Hammercall Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport and Main Roads

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hammercall Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport & Main Roads & Ors [2016] QCA 95

PARTIES:

HAMMERCALL PTY LTD
ACN 002 663 587
(appellant)
v
THE HON SCOTT EMERSON AS MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT & MAIN ROADS
(first respondent)
THE HON JARROD BLEIJIE AS ATTORNEY GENERAL AND MINISTER FOR JUSTICE FOR THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND
(second respondent)
CHIEF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT AND MAIN ROADS
(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 5595 of 2015
SC No 12318 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2015] QSC 114

DELIVERED ON:

15 April 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 October 2015

JUDGES:

Margaret McMurdo P and Fraser JA and Mullins J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS:

REAL PROPERTY – COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND – POWERS OF ACQUISITION – GENERALLY – where the appellant contended that the Minister did not have the statutory power to acquire its land and “land lock” it - where the appellant failed to establish that the Minister was not adequately informed of the effect on vehicle access to its business by the compulsory acquisition – where the appellant failed to adduce evidence that the acquisition was for a purpose other than transport and road purposes – where the broad statutory power granted to the Minister under s 24(1), s 24(3) and s 25 Transport Planning and Coordination Act 1994 clearly and unequivocally modify common law powers – whether the Minister can compulsorily acquire land that will, as a result of the acquisition, become “land locked”

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – PREROGATIVE WRITS AND ORDERS – CERTIORARI – GROUNDS FOR CERTIORARI TO QUASH – EXCESS OR WANT OF JURISDICTION – PARTICULAR INSTANCES OF JURISDICTIONAL ERROR – where the appellant contended the Minister’s decision was invalid as he failed to consider all materials attached to the application in accordance with s 9(5)(a) Transport Planning and Coordination Act – where the Minister’s decision was attached to a briefing memorandum he was given along with a large body of material relating to the application to acquire the land – where the appellant did not establish that the Minister did not consider the material accompanying the briefing memorandum – whether there was a jurisdictional error on the face of the record

REAL PROPERTY – COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND – POWERS OF ACQUISITION – OTHER MATTERS – where the appellant contended its objections were not heard by a validly appointed hearing officer under s 25(8) and s 25(12) Transport Planning and Coordination Act – where under s 7(3)(e)(iii) Acquisition of Land Act 1967 objections may be heard by the constructing authority or its delegate – whether the hearing officer had delegated power to conduct the objection hearings

REAL PROPERTY – COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND – POWERS OF ACQUISITION – RIGHT TO BE HEARD – where the appellant contended it did not have the…

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Details
Case
[2016] QCA 95
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hammercall Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport and Main Roads dealt with the compulsory acquisition of land by the Minister for Transport and Main Roads. Hammercall Pty Ltd challenged the Minister's decision to acquire its land, arguing that the acquisition was not for a transport and road purpose, that the Minister had failed to consider all materials attached to the acquisition application, that the hearing officer lacked the delegated power to conduct the objection hearings, and that it was denied procedural fairness by not being given the opportunity to comment on the briefing memorandum given to the Minister. The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the Minister had the statutory power to acquire the land, whether the Minister's decision was in accordance with the statutory scheme, whether the hearing officer had the delegated power to conduct the objection hearings, and whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal found that the Minister had the statutory power to acquire the land under the broad statutory powers granted by sections 24(1), 24(3), and 25 of the Transport Planning and Coordination Act 1994. The Court found that there was no evidence that the Minister did not consider the application as required by section 9(5) of the Transport Planning and Coordination Act, and that the Minister had considered the application, together with the memorandum and the material accompanying it. The Court also found that the hearing officer had the delegated power to conduct the objection hearings under section 7(3)(e)(iii) of the Acquisition of Land Act 1967. Finally, the Court found that the appellant was not denied procedural fairness because the memoranda did not include any substantially new content about which the appellant had not already been heard.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Minister’s decision, the appellant emphasised, was that he had considered this application and recommended that the Governor in Council may take the land. This, the appellant contended, did not meet the statutory requirements of s 9(5)(a) in that it did not state in terms that the Minister had considered the application, “including all statements and documents, or copies of documents, accompanying” it, and that he had ensured “the land to be taken may…and should be taken for the purpose for which it is proposed to be taken”. The appellant submitted that the Minister was personally required to consider the application, citing Sita Queensland Pty Ltd v Beattie,[19] but had not done so.[19][2000] 2 Qd R 433 (Williams J), 435 [5].Conclusion on this ground of appeal The appellant raised a similar argument before the primary judge which was rejected, there being no evidence that the Minister’s decision was not in accordance with the statutory scheme.[20][20]Hammercall Pty Ltd v Minister for Transport & Main Roads & Ors [2015] QSC 114, [53]. The Minister’s decision[21] was attached to the five-page briefing memorandum proposed to the Minister and signed by members of his Department.[22] Accompanying the memorandum was a large body of material relating to the application to acquire the land.[23] The most obvious inference to be drawn from this material and the Minister’s decision was that he considered the application, together with the memorandum and the material accompanying it, and decided to recommend that the Governor in Council may take the land. There was no competing evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the Minister did not consider the application as required by s 9(5). The most rational conclusion from the evidence was that the Minister considered the land should be taken for the purpose for which it was proposed to be taken, namely “for the purpose of transport, in particular, road purposes.”[24][21]Above n 5, Exhibit “BLC 2” at p 805, AB 1025.[22]Above, pp 800-804, AB 1020-1024.[23]See above n 5, [4] at pp 2-3, AB 222-223 and Exhibit “BLC 1” at pp 6-798, AB 226-1018.[24]See above n 1, Exhibit “LJC 2” at p 4, AB 183; See also above n 5, Exhibit “BLC 1” at p 14, AB 234. Contrary to the appellant’s contentions, it was not necessary, in order to comply with s 9(5) or the principle relied on in Sita, for the Minister in considering the application to repeat verbatim the words of s 9(5)(a) or to swear an affidavit that he had done so. The primary judge rightly identified that this contention was unmeritorious. There was no jurisdictional error on the face of the record under s 9(5)(a). It follows that this ground of appeal is not made out. In order to understand this and some subsequent grounds of appeal it is necessary to set out some more background facts. The process for the acquisition of the appellant’s land commenced with a Land Resumption Request for the purpose of use, “Transport, in particular, road.” The request was dated 2 October 2012 and signed by Mr Donaghey as “Manager, (Network Planning and Performance) as delegate of the Chief Executive.” It was addressed to “Director (Property Services)” and requested that: “Once the land required has been gazetted…that…[t]he land be dedicated to road.” It stated that “No agreements for the taking of land by any of the effected landholders have been obtained. Therefore arrange for the service of Notices of Intention to Resume pursuant to section 7 of the Acquisition of Land Act1967.” It also noted: “Written objections if any, are to be served on…Paul Noonan, Regional Director (South Coast Region) and any objection will be heard by [Mr Donaghey] or [his] nominee a delegate of The Chief Executive”.[25][25]Above n 5, Exhibit “BLC 1” at pp 17-18, AB 237-238.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established