Hanna v Uther Webster and Evans - [2018] NSWSC 465

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation: Hanna v Uther Webster & Evans [2018] NSWSC 465
Hearing dates: 09 May 2017
Date of orders: 17 April 2018
Decision date: 17 April 2018
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Rothman J
Decision:
(1) Summons dismissed;
(2) The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to these proceedings.
Catchwords: COSTS – Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 350 – Assessment – Application for extension of time by father of juvenile client – question whether obligation to pay for services – no suggestion that fees unfair or unreasonable – no satisfactory explanation for delay for period ranging from 15 months to 3½ years – time extension refused.
Legislation Cited: Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW)
Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW)
Cases Cited: Harvey v Goodman Law Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 340
Mackowiak v Hagipantelis; Bickhoff v Hagipantelis [2015] NSWSC 1087
White Industries (QLD) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806
White Industries (QLD) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Samir Hanna (Plaintiff)
Uther Webster & Evans (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
W Cottee (Plaintiff)
S Baron Levi (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Stevens Cottee Lawyers (Plaintiff)
Uther Webster & Evans (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2016/66777

Judgment

HIS HONOUR: By Summons, the plaintiff Samir Hanna, moves the Court for orders under s 350(5) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (“the 2004 Act”) so that an Application for a Costs Assessment (“the Application”) may be dealt with out of time. The extension is opposed.
Briefly stated, the plaintiff, Samir Hanna is the father of Jason Hanna, a person charged with murder on or about 9 June 2011 and convicted of manslaughter on or about 4 October 2014 and subsequently sentenced. Uther Webster and Evans, an incorporated law practice, (or a partner or employee of the firm) represented Jason Hanna during the course of the proceedings.
On 30 October 2013, Legal Aid was granted to Jason Hanna and, in essence, Samir Hanna submits that, for reasons or grounds identified later in these reasons, he should be granted an extension of time or dispensation to allow an assessment after the expiry of the statutory prescribed period of 12 months.
The plaintiff relies upon his Affidavits sworn 4 April 2016 and 12 July 2016 and the Affidavit of Mr John Bracey, Private Investigator, sworn 11 April 2016.

Grounds of Application

The grounds of the Summons are not precisely identified by the plaintiff. Because the Summons is not the commencement of an appeal, there is no requirement under the Rules to identify the grounds upon which the Summons is sought. Nevertheless there are written submissions and there were oral submissions.
The grounds for the Summons include:

The plaintiff is an unsophisticated client;

The plaintiff placed his faith and trust in the defendant, who or which breached that trust;

The plaintiff was unaware that the memorandum of fees or bills could be questioned or challenged;

Only after the trial and sentencing of his son did the plaintiff have the opportunity to consider the issue of costs;

The breach of trust included, it seems, rendering accounts for work done that was paid by Legal Aid New South Wales under a grant of Legal Aid;

The delay in requesting an assessment of the costs is not such as to warrant refusal of leave.

Further to the foregoing, the plaintiff submits that a reminder of fees owing or an oral request as to the timing of a payment already invoiced is a request for payment pursuant to the terms of the 2004 Act and, if that be the case (should the Court accept the evidence of requests made by or on behalf of the defendant), no extension of time is required.

Legal Profession Act 2004

The 2004 Act has been repealed, but the principles remain unchanged. The provisions of s 350 of the 2004 Act allow a client to apply to the Manager, Costs Assessment for an assessment of the whole or any part of legal costs. Further by s 350(2) of the 2004 Act, a third party payer may apply to a costs assessor for an assessment of the whole or any part of the legal costs payable by the third party payer.
(The matter has not been raised by either party, but the Court nevertheless notes that there are some issues associated with the capacity of the plaintiff to seek the orders in the Summons. For the purposes of Division 11 of the 2004 Act, which includes s 350, a client is defined as “a person to whom or for whom legal services are or have been provided”: s 349A of the 2004 Act. A “third party payer” is defined as a person, who is not a client and “is under a legal obligation to pay all or any part of the legal costs for legal services provided to the client, or … being under that obligation, has already paid all or a part of those legal costs”: s 302A of the 2004 Act.
The terms are defined identically in the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW) (“the Uniform Law”), promulgated and effective from 1 July 2015 (i.e. a date prior to the filing of the Summons): the Uniform Law, Sch 4, cl 2(4), Transitional Provisions. The Court will deal with the matter as if the 2004 Act applied. No different result would, it seems, or could, be derived.
The client of the defendant was Jason Hanna, not the plaintiff. The plaintiff may have been a third party payer, although there is much doubt about that proposition. To be a third party payer there would need to be an obligation upon the Plaintiff to pay the legal fees.
The defendant provided legal services to Jason Hanna and not to the plaintiff. The plaintiff may have contracted with the defendant as trustee for his son, thereby creating an obligation to pay the fees contracted, which would result in the plaintiff being a third party payer, as defined in the 2004 Act and the Uniform Law.
Again, neither party has raised this issue with the Court. The Court, as a consequence, will treat the plaintiff as “client” or “a third party payer”, whichever results in the plaintiff having the greater rights and the defendant having greater or additional obligations.
Whether or not the plaintiff is the client or a third party payer, if the plaintiff is “sophisticated” or would be a “sophisticated client”, there is no power to extend time pursuant to the provisions of s 35(5) of the 2004 Act. For that purpose, it is necessary to have regard to the provisions of s 31(1)(c) and (d) of the 2004 Act, which defines the expression in a limited manner.
The plaintiff is not a “sophisticated client”, as defined. However, that does not mean, for the purpose of the application of principles, that the plaintiff is “an unsophisticated client”: Mackowiak v Hagipantelis; Bickhoff v Hagipantelis [2015] NSWSC 1087 at [166].

Background Facts

Jason Hanna was charged with murder on 9 June 2011 and was ultimately convicted of manslaughter as a result of a joint criminal enterprise for an incident that occurred on 30 October 2010. A conference occurred with the defendant on 14 June 2011, which was the first involvement of the defendant in the provision of legal services.
The Court has a file note relating to that conference. On or about 16 June 2011 an amount of $13,000 was paid by or on behalf of the client to the defendant into a Commonwealth Bank of Australia bank account.
On 23 June 2011 the defendant wrote to both the client and his mother and father confirming that conditional bail had been granted on 16 July 2011, and confirming the conditions that had been imposed by Parramatta Children’s Court and the consequences of any breach. The letter of 23 June 2011 recites that the defendant was “required under the Legal Profession Act to submit a costs agreement to you. This is enclosed in duplicate for your attention.”
The costs agreement separated the anticipated work that was required into several parts and sought to explain the process of committal and whether a right would be granted to cross-examine some or all of the witnesses. The letter enclosed the bail conditions and a General Costs Agreement dated 22 June 2011.
The General Costs Agreement is in usual terms and provides that acceptance of the offer is evidenced by the giving of instructions after receiving the Costs Agreement itself. The Costs Agreement was signed by the Senior Partner of the defendant and defined the work involved; how the costs would be calculated; the charge out fees for partners/employees of the firm; expenses and disbursements; and provided an estimate of costs which, for stage 1 of the work, was within the range of between $18,500-$26,400.
The Costs Agreement referred to and confirmed the client’s (and Mr and Mrs Samir’s) entitlement to receive a Bill of Costs that is itemised; the nature of the billing arrangements; a service charge on payments by credit card; the payment of interest on unpaid costs; authority to pay disbursements and receive money; and referred specifically to any dispute as to legal costs and the right to mediation. In particular it set out, separately and in summary form, that the addressees have a right to: negotiate a costs agreement; receive an itemised Bill of Costs; request written reports about progress; apply for costs to be assessed within 12 months if unhappy with the costs rendered; and apply for the costs agreement to be set aside.
Other matters were raised, of no current consequence. The addressees were also referred to the fact sheet titled “Legal Costs – Your Right to Know” from the Law Society or Law Institute.
A Memorandum of Fees, in billable form, was rendered on 23 June 2011, which disclosed the amount of costs and the total balance remaining in trust. The Memorandum of Fees again reminded the addressees of the right to have any legal costs assessed within 12 months of the bill being provided; the right to set aside any costs agreement pursuant to s 328 of the 2004 Act; and the right to an itemised bill, if the bill provided had been a lump sum bill. Attached to the bill is a full record and time sheet for the work undertaken in relation to the matter.
As one would expect, much correspondence was sent from the defendant to the client and the plaintiff (and the plaintiff’s wife), most of which I do not recite. On 12 June 2012 the addressees were updated in relation to s 91 submissions as to committal, from which hearing attendance of the client was excused and his bail continued without variation.
In the course of that letter the defendant referred to and enclosed an Interim Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements for work performed up to that date, noting that a considerable amount of work performed by the Senior Partner and responsible Solicitor had not been billed. A request for payment was made and also a request for a further deposit into the trust account on account of costs and disbursements.
There was an estimate of Counsel’s fees and estimates of the hearing on the s 91 Application and the committal hearing itself, amounting to $40,800.
On 12 June 2012, (and attached to the aforementioned letter) the defendant sent a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, which, in accordance with the utilised procedure of the defendant, included a reminder of the capacity to assess costs; mediate costs where the amount in dispute is less than $10,000; set aside a Costs Agreement and/or request an itemised bill, if the bill provided is a lump sum. Again a full time sheet costing calculation was provided.
On 21 June 2012, there was a telephone attendance between the responsible Solicitor and the plaintiff a note of which is attached to the Solicitor’s Affidavit. The plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter of 12 June 2012 and confirmed that he had looked at the letter and saw the names of the witnesses.
I accept that note as an accurate reflection of the conference between Mr Maksisi (the Solicitor) and the plaintiff and, further, a following telephone attendance on the client, Jason Hanna. After the hearing on 21 June 2012, there was a further telephone conversation between Mr Maksisi and Jason Hanna.
A further conference by telephone occurred between Mr Maksisi and the plaintiff during which, again, the plaintiff made clear that he had read the letter or letters sent by the defendant to him.
On 30 August 2012, Mr Maksisi notified the client and the plaintiff (and his wife) that counsel was prepared to undertake the committal hearing for a fixed fee, the amount of which was disclosed in the correspondence. The letter attached the directions of the learned magistrate and a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements dated 20 August 2012. Again, the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements reminded the addressees of the rights to have costs assessed under the 2004 Act; mediation for amounts less than $10,000; and otherwise if agreed, for a Costs Agreement to be set aside and the right to an itemised bill.
On 18 December 2012, the defendant, through Mr Maksisi, wrote to the client and the plaintiff and his wife to the effect that the costs of a trial in the Supreme Court (to which the matter had been arraigned) would be prohibitive and advising the addressees of their right to make an application to Legal Aid New South Wales to fund the trial and the requirement for a means and merit test.
On 12 September 2013, a further letter was sent to the client, the plaintiff and his wife relating to fees and the reconciliation of an amount otherwise held in the solicitors’ trust account. It acknowledged a discount in counsel’s fees and noted that an amount of $34,815.17 was outstanding to which would be credited the amount returned from bail surety, leaving an amount payable of $14,815.17.
The letter enclosed the General Costs Agreement said to apply from 23 August 2011. It was in the same or similar terms to the previous Costs Agreements, except as to the assessment of fees.
The originally planned joint trial of co-offenders was separated by order of the Court and separate trials were had for a number of the alleged co-offenders. During the course of those trials most of the significant witnesses relevant to the trial of Jason Hanna were called and cross-examined, requiring additional work beyond the mere running of the trial in relation to the client.
On 1 November 2013, the defendant wrote to Legal Aid New South Wales requesting Legal Aid funding for the trial which was due to commence on 11 November 2013. That letter enclosed a full statement of the trust account in relation to the entries relevant to the current client, including all payments into the trust account and all payments out of the trust account for disbursements and the like.
There was subsequent correspondence with Legal Aid New South Wales. Ultimately the trial did not occur until August 2014 and sentence was imposed on 12 December 2014.
Application for Assessment of Costs occurred on 5 May 2015 and an Amended Application for Assessment of Costs was made on 25 June 2015
The Amended Application makes a number of assertions. The Application and Amended Application were made by the plaintiff “on behalf of [his] son Jason Hanna”. The terms of that alleged authority are not before the Court.
First, the plaintiff asserts that he was unaware Legal Aid New South Wales had been granted as from 30 October 2013. It is also asserted that deposits were made into the trust account of the defendant on 14 June 2013.
Secondly, the plaintiff asserts he was never informed by the solicitors that he had obtained Legal Aid. Nor was the plaintiff, he says, informed that he had an opportunity to have the costs assessed. The plaintiff asserted that he had been billed for matters by the defendant at a time when Legal Aid New South Wales were funding the legal costs.
On 5 August 2015, the defendant replied to the Application for alleging, among other matters, that it was out of time.
On 12 November 2015, in correspondence to the then representative of the plaintiff, the Cost Assessor found that the costs that were said to be the subject of the Application were

“included in the bill of costs that was given to the costs applicant by the cost respondent on 26 June 2011. The costs were paid in the sum of $211,028.87 on 28 October 2013.
The costs applicant is out of time to have the costs assessed.”

The Costs Assessor noted that she did not have the power to assess the costs and informed the then representative that application could be made to the Supreme Court, setting out the reasons for the delay, and the Supreme Court could grant an extension of time, if it considered that it was “just and fair for the application to be assessed” after the expiry time.
As earlier stated and I reiterate, by letter dated 19 March 2013, the defendant notified the client and the plaintiff and his wife that Application could be made Legal Aid New South Wales, for which there are means test requirements and merit requirements and strongly advising or suggesting that an Application be made, if the trial was unable to be funded privately. That letter enclosed a copy of the Legal Aid New South Wales Application Form.
Again, on 28 September 2013, the defendant, by letter to the client, the plaintiff and his wife, made it clear that it was necessary “to file an Application with Legal Aid New South Wales on your behalf”; that they would do that and advise them of the outcome.
From the evidence, it is clear that the first invoice issued on 22 June 2011. Costs Agreements and Fee Disclosures issued, in accordance with the 2004 Act, and disclosures informing the plaintiff, his wife and the client: of their right to have an Assessment undertaken; the Costs Agreement set aside; and for them to receive an itemised bill.
The Second invoice issued on 12 August 2011. The third invoice issued on 27 September 2011 and the fourth invoice issued on 18 January 2012. The last invoice issued on 28 October 2013. Each invoice was accompanied by a notice advising the client’s rights.
Legal Aid was granted for work on or after 30 October 2013 and the invoice of 28 October 2013 included all work up to and including the grant of Legal Aid. The defendant provided significant discounts on the originally invoiced fees and, from the timesheets, did not charge for all work performed.
As earlier stated, the First Application for Assessment of Costs occurred on 5 May 2015 and, amongst other things, related to all of the charges on the first, second, third, fourth and last invoice.

Oral evidence

As earlier stated, the plaintiff relies upon affidavits that have been filed and served. The plaintiff’s affidavit of 4 April 2016 discloses that the plaintiff speaks three languages: Assyrian, Greek and English. His oral evidence confirms the number of languages but is to the effect that he speaks Arabic. Assyrian is not Arabic, it is a form of Aramaic.
Relevantly, the affidavit asserts the receipt of a letter dated 23 June 2011, attaching the General Costs Agreement dated 22 June 2011, to which reference has already been made. The plaintiff asserts that he did not sign or return a copy of the agreement, but does not suggest, in his affidavit, that he did not read the letter.
The plaintiff also asserts that he “never had any dealings with the legal system”, apart from a personal injury claim in 2009, which he asserts was the only experience he had with litigation. The second affidavit asserts that the last bill received by the plaintiff from the defendant was dated 28 October 2013.
In oral evidence, the plaintiff displayed a competent understanding of English and had no difficulties understanding the questions and answering them.
In some significant respects, the oral evidence of the plaintiff was inconsistent with other evidence before the Court. For example, the file notes tendered as an exhibit to the affidavit of Mr Maksisi make clear that there were a number of telephone conversations in which the availability of Legal Aid and the capacity to challenge Memoranda of Costs were discussed. Further, those telephone conversations indicate that the plaintiff read and understood letters that were sent to him as one of the addressees, the others being his son and his wife.

Nevertheless, in cross-examination, the plaintiff asserted that he did not read the letters that were sent to him and had never been informed about Legal Aid. I do not accept that evidence and I consider that, both by demeanour and the nature of the evidence given, the plaintiff provided answers that he considered best suited the case that was before the Court.
Further, the plaintiff had been involved in earlier litigation relating to a personal injury claim for a work-related injury. Those proceedings were settled, but the plaintiff was, for the purpose of those proceedings, represented by solicitors who were paid monies owing from the settlement sum negotiated.
The first invoice, as already stated, was received in 2011. That invoice was sought to be challenged in 2015. Moreover, the allegation against the defendant that it charged fees for work done while the work was funded by the Legal Aid Commission is wholly untenable, unarguable and unsupported. It amounts to an allegation of fraud that is unpleaded, unspecified and contrary to the evidence adduced.
Further, the allegation was reiterated on a number of occasions but, when it became clear that it could not be supported on the documents, withdrawn, seemingly, somewhat reluctantly and half-heartedly. Further again, conversations involving Legal Aid and the rights of a client or third-party payer involved both Jason Hanna and Mrs Hanna, neither of whom was called to give evidence.
I draw the inference that the evidence of Mrs Hanna, at least, would not assist the plaintiff’s case. I do not draw the same inference in relation to Jason Hanna, even though the term of imprisonment would not have prevented him from giving evidence in the trial before the Court. Nevertheless, I am prepared to accept that Jason Hanna was not readily available and there was a good reason that his evidence was not called. Having made that comment, the Court notes that the evidence could have been adduced by way of affidavit, but was not.
The plaintiff runs a business, is a director of a Corporation and has bought and sold shops and businesses. He speaks at least three languages. I do not consider the plaintiff “unsophisticated”.
Moreover, I am satisfied on the evidence before the Court, that the plaintiff received and read the letters sent to him by the defendant and fully understood that he had the right to challenge or question the Memorandum of Fees and Costs and to set aside the Costs Agreements that were sent to him. It seems, although it is unnecessary to reach a final conclusion on this issue, that the plaintiff was content to have the defendant, or its partners and/or employees, act for his son and to pay that which was necessary (so long as he could afford to continue to pay that which was billed).
After his son was acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter, the plaintiff sought to question and challenge the fees that had been charged and had been paid previously.
The delay between 2011, being the dates of the first and second invoices and 2015 has not been explained adequately or at all. Nor has the delay between October 2013 and May 2015. The delay between February 2015 and May 2015 has not been explained adequately or at all and the circumstances of the dates on the application have not been explained.
On the evidence before the Court, it seems that the plaintiff has asserted that he filed a document in the Supreme Court on either 24 or 26 February 2015. The document was filed in the Supreme Court in May 2015. The dates 24 or 26 February (depending upon the version of the document examined) are handwritten insertions on draft documents, the original of which bears a Supreme Court stamp with the date May 2015. No satisfactory explanation has been given for the insertion of these dates in handwriting.
The affidavits upon which the defendant relies include notes of telephone conversations between one or other solicitors of the defendant and one or other of (and sometimes all of) Mr and Mrs Hanna and Jason Hanna. There was no cross-examination on this material and no suggestion that the notes were inaccurate.
The Court takes the view that the plaintiff is not “unsophisticated”. The demeanour of the plaintiff and the inconsistent testimony on matters of convenience suggest that the plaintiff was mendacious and deliberately misleading. That assessment adds to the categorisation that the plaintiff is not “unsophisticated”.

Consideration

The Court takes the view that the plaintiff, whether he is the “third party payer” or not, was fully aware of the capacity to challenge and/or question any solicitors’ fees rendered and said to be payable by him. Further, the Court takes the view that the client, Jason Hanna, was also aware of that situation.
No explanation has been given that is satisfactory to the Court for the delay that has been occasioned. On that basis alone the Court would be most reluctant to extend time.
Further, the Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements and the attitude that the defendant displayed in the letters and conversations disclose a willingness to discount significantly the fees that would, according to the Costs Agreements, be able to be charged and to waive fees that had been charged and had not been paid. No arguable case has been put to the Court that the fees that were charged were in any way unfair or inappropriate.
Further, if it be different, no case has been put to the Court that there is an arguable basis for such an allegation. The attitude, displayed in the correspondence and during the course of the conversations between Mr Maksisi and Mr Hanna, Mrs Hanna and Jason Hanna, discloses an attitude where the interests of Jason Hanna in pursuing his legal defences were uppermost in the priorities of Mr Maksisi and, as a consequence, the defendant.
I now deal with the suggestion that an oral enquiry or reminder as to when a previously rendered Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements would be paid recommences the timing for a Costs Assessment. In my view, there is no basis in the construction of the Act, or in law, for such a proposition. Even if the reminder were in writing, the timing for a Costs Assessment operates from the rendering of the Memorandum in a form that gives rise to a requirement to pay and upon which a legal practitioner could sue.
The plaintiff bears the onus of establishing that it is just and fair that he should be granted a dispensation under s 350(5) of the 2004 Act: Harvey v Goodman Law Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 340 at [12]. The plaintiff has failed to satisfy that onus.
Even if there were no onus, or the onus was the reverse, the plaintiff’s case could not justify the dispensation of the kind sought. This is made even more apparent from the lack of any attempt by the plaintiff to suggest, in his application to the Costs Assessor, that the amounts charged by the defendant were other than fair or reasonable.
The proceedings, before this Court (and before the Local Court on committal), relating to Jason Hanna were not complex and the invoices were not confusing. There were provided to the plaintiff (and his wife and son) a summary explanation page, on each occasion, detailing the right to assess costs or set aside any Costs Agreement. There were timely updates as to costs and as to the progress or otherwise of the proceedings.
The criminal proceedings were delayed because of the separation of trials. Jason Hanna was granted bail, most unusually in a charge of murder, and Jason Hanna was one of a few of those charged over the incident that was not convicted of murder. I do not, by the foregoing, suggest that the finding of manslaughter was inappropriate. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of these proceedings, the results at the bail application, on committal and at the trial were relatively successful.
Unfortunately, litigation is expensive. Nevertheless, the plaintiff and his family were fully aware of their rights; were appraised of the costs and any adjustment to costs estimates; and were content to allow the defendant to provide the legal services for the benefit of Jason.
As earlier stated, there is no suggestion, even in the application to the Costs Assessor, that the Memorandum of Fees and Costs rendered were unfair or unreasonable.
Given the state of the advice as to the capacity of the plaintiff to challenge, question or have assessed any costs or bill rendered, the lack of a suggestion that the amounts charged were not fair or reasonable, and the lack of credibility of the plaintiff as to those issues on which he relies, the Court is not satisfied that it should exercise its jurisdiction and grant the dispensation sought in the Summons.

Costs

The defendant seeks indemnity costs, because of the unsubstantiated allegations of serious misconduct made by the plaintiff against the defendant: White Industries (QLD) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773, and at first instance (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806.
As earlier stated the allegation of serious misconduct is wholly unsubstantiated and inconsistent with the documentary evidence and, ultimately, the concession of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has not succeeded in his application and there is no reason for a departure from the ordinary rule that costs should follow the event. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings.
Notwithstanding the serious allegations of misconduct, none of which can be substantiated and, no doubt, each of which would have caused significant concern in the defendant and possibly damage to its standing, I do not consider that it is appropriate, in a matter such as this, for an order for indemnity costs. Part of the reason for that is the evidence before the Court, that the plaintiff’s capacity to pay such indemnity costs would be seriously qualified given the grant of Legal Aid for the substantive trial of his son Jason.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court makes the following orders:

Summons dismissed;

The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to these proceedings.

**********

Decision last updated: 17 April 2018

Medium Neutral Citation:	Hanna v Uther Webster & Evans [2018] NSWSC 465
Hearing dates:	09 May 2017
Date of orders:	17 April 2018
Decision date:	17 April 2018
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Rothman J
Decision:	(1) Summons dismissed; (2) The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of and incidental to these proceedings.
Catchwords:	COSTS – Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 350 – Assessment – Application for extension of time by father of juvenile client – question whether obligation to pay for services – no suggestion that fees unfair or unreasonable – no satisfactory explanation for delay for period ranging from 15 months to 3½ years – time extension refused.
Legislation Cited:	Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW)
Cases Cited:	Harvey v Goodman Law Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 340 Mackowiak v Hagipantelis; Bickhoff v Hagipantelis [2015] NSWSC 1087 White Industries (QLD) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169; [1998] FCA 806 White Industries (QLD) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1999) 87 FCR 134; [1999] FCA 773
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Samir Hanna (Plaintiff) Uther Webster & Evans (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: W Cottee (Plaintiff) S Baron Levi (Defendant) Solicitors: Stevens Cottee Lawyers (Plaintiff) Uther Webster & Evans (Defendant)
File Number(s):	2016/66777