Hamley and Hamley

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HAMLEY & HAMLEY

[2007] FamCA 280

FAMILY LAW - CHILDREN - ORDERS - Dismissal of mother’s urgent application to discharge orders made recently and by consent for 12 year old child to spend time with the father – Adjournment of father’s oral application to change interim parenting orders to permit mother an opportunity to respond to that application – Current parenting orders suspended between now and adjourned date – Treatment of all relevant primary and additional considerations in order to make orders which will operate for only 4 weeks or so – Orders made for child to spend time continuously with father between now and adjourned date with very restricted communication with mother – Father given the opportunity but not the obligation to enrol the child in school in Victoria

Family Law Act 1975
Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006

Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346
Cowling & Cowling (1998) FLC 92-801
R & R: Children's Wishes (2000) FLC 93-000
H & W (1995) FLC 92-598

APPLICANT:

Mrs Hamley

RESPONDENT:

Mr Hamley

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

Marshalls & Dent

FILE NUMBER:

MLF

1269

2002

DATE DELIVERED:

16 March 2007

PLACE DELIVERED:

Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF:

Bennett J

HEARING DATE:

16 March 2007

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Bucknall

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT:

Bucknall Family Lawyers

THE RESPONDENT:

In Person

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER COUNSEL:

Ms Mooney

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER SOLICITOR:

Marshalls & Dent

Orders

That the mother’s application in a case filed 14 March 2007 be dismissed, noting that the mother has already before the Court an application to transfer these proceedings to the Brisbane Registry I do not intend that the dismissal of this application in any way determines the mother’s extant application for change of venue.
That the father have leave to make an oral application this day for various orders including that, between now and the final hearing of this matter, the child, a son, born in September 1994 reside with him in Melbourne and that the child be assessed by a child psychiatrist and educationalist as soon as practicable.
That on or before 23 March 2007 the father file and serve an application in a case in proper form outlining the orders sought in his oral application this day together with any affidavit material upon which he proposes to rely in relation to his application including the child live with him until the final hearing.
That the father’s oral application for a change in parenting orders be adjourned before me on 19 April 2007 at 10am (Melbourne time).
That by 4pm on Friday 5 April 2007 the mother file and serve any response to the father’s application for amongst other things an interim change in parenting orders for the child and any further affidavit material that she relies upon.
That subject to any further order of the Court all previous orders in relation the child, a son, born in September 1994 for the child to live with, spend time with or communicate with either of the parents be suspended.
That until further order and with immediate effect the child spend time with the father between now and the adjourned date.
That until further order the father have sole parental responsibility for matters concerning the child’s education and in this regard the father is authorised to enrol the child in any educational institution at his discretion.
That the father do all acts and things necessary to arrange an assessment as soon as possible of the child by the Child Mental Health Service attached to the Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne, Victoria, or such other child psychiatric facility as is approved by the independent children’s lawyer taking into account any periods of delay and cost. The father promptly advise the independent children’s lawyer and the mother and the supervising family consultant of arrangements he makes in this regard.
That the father forthwith make arrangements to have the child undergo an educational assessment and advise the mother, Ms Mooney and the Family Consultant promptly of those arrangements.
That until further order and pending the adjourned date the mother communicate with the child on Sunday evenings between the hours of 6pm and 6:30pm, Melbourne time, by placing a telephone call to the child at telephone service number … and the father ensure that the child is available and the telephone line is kept free for the purpose of receiving the mother’s call and the father afford the child privacy when taking the telephone call.
That subject to any further order of the Court, apart from the telephonic communication provided for in this order the mother not spend time with the child or otherwise communicate with the child pending the adjourned date.
That the father do all acts and things necessary to enable the child to communicate with Ms B, the supervising family consultant, on a weekly basis and whether that communication be in person or by telephone be according to Ms B’s discretion.
That for the purpose of enabling compliance with the orders made in the Family Court of Australia this day whereby the father is entitled to spend time with the child, a son, born in September 1994 ("the child"), a Recovery Order do issue authorising / directing the Marshal, all officers of the Australian Federal Police and all officers of the Police Forces of all States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia, with such assistance as may be required, and if necessary by force:
14.1 to find and recover the child of the applicant and respondent born in September 1994 and to deliver the child to the father at such place as the father and the person effecting such recovery agree to be appropriate; and
14.2 to stop and search any, vehicle, vessel or aircraft and to enter and search any premises or places in which there is at any time reasonable cause to believe that the child may be found.
That until further order and pending the adjourned date the mother be and is hereby restrained from entering the State of Victoria during the time that the child is spending with the father pursuant to these orders.
That all exhibits tendered today remain on the court file pending the further hearing.
That Mr Bucknall have leave to file a Notice of Ceasing to Act on behalf of the mother, notwithstanding that he has not or may not have waited the time prescribed by the rules for the purpose of doing so.
I DIRECT that my Associate arrange a video link up between this Registry and the Brisbane Registry on the adjourned date.
I DIRECT that my reasons for judgment delivered orally this afternoon be transcribed and when transcribed the original be placed on the Court file and a copy sent to each of the parties, the family consultant, Ms B who is the supervising consultant pursuant to section 65L of the Family Law Act 1975.
I DIRECT that a transcript of Ms B’s evidence this day be transcribed and when transcribed the original transcript be placed on the court file and a copy sent to each of the parties.
That I reserve to the parties liberty to apply between now and the adjourned date and any such application be listed before me if I am reasonably available.
That the preparation of these orders be expedited forthwith.

AND THE COURT NOTES that pursuant to section 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the annexure hereto relating to parenting orders – obligations, consequences and who can help, the particulars of which are included in this Order.

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLF 1269 of 2002

Mr Hamley

Applicant

And

Mrs Hamley

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(ex tempore)

The proceedings

This morning I made orders which dismissed the mother’s an urgent application brought by the mother and to adjourn this matter to me on 19 April 2007. I also ordered that the child, a son, born in September 1994, spend time with the father between now and the adjourned date and communicate by his mother only by telephone I said that I would deliver my reasons orally this afternoon. These are those reasons.

This matter comes before me as the urgent return date of an application in a case filed by the mother, in Brisbane, on 14 March 2007 and returnable before me in Melbourne. The mother seeks to suspend all contact orders, have the father and his spouse psychiatrically assessed; that the proceedings be transferred to Brisbane; that an independent children's lawyer be appointed in Brisbane; and two further orders in relation to child support which I regard as not being intelligible.
In response, the father opposes the orders sought by the wife. He sought to make an oral application that the Australian Federal Police immediately locate the child and place the child in his care; that I order that the child live with him between now and the final hearing of this matter; that the mother not be allowed into Victoria until further order of the court. In any event, that the mother not be permitted to approach within 500 metres of the father’s home, place of work or any school that the child may attend, and that the child be assessed by a child psychiatrist and an educational consultant as soon as practicable.
The wife was represented by Mr Bucknall, solicitor, of Brisbane.
The father represented himself.
The independent children's lawyer Ms Mooney appeared on her own behalf. Additionally the family consultant who supervises this matter pursuant to an existing order under s.65L of the Act, Ms B, was in court for the duration of the proceedings.
The proceedings were conducted via video link between the Melbourne and Brisbane Registries of the Court. Ms B and Ms Mooney were in the Melbourne Registry with me. The father, the mother and mother’s lawyer, Mr Bucknall were in the Brisbane Registry. I understand that the father was in Brisbane for work, and that he continues to reside in B in Victoria. The father’s wife, Mrs H, was also in Court in Brisbane. A friend of the mother, Ms L, also attended Court.
Counsel for the mother did not have various documents. In particular

I ascertained that he did not have the psychiatric assessment of his client conducted by Dr E, consultant psychiatrist, dated 4 December 2006, nor did he have the supervision report of Ms B, family consultant, dated 30 November 2006. I arranged for Dr E's report to be made available to Mr Bucknall and gave him time to take instructions in relation to its contents.
At the outset, I accepted Mr Bucknall's submission that the mother needs time to respond to the father's oral application for a change in interim living arrangements for the child. I accept that the mother would be unduly prejudiced if I proceeded to determine the issue of where the child should live or with whom the child should live between now and a final hearing without giving her an opportunity to respond. At this point there is no date fixed for the final hearing. So any interim determination is likely to last for some months, if not longer. I can see elements of this case which would attract a priority hearing, but I do not think that a final hearing is, necessarily, what is needed at this stage.
I accept Mr Bucknall's submission that the wife thought that she was coming to court today only to stop the father from seeing the child between now and the final hearing, in the terms of her urgent application filed on 14 March 2007. However, it is also understandable that father seeks some urgent relief himself as the mother has failed to comply with orders that the child see his father on the last two weekends just gone. It was possible to deal with the mother’s application in its entirety this morning.
As indicated, I adjourned the hearing of the father's application for an interim change in living arrangements until 19 April 2007 when I am sitting in a defended list. I will list the matter at 10 am Melbourne time in anticipation that my defended will need some time for discussions. Given that I will have another matter before me, the parties in this matter of Hamley must be prepared to be limited in the time they have to present their case. All parties will need to be at court ahead of time. In Brisbane it will be 9:00am so there may need to be arrangements made to permit the mother and her lawyers access into the court building by, say, 8:45am Brisbane time. I may be required to limit the duration of this case to take no more than two hours on that occasion but that should be sufficient.

Background

There are a few things that I should note at the outset.
First Mr Bucknall is the second lawyer who has appeared on behalf of the mother in as many weeks, who has been instructed at the last minute and has not been given documents which are pertinent to these proceedings, such as Dr E's report, transcripts of proceedings, judgments or orders. That is not to say that Mr Bucknall and his predecessor, Mr Emerson were not given any documents, but they have not been given various documents that I have sought to refer them to. This may a recurrent problem in the event that the mother continues to retain solicitors at the last minute and does not have a full complement of documents for them to read. However, it is a difficulty in respect of which the court may not grant further indulgences. On the next occasion, whoever represents the mother should have a full compliment of documents and, if the mother represents herself, then she should do likewise.
Second, I accept that Mr Bucknall is retained only for today. He advised the court that he is not prepared to act for the mother after today. Necessarily, the mother will be acting on her own behalf until she retains solicitors to act for her. Mr Bucknall says that if she retains solicitors in Queensland, she would be eligible for assistance from Queensland Legal Aid, although she may elect to retain solicitors in Victoria.
Third, it was agreed that prior to me commencing the hearing of the wife's application to suspend time between the child and his father and the husband’s oral application even on an interim basis, that I ought to ascertain the whereabouts of the child. I have regard to exhibit “C1”, which is a letter from Australian Federal Police, Brisbane, to the court dated 15 March 2007. That letter sets out the circumstances in which the Australian Federal Police were unable to locate the child last Friday, 9 March 2007, for the purpose of recovering him to ensure that he boarded a plane for Melbourne and spend time with his father.
The letter from the Federal Agent highlights concerns about the extent to which the mother and her close friend Ms L may have sought to avoid the child being collected by the police. The Federal Agent was inclined to the view that the mother and the child may not be residing at the wife's given address which is Ms L’s home at W in Brisbane. The Federal Agent speculated that the mother and the child may be residing elsewhere.
I asked the wife to go into the witness box where she was affirmed. She gave her address as W. However, she said that she had spent the last two nights at a Hotel in Brisbane. I am told by Mr Bucknall that W is about five kilometres from Brisbane. The mother said that this morning, the child was being cared for at W, by Mr A who is the husband of Ms L. I asked the mother whether she would arrange for Mr A to bring the child into the court, and she said that she did not know whether that was possible because Mr A may be out and about, away from home and might not be contactable. I advised the wife that I would stand the matter down for a short time whilst she made arrangements for Mr A to bring the child into the court building in Brisbane or, if she could not do so, to hear from her what arrangements she could make to contact Mr A by any means open to her, including mobile phone. Ms L, the wife of Mr A, was seated beside the wife in court.
There is no doubt in my mind that the mother understood that, upon me recommencing the hearing, she would have to return to the witness box and answer questions as to the precise whereabouts of the child and what arrangements she could make to have him brought to the court. The matter was stood down.
When I recommenced the court about 10 minutes later, Mr Bucknall informed me that his client had left and was not available to go back into the witness box. I was advised by Mr Bucknall that the wife had gone to W to get the child, and that Ms L had accompanied her.
I expressed my concern to Mr Bucknall that the wife had effectively flouted a direction by me to return to the witness box and give evidence of the child’s whereabouts. Mr Bucknall immediately assumed full responsibility for the wife having left court and not being available. He said that it had been his idea that the child should be brought to court immediately and that the wife was the most appropriate person to do that. He immediately rang a mobile telephone number provided by Ms L – … – but all he could do was leave a voice mail message saying that the wife was required to return to court immediately.
Mr Bucknall said that W is about 20 minutes car ride in daytime Brisbane traffic and he expected the mother to be back shortly. About 90 minutes later, Mr Bucknall received a call from the mother, and advised her to return to court immediately. At that point, Mr Bucknall said that he expected her within about 15 minutes. The hearing proceeded for about another 40 minutes or so, but the mother did not ever return to the court. The matter proceeded with Mr Bucknall representing the mother, but the mother not being present. Mr Bucknall did not seek that it be otherwise stood down.
Fourth, on 19 December 2006 I ordered amongst other things:
(14) Until further order, the mother and father, by themselves, their servants or agents, be and are hereby restrained from causing, permitting or suffering the child to be examined and/or assessed by any medical professional, psychologist or like social scientist in connection with these proceedings without the prior written consent of the independent children's lawyer.
Annexed to the mother's affidavit, and being the sole evidence upon which Mr Bucknall said his client relied in relation to a suspension of time between the child and the father, is a photocopy letter from Dr W of S in Queensland. It is dated 8 March 2007, and it reads:
This is to state that [the child] presented to my general medical practice today distressed, frustrated and angry following enforced visits to the father's home in Melbourne. On questioning, [the child] was animated and obviously anxious about his situation. He relates his symptoms to impending court orders which mean he has to visit his dad in Melbourne again. He relays marked distress at his father's and marked distress following return home. I performed a mental health assessment and plan for [the child] today. I believe that he is suffering from acute anxiety with depressed mood. I strongly recommend urgent psychological assessment and am organising this. I also suspected that there has been an ongoing degree of psychological abuse associated with enforced visits to his father. I would strongly recommend that further visits be stopped until a full psychological assessment and management be instigated.
In the mother's affidavit affirmed on 15 March 2007, she deposes that:
Following my advising [the child] that he would be attending with his father on 9 March, [the child] exhibited signs of distress at his school (which is also my place of employment) and the principal of the school, [Ms R], notified me that in her view, I should seek some professional assistance for [the child]. Subsequently on 8 March, [the child] and myself attended at the surgery of [Dr W], a medical practitioner. [Dr W] informed me that she believed that [the child] at that time was suffering from acute anxiety with a depressed mood believed to have been caused by him spending time with his father and his spouse ... following the advice of [Dr W], an appointment was made for [the child] to attend at the surgery of [Dr T] who is a child psychologist. [The child] and myself attended with [Dr T] on Wednesday, 14 March 2007.

Additionally there was tendered as an exhibit a medical certificate from Dr W dated 8 March 2007 (exhibit “W1”) in which Dr W has said:
This is to state that I have examined [the child], and he is suffering from a medical condition and will be unfit for school from 8 March 2007 until 23 March 2007 inclusive.
Given that there are two documents dated by Dr W 8 March 2007, I doubt that the date is inserted by mistake. I am unable to reconcile those documents with the wife's affidavit that says that on 9 March, the child began to exhibit signs of anxiety and distress, and that she had a certain conversation with the principal of the school at which the child attends. I do not know in what context the wife uses the words "subsequently on 8 March". That will have to be a matter which the parties clarify on the next date, if they wish to do so. In all of the circumstances, it would be prudent for the independent children’s lawyer to obtain what evidence she can from the school principal. Preferably by affidavit but if not then by subpoena to produce documents and to give evidence on the next date.
Mr Bucknall submitted to me that a plain reading of annexure A to the wife's affidavit, being the letter from Dr W extracted above at paragraph 23 of these reasons, makes it clear that the child did not attend the doctor for purposes relating to these proceedings, but as a matter of general medical practice. I am unable to accept that submission at this point. There is nothing in Dr W's letter which indicates that the child attended upon her for anything other than stress associated with the idea of seeing his father. That, I think, is the plain meaning of the letter.
Likewise, there is nothing in the medical certificate issued on 8 March 2007 which indicates a condition from which the child is suffering. It is open to me to infer that it was the distress that the doctor referred to in her separate letter on that day. However, even if I do not draw that inference, absent other evidence, I see no support for the fact that the child consulted Dr W for another but unspecified complaint.
It was conceded by Mr Bucknall that the mother's attendance upon Dr T, psychiatrist, was a breach of the injunction contained in paragraph 14 of the orders made on 19 December 2006.
Fifth, I am advised that on 5 March 2007, the independent children's lawyer had a discussion by telephone with Ms R who is the principal of S School, and she confirmed that the child was at school on that day.
Sixth, this matter was listed for mention before me on 6 March 2007 when the husband sought leave to file and have set down for urgent hearing a contravention application in which he alleged that the mother had, without reasonable excuse, failed to comply with orders which entitled the child to spend time with him on the previous weekend, commencing 2 March 2007. I did not grant leave to the father to file that application, but instead took from him an oral application in which he sought some extra time with the child.
The father appeared on his own behalf on 6 March 2007. Ms Mooney was in Melbourne. The mother was in Brisbane and she was represented by a Mr Emerson, solicitor. On that day, I made various orders pursuant to which the father was entitled to spend time with the child for the weekend commencing last Friday, 9 March 2007. I also ordered that a recovery order issue requesting that the Australian Federal Police collect the child and ensure that he boarded a prepaid flight to Melbourne for the purpose of spending the weekend with his father. I required that for one hour before and one hour after any changeover period which was to occur at the child's school, the mother was to absent herself from the school and not attend within 200 metres of the school grounds. The mother has obtained employment with the S school attended by the child and apparently works three days a week as a financial adviser for the school. I recall the submissions were made on behalf of the mother on 6 March 2007 to the effect that the child had attended school on one day in the recent past, but spent the entire day with the mother because he was very upset.
Finally, notwithstanding that the mother’s application for an immediate suspension of time to be spent between the father and the child is said by her to be based on the child’s welfare, the mother did not communicate with the supervising family consultant about any recent anxiety displayed by the child and neither did the 2 health professionals to whom the mother has taken the child or the headmistress of the school attended by the child in Brisbane.

The issue

Today, the issue for me to determine was what should happen between now and the adjourned date of 19 April 2007. The wife says that I should suspend any time which the child is entitled to spend with his father, and if I do not suspend the time, then I should allow the existing orders to continue. In circumstances where the mother has failed to comply by providing the child for the last two weekends of time that he should have spent with his father and having regard to the fact that she left court today and has not returned for the duration of the hearing, to say that I am not confident that she will comply with orders in the future is an understatement.
In submissions, Mr Bucknall said that he would not seek to be heard in opposition to the child spending extended time with his father; that is, between now and 23 March 2007 when the child's medical certificate expires. That is the day on which Mr Bucknall says the child will have to be returned to school. With all due respect, I cannot understand the importance with Mr Bucknall seemed to attribute to the medical certificate. Mr Bucknall submitted that his client would be criticised if she took the child to school whilst there was a medical certificate saying that he ought not attend. I think the proper view is it depends very largely on how the medical certificate was obtained, and what made the child present in an anxious and distressed state to the doctor on

8 March 2007.
On the other hand, the father says that between now and the adjourned date of 19 April, he wants the child to spend time with him continuously. He proposes where he can to enrol the child in a school. It would be a government school close by his place of residence. It seems to me that the husband is fairly flexible as the child’s grade of entry. He has misgivings about the child’s academic abilities at the moment, given that he has missed so much school in the past few years. The father’s concerns seem entirely borne out by school records. It may be that the best place for the child would be to start at Grade 5 instead of Grade 7.
The father says that he will obtain or cooperate with a psychiatric assessment of the child as well as an educational assessment. The father makes no secret of the fact that his plans are more for long term than the short term. That is he is looking past the adjourned date as being times that the child may be living with him.
The independent children's lawyer is entirely supportive of the relief sought by the father, at least in the short term.

Legal principles

In determining what should happen between now and 19 April, I must apply Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 as amended in July 2006 by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006. That process is described by the Full court in Goode & Goode [2006] FamCA 1346, a decision of Bryant CJ, Finn and Boland JJ, delivered on 15 December 2006.
Before setting out the process to be undertaken at in an interim hearing, the Full Court in Goode’s case acknowledged that the procedure for making interim parenting orders will be an abridged process where the scope of the enquiry is “significantly curtailed” compared to the ultimate hearing. It said (at paragraph 68):
“…Where the court cannot make findings of fact it should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible. The Court also looks to the less contentious matters, such as the agreed facts and issues not in dispute and would have regard to the care arrangements prior to separation, the current circumstances of the parties and their children, and the parties’ respective proposals for the future.”
The Full court in Goode also dealt with the previously authoritative decision of another Full Court in Cowling’s case (1998) FLC 92-801 which was, of course, decided under different legislative principles to those which we now have. In observing that there are passages in Cowling that do not sit comfortably with the Act as amended, and must be re-considered in the light of changes to the Act, the Full Court then noted (at paragraph 72) that:
“…it can fairly be said there is a legislative intent evinced in favour of substantial involvement of both parents in their children’s lives, both as to parental responsibility and as to time spent with children, subject to the need to protect children from harm, from abuse and family violence and provided it is in their best interests and reasonably practical.”
As to status quo, it continued:
“…where there is a status quo or well settled environment, instead of simply preserving it, unless there are protective or other significant best interests concerns for the child, the Court must follow the structure of the Act and consider accepting, where applicable, equal or significant involvement by both parents in the care arrangements for the child.”
The Full Court then said (at paragraph 73):
“That is not to say that stability derived from a well-settled arrangement may not ultimately be what the court finds to be in the child’s best interests, particularly where there is no ability to test controversial evidence, but that decision would be arrived at after a consideration of the matters contained in s 60CC, particularly s 60CC(3)(d) and s 60CC(3)(m) and, if appropriate, s 60CC(4) and s 60CC(4A).”
The above comments are particularly apposite to this case. They make clear that, in the event that I determine that there is an impediment to the father being able to have a substantial involvement in the child’s life, my task is to address that as and when it arises, even at this adjournment or interim hearing stage, to the extent that to do so is compatible with the child’s best interests and I have evidence upon which I discern it is safe to act.
This is not a case where I am satisfied that the child is in a well-settled arrangement which it is in the best interests of the child to see preserved. I have grave concerns about the wife’s capacity to parent the child vis a vis the extent to which she will permit the child to have a relationship with the father as well as to the extent to which she will go to ensure that does not happen.
The basis for my concerns is canvassed in a report of Dr E dated 4 December 2006. When the wife was assessed by Dr E for the second time in December 2006, Dr E referred to some materials which he had read, indicating a poor attendance by the child at school. On page 2 of his report, he says as follows:
[….]
I also note the report from the [A] Primary School which notates details of student absences which appear to have occurred on a regular basis including late arrivals at school, unexplained absences and absences by parent choice between 3^rd March and 15^th September 2006 involving 31 full day absences, three morning absences and no afternoon absences. I note further handwritten entries from the School dated 7^th July 2006 indicating that [the child] had been left at Aftercare, and that [the child] impressed as anxious. The Mother on one occasion in a phone call, sounded inebriated. On another occasion she stated she was late because she’d been at a meeting, and on another, that her care had been repossessed. A further entry indicates that in attempting to organise for [the child’s] care and issues over lateness and concerns about [the child], [the mother] had hung up on her partner, [Mr O]. At one point, [the child] had elected to walk back home to an unattended residence.
Dr E’s assessment was directed towards assessing the mother's psychiatric and psychological wellbeing with a diagnosis of suspected personality disorder, and the extent that it may impact on the mother's parenting capacity, and if there was any treatment for it. In this respect, Dr E recorded the following as part of his mental state examination of the wife:
[….]
[The mother] presented a rather conflicted and at times somewhat evasive account of current situation and circumstances, essentially denying any contribution to her son’s difficulties, citing these as very much due to his father’s behaviour and lack of support and liability. Whilst she contends that essentially this is a matter for [the child] to decide about, it is apparent, both in respect to my contact with the Family Court Counsellor, and also in respect to [Ms Y’s] assessment of the situation (report dated 17^th May 2004) regarding the issue over various phone calls which [Ms Y] initially described as being of concern as far back as 27^th July 2003.
[Ms Y] further indicated that it was her clinical view that [the mother] was not fully invested in promoting a relationship between [her son] and his father, at times wishing to make unilateral decisions in relation to the amount and degree of contact which [the son] should have with his father.
Whilst [the mother] was at pains to indicate that her motional, psychological and social functioning were entirely fine and normal, and that within herself she was feeling well, I believe this is not the case and that she remains distracted, if not fixated, on the father and his various failings in respect to both [the child] and herself, with accompanying distress and anger, the origins of which she does not fully understand, despite having attended some form of counselling over an undefined period.
In attempting to get some more accurate assessment of her functioning, she became increasingly evasive. Overall I found her account unconvincing. It is apparent that she continues to harbour considerable rage in respect to the father, as evidenced by the phone [call] which the Court is aware of. That phone call attests to the vehemence and hatred that [the mother] experiences directed towards the father and his family, and contains within it a pleading sense of inner disorganisation and a cry for help. These disturbed emotions and unmet needs result I believe (notwithstanding the father’s contribution) in what appears to be an extremely protracted and conflicted situation with significant ramifications in respect to [the child].
Whilst [the mother] was adamant that the [A] Primary School was a bad school for [the child], the report from the school would not indicate that was the case. Further, [the child’s] attendance at school appears to have been significantly impacted upon by absence and [the mother’s] inability to manage aftercare arrangements, appearing inebriated on the phone when discussing some of these, which further attest to her disturbed level of emotional functioning.
Her account as to her move to Brisbane and the reasons for staying there, were difficult to evaluate, and not entirely clear to me. Overall, I believe that [the mother] is having great difficulty in allowing her son to separate from her to the point where he can independently move towards a more functional and ongoing relationship with his father. Her earlier childhood issues of abandonment and abuse play a significant part in that problem.
Cognition – She showed no disturbance of cognitive functioning, but I did note that when describing issues which were emotionally laden, she would talk in a circular fashion, becoming evasive and at times not making sense.
Perception – There was no evidence of psychotic functioning or perceptual disturbance.
Insight – Insight was limited.
OPINION
1. [The mother] presents with significant physical and mental health issues. Her developmental history is consistent with that of early childhood abandonment by her mother and ongoing abuse and family dysfunction in the setting of her relationship between her mother and step father. As indicated in my earlier report, she has also had to deal with the debilitating effects of Crohn’s disease upon her health, and did at one point lose considerable weight and endured bouts of chronic pain and required multiple surgeries. The relationship between herself and her husband presented an escape from these earlier mental and more recent physical health issues.
2. I remain of the view that [the mother] is likely to suffer from a borderline personality disorder. As such, she is prone to issues of abandonment. I believe her sense of abandonment by her husband continues to have significant ramifications for her son, […]. To the degree that her emotional functioning is not what she says it is, there remains unresolved issues which continue to this day to affect [the child] in his emotional functioning.
3. [The mother’s] difficulties in separating from her son and allow for a relationship with his father continue to be an issue of concern. Given the protracted nature of these difficulties, it is paramount that [the child’s] best interests are served.
4. At this point I have significant reservations about [the mother’s] ability to allow for the development of a happy and successful relationship between father and son, and given those concerns, I believe that questions of residence need to be carefully considered by the Court.
At about the same time, the mother, father and the child saw the supervising family consultant Ms B. Her supervising report is dated 30 November 2006 and is on the court file. It is apparent from the report that the child’s presentation before the family consultant was extremely worrying, complex and concerning. The family consultant records as follows:
[The mother] found it difficult to leave [the child] at the court. Mother and son both presented as hostile and antagonistic about complying with court orders. For the next two hours, [the child] presented as enraged, angry, oppositional and defiant. Verbally he was impulsive, had a pressured speech pattern, talked excessively and was unable to engage in reciprocal conversation. [The child] expelled a litany of abuse towards this family consultant and his father. He gesticulated aggressively, was verbally abusive, blasphemous and disrespectful of expected social norms. The purpose of [the child’s] behaviour seemed to be to control the conversation, prevent his father or others from offering information contrary to his own views, and to maintain his rage.
[The child] launched into a long diatribe against his father's behaviours in the distant and recent past. Much of what [the child] said was unintelligible and circular and related to adult issues and disputes. Examples included, "You gave my dog away --- you won't sign and let me go to China --- seven long years --- you fucked up my life," and many other such comments. Despite [the child’s] enduring verbal hostility, he did not physically resist leaving the court environment with his father, and apparently father and son enjoyed some quality time together in the evening.
Then, by way of summary, the family consultant offered the following opinion:
If [the child] is to enjoy the benefit of having access to two involved and appropriate parents in his life, then these parents need to focus on his needs and interests. The status of [the child’s] mental health is paramount at present. It was sufficiently concerning for this family consultant to make a notification of risk to the Department of Human Services, Victoria. [The child] appears to have adopted a mindset of blaming his father for all of his and his mother's difficulties. [The child’s] presentation at court was concerning in that he appeared to lack the internal resources to halt the cycle of intense, blame, rage and anger that he presented with.
Whether [the child’s] presentation is attributable to the mother's direct influence or caused as a result of her own mental health issues is unknown. Regardless of the cause, if this is the situation, the immediate risk to [the child] is that he is exposed to an uncontained and possibly unsafe home environment. The longer term risk for [the child] is, if he doesn't have access to appropriate coping strategies to deal with stress, that he adopts this type of behaviour more readily and for increasingly lengthy periods of time. It is recommended that a thorough investigation of [the child’s] family situation and his own mental health occurs.
If [the child] is not supported to understand the inappropriateness of such behaviour and accept responsibility for his actions, he may continue to believe that it is acceptable to use aggression, abuse and anger to get his needs met. At 12 years of age, this presents him and other children his age with a dilemma in social situation. If [the child’s] concerning emotional presentation is related to the parenting he receives in the mother's care, it would be imperative that this influence is buffered by him maintaining a connected relationship with his father.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that [the child] present for a psychiatric assessment to determine the status of his mental health. It is considered imperative that [the child] spend significant amounts of time with his father. (emphasis added)

On 18 December 2006, both Dr E and Ms B attended court and were cross examined by the father who appeared for himself, Mr Howe of counsel who appeared on behalf of the mother, and Ms Carter of counsel who appeared on behalf of the independent children's lawyer. The cross examination of the experts was conducted concurrently with the consent of all parties. It went for approximately two hours. A transcript of that appears on the court file (39 pages long). So whereas the reports of Ms B and Dr E are reports obtained in interim proceedings, the parties have had the opportunity and indeed have cross examined the experts on those reports. My assessment of the evidence of Ms B and Dr E is that it was not shaken in any sense in cross examination. In fact one of the matters upon which they could also agree was that any time between the father and the child was best spent away from the vicinity of the wife; that is that she should be as far away from the child when he was spending time with his father as was possible.
On 19 December 2006 I made orders. The evidence of Ms B and

Dr E was, in part, the evidence upon which paragraph 6 of orders made by me on 19 December 2006 were made. That order read:
The mother be and is hereby restrained from
(a) accompanying the child on the said flights to Melbourne as set out in paragraph 1.1 and 1.2, and full details of which are annexed hereto; and
(b) from entering the state of Victoria during the times the child is spending with the father pursuant to these orders.
On 19 December 2006 I made orders which provided for the father to spend time with the child for four days in December and for six days in January as may otherwise be agreed between the parties (but none eventuated) and for the matter to be adjourned to me on 20 February 2006 for a determination of what further time ought be spent between the child and his father.
On 20 February 2007 the matter came before Mushin J. The parties had managed to agree to the orders that ought to be made for the child to spend time with the father up until July 2007. the child was to spend time with his father on the weekend commencing 2 March 2007, for the school holidays between 5 and 13 April, for a weekend commencing 18 May 2007, and for some further holiday time between 22 June and 1 July 2007.
Arrangements were made for the child to travel by plane, and an order was made restraining the mother from accompanying the child on any flights to Melbourne or from entering the state of Victoria during the times the child was to spend with his father. It is noteworthy that those orders were made by consent. Still, included in the orders was the provision prohibiting the mother from entering Victoria during periods of time spent by the child with the father and recovery orders were made but stayed. Both provisions are fairly unusual provisions to find in orders sought by consent but, I think, indicate that this matter is one of some complexity.
Unfortunately, to date, the mother has not complied with the orders made by Mushin J. In fact, she now seeks that the operation of them be suspended.
I asked the father to briefly describe from the bar table what evidence he will adduce in support of his application for a change in interim living arrangements for the child. The father said that his concerns about the child and the reason that he should reside with him until further order included the following:
a)Arising out of an incident on 9 February 2005, the wife's licence had been cancelled. She was apparently detained driving under the influence of alcohol and was charged and subsequently convicted of one count of refuse a breathalyser test, two counts of assault police, one count of resist arrest. Her licence was cancelled. That means she is not entitled to drive in Victoria, and she was fined $1,500. There is another charge that in March 2006, she was driving a motor vehicle whilst using a mobile phone. That is apparently awaiting hearing.
b)The father says that the school records produced recently indicate that in the last term of 2006, whilst the child was in the care of the mother in Queensland and attending a school of the mother's choice, of the nine weeks of school in term 4, the child was absent for 19 days. That is about 40 per cent of the time that he had to attend school.
Mr Bucknall submitted that the evidence on which the father wishes to rely predates the last orders made on 20 February 2007. That is correct. There is no change in circumstances arising out of those points which could, in my view, justify a further interim determination of living arrangements in this matter. It is significant, however, that since the last orders were made, the mother has not complied with them and seeks now to suspend them. In my view, that in itself is a basis to revisit the matter. I am also prepared to infer, by the application now made by the mother, a concession that there is a change in circumstances such as warrants a further hearing, because that is what she seeks to do.
The fact that since orders were made on 20 February, the mother has not abided her obligations to provide the child for the only two weekends that he was due to spend time with his father and that the mother has apparently breached an order of the court prohibiting her taking the child for assessment in connection with these proceedings, gives me very little confidence that the arrangements for the child that the mother has made in her household represent a status quo which it is in the child's best interests to preserve.
That being the case, I must consider the matters set out in s.60CC that are relevant to the child’s best interests, and if possible make findings about them, although again it must be acknowledged that in interim proceedings such as these and when orders will operate for something less than a month or something like a month, there may be little uncontested evidence which will enable more than a limited consideration of the matters.
There is no support in the evidence, as I assess it, for the mother’s application to suspend the existing orders for the child to spend time with the father in Melbourne. Mr Bucknall’s submission is that I ought then leave those orders as they are or else allow extra time between the child and the father until 23 March 2007 and then wait to hear the father’s application to vary interim orders in due course.
The supervising family consultant, Ms B, gave evidence to the effect that, in her opinion, the child’s best interests would be served by spending an extended time with the father, uninterrupted between now and the final hearing. Her evidence was:-
It’s been my view for [the child] that the more time he’s away from his father, the more there is to his mental health. When I last saw [the child] with [his father] and his wife […], [the child] presented as happy, relaxed, friendly, open. He expressed a supportive close-knit relationship with his father and with his father’s wife. He described a happy content home environment with hid dad and his dad’s wife. He was respectful, friendly and enjoying his time with his father. That was after having spent – come back down from Queensland and spent a couple of days with him around Christmas time. So for me that was beneficial for [the child] in that he was able to relax and enjoy that time unhindered by his mother’s concerns and influence. So extended periods of time for [the child] at this stage with his father I would be supportive of.
As to what contact the child should have with the mother, Ms B gave the following evidence:-
MS MOONEY:[…] If her Honour was minded to make an order that [the child] come to Melbourne with his father from today and remain with his father until, say, 16 April which is one month away, what sort of communication , if any, or time should he, do you think, have with his mother, if any? - - - I think at this point in time, I still stand by my evidence given at the last court event that I attended and that while [the child] is in his father’s care, his mother’s capacity to communicate with him should be very restricted.
HER HONOUR: What were you thinking that form will take? - - - Possibly supervised telephone call only.
MS MOONEY: Would you have any views about the frequency of that if that was what was ordered? - - - No more than twice a week be my initial instinct.
Ms B is an experienced family consultant in the permanent employ of the court. She has seen the child, quite extensively on 2 occasions. She said that her observations have been across the range, from observing the child at his worst and at his best. It will become apparent that I am satisfied that

Ms B’s professional opinion should carry considerable weight.
I will assess the father’s proposal that the child spend time with him between now and the adjourned date against the mother’s proposal that I leave the orders in tact or, alternatively, that the child have extra time with the father between now and 23 March 2007.

Consideration of the s.60CC matters

I start with the primary considerations.

The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents.

Section 60CC(2)(a) requires me to consider the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with both of his parents. I do not understand the father to be contesting the fact that the child should have a meaningful relationship with his mother or that he does have a meaningful relationship with his mother. Ms B, who gave some evidence today, said that the child was extensively bonded to his mother and that he was sufficiently connected with his mother that in her view no damage would be done to their relationship by the child spending an extended period of time with the father with little communication from the mother.
The child's relationship with the father is more problematic. I do not know whether the mother is contending that there is no benefit to the child in having a meaningful relationship with the father or whether she is contending that the father is incapable of supporting a meaningful relationship with the child. It is clear from the psychiatric assessment of Dr E and the supervisory family consultant's reports, both of late last year, that the mother appears to lack the capacity to permit, much less promote, a relationship between the father and the child. I am, however, confident that the child maintaining a meaningful and viable relationship with his father is in his best interests.

Section 60CC(2)(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.

I have regard is the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm and from being subjected to or exposed to abuse, neglect or family violence. This primary consideration mirrors s.60B(b) of the Act and recognises the necessity of protecting children from physical or psychological harm, including being exposed or subjected to abuse, neglect or family violence.
The term, ‘abuse’ is narrowly defined in s.4 of the Act as ‘an assault, including a sexual assault, of the child’[1] or as the involvement of the child in a sexual activity by a person, where the child is used either directly or indirectly as a sexual object and where there is an unequal balance of power between the child and that person.[2]
[1] s 4(a) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
[2] s 4(b) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
‘Family violence’, however, is given a broader definition as actual or threatened conduct toward another person, their family or their property, which causes reasonable fear or apprehension for their safety and wellbeing.[3]

A notation to the definition in the legislation adds that the standard for such reasonable fear or apprehension is that of the reasonable person in those same circumstances. ‘Neglect’ is not defined in the Act.
[3] s 4 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
I must assess the future risk of exposure by the child to physical or psychological harm and formulate orders which protect him from that harm.
The mother has filed a notice of risk of child abuse. By way of describing the acts or omissions that she alleged constitutes the abuse of the child by the father, she has included the following:
a)Continual derision of the child by both parties; father and spouse.
b)Continual negation and denigration of the child's relationship with the mother through written signage and verbal diatribes by father and his spouse.
c)Withdrawal of familiar contacts; the child's father.
d)Negating and removal of child's medication without professional advice - Ventolin and calmatives, Rescue Remedy - by the father and the spouse.
e)Refusal to provide child with proper bed and sleeping arrangements; father and spouse.
f)Failure to provide any financial support for the child; father and spouse.
Necessarily, the mother’s contentions in relation to abuse pre-date the orders which were made by Mushin J., by consent, on 20 February 2007. The recent affidavit material relied upon by the mother does not particularise the facts and matters on which he contentions of child abuse are based. However, as semaphored in the Notice, I do not find them to be of concern in light of the fact that the mother recently consented to extended overnight time being spent between the father and the child.
On the other hand, the father says that whilst the child resides in the care of the mother, the child is subjected to damaging and psychologically dangerous behaviour, being that of the mother. These are the matters which are dealt with in the report of Ms B, family consultant. My recollection of her evidence on 18 December 2006 was that, whilst the child’s initial presentation to her was verbally violent and bizarre, he ran out of steam and when was told enough was enough and he was going with his father come what may, he went with his father.
There are a number of indications in this case that the mother excites the child into a state of high distress and anxiety when there arises anything to do with the father. I am satisfied that that is a form of child abuse. Depriving the child of a meaningful relationship with his father and of failing to comply with orders of the court that the child spend time with the father is also a form of child abuse.

The additional considerations

The additional considerations listed in s.60CC(3) of the Act are numerous but not exhaustive. It is only necessary to consider those which are relevant to this case. However, where an additional consideration is relevant it may either alone or cumulatively with other considerations outweigh the applicable primary considerations. I therefore propose to have regard to the relevant additional considerations in the context of evaluating the primary considerations, namely, securing for the child the benefit that may flow from having a meaningful relationship with both parents and ensuring that the child is protected from harm and exposure to abuse, neglect or family violence.
Finally s.60CC(3)(m) of the Act requires me to take into account ‘any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant’. This ensures that the infinite variety of individual children’s circumstances can be addressed.[4]
[4] B and B: Family Law Reform Act (1997) FLC 92-755.
The next matter which I consider are any views expressed by the child, and factors such as the child's maturity or level of understanding that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child's views.[5]
[5] s 60CC(3)(a) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
In determining what is in the child’s best interests the Court must consider, amongst other factors, any views expressed by the child and any other factors that the Court thinks are relevant to the weight to be accorded to the child’s views. Previously there was a similar provision,[6] which required the court to take into account the child’s ‘wishes’. There is significant jurisprudence from this court in relation to children’s wishes which, as will become apparent,

I consider relevant and helpful in relation to the Court’s assessment of, and weight to be accorded to, children’s views in the context of s.60CC(3)(a) of the Act.
[6] The repealed s 68F(2) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The Full Court of the Family Court considered children’s wishes in

R & R: Children's Wishes
(2000) FLC 93-000. The Court, there comprising Nicholson CJ, Finn and Guest JJ, cited with approval the following statement of principle drawn from the joint judgment of Fogarty and Kay JJ in H & W (1995) FLC 92-598 at 81,944:
The wishes of children are important and proper and realistic weight should be attached to any wishes expressed by children.
There is a distinction between the concept of children’s wishes and children’s views. ‘Views’ will capture a child’s perceptions, inclinations and feelings but not necessarily involve an aspiration or conclusion. ‘Wishes’ are the result of perceptions, inclinations and feelings coalescing into a specific desire or ambition in the child’s mind. The requirement to focus on the child’s views, as opposed to wishes, means that I may have regard to the child’s perceptions and inclinations without requiring the family consultant or independent children’s lawyer to make enquiries or elicit the child’s ultimate preference or wish.

I agree with the reference in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum[7] that consideration of the children’s views will:
Allow for a decision to be made in consultation with the child without the child having to make a decision or express a ‘wish’ as to which parent he or she is to live or spend time with.[8]
[7] Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005 (Cth).
[8] Ibid paragraph 56.
Consideration of a child’s views does not exclude consideration of a child’s wishes.
Once a child's views are ascertained, the next step in interpretation and assessment of these views requires a balancing of the views against the applicable primary and additional considerations which are relevant to the child's welfare. This process was is described by the Full Court in R & R , in relation to children’s wishes, as follows:-
42. […] the court will attach varying degrees of weight to a child's stated wishes depending upon, amongst other factors, the strength and duration of their wishes, their basis, and the maturity of the child, including the degree of appreciation by the child of the factors involved in the issue before the court and their longer term implications. Ultimately the overall welfare of the child is the determinant. That is so because the legislation says so and also because long before specific legislation the practice of the Court in its parens patriae jurisdiction established that view.
54. […] There are many factors that may go to the weight that should be given to the wishes of children and these will vary from case to case and it is undesirable and indeed impossible to catalogue or confine them in the manner suggested. Ultimately it is a process of intuitive synthesis on the part of the trial judge weighing up all the evidence relevant to the wishes of the children and applying it in a commonsense way as one of the factors in the overall assessment of the children's best interests.
I consider that in the discussion by the Full Court in R & R, reference to ‘wishes’ may be read interchangeably for ‘views’.
The court may inform itself of views expressed by children by having regard to anything contained in a report given to the Court by a family consultant[9] or other expert or appropriately qualified person retained by the parties or through the independent children’s lawyer.[10]
[9] ss 60CD(2)(a), 62G(2) and 62G(3A) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the last provision of which generally requires the person giving the report to ascertain the child’s views and include them in the report.
[10] ss 60CD(2)(b), 62G(2) and 68LA(5)(b) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the last provision of which requires an independent children’s lawyer to ensure that the child’s views are put before the court.

Does the s.61DA presumption of equal shared parental responsibility apply?

I must decide whether the presumption in s.61DA that equal shared parental responsibility is in the best interests of the child applies or does not apply because there are reasonable grounds to believe there has been abuse of the child or family violence or, in an interim matter, the court does not consider it appropriate to apply the presumption.
Section s.61DA(3) that provides that, although the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility (ie: not equal time) applies in interim hearings, it will not be applied if the court considers it would not be appropriate in the circumstances to apply it.
In Goode's case the Full Court said that s.61DA(3) does not create a discretion to be exercised in a broad exclusionary manner, but only in circumstances where limited evidence may make the application of the presumption, or its rebuttal, difficult. I regard this as such a case. This is an interim case. I have not heard from either of the parties as to whether there should be any alteration in parental responsibility over and above submissions I have taken in relation to the father’s responsibility or otherwise to enrol the child in school whilst the child is in Melbourne. I have not had an opportunity to assess all of the evidence which would be relevant although I very much doubt that between now and a final hearing, the parents will demonstrate an ability to make decisions jointly.
I do not consider that this is a matter in which it would be appropriate for me to recast parental responsibility over the next 4 weeks, save for in the area of the child’s education.
According to Goode's Case, even where I do not apply the presumption in relation to equal shared parental responsibility, then I should still consider equal time or substantial and significant time, especially if one of the parties has sought it or, even if neither has sought it, if the court considers after affording procedural fairness to the parties it to be in the best interests of the child.

Equal time

In the circumstances of this case, equal time between the parents is simply impracticable. Neither party proposes it. The wife has unilaterally relocated the child to Queensland and refused to return to Melbourne, notwithstanding that orders have been made for her return, albeit they have not been pressed at this stage.

Substantial and significant time

Likewise, this is not a case where I could consider that substantial and significant time is a realistic consideration for me on an interim basis. The parents are in different states. There is no demonstrable capacity for them to communicate with each other.

Conclusion

In case it is not clear, the orders that I have made are orders which are designed to protect the child’s emotional wellbeing between now and mid-April when

I can look at the matter, after the wife has had a chance to respond to the father's application for an interim change in residence. For the time being, I am satisfied that to leave the child in the care of the mother would be deleterious to the child’s emotional and mental wellbeing as well as to place in peril, and perhaps beyond salvation, the child’s ongoing relationship with the father.
I will provide the father with authority to enrol the child in school if he decides that is the best course for the child. I note the comments about the child’s small stature. He is born in September 1994. He may be not out of place in grade 5 rather than grade 6. It seems to be unlikely that he could fit in to the first year of high school in Victoria, which is the equivalent of the last year of primary school in Queensland and I have already said that I accept Ms B’s evidence that the school environment should be not be too challenging for the child in the short term. These are matters which should follow on an educational assessment. In the meantime I have no doubt that any short-term disruption to the child’s schooling will be more than offset by the potential benefit of the child being able to spend some interrupted, extensive and hopefully calm time with his father. I also accept the evidence of the family consultant that the child should be provided with structured activities, like a school holiday program and not left to his own devices which could result in over exposure to electronic games and a feeling of isolation.
It is for the above reasons that I have made the orders which I set out at the beginning of this judgment.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and twenty seven (127) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Bennett

Associate:

Date: 30 March 2007

IT IS NOTED that this judgment for all publication and reporting purposes be referred to as HAMLEY & HAMLEY

[2007] FamCA 280

16 March 2007

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Civil Procedure

Legal Concepts

Jurisdiction

Procedural Fairness