JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION: HANNEYBEL -v- UNIFLEX (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD [2002] WASCA 349
CORAM: MALCOLM CJ
STEYTLER J
MATHEWS AJ
HEARD: 25 JULY 2002
DELIVERED : 16 DECEMBER 2002
FILE NO/S: FUL 141 of 2001
BETWEEN: WARREN HANNEYBEL
Appellant (Defendant)
AND
UNIFLEX (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
Respondent (Plaintiff)
Catchwords:
Contract of employment - Confidential information used by former State Manager after termination of employment - Breach of implied term not to disclose confidential information - Whether such term applied after termination of employment
Legislation:
Building Code of Western Australia
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Cross-appeal allowed
Injunction varied
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant (Defendant) : Mr P G Clifford
Respondent (Plaintiff) : Mr J A Chaney SC
Solicitors:
Appellant (Defendant) : Paiker & Overmeire
Respondent (Plaintiff) : Karp Steedman Ross-Adjie
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Alterskye v Scott (1948) 1 All ER 469
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1978) 52 ALJR 20
Butt v M'Donald (1896) 7 QLJ 68
Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519
Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41 NSWLR 176
Distillers Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Times Newspapers Ltd [1975] QB 613
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10
Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler (1987) 1 Ch 117
Green & Clara Pty Ltd v Bestobell Industries Pty Ltd [1982] WAR 1
Hadzel v DeWaldorf (1970) 16 FLR 174
Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280
Kennett v Farmer [1988] VR 991
MacKay v Dick (1881) 6 App Cas 251
Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford [1986] QB 1000
Prichard v Krantz (1984) 37 SASR 379
Reid Sigrist Ltd v Moss & Mechanism Ltd (1932) 49 RPC 461
Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881
Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596
Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd (1968) 2 QB 157
Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1
Taylor v Jecks (1993) 10 WAR 309
Case(s) also cited:
Nil
MALCOLM CJ: This is an appeal against part of a judgment of Hasluck J on 12 June 2001 by which it was ordered that there be a permanent injunction restraining the appellant, his servants and agents from publishing or re‑publishing to any person, except to his solicitors or counsel, or under compulsion of law:
"That part of the allegations contained in paragraph 87 of the affidavit sworn by the [appellant] on 10 July 1998 in CIV 1541 of 1998 concerning the fire rating of any of the [respondent's] products referred to in the said paragraph, or any similar allegations that the said products were not in compliance with fire rating standards."
The appellant also appeals against the order of the trial Judge that the appellant pay three‑fourths of the respondent's costs of the action, including reserved costs, to be taxed, save for certain costs to which I shall refer later.
Par 15 of the Statement of claim alleged that on or…
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- Case
- [2002] WASCA 349
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to address included the scope and application of the implied term not to disclose confidential information beyond the termination of employment and the extent to which the meanings of words used in the employment contract could be interpreted. The respondent had pleaded specific meanings, but the court needed to determine which meanings were fairly open in the circumstances. The case drew on the principles established in National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v GTV Corporation Pty Ltd, which held that the meaning of the words used in the contract was ultimately a question for the jury. The court was not bound to confine the jury to the meanings asserted by the parties.
The court reasoned that the practice of pleading specific meanings did not alter the legal position that the meaning of the words was ultimately for the jury to determine. The court referred to the decision in Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford, where it was noted that it was open to the defendant to plead that the words were justified in the meanings attributed by them, even if not justified in the meanings attributed by the plaintiff. However, the court also considered the decision in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd, which suggested that a less injurious meaning than the pleaded meaning could still be considered by the jury if it was not unfair to the defendant. The court concluded that the primary judge was not restricted by the specific imputations pleaded and had to decide the meanings that were fairly open in the context of the case.
The final orders of the court would depend on the determination of these legal issues, including whether the implied term not to disclose confidential information continued to apply post-termination and the specific meanings of the words used in the contract.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STEYTLER J
Although the respondent had pleaded specific meanings, it was necessary for the learned Judge to decide what meanings were fairly open in the circumstances and in this context his Honour was not restricted by the specific imputations pleaded. In National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v GTV Corporation Pty Ltd [1989] VR 747 at 768, Fullagar, Hampel and McDonald JJ at 768 noted that the practice had developed of the parties pleading what they alleged the words used meant in their plain and ordinary meaning but went on to say that:" … the practice did not, and in our opinion could not, alter the position at law that the meaning of the words was ultimately a question for the jury, and that the jury must be at large in finding the true meaning amongst such possible meanings as were left to them by the Judge, and that the Judge was not bound to confine the jury to the false innuendos asserted. …" Their Honours also said at 768:" … that practice did not and could not alter the position at law that the Judge was to decide what meanings were fairly open and was to leave to the jury all such meanings, and only such meanings, of the words as were fairly open. In our opinion, neither the Judge nor the jury were thereby confined to the meanings asserted by the parties." Their Honours went on to consider at 768 – 769 the decision of the Court of Appeal in England in Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford [1986] QB 1000 at 1032 – 1033:"(1)there was an obligation upon the plaintiff and upon the defendant each to plead what he respectively contended were the false innuendos, and(2)that it was open to the defendant to plead that the words were justified in the meaning(s) attributed to them by the defendant although not justified in the meaning(s) attributed to them by the plaintiff, and(3)such pleadings were effective to 'define the issues'." The learned primary Judge was invited by the plaintiff's counsel not to follow the Polly Peck case despite the fact that it had been followed in England and had been very recently followed in Victoria in the case of Kennett v Farmer [1988] VR 991. In Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd (1968) 2 QB 157 at 185, Salmon LJ said that a plaintiff was bound by his or her pleaded meaning. Diplock LJ said in Slim at 175 that a plaintiff could rely on any unpleaded meaning which was less injurious than the pleaded meaning. In Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1 at 14, Stephen J referred to both views. In Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519, Brennan CJ and McHugh J said at [21] that the proposition advanced by Salmon LJ in Slim was too rigorous and appeared to sacrifice form to substance. Their Honours' view was that a less injurious meaning than the meaning pleaded is not always without significance as Diplock LJ seemed to imply. As their Honours said in Chakravarti at 533:"A defendant who could not justify or otherwise defend a publication having the meaning pleaded by the plaintiff might have been able to justify or otherwise defend a defamatory publication having a less injurious meaning. But a different nuance of meaning from the meaning pleaded may go to, and be found by, the jury provided it is not unfair to the defendant to allow the plaintiff to so to depart from the meaning pleaded."