions of s. 52a (1) of the Crimes Act 1900-1951 (N.S.W.) appear fully in the judgment of the Court hereunder.

J. M. Foord, for the appellant.

H. A. Snelling Q.C., Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales, and J. R. Nolan, for the Crown.

Cur. adv. vuU.

The Court dehvered the following written judgment:—

This appHcation for special leave to appeal was made by an accused person who had been…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Harlor v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Harlor v The Queen [1956] HCA 50
Case: [1956] HCA 50
Decision Date: 30 August 1956

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Harlor v The Queen*, the High Court of Australia considered an appeal from a conviction for manslaughter by culpable driving. The central dispute concerned the interpretation of a statutory provision that defined culpable driving as causing the death of another person "through the impact of a motor vehicle with any vehicle or other object in, on or near which the person was at the time of impact". The appellant argued that this provision did not extend to the death of a passenger within the offending vehicle itself.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the phrase "in, on or near which the person was at the time of impact" encompassed a person who was a passenger in the vehicle causing the impact. The Court had to determine if the statutory definition of culpable driving extended to the death of an occupant of the offending vehicle, or if it was limited to persons outside that vehicle.

The High Court held that the wording of the statute did not limit its application to persons outside the offending vehicle. The Court reasoned that the phrase "in, on or near which the person was at the time of impact" was broad enough to include a passenger within the vehicle. The impact of the motor vehicle was the direct cause of death, and the passenger was, at the time of impact, "in" the vehicle. Therefore, the statutory requirements for culpable driving were met. The appeal was dismissed.

Orders