Hanrahan and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services
[2002] AATA 1128
•4 November 2002
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2002] AATA 1128
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No N2001/1966
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re GEOFF HANRAHAN
Applicant
And SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr J D Campbell, Member
Date4 November 2002
PlaceSydney
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution therefor determines that: (a) special circumstances exist; and (b) one half of the periodic compensation payments are to be treated as not being, or liable to be, paid.
………………………………..
Dr J D Campbell
Member
CATCHWORDS
Social Security – work injury – periodic compensation payments – onset of blindness – claim for disability support pension – qualifies for disability support pension – no payment of disability support pension because of prior and continuing receipts of weekly compensation payments – special circumstances
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) - sections 17, 94, 95, 1168 and 1184
Re Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hulls (1991) 22 ALD 772
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Ellis (1997) 46 ALD 1
Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64
Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281
REASONS FOR DECISION
4 November 2002 Dr J D Campbell, Member
In this matter, Mr G Hanrahan ("the Applicant") seeks a review of the decision of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal ("SSAT") dated 6 December 2001, which affirmed the decision of an authorised review officer dated 7 November 2001, which in turn had affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services ("the Respondent") dated 7 September 2001, that the Applicant was not entitled to any payment as a consequence of his claim for disability support pension ("DSP") lodged with the Respondent on 28 August 2001.
The hearing was held before the Tribunal in Orange on 1 July 2002 at which the Applicant assisted by his father, Mr Hanrahan, presented evidence. The Respondent was represented by Ms Garcia, an advocate from the Advocacy and Administrative Law Team at Centrelink. Further material was received from the Applicant on 4 July 2002, the Respondent filing further material received from the Applicant with the Tribunal on 28 August 2002. A final submission from the Respondent was received by the Tribunal on 18 September 2002.
The following material was placed into evidence before the Tribunal:
Exhibit Description Date
T1-T18 pp1-67 Documents prepared pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ("the T-documents")
A1 Submissions by Applicant – 8 pages
A2 Letter from Neil Sullivan & Bathersby Solicitors 11 July 2000
A3 Letter from Neil Sullivan & Bathersby Solicitors 5 May 2000
A4 Letter from Dr Hipwell 9 March 1999
A5 Letter from Mr Ironside 16 June 1997
A6 Letter from Dr Rushworth 5 February 1997
A7 Letter from Dr Rushworth 5 February 1997
A8 Copy of Judgement in matter of Hanrahan and C S Abood Pty Ltd 13 June 1997
A9 Bundle of documents received from Applicant 4 July 2002
A10 Two further documents received from the Respondent on behalf of Applicant 28 August 2002
R1 Respondent's Statement of Facts and Contentions 27 June 2002
ISSUE
The relevant issue in this matter is whether special circumstances exist which would allow all or part of the Applicant's periodic compensation payments to be treated as not being paid.
LEGISLATION
The relevant legislation is the Social Security Act 1991 ("the Act") and in particular sections 17, 94, 95, 1168 and 1184.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant had a pre-existing condition of Scheuermann's disease and degeneration of his lumbar disc spaces, which was aggravated together with the creation of frank disc lesions at both the L3-4 and L4-5 levels of his spine as a result of a semi trailer collision on 12 July 1993. The Applicant suffered further injury when alighting from a semi trailer on 3 March 1994. On this occasion, as a result of the fall, the Applicant suffered musculo-ligamentous strain to the neck, which had failed to settle by 13 June 1997. The Applicant was awarded $54,383 in lump sum compensation and ongoing fortnightly compensation payments of $569. The Applicant has not worked since the second accident (Exhibit A8).
On 14 June 1995 Dr MacMillan, an ophthalmologist, certified that the Applicant was suffering from Retinitis Pigmentosa, had a visual acuity of less than 6/60 in each eye with severely restricted visual fields, and must be regarded as legally blind (T15).
On 9 March 1999, Dr Hipwell, an ophthalmologist, in noting that the Applicant's eyes had commenced to deteriorate in 1996, confirmed that the Applicant and three members of his immediate family had Retinitis Pigmentosa; that his vision was 6/60 in each eye and that one would expect him to be legally blind within the next few years (Exhibit A4).
As a consequence of the two accidents, the Applicant commenced a common law claim in Queensland, but after settlement of his workers' compensation claim in NSW in June 1997, elected upon receipt of legal advice not to proceed. A sum of $24,000 is said to be owing to the legal firm of Neil Sullivan & Bathersby (Exhibit A9).
On 28 August 2001 the Applicant lodged a claim for DSP on account of his vision being less than 6/60 in both eyes (T4). The Applicant's claim for payment of DSP was rejected on 7 September 2001 (T5). On 7 November 2001 the Applicant was advised that he qualified for payment of DSP because of his blindness (not subject to means test), but as it is a compensation affected payment, the rate of DSP is reduced on a dollar for dollar basis for any periodic compensation payments received (T10). In the Applicant's case payment was withheld completely because his periodic compensation payment rate was greater that the DSP rate. This decision was affirmed by the SSAT on 6 December 2001 (T2).
APPLICANT'S EVIDENCE
The Applicant in a submission dated 1 July 2002 (Exhibit A1), together with oral evidence presented before the Tribunal, detailed the following significant matters:
·He was born on 15 September 1963, is single and lives alone in a house at Kandos. The house is owned by the Applicant, with a mortgage of $25,000 held by the Orange Credit Union. The mortgage repayments are $252 every four weeks and are paid by the Applicant.
·During the late 1980's, the Applicant, together with a younger brother and sister were diagnosed as suffering from a genetic sight disorder, commonly referred to as Retinitis Pigmentosa. The progression of this disorder as regards sight deterioration is variable, with periods of sudden deterioration, followed by a period of dormancy when the sight loss remains static, followed by another period of sudden sight deterioration until eventually there is a complete loss of sight.
·In July 1993 the Applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident when the semi trailer driven by the Applicant struck a vehicle making an illegal 'U'-turn in front of the semi trailer. The Applicant suffered injury to his back, neck and shoulders. The Applicant was off work for a short period of time before returning to drive articulated vehicles for the same employer.
·In March 1994 while driving his work truck in Queensland the front stub axle on his steering wheel broke off, resulting in the Applicant suffering aggravation to his previous injuries in his back, neck and shoulders.
·In about July 1994 the Applicant commenced receiving fortnightly workers' compensation payments from GIO. These currently amount to $601 per fortnight gross, with $75 being deducted from this amount for tax, leaving a net position of $526 per fortnight.
·In 1995 the Applicant's sight commenced a period of rapid deterioration and when seen by Dr MacMillan, a consultant ophthalmologist, on 14 June 1995, the Applicant had a visual acuity of less than 6/60 in each eye and was considered legally blind.
·The Applicant had been educated to year 9, trained as a mechanic and worked in the transport industry for 12 years until his second accident in March 1994. The Applicant has not worked since that accident.
·The Applicant purchased his house in Kandos for $62,650 in February 1999, with a mortgage to the Orange Credit Union, which now stands at $25,000 and for which he pays $126 dollars a fortnight. Cash in bank account(s) is in the order of $1,000.
·The Applicant has an outstanding debt of some $25,000 to a solicitor in Queensland as a consequence of a third party claim. The status of this debt is said to be unclear.
·The Applicant's mobility has been restricted by his loss of vision. He is only able to watch television if he puts his face adjacent to the screen; everyone and everything is a blur at six feet; at night he has a complete loss of vision. He experiences social isolation as a consequence of his disability as he is unable to participate in most social activities.
The following is a summary of the Applicant's oral evidence, his submission of 1 July 2002 and further material provided by the Applicant in relation to his financial affairs (Exhibits A9 and A10).
(a)Income per fortnight:
Gross $592.40 Tax $73.70 Net Amount $518.70.
These income figures are taken from T16 and T17. The figures given by the Applicant may well represent adjusted figures after price index adjustment for the new financial year.(b)Expenditure per fortnight:
Mortgage $126
House and Contents Insurance $14
Council Rates $42
Electricity $35
Telephone $31
Groceries $125
Fuel (oil heating) $14
Transport $8
Total $395 per fortnight(c)Other expenditure per fortnight as a consequence of blindness (some of which he is prevented from doing because of lack of funds):
Ironing $24
Repair to and other items $4
House repairs $58
Lawn maintenance $4
Transport to visit father in Orange (twice per year) $9
Transport to visit sister in Penrith (twice per year) $10
Transport to visit friend in Blacktown (twice per year) $10
Transport to visit brother in Adelaide (once per year) $8
Transport to Mudgee for social outing (twice per year) $3
Social activity including club membership $26
Total $158 per fortnight(d)Other expenses of a "one off" nature (which may, however, be repeated in some cases over time):
Dental work re wisdom teeth $157
New prescription glasses $300
New sunglasses $230
Visit to ophthalmologist in Orange and transport $250
Replacement of vacuum cleaner $325
Replacement of stove (second hand) $150
Addition of extra lights $125(e)Purchase of equipment/aids to assist in coping with his disability:
Liquid level sensors $50
Sighted magnifiers $50
Reading block $80
Large print telephone book $100
Talking watch $100
Talking book $300
Zoom text computer package $1000
Closed circuit television $3500(f) Issue of, and cost of, a guide dog.
SUBMISSIONS
the applicant
The Applicant submits that his circumstances should be considered special circumstances and that a discretion should be exercised to treat the whole or part of his compensation payments as not having been made and/or not liable to be made on the following grounds:
(a)Financial hardship – his only source of income is $527 (net) per fortnight in the form of periodic workers' compensation payments. His expenditure in relation to everyday living is $395 per fortnight. Other expenditures per fortnight as a consequence of his blindness average $158 a fortnight, and some of these activities cannot be undertaken because of an absence of funds. Further, there are "one off" expenditures and purchases of capital equipment to assist with coping with his blindness that cannot be afforded. The Applicant further contends that sale of the house would not be of great assistance financially, as rent for appropriate accommodation would exceed $100 per week. In summary, the Applicant submits that his financial position is extremely difficult with equity in the house offset by the debt to his solicitor and his expenses of daily living outweighing his income as a consequence of his disability. Consequently, he has to forego activities and expenditures which are necessary to prevent social isolation and assist him in being better able to cope with his disability.
(b)Medical – The Applicant contends that his medical disabilities, namely back, neck and shoulder injuries, for which he continues to receive compensation payments, and his blindness, prevent him from undertaking any work activities, and limit his ability to undertake the routine maintenance tasks associated with house and garden upkeep. These disabilities, and in particular his blindness, are recognised as significant disabilities by the Act, section 95 – where blindness qualifies an individual for DSP.
(c)Unfairness – The Applicant contends that a strict interpretation of the Act creates unfairness in that if an Applicant were blind prior to his receipt of compensable periodic payments, his compensation affected payment (for example DSP) would be paid in full. Whereas in the circumstances of this matter, because periodic payments were being received prior to his blindness and qualifying for DSP, the Applicant does not receive any DSP payment. The Applicant argues that this is unfair, when the reason for which he receives the periodic compensation payments is unrelated to the reason for which he qualifies for DSP, namely blindness, which in itself is accepted as a sole qualification for DSP, without any of the other qualifying elements nominated in section 94 of the Act.
the respondent
The Respondent submits that no special circumstances exist in this matter, contending that:
(a)The Applicant's net income adequately covers the Applicant's living expenses and there is a surplus in excess of $100 per fortnight.
(b)Expenses associated with the maintenance of the house should not be taken into consideration as these are not classed as living expenses and are financial responsibilities associated with an individual who chooses to become a home-owner. If the Applicant was not a home-owner these expenses would not exist.
(c)The debt in relation to the solicitor, of $25,000, is not yet finalised, therefore there is uncertainty as to the status of the debt.
(d)Not all proposed additional costs nominated by the Applicant are related to his blindness, with the cost of visiting family and friends being one not necessarily associated with his blindness.
(e)The majority of the "one off" or infrequent costs associated with buying specialised products for the blind are luxury purchases and it would be unreasonable that all blind persons own these items.
(f)The purchase of such items is not an urgent necessity; quotes have not been provided and they could, even though he appears to be managing without these, be purchased over time.
(g)The condition of blindness was not unforeseen and that there has been sufficient time for him to plan and manage his financial circumstance with a view to meeting associated future costs.
(h)The Applicant's compensable injuries do not constitute special circumstances.
CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS
In this matter the essential facts are not in dispute between the parties and accordingly the Tribunal makes the following findings of fact:
(a)The Applicant was involved in two motor vehicle accidents in 1993 and 1994, and after the last accident the Applicant has not worked.
(b)As a consequence of his work-related accidents, the Applicant is in receipt of periodic compensation payments, which amount to $601 gross (or $526 net) per fortnight.
(c)In 1995/1996 the Applicant's vision deteriorated to the point that his vision was less than 6/60 in each eye and as a consequence he was deemed to be legally blind. The Applicant suffers from a genetic eye disorder, namely Retinitis Pigmentosa.
(d)In August 2001 the Applicant lodged a claim for DSP. While the Applicant qualified for DSP, payment was withheld because the Applicant's periodic compensation payment rate was greater than the DSP rate.
Further, the Tribunal notes the following provisions contained within the Act (as at 7 September 2001). The Tribunal also notes that there is no disagreement between the parties as to the effect of the legislation.
"Rate reduction of certain compensation affected payments where periodic compensation payments have been received
1168.(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), if:(a) a person, or the person's partner, receives a series of periodic compensation payments; and
(b) the person receives or claims a compensation affected payment for the periodic payments period; and
(c) the person was not, at the time of the event that gave rise to the entitlement of the person, or the person's partner, to the compensation, receiving a compensation affected payment referred to in paragraph (b);the rate of the person's compensation affected payment is to be reduced, in accordance with this section, for the periodic payments period.
Note 1: for periodic payments period see section 17.
Note 2: if a person, or a person's partner, was, at the time of an event that gave rise to the entitlement of the person, or the person's partner, to compensation, receiving a compensation affected payment, the compensation is treated as ordinary income.
Note 3: Subsection (1) can apply to both members of a couple so as to reduce both their social security payments. For example, if a wife pensioner receives periodic compensation payments and her partner is receiving a disability support pension, subsection (1) applies to the wife pensioner to reduce her pension and to the partner to reduce his pension.1168.(2) If the rate of a person's compensation affected payment is to be reduced under subsection (1), subsections (3), (3A) and (3B) are to be used to work out the person's reduced rate.
Note I: If the fortnightly rate of periodic compensation is higher than the fortnightly rate of the compensation affected payment, the compensation affected payment will be reduced to nil for the periodic payments period.
Note 2: If a person's rate is reduced under subsection (I), the order in which the reduction is to be made against the components of the maximum payment rate is laid down by section 1210 (maximum basic rate first, then rent assistance).1168.(3) If the person is not a member of a couple, the person's fortnightly rate of compensation affected payment is reduced by the fortnightly rate of periodic compensation.
…1168.(5) If the rate of a person's social security benefit is to be reduced under subsection (4), the person's reduced rate is worked out as follows:
Social security - Partner's excess - Person's
payment rate compensation rate compensation rate
where:
'Social security payment rate' is the fortnightly rate of the social security benefit payable to the person during the periodic payments period;
'Partner's excess compensation rate' is the fortnightly rate of the amount (if any) by which any periodiccompensation payable to the person's partner during the periodic payments period exceeds the fortnightly rate of the social security benefit, payable to the partner during that period;
'Person's compensation rate' is the fortnightly rate of any periodic compensation payable to the person during the periodic payments period.Note I: If the person's compensation rate or the partners excess compensation rate, or the 2 rates taken together, are higher than the fortnightly rate of the social security benefit, the benefit or payment will be reduced to nil for the periodic payments period.
Note 2: If a person's rate is reduced under subsection (5), the order in which the reduction is to be made against the components of the maximum payment rate is laid down by section 1210 (maximum basic rate first, then rent assistance)."
The Tribunal also notes section 1184 of the Act which provides:
"Secretary may disregard some payments
1184.(1) For the purposes of this part the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:(a) not having been made; or
(b) not liable to be made;
if the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case."
As to what constitutes special circumstances has been the subject of much past consideration. Assistance is drawn from the following cases.
(a)In Re Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD1 at 3 Toohey J stated:
"An expression such as 'special circumstance' is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special."
(b)In Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 at 545, Kiefel J, after referring to Beadle [supra], said:
"…for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth's case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only inquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary, The inquiry I have referred to would involve considering what would be the effect. if the provision in question or the principle of liability it creates, is applied."
(c)In Secretary, Department of Social Security v Smith (1991) 30 FCR 56 Von Doussa J held that it was a consideration of relevance to the exercise of the discretion, under a precursor of section 1184(1), that the supervening incapacity for work that attracted pension payments was unrelated to the earlier injury that attracted compensation payments.
(d)In Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hulls (1991) 22 ALD 772 at 427 O'Loughlin J referred with approval to Re Ivovic and Director-General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN N95, concerning similar provisions, stating that:
''In the exercise of the discretion which s115 (4A) confers the decision maker must have regard to whether, by exercising the discretion in a particular case, he will be achieving or frustrating ends or objects which are conformable with the scope and purpose of the Social Security Act 1947 ...Thus whilst keeping the dominant principle of s115 in mind, he must nevertheless be prepared to respond to the special circumstances of any particular case by reason of which strict enforcement of the liability created by the section would be unjust, unreasonable or otherwise inappropriate."
(e)In Secretary, Department of Social Security v Ellis (1997) 46 ALD 1 at 6 Carr J at 6 concluded that the lack of a casual relationship between the injury and the benefit is "in my opinion, this was not an irrelevant factor."
(f)In Kirkbright v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (2000) 106 FCR 281. Mansfield J concurred with the opinions of Von Doussa J in Smith [supra], Carr J in Ellis [supra] and Merkel J in Kertland v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services (1999) 95 FCR 64 where at 71 it was stated:
"In Smith, to which I will later return, von Doussa J rejected a contention put on behalf of the Secretary that "the circumstances of the case" should be confined to matters which are external to the operation of the statutory scheme. His Honour made the point, with which I respectfully agree, that a distinction cannot meaningfully be drawn between matters external to the operation of the scheme and matters which are the product of the strict application of the scheme."
In addressing the factual issues, the Tribunal has already concluded that the compensation injury, which has given rise to the compensation periodic payments, and the blindness, which has given rise to the claim for a DSP, are unrelated. As such, and in view of the authorities nominated, the lack of a causal relationship between injury and benefit is a factor which is relevant to a consideration of whether special circumstances exist.
The Tribunal would also consider that blindness as the medical condition which has led to the claim for DSP stands alone as a particular condition under section 95 of the Act, while all other medical conditions are subject to the very particular requirements, both as to assessment and resultant inability to work, nominated in section 94 of the Act. From this, the Tribunal infers that blindness is given a particular status as vis a vis other medical conditions when claiming for DSP.
The Tribunal observes that such a particular status is given to blindness because it is a disability that requires particular assistance, in order for the blind person to cope and manage his everyday affairs as a disabled person in a modern society.
In addressing the particulars of this matter, the Tribunal further observes that the Applicant's genetic predisposition evolved to blindness when the Applicant was in his early thirties, and was subsequent to his earlier work related injuries for which he was and is receiving periodic compensation payments. It is a combination of his blindness and his continuing work related injuries, which is preventing the Applicant from working and is restricting his freedom of movement in the wider community. Further, his blindness and work related injuries interfere with his ability to both maintain the full complement of household duties and to undertake the maintenance activities associated with home ownership.
On reflection, the Tribunal accepts that the disability of blindness imposes particular costs upon individuals as they endeavour to move as freely as possible in a wider society; to escape social isolation; to replace previous modes of communication and learning with new modes; and to endeavour to carry on a lifestyle consistent with their disability. The Tribunal also accepts that had blindness occurred as a result of a work related injury, such issues would have been considered in determining the compensation quantum.
The Tribunal also observes that the Respondent argues that the Applicant had ample warning of his predicament and that he should have planned and financially prepared for the ensuring difficulties. Further, the Tribunal observes that the Respondent has argued that home ownership creates maintenance costs, which would be avoided if rented accommodation was secured. The Tribunal rejects both propositions, for no matter how much planning is undertaken, coping with an evolving disability is a continuous activity, within an overall environment where a disabled individual cherishes whatever independence is able to be maintained. Hence, a decision to purchase an affordable house should not be the subject of criticism, particularly when rent payments ($130 a week) would be double the mortgage repayments.
It is the Tribunal's finding in this matter that a strict interpretation of the statutory requirements creates a situation where the Applicant's financial ability to cope with the necessary costs of his blindness interfere with his independence; his ability to pay for necessary services in relation to both his domestic and personal circumstances; to meet the costs of necessary aids to assist in his rehabilitation and coping with his disability; to meet the costs of alternative transport; and to meet the costs of social activity to escape social isolation.
The Tribunal is mindful that some may believe that some of the Applicant's desired purchases to cope with his disability are discretionary. With reference to the list of purchases provided, the Tribunal has some reservation concerning the closed circuit television, with the Tribunal being the first to recognise that such a reservation may arise from a lack of understanding as to how such equipment is to be used.
The Tribunal also notes that there has been a careful delineation of income and expenditures. It is the Tribunal's view that expenditure assessment in the circumstances of the disability of blindness must include: general expenditures ($395 per fortnight); other expenditures ($158 per fortnight); an annual allowance for 'one-off' items relating to health, vision and various replacements ($30 per fortnight); and purchases of equipment/aids to assist in coping with blindness ($30 per fortnight), if indeed the Applicant is to live and cope with his disability in his current environment.
In the circumstances that have been described, the Tribunal concludes that a strict interpretation of the statutory requirements creates an unfair outcome, where the Applicant's pension disability of blindness is not causally related to his compensable injuries giving rise to the periodic payments. The Tribunal concludes that it is unfair in that:
(a)The nature of the pensionable disability of blindness creates a set of financial imperatives for an individual, if indeed the individual is to retain independence, escape social isolation and cope with, and adapt to, living with his disability.
(b) The financial data tabled before the Tribunal indicates, in the Tribunal's view, that the Applicant's disposable income would not, and does not, meet his necessary annual expenditure, if indeed an assessment of necessary financial expenditure is undertaken in the context of an individual coping with a significant disability in his late thirties, his place of residence, and pre existing disabilities which interfere with his physical ability to work.
The Tribunal is satisfied that consequent to a thorough examination of the issues in this matter, special circumstances do exist for the various reasons which have been earlier detailed. In summary, it is the Tribunal's view that the lack of a causal relationship between compensability and pensionablily has created an environment where the financial imperatives surrounding the pensionable disability of blindness are being unfairly contained by a strict interpretation of the statue. The unfairness extends to depriving the Applicant of some financial assistance which would allow him to maintain his independence, cope with his disability and continue to live in an environment, which is compatible with his desire for relative independence.
The Tribunal, having concluded that special circumstances exist in this matter, and having further analysed the financial material before it, in exercise of its discretion pursuant to section 1184(1) of the Act, has elected to treat one half of the periodic compensation payment as not having been made and not liable to be paid in relation to each future periodic compensation payment.
As with such circumstances, if the Applicant's overall financial circumstances are to vary significantly in the future, the Applicant should address such issues with the Respondent.
DETERMINATION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution therefor determines that:
(a)special circumstances exist; and
(b)one half of the periodic compensation payments are to be treated as not being, or liable to be, paid.
I certify that the 32 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr J D Campbell, Member
Signed: O. Caragianni .....................................................................................
AssociateDate of Hearing 1 July 2002
Date of Decision 4 November 2002Representative for the Applicant Self
Advocate for the Respondent Andrea Garcia
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