Hancock and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

[2016] AATA 435

Hancock and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2016] AATA 435 (28 June 2016)

Division	GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s)	2015/3998
Re	Marilyn Hancock
APPLICANT
And	Secretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal	Deputy President Gary Humphries
Date	28 June 2016
Place	Canberra

The decision under review is set aside. Miss Hancock was eligible for the Disability Support Pension on 10 September 2014. The matter is remitted to the Secretary to determine Miss Hancock’s entitlements consistent with this decision.

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Deputy President Gary Humphries

Catchwords

SOCIAL SECURITY – disability support pension – upper limb, lower limb and cognitive impairments – rating of impairments – rating of 20 points under a single Impairment Table – continuing inability to work – decision under review set aside and remitted

Legislation

Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) s 94

Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)

Cases

Fanning and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] AATA 447

Secondary Materials

Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011
Social Security (Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2014

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President Gary Humphries

28 June 2016

Background

1. This is a claim for disability support pension (DSP).  The applicant, Miss Marilyn Hancock, suffered a subarachnoid haemorrhage (a stroke) due to a ruptured aneurysm in her brain in June 2014. Unfortunately, she did not present to a hospital until about a week after the haemorrhage. Her stroke – described by Prof Michael Davis, who gave evidence to the Tribunal, as very complicated – gave rise to multiple disabilities and has led to her being severely functionally affected. She is now 51 years of age.

2. Her claim for the disability support pension was made on 10 September 2014, three months after her stroke. Centrelink rejected her application on 16 October 2014 and affirmed that decision on 13 February 2015. On 23 June 2015 the Child Support and Social Services Division of the Tribunal affirmed the decision to reject her claim, although it increased the number of points it allocated her under the relevant impairment tables. It found that she suffered from cognitive dysfunction, but was uncertain whether this condition could be classified as permanent during the relevant period specified under the legislation because of the absence of corroborative evidence. Miss Hancock appealed that decision on 6 August 2015.

3. Miss Hancock appeared before the Tribunal on 1 April 2016, but was not called to give evidence. Unusually for such cases, viva voce medical evidence on behalf of the applicant was called in the form of Prof Davis, who was cross-examined. Other written medical reports were also before the Tribunal.

   Legislative framework

4. The relevant legislative and regulatory framework is the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act), the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, the Impairment Tables and the Social Security (Requirements and Guidelines – Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2011.  Section 94(1) of the Act provides, in part:

   94 Qualification for disability support pension

   (1) A person is qualified for disability support pension if:

   (a) the person has a physical, intellectual or psychiatric impairment; and

   (b) the person’s impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables; and

   (c) one of the following applies:

   (i) the person has a continuing inability to work…

   For the purposes of cl 4(1) of Schedule 2 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 the relevant period during which Miss Hancock’s claim to be qualified for the DSP must be assessed is 10 September 2014 to 10 December 2014 (the relevant period).

5. The phrase continuing inability to work in s 94(1)(c) is defined in s 94(2) and 94(3B):

   (2) A person has a continuing inability to work because of an impairment if the Secretary is satisfied that:

   (aa) in a case where the person's impairment is not a severe impairment within the meaning of subsection (3B) or the person is a reviewed 2008-2011 DSP starter who has had an opportunity to participate in a program of support–the person has actively participated in a program of support within the meaning of subsection (3C), and the program of support was wholly or partly funded by the Commonwealth; and

   (a) in all cases–the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from doing any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years; and

   (b) in all cases–either :

   (i) the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent the person from undertaking a training activity during the next 2 years; or

   (ii) if the impairment does not prevent the person from undertaking a training activity–such activity is unlikely (because of the impairment) to enable the person to do any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years.

   …

   (3B) A person's impairment is a severe impairment if the person's impairment is of 20 points or more under the Impairment Tables, of which 20 points or more are under a single Impairment Table.

6. The Secretary conceded before the Tribunal that Miss Hancock suffered from physical, intellectual and psychiatric impairments, arising out of her stroke, during the relevant period. However, his representative argued that not all of these impairments qualified the applicant for the DSP under the terms of the Act, in that some were not permanent impairments. It was contended that not all of Miss Hancock’s conditions could be attributed to her stroke, and that only impairments arising from her stroke could qualify her for a rating under the Impairment Tables. It was also put to the Tribunal that Miss Hancock did not have a continuing inability to work during the relevant period.

   The medical evidence

7. The Tribunal had before it the following medical evidence:

   ·Reports of Dr P Hamilton-Gibbs dated 3 November 2014, 4 March 2015, 13 February 2015, 16 February 2015, 24 September 2015 and 13 October 2015;

   ·Report of Dr A Hosseiny dated 22 July 2014, and annotated by Dr I Sullivan;

   ·Report of Mr R Rowan (psychologist) dated 21 September 2015;

   ·Report of Prof M Davis dated 25 November 2015;

   ·Report of Dr E Ho, undated but after 15 May 2015; and

   ·Reports of Dr M McGee-Collett dated 27 April 2015 and 26 August 2015.

   The Tribunal also had other medical reports, social work reports and reports from speech pathologists, including a Mini Inventory of Right Brain Injury dated 2 October 2014.

8. Overall, the medical evidence falls into two categories:

   (a)Reports prepared during the relevant period, many of which appear to be incomplete or uncertain. For example, the report of Dr Hamilton-Gibbs of 3 November 2014, prepared for Centrelink, makes no reference to Miss Hancock’s cognitive impairment, whereas other reports from the same period do. A further example is a set of annotations made by Dr Sullivan to the report of Dr Hosseiny of 22 July 2014; these annotations demonstrate that Dr Sullivan took a less optimistic view about Miss Hancock’s recovery prospects than Dr Hosseiny.

   (b)Reports prepared after the relevant period, which record overall a more severe and permanent impact from the stroke than the earlier reports.

9. As an example of the latter, Prof Davis reported on 25 November 2015:

   Ms Hancock’s cognitive impairment as a result of her stroke affects her ability to perform day to day tasks at a severe functional impact. She has ongoing problems with poor memory (regularly misplacing items such as her keys, her purse or documents including unpaid bills). She has problems with attention and concentration for tasks such as cooking which she is no longer able to perform independently. Her attention span is poor and she will become distracted part-way through a task, walk away and fail to return to complete it. Ms Hancock has significant difficulties with problem solving and planning such that she would miss simple appointments without being reminded and is no longer able to manage tasks which she has [sic] previously done such as caring for both her son and grandson who have significant care needs. Her comprehension is poor and she is unable to remember instructions from her general practitioner such as why she should take a particular medication or how to take it without assistance in this task. She has a loss of vision in her left visual field (due to brain damage, not due to a problem with her eyes) which means that she is no longer able to read and she is certainly unable to drive a motor vehicle. She requires daily assistance, supervision and support from family, friends and carers to manage everyday activities. This includes both activities of daily living (personal care such as showering and dressing) and instrumental activities of daily living (such as housework, cooking, shopping, paying bills, managing telephone calls). She becomes extremely frustrated with the disabilities resulting from her impairments listed above and is reported to burst into tears in relation to this at least once a week. She does have awareness of her own limitations and the difficulties that they place on her.

10. A comment on some of the medical evidence is warranted. The Secretary submitted that Dr Sullivan’s undated amendments should be given less weight than the report of Dr Hosseiny of 22 July 2014 which they annotate. Even though the annotations appear to have been made at about the same time as the original report, in that presumably they were incorporated when the report was submitted to Centrelink, it appears the two doctors took different views of the patient’s condition. It seems the report of Dr Hosseiny at the Canberra Hospital was subsequently referred to Dr Sullivan at Young, in the practice where the applicant had been a patient since 2012. In the section of the form referring to Miss Hancock’s impaired vision, upper limb weakness, impaired mobility and impaired cognitive function, Dr Sullivan appears to have deleted the tick Dr Hosseiny had placed in the box indicating that the impact of the condition was likely to persist for 3-12 months, and ticked instead the box indicating that it was expected to persist for more than 24 months.

11. The methodology of two doctors completing the one form, with one overriding the views of the other, leaves something to be desired. However, the Tribunal notes that some reliance has been placed by the Secretary on Dr Hosseiny’s assessment, notwithstanding an apparently contemporaneous disagreement with that assessment from Dr Sullivan, a doctor at the practice where Miss Hancock had been previously treated. It appears to the Tribunal that it would have behoved the Secretary – given the later evidence contradicting Dr Hosseiny’s more optimistic prognosis – to have requested clarification from the two doctors as to the status of their joint report. This was, it should be remembered, a report prepared specifically for Centrelink’s information in assessing the extent of Miss Hancock’s disability. To accept one doctor’s opinion, and to discount the other’s because of a perceived procedural irregularity, without attempting to clarify the issue with the doctors directly, seems to the Tribunal to be quite unsatisfactory.

12. I will now deal with each of the conditions upon which the claim for DSP is based.

    Upper limb impairment

13. Section 6(3) of the Impairment Tables requires that an impairment rating can only be assigned to an impairment that arises from a condition that is permanent. Section 6(4), in turn, provides that a condition is permanent if it

    ·has been fully diagnosed by an appropriately qualified medical practitioner;

    ·has been fully treated;

    ·has been fully stabilised; and

    ·is more likely than not, in light of the available evidence, to persist for more than two years. (emphasis added)

    Corroborating evidence of the condition must be considered (s 6(5)).

14. Both parties submitted to the Tribunal that Miss Hancock’s upper limb impairment was permanent within the meaning of the Impairment Tables. The Secretary contended, and Miss Hancock did not dispute, that the upper limb impairment attracts 10 points under Table 2. The medical evidence before the Tribunal is consistent with this view. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that Miss Hancock’s upper limb impairment satisfies s 94(1)(a) and attracts 10 points under Table 2.

    Lower limb impairment

15. Dr Hosseiny diagnosed left-sided lower limb weakness… causing impaired mobility on 22 July 2014. As has been mentioned, he considered that this condition was likely to persist for 3-12 months, but Dr Sullivan apparently disagreed, indicating it would last more than 24 months. The Secretary contended that this condition was not fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised during the relevant period, and therefore could not be considered permanent. This opinion appears to be based on the  opinion of Dr Hosseiny, and on a report of the Department of Human Services’ Health Professional Advisory Unit (HPAU) dated 5 February 2015. This latter report had been completed by a registered nurse, and does not appear to have been based on an actual examination of Miss Hancock, but rather is a synthesis of the reports already on the department’s file at that time.

16. Against this evidence is a report of Dr Hamilton-Gibbs of 24 September 2015 in which he responds to a series of questions issued to him on behalf of the Secretary. In answer to questions relating to the lower limb condition (apparently, as the commissioning letter was not tendered), Dr Hamilton-Gibbs comments:

    Subsequent to her stroke she under went [sic] a rehabilitation program and reached probable maximal improvement three to four months after the original stroke.

    … she has now reached her maximal expected improvement.

    All activities that she performs are done very slowly and this has not changed in the past six months.

    The Secretary contended that the quoted phrases of Dr Hamilton-Gibbs are internally inconsistent, and that he appears to employ the benefit of hindsight, rather than commenting, as asked, on Miss Hancock’s condition during the relevant period.

17. The Tribunal notes that the doctor was asked to comment on Miss Hancock’s condition during the relevant period. His report appears to respond to the questions asked; the internal inconsistency referred to by the Secretary is not apparent to the Tribunal, nor could the Secretary’s representative at the hearing explain how this supposed inconsistency arose. Once again, it is necessary to comment that, if the Secretary sought evidence of Miss Hancock’s condition from this doctor and then considered that his replies were ambiguous, it was surely incumbent on the Secretary to clarify what the doctor meant, not to tender the report he had commissioned from the doctor and then criticise its lack of clarity.

18. The Tribunal finds nothing inconsistent or ambiguous in Dr Hamilton-Gibbs’ report of 24 September 2015. He describes a severely impaired woman, and makes it clear that her condition has subsisted from three to four months after the original stroke, i.e. the conditions he described were unchanged from the relevant period. The only reasonable inference from this evidence is that her lower limb condition was fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised during the relevant period, and was likely at that time to be expected to persist for two years or more.

19. The Secretary submitted that, if the lower limb condition was considered by the Tribunal to be fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised in the relevant period, it should attract an impairment rating of five points under Table 3. There were several reports before the Tribunal describing the extent of Miss Hancock’s impairment from this condition; it is unnecessary to comment on them, save to indicate the Tribunal’s agreement with the conclusion of the Secretary as to the points the condition warrants if it is found to be permanent.

    Cognitive impairment

20. The report of Dr Hosseiny dated 22 July 2014 noted Miss Hancock’s Impaired cognitive function with concentration, memory. Like the conditions referred to above, there appears to have been a disagreement between doctors Hosseiny and Sullivan at that time as to how long this condition was expected to persist – 3-12 months in the case of Dr Hosseiny and more than two years in the case of Dr Sullivan. The Secretary contended that this cognitive impairment condition was not fully diagnosed, fully treated and fully stabilised during the relevant period, and therefore could not be considered permanent.

21. Once again, the Secretary’s position appears to have been educated by the (contested) opinion of Dr Hosseiny and by the 5 February 2015 report of the nurse in the Health Professional Advisory Unit who had not examined Miss Hancock. In addition, the Secretary referred to the report of a job capacity assessor – a registered psychologist described only as Patrick in his report – of 15 October 2014. Although Patrick, unlike the HPAU nurse, did examine Miss Hancock, his comments with respect to her general condition were:

    The treating doctor has indicated that the effect of this condition on the patient’s ability to function is expected to ‘significantly improve’ within the next two years. This is consistent with maximal expected recovery from cerebro-vascular accidents taking 12 to 18 months. As such, this condition is not considered to be Fully Stabilised at this time.

22. This suggests that Patrick did not independently form a view that Miss Hancock’s cognitive impairment condition was fully stabilised at that time, but rather relied on the opinion of the treating doctor – presumably a reference to Dr Hosseiny. In any case it is not clear what qualifications Patrick, as a psychologist, could have brought to bear on a prognosis for stroke.

23. Against this evidence based, in essence, on a single medical examination by one doctor, that Miss Hancock’s condition was not fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised in the relevant period is the evidence, in particular, of two doctors who examined her after the end of the relevant period. Pursuant to the decision in Bobera and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 922 I can take into account more recent medical reports but only insofar as they throw light on the nature of the condition that Miss Hancock suffered during the relevant period.

24. The first is the report of Dr Hamilton-Gibbs of 24 September 2015, referred to above, in which he responds to a series of questions issued to him on behalf of the Secretary. In this report he comments:

    She has considerable cognitive impairment and can not [sic] perform simple sums…

    She has considerable cognitive impairment as well as memory impairment and poor concentration and is easily confused whin [sic] performing simple tasks. She requires assistance with dressing and showering. She does have the help of Home Care in Young…

    The conditions are permanent and I do not see any likelihood of improvement in the future…

    She does have cognitive impairment as mentioned her memory is poor, she has great difficulty in writing a sentence as she gets muddled and apraxic. Her calculation skills are severely impaired…

    In summary Marilyn suffers from severe permanent loss of function as a consequence of her stroke as detailed from last year.

25. Dr Hamilton-Gibbs makes it clear that the condition he describes has persisted at that level since three to four months after the original stroke.

26. In addition, the Tribunal had evidence from Prof Davis. In his medical report of 25 November 2015, he said he had examined Miss Hancock on that date, diagnosed, among other conditions, cognitive impairment and then commented:

    All of these were documented as a result of her stroke and there was no evidence that they had existed before this time. These impairments have remained largely unchanged over the 18 months since her original stroke and will not improve in the future. My personal assessment confirmed the presence of each of these deficits…

    The impairments outlined above and the resultant disabilities are a direct result from the single event of her stroke. They have not significantly improved over the last 18 months and will not improve into the future, even over a long period such as two years…

    I place Ms Hancock’s impairment in the range of having a severe functional impact.

    Ms Hancock is unable to work at all given the nature of her impairments and is certainly not able to work 15 hours a week. I reinforce that these impairments have been fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised.

    Prof Davis also gave a detailed description of the symptoms of her cognitive impairment condition, as set out in paragraph 9 above.

1. This evidence appears to the Tribunal to be quite unambiguous; in his assessment, her condition is fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised, and has been so since about the time of the stroke itself. He finds that it was at all relevant times a condition likely to persist for more than two years.

2. This written evidence was reinforced by Prof Davis’s oral testimony. Prof Davis informed the Tribunal of his extensive experience in dealing with victims of stroke. In relation to Miss Hancock, he said that he had examined her in the presence of her carer, from whom he took some history. He explained that he also had the benefit, in reaching the conclusions in his report, of several other documents: reports from her GP, Dr Hamilton-Gibbs; reports from rehabilitation specialists; discharge reports from Royal Prince Alfred Hospital and the Canberra Hospital; reports from Dr Ho and Mr Rowan; and all the notes from Mercy Care Centre in Young, where Miss Hancock had been receiving rehabilitation. He told the Tribunal he was confident that the impairment he observed in November 2015 would have been present in Miss Hancock in December 2014.

3. The Secretary’s representative briefly cross-examined Prof Davis to ask him about the reports and other information he had access to before writing his own report. At the end of this questioning, and some further questions from the Tribunal itself, the Tribunal took it that Prof Davis had, broadly speaking, affirmed the thrust of his written report – that is, that Miss Hancock’s condition was, during the relevant period, fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised, and was likely to persist for more than two years.

4. Later in the hearing the Secretary’s representative made the submission that Prof Davis’s access to reports prepared after the relevant period suggested that his own report had been prepared with significant hindsight, and therefore did not describe Miss Hancock’s condition during the relevant period so much as her condition at the time of his examination of her. It was suggested that his evidence would have been different if he had relied on more contemporaneous medical reports, including that of Dr Hosseiny. The representative referred to the decision in Fanning and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] AATA 447, where Deputy President Handley noted (at [33]):

   While hindsight may suggest that treatment did not result in improvement within two years, that is not the question for the Tribunal to determine. The legislation requires the Tribunal to consider the treatment that has taken place, and was intended to take place, and the likely effect of that treatment, at the time of the claim and in the 13 weeks thereafter. For that reason, evidence of treatment, and the efficacy of that treatment, after the relevant period is not directly relevant to the Tribunal’s decision.

5. The Secretary went on to submit that Prof Davis had regard to the evolution of the condition up until his examination, but didn’t specifically consider the condition as it was during the relevant period. The Tribunal rejects this submission for two reasons. First, it appears that Prof Davis had a slew of reports relating to Miss Hancock’s condition (see para 28 above), although he had not, apparently, seen Dr Hosseiny’s report. In addition, Prof Davis is a specialist in treating stroke. The Tribunal accepts his professed capacity to give evidence as to the state of Miss Hancock’s condition during the relevant period, noting that the Secretary’s representative was unable to describe what other documents Prof Davis needed to have seen before his evidence would have been regarded as reliable.

6. More significantly, however, the suggestion that Prof Davis’s evidence should be given less weight because of shortcomings in the documentation before him was never put to him. Indeed, the Tribunal inferred from the failure of the Secretary’s representative to put that matter to him a late concession by the Secretary that his evidence was reliable in this respect. The Tribunal is not, of course, bound by the rules of evidence (s 33(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975); however, a failure to observe the rule in Browne v Dunn[1] visits a procedural unfairness on a party leading evidence, particularly where the offending party is a government agency.

   [1] (1893) 6 R 67.

7. In the Tribunal’s opinion, Prof Davis was a witness of credit and his evidence was coherent and clear. His evidence was critical to Miss Hancock’s case before the Tribunal. Were I to accept the Secretary’s submission and discount Prof Davis’s evidence – notwithstanding that it was not tested in the witness box by the Secretary – it would amount to a substantial unfairness to Miss Hancock.

8. The Tribunal finds that Miss Hancock’s cognitive condition was fully diagnosed, treated and stabilised during the relevant period, at which time it was more likely than not to persist for more than two years. As such the condition is permanent and can receive an impairment rating under the Impairment Tables. Prof Davis described Miss Hancock’s condition in detail in his report of 25 November 2015 – see paragraph 9 above. Noting his opinion that these symptoms had not significantly improved since the stroke itself, the Tribunal is satisfied that the described condition falls within the description of a severe functional impact in Table 7 of the Impairment Tables. This is consistent with Prof Davis’s own assessment in his report. The Tribunal at first instance took into account Miss Hancock’s cognitive dysfunction but was uncertain whether it was permanent during the relevant period because of the absence of corroborative evidence. The Tribunal in its present iteration considers that that corroborative evidence is now available. The impairment is appropriately assigned a rating of 20 points under Table 7.

   Other conditions

9. As Miss Hancock’s upper and lower limb and cognitive impairments attract a total of 35 points under the Impairment Tables, her condition satisfies s 94(1)(b) of the Act, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider her other conditions.

10. In passing, however, the Tribunal notes the argument of the Secretary in respect of some of those other conditions. It was put to the Tribunal that s 3 of the Impairment Tables provides that an impairment is a loss of functional capacity affecting a person’s ability to work that results from the person’s condition. It was contended that Miss Hancock’s pre-morbid memory and communication issues could not therefore be considered impairments as they arose before the haemorrhage which caused her stroke.

11. Though it is unnecessary to determine whether Miss Hancock’s memory and communication issues are in fact impairments under s 94(1), the Secretary’s argument deserves some comment. The argument appears to distinguish the conditions Miss Hancock suffered from at the time of her application based on whether they arose from her stroke or were in existence before her stroke, with the suggestion that the stroke-related conditions could constitute impairments but non-stroke-related conditions could not. With respect, this argument – that only impairments arising from her stroke could qualify her for a rating under the Impairment Tables – is fallacious. There is nothing in the architecture of the Act which requires a decision maker to focus on a particular incident or event as a basis for qualifying for the DSP. A qualifying condition could be congenital, or could arise from a traumatic event/be of sudden onset, or could be a combination of both. The Act makes no distinction with respect to a condition’s origin or cause, but merely requires that the presenting condition constitute a permanent impairment.

    Continuing inability to work

12. Section 94(1)(c) requires that Miss Hancock, to qualify for the DSP, must demonstrate a continuing inability to work. Miss Hancock’s condition is a severe impairment for the purposes of s 94(3B), in that it attracts 20 points under a single Impairment Table (Table 7). Therefore, she will be found to have a continuing inability to work, pursuant to subsection (2), if the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent her from doing any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years and either

    (i)the impairment is of itself sufficient to prevent her from undertaking a training activity during the next 2 years; or

    (ii)if the impairment does not prevent her from undertaking a training activity—such activity is unlikely (because of the impairment) to enable her to do any work independently of a program of support within the next 2 years.

13. Prof Davis’s evidence was that Ms Hancock is unable to work at all given the nature of her impairments. This was based on his assessment that her impairments entailed a severe functional impact. This is consistent with the opinion of Dr Hamilton-Gibbs that she had experienced a severe permanent loss of function and was severely and permanently disabled. Her condition, therefore, can clearly be said to have prevented her, as of 10 September 2014, from either working or undertaking a program of support or training activity within the next two years. The Tribunal is satisfied, in light of this evidence, that Miss Hancock meets the requirements of s 94(1)(c) of the Act.

    Conclusion

14. Accordingly, the Tribunal sets aside the reviewable decision of 23 June 2015 and finds instead that Miss Hancock is eligible for the Disability Support Pension from 10 September 2014. The matter is remitted to the Secretary to determine Miss Hancock’s entitlements consistent with this decision.

I certify that the preceding 40 (forty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President Gary Humphries

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Associate

Dated 28 June 2016

Date of hearing	1 April 2016
Advocate for the Applicant	Radhika Chaudri
Solicitors for the Applicant	Canberra Community Law
Solicitors for the Respondent	Department of Human Services