Hamza and Rabi

[2017] FamCA 695

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HAMZA & RABI [2017] FamCA 695

FAMILY LAW – ORDERS – consent orders refused by Registrar - whether consent orders just and equitable – where consent orders fall within broad range of what is just and equitable

APPLICANT: Mr Hamza

RESPONDENT: Ms Rabi

FILE NUMBER: CAC 929 of 2017

DATE DELIVERED: 11 September 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Canberra

PLACE HEARD: Canberra

JUDGMENT OF: Gill J

HEARING DATE: 11 September 2017

REPRESENTATION

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Self-representing

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Self-representing

Orders

1. I make orders in terms of the Final Consent Orders filed by the parties and signed by them on 26 May 2017, and initialled by me and dated with today’s date, being 11 September 2017.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hamza & Rabi has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT CANBERRA

FILE NUMBER: CAC 929 of 2017

Mr Hamza

Applicant

And

Ms Rabi

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. The matter has been listed before me today for the purpose of making final consent orders.  These consent orders were listed before the Registrar who referred them in relation to the question of whether or not the orders would be just and equitable.  The principal issue arising relates to the proceeds from the former matrimonial home, and it appears that the bulk of these have been retained by the husband who has put what was left into the purchase of a new home with his new partner.  He has however accumulated significant debts which were required to be paid from those proceeds and also significant further debts.  The precise nature of those debts has not been set out. 

2. The usual practice of the Court is not to add back money once it has been depleted from the pool unless a justification is put forward to do so; that has not occurred in this case, except to the extent that the husband has retained part to pay his share of the property purchased with his new partner.

3. Having considered the application for consent orders it is there put that the distribution would result in a 55/45 per cent split to the husband.  He sets out a series of matters which indicate that at least at the start of the relationship his contributions were superior to those of the wife.  That has little impact now in a relationship that spanned approximately 19 years.  What, however, did not appear on the application for consent orders, but was disclosed by the wife in her affidavit, is that she also holds further funds in the Middle East, that is $15,000 in the Middle East which it is expected that she will retain.  Her intention is to relocate to the Middle East and she has indicated in her affidavit material that this changes what it is that she will be required to live on, that is, the disparity in relation to s 75(2) factors which might come from the difference in income.  It seems to be partially offset by the move to the Middle East. 

4. Accordingly, it appears that the division that is proposed comes close to, although not precisely to, a 50-50 split for a relationship of significant duration, given the evening out of the s 75(2) factors it appears that it is within the general range of what might be just and equitable to make the orders.  On the basis that each of the parties seeks that the orders be made by consent, and on an assessment that they are within a broad range of what could be considered to be just and equitable I make orders in terms of the final consent orders filed by the parties and signed by them on 26 May 2017, and initialled by me with today’s date, being 11 September 2017.

I certify that the preceding four (4) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Gill delivered on 11 September 2017.

Associate:

Date:  11 September 2017