Hansford and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations
[2007] AATA 1152
•21 March 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1152
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No S2006/246
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re PAUL ANTHONY HANSFORD Applicant
And
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member R W Dunne Date21 March 2007
PlaceAdelaide
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
..............................................
R W DUNNE
(Senior Member)
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY – pensions, benefits and allowances – Parenting Payment Single – compensable injury – settlement included compensation for loss of earnings – calculation of compensation preclusion period – receipt of compensation affected payment during preclusion period – amount recoverable by Centrelink – decision affirmed
Social Security Act 1991 ss 17(1), 17(2), 17(3), 17(4), 1160(1), 1161(2), 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1184K(1)
Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281
Re Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations and Donald [2006] AATA 920
Commonwealth of Australia v Daniels (1994) 33 ALD 111
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541REASONS FOR DECISION
21 March 2007 Senior Member R W Dunne 1. This is an application by Paul Hansford (the “applicant”) for review of a decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (“SSAT”) made on 25 July 2006. The SSAT affirmed a decision of an Authorised Review Officer from Centrelink to preclude payment of compensation affected payments from 3 October 2003 to 7 September 2006 and to recover compensation affected payments of $20,687.39 for the period from 3 September 2004 to 8 May 2006, arising from a lump sum compensation payment made on or about 4 May 2006.
2. On 11 August 2006, Mr Hansford applied to this Tribunal for review of the SSAT’s decision. At the hearing, Mr Jim Mahoney appeared on behalf of the applicant and Mr Paul d’Assumpcao appeared on behalf of the respondent (Centrelink). Mr Hansford was present at the hearing, but was not called to give evidence. The Tribunal received into evidence the documents lodged under s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Exhibit R1).
issues for the tribunal
3. The issues for the Tribunal are as follows:
(a) whether, following the receipt by the applicant of a compensation settlement, part of which was for loss of earnings, the compensation preclusion period had been correctly calculated;
(b) whether the applicant received a compensation affected payment from Centrelink during the compensation preclusion period;
(c) whether the periodic WorkCover payments made to the applicant and repaid to WorkCover Corporation constituted “compensation” within the meaning of s 17(2) of the Social Security Act 1991 (the “Act”);
(d) whether the circumstances of the periodic WorkCover payments made to the applicant and repaid to WorkCover Corporation constituted “special circumstances” for the purposes of s 1184K(1) of the Act.
4. It was common ground that Mr Hansford had a compensable injury for which he received a compensation settlement, part of which was for loss of earnings and part for loss of earning capacity.
legislation
5. The following provisions of the Act apply in this matter:
“17(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
…
compensation affected payment means:
…
(b) a parenting payment; or
…
17(2) Subject to subsection (2B), for the purposes of this Act, compensation means:
(a) a payment of damages; or
(b)a payment under a scheme of insurance or compensation under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law, including a payment under a contract entered into under such a scheme; or
(c)a payment (with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim for damages or a claim under such an insurance scheme; or
(d) any other compensation or damages payment;
(whether the payment is in the form of a lump sum or in the form of a series of periodic payments and whether it is made within or outside Australia) that is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn resulting from personal injury.
…
17(3) Subject to subsection (4), for the purposes of this Act, the compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment is:
(a) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment is made (either with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(ii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(ab) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment represents that part of a person’s entitlement to periodic compensation payments that the person has chosen to receive in the form of a lump sum; and
(ii)the entitlement to periodic compensation payments arose from the settlement (either with or without admission of liability) of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(iii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(b)if those circumstances do not apply—so much of the payment as is, in the Secretary’s opinion, in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn, or both.
…
17(4)Where a person:
(a)has received periodic compensation payments; and
(b)after receiving those payments, receives a lump sum compensation payment (in this subsection called the LSP); and
(c)because of receiving the LSP, becomes liable to repay an amount (in this subsection called the Repaid Periodic Compensation Payment—RPCP) equal to the periodic compensation payments received;
then, for the purposes of subsection (3), the amount of the lump sum compensation payment is:
LSP - RPCP
…
1160(1)This Part operates in certain specified circumstances to do one or more of the following:
(a)reduce a person’s compensation affected payment;
(b)render a person’s compensation affected payment not payable;
(c)require the repayment of some or all of a person’s compensation affected payment;
because of the receipt of compensation by the person or the person’s partner.
…
1168Application
A provision of this Division that refers to a person receiving or claiming a compensation affected payment and receiving a lump sum compensation payment has effect regardless of whether the lump sum compensation payment was received before or after the person received or claimed the compensation affected payment.
1169 Compensation affected payment not payable during lump sum preclusion period
1169(1)If:
(a)a person receives or claims a compensation affected payment; and
(b)the person receives a lump sum compensation payment;
the compensation affected payment is not payable to the person in relation to any day or days in the lump sum preclusion period.
1169(2)In this section:
lump sum compensation payment does not include a lump sum payment:
(a)to which section 1164 applies; or
(b)that relates only to arrears of periodic compensation payments.
1170(1)Subject to subsection (2), if a person receives both periodic compensation payments and a lump sum compensation payment, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the day following the last day of the periodic payments period or, where there is more than one periodic payments period, the day following the last day of the last periodic payments period; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(2)If a person chooses to receive part of an entitlement to periodic compensation payments in the form of a lump sum, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the first day on which the person’s periodic compensation payment is a reduced payment because of that choice; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(3)If neither of subsections (1) and (2) applies, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the day on which the loss of earnings or loss of capacity to earn began; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
1170(4)The number of weeks in the lump sum preclusion period in relation to a person is the number worked out using the formula:
Compensation part of lump sum
Income cut-out amount
…
1171(1)If:
(a)a person receives 2 or more lump sum payments in relation to the same event that gave rise to an entitlement of the person to compensation (the multiple payments); and
(b)at least one of the multiple payments is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn;
the following paragraphs have effect for the purposes of this Act and the Administration Act:
(c)the person is taken to have received one lump sum compensation payment (the single payment) of an amount equal to the sum of the multiple payments;
(d) the single payment is taken to have been received by the person:
(i)on the day on which he or she received the last of the multiple payments; or
(ii)if the multiple payments were all received on the same day, on that day.
…
1184K(1)For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:
(a)not having been made; or
(b)not liable to be made;
if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case.
…”
6. To relevantly summarise the legislation, Part 3.14 of the Act provides for the effect of compensation recovery on certain Social Security benefits. Section 1160(1) provides for the general effect of that Part of the Act. Section 1169(1) provides in effect that a compensation affected payment is not payable during a lump sum preclusion period. Section 17(2) defines “compensation”. This includes a payment of damages “that is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn resulting from personal injury”. Section 17(1) then defines the expression “compensation affected payment”, and a Parenting Payment is included in that definition. Section 1170(3) provides that the lump sum preclusion period is the period that begins on the day on which the loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity began, and ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out pursuant to the statutory formula referred to in s 1170(4) and s 1170(5). That formula refers to the “compensation part of lump sum”. Section 17(3) provides an artificial statutory formula for determining the “compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment”. These provisions in Part 3.14 of the Act must, however, be read subject to s 1184K(1). That subsection authorises the Secretary (and the Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Secretary) to disregard the whole or part of a compensation payment in certain “special circumstances”.
background
7. Mr Hansford is 38 years of age and has been caring for his son who suffers with severe attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. He has been receiving Parenting Payment Single since 3 September 2004. On 5 January 2001, Mr Hansford sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident whilst driving home from work as a delivery driver. He claimed compensation for his injuries and received various payments from WorkCover, including periodic payments (income maintenance). He also made a common law motor vehicle accident claim and received an out-of-court lump sum settlement of $275,000 on or about 4 May 2006. WorkCover Corporation recovered an amount of $132,692.65 from the motor vehicle insurer for payments that had been made to the applicant. Of this amount, $61,975.35 was for periodic payments of income support received up until 2 October 2003. The lump sum compensation payment also included an amount for loss of earning capacity. Centrelink then calculated the preclusion period for compensation affected payments from 3 October 2003 to 7 September 2006, including recovery of compensation affected payments of $20,687.39 for the period from 3 September 2004 to 8 May 2006 from the lump sum amount.
contentions of applicant
8. Mr Mahoney submitted that the question before the Tribunal was simple in nature. He said that s 1170 of the Act set out the formula for determining the lump sum preclusion period applicable to the applicant in respect of his compensation payment. However, his contention was that the periodic WorkCover payments that were made to Mr Hansford and repaid to WorkCover Corporation did not constitute “compensation” within the meaning of s 17(2) of the Act. In particular, the WorkCover payments did not fall within s 17(2)(b). The WorkCover payments made to Mr Hansford were interim payments and he received them in the knowledge that, if his common law claim was successful, the payments would have to be repaid to WorkCover Corporation. The payments should be considered to be a loan to Mr Hansford pending the outcome of his motor vehicle claim. As he was required to repay all that he had received from WorkCover Corporation, the payments (or the arrangements under which they were made) should be treated as a “nullity”. In other words, Mr Hansford did not “receive” the WorkCover payments because they were repaid in full and should be disregarded. Further, he submitted that Mr Hansford’s compensation payment should be treated as compensation for a vehicle accident, rather than workers’ compensation. In this way, the start date for calculating the preclusion period would be the date of Mr Hansford’s motor vehicle accident (5 January 2001), and not the day after the date that he ceased to receive weekly payments of compensation (3 October 2003).
9. In the alternative, Mr Mahoney contended that the applicant’s case was one where s 1184K(1) of the Act applied. He argued that grave injustice and unfairness had been caused to Mr Hansford as a result of Centrelink’s decision and that this amounted to special circumstances. Based on this, the Tribunal understood his submission to be that the whole of the compensation payment, whether it be all the periodic WorkCover payments or the lump sum payment, should be treated as not having been made. He referred to the Federal Court decision of Mansfield J in Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281. The Tribunal was not referred to a particular extract from that decision, but it has been relevantly considered in paragraph 13 of these reasons.
10. Against this, Mr d’Assumpcao submitted that the lump sum compensation paid to Mr Hansford was “compensation” for the purposes of s 17(2)(c) of the Act. Mr Hansford had received periodic WorkCover payments and had become liable to pay an amount equal to those payments to WorkCover Corporation. The lump sum preclusion period had been correctly calculated. Any unfairness that Mr Hansford had suffered as a result of Centrelink’s action did not constitute special circumstances within the meaning of s 1184K(1).
consideration
11. Mr Hansford has been receiving Parenting Payment Single from Centrelink to assist in caring for his young son. As a result of a motor vehicle accident, the receipt of a lump sum compensation payment and the repayment of periodic WorkCover payments that he had received, a lump sum preclusion period in respect of his Parenting Payment was calculated by Centrelink and Parenting Payment totalling $20,687.39 was recovered by Centrelink. It is apparent from the evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Hansford expected that the start date of the preclusion period would be 5 January 2001, the date of his motor vehicle accident. This would obviously affect the amount of the Parenting Payment (if any) that could be recovered by Centrelink. As the SSAT recorded in its decision “Mr Hansford was understandably confused about the operation of the debt recovery and preclusion period rules contained in the legislation on his case.”
12. According to Mr Mahoney, the periodic WorkCover payments received by Mr Hansford and repaid in full to WorkCover Corporation did not constitute compensation, within the meaning of s 17(2) of the Act. There was no payment to Mr Hansford because he paid back what he had received and, until that repayment occurred, the periodic payments were akin to a loan from WorkCover Corporation. The Tribunal does not accept this argument. The periodic WorkCover payments constituted “compensation” in that they were payments “under a scheme of insurance or compensation under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law … (… in the form of a series of periodic payments …) … made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn resulting from personal injury.” The fact that the WorkCover payments were repaid to WorkCover Corporation does not, in the Tribunal’s view, affect the nature or description of them as compensation, within the meaning of s 17(2). Nor does the fact that the WorkCover payments were repaid give to them the character of a “loan” by WorkCover Corporation, which makes them a nullity. To advance such an argument misdescribes the nature or character of the payments made by WorkCover Corporation. Moreover, the lump sum payment made to Mr Hansford in settlement of his motor vehicle accident claim was “compensation” within the meaning of s 17(2)(c). It was “a payment (with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim for damages or a claim … [under a scheme of insurance or compensation under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law] …”. Mr Hansford had received periodic compensation payments and was liable to repay an amount equal to those payments to WorkCover Corporation. The total amount repaid was $132,692.65, of which $61,975.35 related to periodic compensation payments. Section 17(4) of the Act required that $61,975.35 be deducted from the lump sum payment ($275,000.00) to determine the compensation part of the lump sum for the purposes of s 17(3). Thus, the compensation part of the lump sum would be calculated as: ($275,000.00 - $61,975.35) x 50% = $106,512.33. No other deduction from the lump sum would be available under the Act in these circumstances. On the evidence before the Tribunal, the lump sum preclusion period in respect of Mr Hansford’s Parenting Payment Single, from 3 October 2003 (ie the day after his periodic WorkCover payments ceased) to 7 September 2006, has been correctly calculated. Also, on the evidence, the amount of Parenting Payment Single recovered by Centrelink, for the period from 3 September 2004 to 8 May 2006, has been correctly calculated.
13. It was Mr Mahoney’s alternative contention that, if the periodic payments by WorkCover Corporation were compensation, within the meaning of s 17(2) of the Act, then the payments should be treated as not having been made due to the special circumstances of the applicant’s case. He referred to s 1184K(1) and to the unfairness that had arisen to Mr Hansford as a result of the strict application of the Act. In Kirkbright (supra), Mansfield J commented upon s 1184(1), which was the predecessor to s 1184K(1) of the Act. At page 286 (paragraph 22) and page 288 (paragraphs 28-29), he said:
“22 In my view, that misapprehension of the legislative policy has influenced the Tribunal into excluding from consideration unfairness in the strict application of the legislation as possibly demonstrating that special circumstances exist in the applicant's case. Indeed, in my view, s 1184 is designed specifically to enable the respondent, and on review the Tribunal, to ameliorate such unfairness or injustice when it appears by virtue of the strict application of the Act. That view was effectively expressed by von Doussa J in Smith at 61:
‘The arbitrary nature of the provisions of s 152 would have been quite apparent to the legislature. The "50 per cent rule" in s 152(2)(c)(i), and the other provisions to which I have referred, are intended to operate together as a fair balance of the interests of the recipient of the payment with the competing interests of others in the community whose needs must be met as far as possible from a finite budget allocation for social security measures. As I observed in Banks (at 424) it is in the very nature of an arbitrary provision that it can entail a degree of unfairness in a particular case. The scheme of Pt XVII recognises that perfect matching of eligibilities by dollar amounts or by periods of time for pension and for payments by way of compensation in respect of an incapacity for work is impracticable. At the same time the legislature must have recognised that from time to time a case may arise where the degree of unfairness to a recipient of a payment by way of compensation would bring about an unreasonable or unjust result which was outside that which could be justified by the practical expediency of the arbitrary nature of the provisions in ss 152 and 153. Section 156 was enacted as part of the scheme under Pt XVII before the "50 per cent rule" was introduced by the Social Security Amendment Act 1988 (Cth), but this is no reason to construe s 156 as having no operation in respect of a case where the "50 per cent rule" produces a clearly unjust result. Before the 1988 amendment there were other provisions in Pt XVII, the strict application of which could operate in an arbitrary way. By its terms the discretion given by s 156 may be exercised where the Secretary (or a body standing in the place of the Secretary on appeal) "considers it appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case". These are wide words intended, as the Tribunal in Ivovic pointed out, "to allow the decision-maker the fullest opportunity to consider the particular circumstances of each case”.’
…
28 In my judgment the Tribunal has erred in approaching the matter in the way in which it did. It has failed to recognise that s 1184 may provide a release valve for such unfairness or injustice in certain circumstances.
29 The consequence is that the Tribunal has deprived the applicant of the opportunity of the Tribunal considering whether, in the light of the injustice and unfairness which the Tribunal clearly found to exist by the strict application of the Act, it would determine in accordance with s 1184(1) of the Act that that gives rise to special circumstances so as to make some decision under that provision. …”
On Mr Mahoney’s argument, if the periodic WorkCover payments were treated as not having been made due to special circumstances, it would follow that the start date of the lump sum preclusion period would be 5 January 2001. It would also follow that some or all of the amount of $20,687.39 Parenting Payment recovered by Centrelink would be repayable to Mr Hansford.
14. As to what constitutes “special circumstances”, a useful analysis has recently been given by Deputy President D G Jarvis in Re Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations and Donald [2006] AATA 920, where at paragraphs 43 to 48 he said:
“43. The concept of what constitutes ‘special circumstances’ has been discussed in many cases in the Federal Court and in this tribunal. In Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 the tribunal was dealing with an application under a different section of the Act which also, however, involved a consideration of whether special circumstances existed. Toohey J said (at page 3):
‘An expression such as ‘special circumstances’ is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special.’
44. In the same case on appeal ((1985) 7 ALD 670 at 674), the Full Federal Court reiterated the need to avoid limiting the scope of what might constitute special circumstances when it explained:
‘We do not think it is possible to lay down precise limits or precise rules. The matter is one for the Director-General bearing in mind the purpose for which the power is given. The phrase ‘special circumstances’, although lacking precision, is sufficiently understood in our view not to require judicial gloss.’
The Full Court also said, at page 675, that they did not consider that any error of law had been made by the tribunal, but continued:
‘While we would place less emphasis on one dictionary definition of “special”, we are in broad agreement with the approach of the Tribunal and are in agreement with its conclusion.’
45. In a later case, Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541, at page 545, Kiefel J, after referring to the Federal Court’s decision in Beadle, observed that special circumstances:
‘… would require something to distinguish Mr Groth’s case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case ... It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.’
46. The flexibility of the concept of special circumstances was also referred to in Riddell v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1993) 42 FCR 443, where the Full Court of the Federal Court said, at page 450:
‘Each particular case must be considered on its merits. It is the essential nature of the provision to create a broad discretion to meet the great variety of circumstances which must occur, raising considerations of individual hardship, need, fairness, reasonableness, and whatever else may move an administrator, keeping in mind the scope and purposes of the Act, to make a decision one way or the other.’
47. In a similar vein Heerey J, in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Allan (2001) 66 ALD 147, said at [17]:
‘It is not sensible to lay down precise limits or precise rules as to what may constitute special circumstances … ill health, financial circumstances and the unfairness of a strict application of the Act are some matters which may in an individual case, constitute special circumstances.’ (References omitted).
48. Finally, I refer to Haidar v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1998) 52 ALD 255 at 263, where Hill J discussed the predecessor of s 1184K of the Act, and agreed with an earlier observation by von Doussa J to the effect that in that section and attempt was made to balance on the one hand finite budgetary allocations against the interests of the recipient of the payment. His Honour continued:
‘Without putting too fine a point upon it, the purpose of the basic thrust of the legislation was to avoid a claimant being entitled both to social security benefits and benefits in the nature of income through lump sum payments.
However, the legislature was conscious of the possible harshness of a rule structured in an arbitrary way. Section 1184, therefore, provided the means whereby the secretary or, in the event ultimately of an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that tribunal, could alleviate the harshness of the statutory provision in an appropriate case but only where there were special circumstances. The question of what constitutes special circumstances has been the subject of a number of decisions of this court. It suffices here to say no more than that something is required which would take the matter out of the usual ordinary case …’”
15. Having regard to the evidence presented to the Tribunal and as set out in the documents, the Tribunal finds that Mr Hansford received periodic WorkCover payments until 2 October 2003, so that the lump sum preclusion period commenced the next day, namely 3 October 2003. The Tribunal is satisfied that the preclusion period from 3 October 2003 to 7 September 2006 was correctly calculated by Centrelink. It follows that Mr Hansford cannot be paid Parenting Payment Single during that period. The Tribunal is also satisfied, again based upon the evidence before it and as set out in the documents, that Mr Hansford was paid Parenting Payment Single during the period 3 September 2004 to 8 May 2006 and that payments totalling $20,687.39 were recoverable by Centrelink.
16. The Tribunal does not accept Mr Mahoney’s submission that the periodic WorkCover payments should be ignored as amounting to a nullity and that the compensation payment should be treated as compensation from a road accident, resulting in the start date of the preclusion period being 5 January 2001. Nor does the Tribunal accept his submission that what has occurred produces a result to Mr Hansford which is “unfair, unjust, unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate” (as said by Neaves J in Commonwealth of Australia v Daniels (1994) 33 ALD 111) and, as such, constitutes “special circumstances”. It has been recognised that special circumstances can arise from unfairness due to the strict application of the Act. However, as was held by Kiefel J in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain (2002) 116 FCR 348, the application of the statutory formula in s 17(3)(a) of the Act does not bring a matter out of the ordinary and therefore does not amount to “special circumstances”. In addition, the Tribunal is not satisfied that what occurred in Mr Hansford’s case “distinguishes [it] from others, something that sets it apart from the usual or ordinary case” (per Kiefel J in Chamberlain and in Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541). The Tribunal has sympathy for Mr Hansford’s position and can appreciate that he would (as the SSAT found) be confused about the operation of the debt recovery and preclusion period rules that have applied in his case.
decision
17. The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
I certify that the 17 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member R W Dunne
Signed: ..............J Coulthard...........................................
AssociateDate of Hearing 11 December 2006
Date of Decision 21 March 2007
Counsel for the Applicant Mr J Mahoney
Solicitor for the Applicant Mahoney’s Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent Mr P d'Assumpcao
Solicitor for the Respondent AGS
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