Hanna v Flinders University - [2025] SASCA 81

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
HANNA v FLINDERS UNIVERSITY
[2025] SASCA 81
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable Acting Chief Justice Livesey and the Honourable Justice Stanley)
22 July 2025
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS - LEAVE TO APPEAL
This is an application for leave to appeal against a decision by a Supreme Court judge (the appeal judge) to refuse an extension of time and leave to appeal, amongst other matters, from the decision of a magistrate on a second disqualification application.
The second appeal concerned allegations concerning the magistrate’s past association with the firm of solicitors representing the respondent and the magistrate’s conduct of the second disqualification application. There were additional issues. An application to lead further evidence was dismissed by the appeal judge.
Held (the Court) refusing leave to appeal:
1.There was no obvious error in the detailed and careful reasoning of the appeal judge nor in the refusals to grant leave to appeal or to receive further evidence. There is no reason to question the decision that it was futile to grant an extension of time.
2.There do not appear to be any prospects of success associated with the many complaints made in the grounds of appeal, and there is no basis to think that any substantial injustice will be caused should the appeal judge’s decision be allowed to stand.
3.There is no basis to conclude that there will be any substantial injustice to the applicant in permitting the magistrate to hear the substantive proceeding.

Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 6; Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 81; Mallios v Commissioner of Police [2025] SASCA 66; Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148; Shmandiy v Police (No 2) [2024] SASCA 90; Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Bond (2000) 78 SASR 339; Stone v Moore (2015) 122 SASR 54, considered.

HANNA v FLINDERS UNIVERSITY
[2025] SASCA 81
Court of Appeal – Civil: Livesey ACJ and Stanley JA
THE COURT:
Introduction

By Notice of Appeal dated 27 June 2025, the applicant has sought leave to appeal the decision of a judge (the appeal judge) refusing an extension of time and leave to appeal, amongst other matters, on 29 May 2025.[1]
[1] Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 81 (B Doyle J) (Reasons).
The appeal judge dismissed what was a second appeal concerning a second disqualification application concerning the same magistrate who was hearing the substantive proceeding involving these parties in the Magistrates Court.
The first disqualification application was dismissed by the magistrate on 22 April 2024. The first appeal, after it was re-opened, was eventually dismissed by Hughes J.[2] The second disqualification application was dismissed by the magistrate on 11 December 2024.
[2] Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 6 (Hughes J).
Determination on the papers
Whilst this matter was listed in the callover for August, that date was vacated and the parties were given the opportunity to file a short written submission and appear on 22 July 2025. As it turned out, the applicant was unable to prepare a written submission or appear within that time-frame.
The applicant produced a letter from her psychiatrist which said that she must avoid “anxiety-generating tasks” for two months. The applicant sought a two-month adjournment.
The Court determined that it would be inappropriate to defer the determination of leave for two months in this case. Accordingly, the Court advised that it would determine the question of leave within that period without hearing from the parties. The Court advised that its determination would be emailed to the parties once it was made.
Although the respondent provided a short written submission, that was not considered by the Court for the purposes of determining the question of leave to appeal. The Court determined to proceed on the papers as the applicant’s notice of appeal effectively comprised submissions concerning the appeal as well as the question of leave to appeal.
The second appeal
In substance, the second appeal which came before the appeal judge was concerned with the magistrate’s past association with the firm of solicitors representing the respondent, as well as her conduct of the second disqualification application. There were other issues.
Other matters
The appeal judge assumed that the second appeal was competent.[3] In the earlier appeal, the first appeal judge found that the appeal was not competent,[4] and referred to Stone v Moore,[5] and certain obiter observations made in Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls.[6] Without considered argument, the appeal judge declined to consider the additional questions raised concerning the competence of the appeal arising from QYFM v Minister.[7]
[3]     As to which there was some doubt, see Reasons, [16]-[17]; See also the first appeal decision of Hanna v Flinders University [2025] SASC 6 (Hughes J).
[4]     Flinders University [2025] SASC 6, [44] (Hughes J).
[5]     Stone v Moore (2015) 122 SASR 54, [29], [40] (Nicholson J), where it was held that no appeal lay from the dismissal of a recusal application on the basis of apprehended bias.
[6]     Michael Wilson & Partners v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427, [79]-[86] (Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). Reference was also made to Southern Equities Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Bond (2000) 78 SASR 339.
[7]     Reasons, [80]-[81], referring to QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148, [28] (Kiefel CJ and Gageler J), [123], [130] (Edelman J) and [316] (Jagot J), which suggests the possibility of an appeal or judicial review being available.
Before the appeal judge, an application was made by the applicant to lead further evidence. That application was also dismissed.[8]
[8] Reasons, [64]-[69].
Finally, before this Court, the applicant made a wide-sweeping request for the audio recordings of various hearings in the Supreme Court. Ordinarily, audio recordings of Supreme Court hearings are not made available.[9] No attempt was made to articulate the relevance of those recordings.
[9] Shmandiy v Police (No 2) [2024] SASCA 90, [9]-[16] (Livesey ACJ and David JA).
The application for leave to appeal
The Notice of Appeal spans six pages. It largely comprises detailed argument, including on the question of leave. It is doubtful whether it complies with the Rules of Court insofar as, amongst other issues, it refers to the underlying Magistrates Court file, to various supporting documents and to the dates of hearings between December 2023 and May 2025. For the purpose of ruling on the application for leave to appeal, it is not necessary to make any decision about compliance.
The question of leave to appeal in relation to an applicant’s second opportunity to appeal has been considered on a number of occasions.[10] The application for leave to appeal is supported by the following pleaded grounds:
[10] See, by way of example, Mallios v Commissioner of Police [2025] SASCA 66, [18] (Livesey ACJ and Stanley JA) and the cases there cited.
[1] The appeal raises serious and arguable issues of procedural fairness and bias, which warrant appellate scrutiny.
[2] The decision involves an alleged failure by the Magistrate Jackson in failing to disclose a conflict of interest, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, which is a matter of public importance.
[3] There are substantial questions of law concerning judicial conduct, particularly regarding undisclosed associations, supported by Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337.
[4] The appeal raises an issue of general public interest: the integrity and transparency of the judicial process.
[5] There is a strong prima facie case that the Appellant was denied procedural fairness, contrary to principles established in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550.
[6] The appeal has reasonable prospects of success on the grounds as outlined above.
[7] The refusal to grant an extension of time failed to consider personal health circumstances and relevant factors, contrary to the principles of justice and fairness.
[8] Leave is required to correct potential miscarriages of justice, particularly where bias or judicial misconduct are alleged, and to insure [sic] judicial integrity and public confidence.
These grounds are in addition to the nearly 30 separate complaints made under the heading “Grounds of Appeal” which are as follows:
A. Error of Law by Accepting Misconduct and Ignoring Grounds of Appeal
1)   Justice Doyle erred in law by accepting or justifying the serious allegations of judicial misconduct by Magistrate Jackson, without scrutiny by failure to refer to the transcripts provided, particularly in relation to:
a)   Misconduct by Undisclosed Partnership with HWL Ebsworth (Respondent's Law Firm)
b)   Systematic & Repetitive Prejudicial Remarks in Direction Hearings
c)   Communications Outside the Courtroom
d)   Dismissing, Ignoring, and Unbelieving the Appellant’s Words
e)   Meeting the Two-Step Test of Bias in Document Omissions, Cost Orders, and Protecting the Respondent
f)   Unpreparedness for Listening nor Understanding
g)   Premade Recusal Decisions of Refusing Recusal
h)   Conduct and Unfairness in the Last Hearing on 11 December 2024
i)    Deception, Procedural Unfairness, and Misconduct in the Decision on 11 December 2024
j)    Misconduct of Magistrate Jackson by Undisclosed Work Relationship with Mr Nicholas Swan when Working with Lawson Smith Lawyers.
k)   Deception of Mr Nicholas Swan when Claiming of Not Knowing Magistrate Jackson was Working in HWL Ebsworth
2)   Justice Doyle failed to meaningfully engage with the full scope of the grounds of the appeal and admission of the new evidence. When Justice Doyle accepted such misconduct as listed above, it raises questions his impartiality and integrity of the judicial process.
B. Error of Law in Failure in Answering Questions of Law
3)   Justice Doyle failed to answer the questions of law that Dr Hanna has brought to the court, including:
a) Did the failure of Magistrate Jackson to disclose her prior partnership with HWL Ebsworth, the law firm representing the Respondent, give rise to a judicial misconduct and an apprehension of bias that the Applicant will not have fair trial, thereby requiring her disqualification from presiding over the matter in accordance with the principles established in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 and the Guide to Judicial Conduct?
b)   Whether the repeated prejudicial remarks made by Magistrate Anna Jackson during direction hearings, indicating preconceived views on the court’s jurisdiction and the merits of the Applicant’s case, amount to a reasonable apprehension of bias, thereby warranting judicial recusal or setting aside of the decision?
c) Whether private communications between Magistrate Anna Jackson and the Respondent or their representatives, without disclosure to the other party, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias requiring recusal, particularly in light of the High Court's principles in Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29?
d)   Did the conduct of Magistrate Jackson, in consistently dismissing, ignoring, or disbelieving the Appellant’s submissions while favouring those of the Respondent, amount to a denial of procedural fairness and a breach of the Appellant’s right to a fair hearing under Australian law, and requiring re-hearing before another judicial officer?
e) Did Magistrate Jackson’s prior undisclosed partnership with HWL Ebsworth, combined with her procedural decisions, including refusals of discovery, omissions in orders, and cost orders, constitute actual bias or give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, thereby breaching the principles of procedural fairness under Australian law as established in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337?
f)   Whether the conduct of Magistrate Jackson, including restrictions on submissions, refusals to consider certain arguments, and demonstrated reluctance to engage with the Applicant’s claim and arguments during various hearings, constitutes a denial of procedural fairness and a breach of the principles of natural justice?
g)   Whether a judicial officer’s pre-preparation of a decision, without meaningful engagement with oral submissions and evidence presented at the hearings, constitutes a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to warrant recusal?
h)   Did the conduct of Magistrate Jackson during the hearing on 11 December 2024, including her interruptions of the Applicant and her response to the Respondent’s counsel, amount to a denial of procedural fairness, thereby vitiating the decision?
i) Did the conduct of Magistrate Jackson, including her failure to disclose her prior partnership with HWL Ebsworth, her alleged mischaracterisation of that role, and her handling of objections and procedural matters during the hearing, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias under the test established in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337?
j)    Did Magistrate Anna Jackson’s alleged failure to record or consider objections raised by the Applicant regarding procedural fairness and evidentiary issues amount to a denial of natural justice, thereby invalidating the fairness of the proceedings?
k)   Does the cumulative conduct of Magistrate Anna Jackson during the proceedings, when considered in its totality, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and/or a lack of impartiality, warranting her disqualification?
l)    Whether the repeated misconduct on the intentionality of undisclosed association constitute a judicial misconduct and give rise to actual bias which warrants disqualification of the judicial officer from presiding over the proceedings?
4) Justice Doyle in dismissing the appeal and the new evidence summarily, without answering the questions of law, raises further question about exercising the court discretion in accepting misconduct and judicial errors.
C. Error of Law in Time-Limit Dismissal of the Appeal without Consideration to Health Issues and Family Commitments
5) Justice Doyle refused to extend time for the appeal without adequately considering the Appellant’s medical evidence and health circumstances, which were raised during oral submissions. This constitutes an error of law, as courts are bound to consider relevant factors including personal circumstances including health issues and family commitments.
6) By failing to give genuine consideration to the reasons for the delay, namely the Appellant’s physical and mental health constraints and the complexity of preparing the appeal unrepresented, Justice Doyle effectively denied the Appellant a fair process, in breach of the requirements of natural justice.
There is no basis offered by the applicant for the assertion that the magistrate has an ongoing relationship with the firm with which she was formerly associated some years ago. No basis was offered for the assertion of a denial of procedural fairness, either. The issues raised by the applicant concerning disqualification or recusal and receiving further evidence have been the subject of a number of recent decisions, whether in the High Court or this Court, and the underlying principles may be regarded as settled.
It is probably sufficient to observe that there was no obvious error in the detailed and careful reasoning of the appeal judge, nor in the refusals to grant leave to appeal or to receive further evidence. There is no reason to question the decision that, in those circumstances, it was futile to grant an extension of time.
There do not appear to be any prospects of success associated with the many complaints made in the grounds of appeal. In addition, there is no basis to think that any substantial injustice will be caused should the decision of the appeal judge be allowed to stand. There is no basis to conclude that there will be any substantial injustice to the applicant in permitting the magistrate to hear the substantive proceeding.[11]
[11] If this appeal is not competent, then the point may possibly be available to be taken should there be an adverse decision in the substantive proceeding.
Conclusion
Assuming that the appeal to this Court is competent, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that it is in the interests of justice that leave to appeal should be granted.
The application for leave to appeal must be dismissed.