Hammond and Chapman

[2013] FCCA 851

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HAMMOND & CHAPMAN [2013] FCCA 851

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – time to be spent with each parent – equal time – substantial and significant time – child’s surname.

Legislation:
Family Law Act 1975, ss.60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA

Beach & Stemmler (1979) FLC 90-692
Chapman & Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510
Tommy & Harris [2009] FamCA 278

Applicant: MR HAMMOND

Respondent: MS CHAPMAN

File Number: BRC 11674 of 2011

Judgment of: Judge Howard

Hearing date: 7 May 2013

Date of Last Submission: 7 May 2013

Delivered at: Brisbane

Delivered on: 22 July 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Hodges

Solicitors for the Applicant: Canning Lawyers

Solicitors for the Respondent: In person

ORDERS

1. That each party shall provide a copy of a proposed Final Order to each other party by 4:00pm on 29 July 2013.

2. That the parties shall attempt to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) and shall send a copy of same to the Court by no later than 4:00pm on 29 July 2013.

3. That in the event the parties are unable to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (and send a copy of same to the Court) within the time frame stated in paragraph (2) – the matter shall be listed for Mention and each party shall attend personally along with their legal representative (if any) on a date to be fixed by the Court.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Hammond & Chapman is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT BRISBANE

BRC 11674 of 2011

MR HAMMOND

Applicant

And

MS CHAPMAN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

1. The Applicant father was born on (omitted) 1972.  The Respondent mother was born on (omitted) 1978.

2. The parties met in about (omitted) 2008.  In (omitted) 2008 the parties commenced cohabitation.

3. At the time that cohabitation commenced the mother’s two children from a previous relationship (X aged eight and Y aged six) moved with the mother to live at the father’s residence at (omitted).

4. There is one child of the relationship.  The child’s name is Z and she was born on (omitted) 2009.

5. The parties separated on a final basis on 10 February 2011.

6. The parents are unable to agree in relation to parenting arrangements for the child Z.

7. After the callover held on 3 December 2012 an order was made limiting the issues at the final hearing to the following:-

   i)The amount of time the child was to spend with each parent; and

   ii)Whether the final order to be made should progress or proceed to a week about shared care arrangement.

8. A family report was privately funded by the parties.  It is dated 5 June 2012 and was prepared by Mr M.  That report is exhibit 8 in the proceedings.  Having regard to that report the Court made orders on 6 June 2012 which provided that the child would live with the mother and spend time with the father as follows:-

   “1) Each week from 9.00am Wednesday until 4.00pm Thursday;

   2)In week one of a two week cycle, on Sunday from 10.00am until 6.00pm; and

   3) In week two of a two week cycle, from 10.00am Sunday until 8.00am Monday.”

9. The Applicant father wishes to increase the time that Z spends with him as follows:

   i)For a period of 12 months:

   i)

   Week 1:         Wednesday 9:00am to Thursday 5:00pm;

   
                     

   Saturday 9:00am to Sunday 5:00pm.

   ii)Week 2:         Tuesday 5:00pm to Thursday 5:00pm.

   ii)At the expiration of 12 months for a period of 12 months:

   i)

   Week 1:         Tuesday 5:00pm to Thursday 5:00pm;

   
                     

   Saturday 9:00am to Sunday 5:00pm.

   ii)Week 2:     Tuesday 5:00pm to Thursday 5:00pm.

   iii)At the expiration of 12 months week about with each parent commencing after school on Friday.

10. It can therefore be seen that the father wants to proceed to a week about shared care arrangement from the time that the child turns six years of age.

11. The mother would like to see the current arrangement remain in place until 30 November 2013 – at which time the child will be four and half years old.  From 30 November 2013 the mother would like to see an arrangement as follows:

    i)

    Week 1:        Wednesday 9:00am until Thursday 4:00pm;

    
      

    Sunday 10:00am until Monday 8:00am.

    ii)

    Week 2:        Wednesday 9:00am until Thursday 4:00pm;

    
      

    Sunday 10:00am until Monday 8:00am.

    (Essentially, four nights per fortnight with the father from the time the child turns four and half years old).

12. Further, from 30 November 2014 (when the child is five and half years old) the mother proposes as follows:

    i)

    Week 1:        Wednesday 9:00am until Friday 8:00am;

    
      

    Sunday 10:00am until Monday 8:00am.

    ii)

    Week 2:        Wednesday 9:00am until Thursday 8:00am;

    
      

    Sunday 10:00am until Monday 8:00am.

    (Essentially, the mother proposes five nights per fortnight with the father from the time the child turns five and half years old).

13. The child turns six years of age on 30 May 2015.  It is the mother’s intention that the child will commence her prep year in January 2015.

14. The mother did not make any submission in relation to more time with the father beyond those periods of time detailed above.

15. The scope of the trial really was quite limited (as noted in the order made at the callover on 3 December 2012).  But nonetheless the Court must have due regard to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 and in particular the provisions of section 60CC.

16. To begin with, it is important to note s.60CA which makes it clear that when a Court is deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child – the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.

17. In determining best interests the Court must have regard to s.60CC. The primary considerations are set out in s.60CC(2).

18. There is no doubt that there are great benefits to the child, Z, in having a meaningful relationship with both the mother and the father in this case.

19. Furthermore, there is no evidence that would concern the Court in relation to the matters raised in s.60CC(2)(b) of the Act.

Additional considerations

Section 60CC(3)(a) – any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views.

1. The child is too young to express any meaningful views.

Section 60CC(3)(b) – the nature of the relationship of the child with:-

1. each of the child’s parents;  and

1. other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child).

1. The child has a close and loving relationship with both the mother and the father.  Furthermore, the evidence discloses that the child has a close and loving relationship with her siblings (the mother’s children – X and Y).

Section 60CC(3)(c) – the willingness and ability of each of the child’s parents to facilitate, and encourage, a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent.

1. Both parents are willing and able to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent.  Indeed both parents are doing just that.

Section 60CC(3)(d) – the likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:

1. either of his or her parents;  or

1. any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living.

1. There are no significant changes planned in relation to this child and therefore there is little to add in respect of this subsection.

Section 60CC(3)(e) – the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis.

1. There are no particular difficulties or expenses involved because the parents in this case both live on the (omitted) of Brisbane.

Section 60CC(3)(f) – the capacity of:-

1. each of the child’s parents;  and

1. any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child)

to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs.

1. Both parents have the capacity to provide for the emotional and intellectual needs of the child.

Section 60CC(3)(g) – the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child’s parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant.

1. There are no particular issues in this case which require findings under this subsection.

2. This is not a case to which s.60CC(3)(h) applies.

Section 60CC(3)(i) – the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents.

1. Both parents have an excellent attitude towards the child.  Both parents have fully accepted the responsibilities of parenthood and this has been demonstrated by the actions of the parents.

2. Sections 60CC(3)(j) and (k) are not relevant in this case.

Section 60CC(3)(l) – whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child.

1. The father has requested that the Court put in place orders which will effectively mean that the matter does not have to return to Court.  The father seeks to progress to a situation where there is an equal time order made.  The father seeks a week about shared care arrangement as detailed above.

2. The mother proposes a more cautious approach.  The mother is worried about the Court putting in place now final orders which progress to a week about shared care arrangement.  She wants to wait and see how the child progresses over the next few years.

3. As things have transpired – this turns out to be the most important issue in the trial.

4. Mr M in his report stated the following conclusions and recommendations:-

   “CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

   52. The issue in dispute here is the amount of time that Z should have with each of her parents in the context of their recent separation and their allegations regarding their respective capacities.

   53. The parents provided a distinctly disparate version of most events over the course of these interviews, to the extent that they only agreed on a few core facts.

   54.  The parents formed an initially idyllic relationship and married following Ms Chapman’s pregnancy.  The dreamlike qualities of their early romance quickly dissipated as stress increased naturally after the birth of Z.

   55.  A prudent view would be that – due to the impulsiveness with which they formed their relationship on the cusp of Ms Chapman’s separation – they were unprepared for the stress that was to come.  Predictably, problems developed over the cohesiveness of the new family unit and their respective roles.  As is noted in the body of this report, communication and their underlying trust in each other were untested until then.

   56. Due to the very differing accounts of that history, it is difficult to exactly ascertain their respective roles within the family.  Seemingly, Mr Hammond was able to form a viable relationship with Ms Chapman’s children initially, and her perception that this deteriorated over time would be consistent with the deterioration of their own relationship.  Whatever the exact facts regarding their respective involvement with the children, they did not remain together for long enough to allow for an established pattern to emerge.

   57. Certainly, several aspects of those tensions were how Z was incorporated into the new family structure, his perception of control that she had compared to his, and their mutual assertions that the other was uninvolved or distant from the day to day running of the household.  On this point I thought that both parents provided overly subjective accounts, as was their want.

   58.  I note that the parents also raise concerns regarding their respective treatments of the children prior to separation.  In general, I would assess these as being minor and, even if such behaviour did occur, that this would not constitute a pattern of events that would lead one to question the capacity of either parent to care for Z.

   59.  In fact, this does not appear to have been questioned during the marriage, but only now since separation, and seemingly both parents had meaningful involvement with all the children prior to that time.

   60.  Apparently there was no one event that caused separation but it was rather initiated by Mr Hammond after his confessed long period of frustration or intolerance.  Events since that time between them have been chaotic.  They provide such characteristically disparate versions of events that it is difficult to ascertain – during the course of this report – what exactly has occurred, except that there has been ongoing conflict over property and other possessions and also arrangements about Z.  I note that each of the parents have made applications to the Magistrates Court regarding allegations of Domestic Violence.  I am unable to conclude any opinion on these matters.

   61.  It is my view however that both parents are able to care for Z and that her bond with each of them is intact.  Although Ms Chapman reports Z as exhibiting fractious behaviour upon her return, this is not such that, in my view, it would necessitate her arrangement with either of them being cautionary.

   62. Other factors are relevant however.  It does unfortunately appear to be the case that the parents are unlikely to form a cooperative relationship any time soon.  Their capacity to do so is relevant to their ability to communicate about Z’s needs on an ongoing basis.  As she is a young child, her development changes and tasks are an important topic for discussion.  I doubt that the parents – in the near future at least – can do this.

   63.  Secondly, it is the case that – although Z has strong bonds with each of the parents – she has largely been in the care of her mother since separation.  My view is that prematurely moving to a shared time arrangement would be unsuited to her development and practically unworkable, due to the parents’ contentious communication.

   64. It is my view that given her age, Z should continue to have time with her father during each week and that she would benefit from an extra night per fortnight currently.  This could be increased each year by one night per fortnight such that – by five years of age – she could have five nights per fortnight with her father.  I think the potential of Z having a shared time arrangement between her parents at that time would depend upon events, and the capacity of the parents at that time.

   65. Both parents would benefit from attendance at a parenting course.”

5. This report by Mr M was prepared in June 2012.  It was privately funded.  Neither party wanted to cross-examine Mr M.  The report was accepted into evidence without any cross-examination of Mr M.

6. It is also noteworthy that the parties did not obtain an updated report.

7. It is important for the Court to re-iterate some of the parts of Mr M’s conclusion and recommendation. 

8. In particular, I note paragraphs 62, 63 and 64.  In paragraph 63 Mr M essentially summarised his expert opinion concerning this matter.  This is especially so in the second sentence in that paragraph.  That sentence hones in on the crucial issue in the trial – namely the question of putting in place final orders which provide for a shared care arrangement.  Mr M stated in that sentence:-

   “My view is that prematurely moving to a shared time arrangement would be unsuited to her development and practically unworkable, due to the parents’ contentious communication.”

9. Essentially, Mr M has made two particular points in that sentence.  There are two issues to be considered before “moving to a shared time arrangement”.  The two issues are:

   i)The child’s development; and

   ii)The question of the workability of such an arrangement having regard to the “parents’ contentious communication”.

10. Mr Hodges of counsel appeared on behalf of the father and referred to evidence to show that since the time of the report prepared by Mr M there has been an improvement in relation to the question of the communication between the parties.

11. To start with, the father taped two of the changeovers.  There was (it seems) civil conversation between the parties during those changeovers.  That can be seen in exhibit 3.  The father, however, did not inform the mother that he was taping (or videoing) the changeover.  In my view such evidence is of limited assistance.  When one side (in that instance, the father) is aware that events are being taped or videoed it is human nature and undoubtedly the case that the person “in the know” conducts themselves in an exemplary manner.

12. The mother has pointed out that generally, the father was non-communicative during changeovers.  The mother was extremely disappointed that the father had taped the changeover without letting her know.  The mother decided to do the same.  Exhibit 7 shows changeovers on or after 28 April 2013 (very recent).  On this occasion the mother was doing the videoing on her mobile phone.  The father was not aware that the changeover was being taped.  The exhibit shows that the father was non-communicative – at the changeover taped by the mother – when the father was not aware that the taping was occurring.

13. In the situation when the father conducted the taping (and the mother was not aware) – both the mother and the father conducted themselves in a civil manner.

14. Certainly, when the mother did the taping she (once again) conducted herself in a civil and appropriate manner.

15. I have come to the conclusion that the mother’s evidence is to be accepted ahead of the father.  When the father knew that taping was occurring he conducted himself in an appropriate manner.  When the father was not aware that the taping was occurring he ignored the mother and was non-communicative.  This accords with the mother’s version of events.

16. I note that there is evidence (exhibits 4 and 6) which shows the parents communicating (via text) in an appropriate manner.  Indeed the communication is child focused.

17. The text messages do tend to support the submission made by Mr Hodges that the communication has improved.  But the taping done by the mother of the changeovers (at a time when the father did not know about it) tends to (as noted earlier) support the mother’s argument that when it comes to communicating verbally – there is still an ongoing problem between these parents.

18. I have come to the conclusion that the Court is not able to find, at this point in time, that the communication between these parties has progressed to such an extent that the Court can be confident of putting in place final orders (when this child is still so very young) which would progress the child’s time with the parents to a week about shared care arrangement.

19. In addition, and irrespective of the findings made above, I would not have been convinced that final orders now progressing to a week about arrangement were appropriate in any event.  The difficulty is that the question of the child’s “development” (as highlighted by Mr M in paragraph 63) of his report is simply untested.  The Court does not have a crystal ball.  The Court cannot see into the future to see whether or not the child’s development would be suited to a week about arrangement at the age of five or even six.

20. Whilst it is always the case that a Court should tend towards the making of final orders putting an end to litigation between parties – I have come to the conclusion that in this particular case there is no alternative.  The child is too young.  The Court has no evidence from an expert in relation to whether or not the child’s development is likely to be sufficient or appropriate such that a week about shared care arrangement would be appropriate and in the child’s best interests.

1. I accept the recommendations of Mr M.  To my mind, in the absence of any cross-examination of Mr M and in the absence of any further evidence from Mr M or another expert in relation to the child’s development, it is not appropriate (and not in the child’s best interests) to now put in place final orders which would lead to a week about shared care arrangement.

2. Having said that, I consider that the recommendations of Mr M in paragraph 64 of the family report should be adopted.  So that from 30 May 2013 (when the child turns four years of age) the child’s time with the father should be increased.  Further from 30 May 2014 when the child turns five years of age – the child’s time with the father should be increased again.  The final orders should therefore reflect the following:

   i)From 30 May 2013 the child should spend time with the father:

   i)

   In Week 1:     Wednesday 9:00am to Thursday 5:00pm;

   
     

   Saturday 9:00am until Sunday 5:00pm.

   ii)In Week 2:         Tuesday 5:00pm until Thursday 5:00pm.

   ii)From 30 May 2014 (when the child turns five years old) the arrangements should be as follows:   

   i)

   In Week 1:         Tuesday 5:00pm to Thursday 5:00pm;

   
     

   Saturday 9:00am to Sunday 5:00pm.

   ii)In Week 2:     Tuesday 5:00pm to Thursday 5:00pm.

Section 61DA

1. There will be an order for equal shared parental responsibility. The presumption in s.61DA has not been rebutted.

Section 65DAA

1. There will not be an order for equal time.  It will be noted that I have come to the conclusion that it is not in the child’s best interests for there to be an equal time order made.  I rely upon the reasons stated earlier herein.  It would have been reasonably practicable – noting that both parents live on the (omitted) of Brisbane.

2. The order that will be put in place is an order that comes within the definition of “substantial and significant time”.  In my view such an order is in the child’s best interests and this accords with the recommendation of Mr M (which I accept).  Further, it is reasonably practicable for such an order to be put in place.

Other Matters

1. I do not consider that there is sufficient evidence before the Court for the Court to make a determination in relation to the child’s schooling.  The mother wants the child to attend (omitted) College but there is no evidence that would enable the Court to make sufficient findings concerning such a decision.

2. It was submitted that the mother was somewhat evasive in relation to her answers concerning her work timetable.  At the end of the day, the decision that I have made concerning the child’s time with the father really comes down to the question of the evidence concerning communication between the parents and the lack of evidence in relation to whether or not the child’s development in the years ahead will be such that a week about shared care arrangement is appropriate.

The Child’s Surname

1. Exhibit 5 is the child’s birth certificate.  The child was born on (omitted) 2009.  On 1 July 2009 the child’s name was registered as, “Z”.  Both the mother and the father registered the child’s name. 

2. The mother would like the child to be referred to as Chapman-Hammond.  The mother wants the child to have a hyphenated name to avoid embarrassment.  The child has two siblings and their surname is Chapman.  The father wants the child’s name to remain as Hammond.

3. I note that the mother’s other two children have had three surnames in recent years.  Initially they had a surname of “(omitted)”, next they had a surname of “Chapman-(omitted)” and finally their surname was “Chapman”. 

4. I note the mother’s affidavit filed 9 April 2013.  The mother’s evidence in relation to this issue is as follows:-

   “59. I currently use the hyphenated surname of Z Chapman-Hammond when enrolling Z in ballet classes, gymnastics, and play groups because the surname uses my surname and also the official surname of her siblings.

   60. The use of the hyphenated surname (Chapman-Hammond) ties Z into our family unit and links her with her siblings whom also attend the same ballet school and gymnastics classes.

   61. Due to the fact that Z is currently utilising the surname Chapman-Hammond in the ‘community’ I strongly believe that Mr Hammond take all necessary steps to change the birth certificate paperwork to say the same.

   62. Mr Hammond and I co-signed school paperwork for Z to attend (omitted) College starting in prep in 2015, where Z’s siblings X and Y also attend.  The use of the hyphenated surname would take away any embarrassment or confusion that Z is not related to her siblings when attending the same school for education or ballet purposes, and links all the children as one family unit.

   63. Mr Hammond won’t agree or disagree on this use of name.

   64. I propose that Chapman is stated first before Hammond because Z’s siblings X and Y are only known by the surname Chapman on their birth certificates.

   I also go by the surname Chapman and as her primary care giver, and with her siblings it would lead to a greater sense of belonging to have the hyphenated surname.

   I propose that Z’s birth certificate paperwork state Z Chapman-Hammond.”

5. In the father’s trial affidavit filed 8 April 2013 there is no evidence concerning the issue of the child’s surname.  Counsel for the father, Mr Hodges, sought and obtained leave to ask the father some questions during his evidence-in-chief concerning the child’s surname.  The father – from page 13 of the transcript – confirms that the name “Hammond” means a lot to him.  This is hardly surprising.  In any event – the father wishes for the child’s surname to remain the same.  He noted that the child was enrolled at swimming lessons at (omitted) as “Z Hammond” and this is also the name that she is known as at the (omitted) Medical Centre.

6. Furthermore, exhibit 2 notes the enrolment at (omitted) Childcare at (omitted).  The enrolment form was signed by both parents in November 2011 – enrolling the child as “Z Hammond”.  I note that the parties separated in February 2011.

7. During the marriage the parties jointly enrolled the child at (omitted) College in the name – “Z Hammond”.

8. In an early decision of the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia – Chapman & Palmer (1978) FLC 90-510 – the Full Court (Evatt CJ, Asche & Marshall S JJ) stated from page 77,675 in relation to a child’s surname –

   “We believe that each such case should be approached in an even-handed manner with the object of making a decision that will promote the welfare of the child. 

   To summarise, the factors to which the Courts should have regard in determining whether there should be any change in the surname of a child include the following:

   a)    the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration;

   b)    the short and long term effects of any change in the child’s surname;

   c)    any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child if its name is different from that of the parent with custody or care and control;

   d)    any confusion of identity which may arise for the child if his or her name is changed or is not changed;

   e)    the effect which any change in surname may have on the relationship between the child and parent whose name the child bore during the marriage;

   f)    the effect of frequent or random changes of name.”

9. In a decision entitled, Tommy & Harris [2009] FamCA 278 – Ryan J referred to Chapman & Palmer (supra) and also to a decision in Beach & Stemmler (1979) FLC 90-692. That decision is authority for the proposition that the considerations listed in Chapman & Palmer were not meant to restrict any particular Court when considering a case.  Connor J in Beach & Stemmler (supra) also referred to these considerations –

   “i) The advantages both in the short term and in the long term which will accrue to the children if their name remains as it is now.

   ii) The contact that the father has had and is likely to have in the future with the children.

   iii) The degree of identification that the children now have with their father.

   iv) The degree of identification which the children have now with their mother and their stepfather.

   v) The degree of identification which the children will have with the child that is about to be born to their mother and any likely confusion in the future if their father’s surname is restored.

   vi) The desire of the father that the original name be restored.”

10. Turning to those considerations identified in Chapman & Palmer (supra) and Beach & Stemmler (supra) –

    i)I don’t know whether one could say that the welfare or “best interests” of the child could be said to be significantly impacted whether the child is known as “Hammond” or “Chapman-Hammond”.  Although I must say – I tend towards the view that there probably are some benefits to young Z by use of a hyphenated surname – “Chapman-Hammond” – because her two siblings in her mother’s household – Y and X – are known by the surname “Chapman”.  I note that those children have had more than one surname.  But it is clear enough that they now have the name “Chapman”.

    ii)The child is still very young.  I do not consider there are any particular short term effects in relation to the child’s surname that would cause her problems or confusion.  I note that the child is known by the name “Z” at ballet classes, gymnastics and play groups.  As to the long term effects of a change in the child’s name – there are none that have been identified and I agree with the views stated by Ryan J in Tommy & Harris (supra) at paragraph 153 that the use of a hyphenated surname is likely to enhance “the child’s sense of her own identity in that she would be publicly acknowledged as the child of both parents”.

    iii)I do not consider that there would be any embarrassment likely to be experienced by Z if her name is changed officially to “Chapman-Hammond”.

    iv)Z has just turned four years of age.  She is already known in some quarters as “Chapman-Hammond” and in other areas as “Hammond”.  There is no evidence that the child would suffer embarrassment by a change of surname to “Chapman-Hammond”.  Furthermore, embarrassment may well be avoided – noting that the child lives primarily in the house of the mother – if Z has a surname which includes the name “Chapman” – this being the surname used by X and Y.

    v)I do not consider that there is likely to be any change in the relationship between the child and the father in the event that the child’s surname is changed to “Chapman-Hammond”.

    vi)There is very little likelihood of a further change of surname for the child.

11. As to the matters identified in Beach & Stemmler – many in fact appear to me to overlap with the considerations in Chapman & Palmer.  I do note that the father has had significant involvement in the child’s life in this case.  The child has a significant degree of identification with both her father and her mother. 

12. There will be benefits to the child in relation to the “degree of identification” – which the child will have with X and Y – should she have a surname which includes the name “Chapman”.

13. I do note that the father is keen for the child to maintain the surname “Hammond”.  But in the overall context of this case and noting the evidence which has been adduced – I am not convinced by the arguments put forward by the father.  It may well be the case that an enrolment form was signed by the mother in late 2011 which included the child’s surname as “Hammond”.  But the mother’s views in relation to this matter have clearly crystallised in the lead up to the final hearing.  Indeed the child Z has been known by the surname “Chapman-Hammond” in some quarters for some time.

14. I have come to the conclusion that the arguments put forward by the mother are more persuasive then those put forward on behalf of the father.  I have come to the conclusion that the child’s best interests will be served in relation to this issue by allowing the child’s surname to be changed to, “Chapman-Hammond”. 

15. Further, having come to that conclusion – I can see no reason why the child’s birth certificate ought not be amended.  If the Court has concluded that it is in Z’s best interests for her surname to change from “Hammond” to “Chapman-Hammond” – then in my view, not only should the child be known as “Chapman-Hammond” but it follows as a matter of good sense – that the child’s name should be registered as, “Chapman-Hammond” and an order should be made that the child is to be known as “Chapman-Hammond”.

Conclusion

1. I would ask that the parties attempt to reach an agreement in relation to the wording of the final order.

2. In the event that the parties have not been able to reach an agreement in relation to the wording of the final order (such wording to, of course, reflect these reasons for judgment) – then the matter shall be relisted for mention.

I certify that the preceding seventy-three (73) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Howard

Date:  17 July 2013