Hamersley Resources Limited formerly known as Broken Hill Consolidated Limited v Roberts

[2005] NSWWCCPD 127

WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR

CITATION:Hamersley Resources Limited formerly known as Broken Hill Consolidated Limited v Roberts [2005] NSWWCCPD 127

APPELLANT:  Hamersley Resources Limited formerly known as Broken Hill Consolidated Limited

RESPONDENT:  Allan Roberts

INSURER:Hamersley Resources Limited formally known as Broken Hill Consolidated Limited

FILE NUMBER:  WCC13840-03

DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION:          2 February 2004

DATE OF APPEAL DECISION:  7 November 2005

SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Section 66 and Schedule 6, Part 6, clause 3 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; binaural hearing loss; date of injury and the effect of Medical Panel Certificate.

PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER:  Acting Deputy President Michael Sassella

HEARING:On the papers

REPRESENTATION:  Appellant: Cutler Hughes & Harris

Respondent: Paul J Keady & Associates Pty Ltd

ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:  The decision of the Arbitrator is confirmed.

The costs of the appeal are to be paid by the Appellant Employer, as agreed or assessed.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL

1. On 3 March 2004 the Appellant, Hamersley Resources Limited, formerly known as New Broken Hill Consolidated Limited (‘the Appellant Employer’), sought leave to bring an ‘Appeal Against Decision of Arbitrator’ in the Workers Compensation Commission (‘the Commission’) against a decision, dated 2 February 2004.

1. The Respondent to the Appeal is Allan Roberts (‘the Respondent Worker’).

1. The Respondent Worker is aged 62, having been born on 6 April 1943.  In 1965 he began working as a miner for New Broken Hill Consolidated Limited, a corporation which, as Hamersley Resources Limited, is currently self-insured for the purposes of workers compensation.  His employment exposed him to industrial noise.  He last worked for the Appellant Employer on 6 December 1985.

1. The Respondent Worker made a claim for workers compensation in respect of industrial deafness in 1986.  This claim resulted in the insurer agreeing to pay the Respondent Worker lump sum compensation under section 16 of the Workers Compensation Act 1926 (Repealed) (‘the 1926 Act’). 

1. On 11 November 1986 the Respondent Worker signed a receipt accepting an assessment of his hearing loss at that time as 16% loss of hearing in his left ear and 12% loss of hearing in his right ear.  This resulted in compensation assessed as $2,506.00 in total.  The Respondent Worker, in signing this receipt, accepted the total amount in “full settlement” of his claim.

1. On 19 June 2003 the Respondent Worker, through his solicitor, lodged with the Appellant Employer’s solicitor a claim for compensation for non-economic loss related to his hearing loss pursuant to section 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (‘the 1987 Act’). Based on an assessment completed by a Medical Panel under section 122 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’), the Respondent Worker argued that he had a diminution of 19% in his left ear and a diminution of 21% in his right ear. It was acknowledged that credit would be given to the Appellant Employer for the $2,506.00 already paid in 1986.

1. On 30 June 2003 the solicitor for the Appellant Employer advised the Respondent Worker’s solicitor that the Appellant Employer did not accept liability for the compensation claimed on the basis that the Respondent Worker had been compensated on 11 November 1986 for his loss as suffered on the deemed date of injury.  This letter also stated that the certificate of a Medical Panel is not binding as to the cause of a worker’s loss.  It was said to be binding merely as to the extent of the loss suffered as at the date of the certificate.

1. On 19 August 2003 the Respondent Worker lodged with the Commission an ‘Application to Resolve a Dispute’.  The Respondent Worker summarised his claim.  He sought compensation for a permanent impairment in the form of binaural hearing loss at a level of 19.6%.  He quantified his claim as $3,580.00.  The 19.6% assessment was that recorded in the Medical Panel’s Certificate dated 16 April 2003.  That certificate was attached and contained the following particulars:

·     The Respondent Worker had partial bilateral loss of hearing due to industrial deafness.

·     With no allowance for presbycusis (a lessening of hearing acuteness resulting from degenerative changes in the ear that occurs especially in old age), there was a 23% diminution in left-side hearing and 25% in right-side hearing.  Allowing for presbycusis, the percentage diminution was 19% in the left ear and 21% in the right ear.  This was corrected to 19.6% binaural hearing loss.

·     The Respondent Worker did not suffer any loss of hearing in either ear as a result of any condition other than industrial deafness. 

1. The parties were unable to reach agreement and the Arbitrator determined the matter on the papers after a teleconference.

THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW

1. The Certificate of Determination, dated 2 February 2004, records the Arbitrator’s orders as follows:

“The determination of the Commission in this matter is as follows:

1.That the Respondent [the Appellant Employer in the present appeal] pay to the Applicant the sum of $7,686.00 pursuant to Section 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.

2.That the Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.”

1. The Arbitrator’s reasoning commenced with the finding that the Commission has jurisdiction in this matter despite the Appellant Employer’s argument that it does not because the Respondent Worker has already been paid. The Arbitrator proceeded to find that the measure of the Respondent Worker’s loss is the loss as certified by the Medical Panel, that is 19.6% binaural hearing loss. He then found that the Respondent Worker had not been paid for that loss as he had been paid for a loss of only 12.8% binaural hearing loss. He concluded by referring to the transitional provision, Schedule 6, Part 6, clause 3 of the 1987 Act (‘the Transitional Provision’). He found that the Respondent Worker was not precluded from receiving compensation for the full amount of his loss because he had not received compensation for his loss in 1986, having received an amount referable to only 12.8% loss whereas the amount should have been referable to a 19.6% binaural hearing loss.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

1. The issues in dispute in the appeal are:

a)Did the Arbitrator err in deciding that he was bound to give effect to the certificate given by a Medical Panel?

b)Did the Arbitrator err in deciding that the Transitional Provision in clause 3, Part 6 of Schedule 6 of the 1987 Act did not stand in the way of the Respondent Worker receiving compensation under section 66 of that Act?

ON THE PAPERS REVIEW

1. Section 354(6) of the 1998 Act provides that, if the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under the 1998 Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.

2. The Appellant Employer asked that oral submissions be taken by the Commission because the issues arising in this case arise in many cases involving ex-employees from Broken Hill mines.  I note that the Appellant Employer has made extensive written submissions in this case on matters that are essentially matters of law.  The Respondent Worker has also provided comprehensive submissions.  I do not see any need for oral submissions in addition to those already before me.  Having regard to Practice Directions Numbers 1 and 6, the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.  The Respondent Worker agreed to this course of action in his submissions. 

LEAVE

1. Before proceeding to deal with an appeal the Commission must determine whether the application meets the requirements of section 352 of the 1998 Act which governs whether the Appellant Employer should be allowed leave to appeal.  Two criteria that must be met are (i) that the amount of compensation at issue on the appeal is both at least $5,000 and at least 20% of the amount in the decision appealed against (section 352(2)); and (ii) the appeal was made within 28 days after the making of the decision appealed against (section 352(4)). 

1. The amount in issue in this appeal is $7,686.00 and, if the Appellant Employer succeeds, 100% of that amount will not be payable to the Respondent Worker.  The requirements in section 352(2) of the 1998 Act are therefore met.  The appeal was not lodged within 28 days of the Arbitrator’s decision.  It was lodged a day late.  Deputy President Fleming resolved this issue on 20 September 2004 when she granted the Appellant Employer leave to appeal despite this non-compliance with section 352(4).  Deputy President Fleming acted in accordance with Rule 71(1) of the Workers Compensation Rules 2003 which permits the Commission to extend the time for lodging an appeal.

1. Leave to appeal is granted.

EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS

1. The Appellant Employer presented a number of submissions which are summarised as follows:

a)The Arbitrator failed to give proper reasons for his findings and/or that the Arbitrator failed to properly disclose his reasoning process.

b)The Arbitrator failed properly to apply the law.

c)The Arbitrator failed to properly consider section 17 of the 1987 Act and the date of injury.

d)The Arbitrator failed to give proper weight to the Transitional Provisions.

e)The Arbitrator failed to give proper weight to the opinion of Dr J H Seymour, Ear, Nose and Throat specialist, dated 28 October 2002.

f)A certificate from a Medical Panel is not always binding.  The Compensation Court of New South Wales decision in Kelly v Lake Macquarie City Council (unreported, 3 June 2003) (‘Kelly’) is cited in support.  In addition, it is argued that the Arbitrator failed to properly consider the effect of the certificate in regarding it as conclusive and binding as regards the date of injury. 

g)The Arbitrator erred wholly in finding the Respondent Worker entitled to further compensation for an increase in his industrial deafness when he had already been compensated after the last date of his noisy employment.

1. The Respondent Worker’s representative presented submissions.  The cogent submissions from that list are summarised as follows:

a)The Respondent Worker suffers from industrial deafness because of his noisy employment. 

b)The Respondent Worker received compensation from the Appellant Employer on 11 November 1986.

c)The Respondent Worker is entitled to have the extent of his loss determined by a Medical Panel under section 122 of the 1998 Act. The certificate issued by such a Medical Panel is conclusive as regards the matters certified in the certificate.

d)The Respondent Worker cannot be said to have received compensation, as he was not paid in accordance with the extent of his loss as determined by the Medical Panel as applying on the deemed date of injury.

e)The effect of the Medical Panel’s certificate is that the Respondent Worker’s deemed loss as at the date of his last employment with the Appellant Employer is settled. 

f)The Appellant Employer is entitled to have credit in respect of the amount paid to the Respondent Worker in 1986 but cannot rely on the earlier payment as an estoppel because the Appellant Employer did not pay compensation commensurate with the full extent of his loss.

g)It is not suggested by the Respondent Worker that his hearing has deteriorated since he left the Appellant Employer’s employment.

1. Dr John C Rice, a surgeon, saw the Respondent Worker on 28 October 1986 and reported to New Broken Hill Consolidated Ltd that the Respondent Worker had 16% (left ear) and 12% (right ear) deafness.  Dr J Cullen, apparently a medical referee for workers compensation purposes in 1986, adopted Dr Rice’s assessment as part of the process leading to the compensation paid in 1986.  The Appellant Employer made a submission tending to suggest that Dr Cullen’s assessment had the same force in 1986 as the certificate of a Medical Panel now has under the 1998 Act.  The Respondent Worker submitted in response that Dr Rice had in fact performed that assessment and that he was not a medical referee under the 1926 Act.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

1. One of the submissions is easily dealt with. The Appellant Employer submitted that the Arbitrator provided no proper reasons. In fact, the Arbitrator provided reasons sufficient to satisfy the requirements in Rule 73 of the Workers Compensation Commission Rules 2003. I have summarised the reasons in paragraph 11 above. This submission therefore has no force. The correctness of those reasons is discussed below.

Did the Arbitrator err in deciding that he was bound to give effect to the certificate given by a Medical Panel?

1. The claim for compensation in this matter was made on the Appellant Employer on 19 June 2003.  It is therefore a “new claim” in accordance with the definition in section 250(1) of the 1998 Act. 

1. However, prior to that, at some time before 19 March 2001, the Respondent Worker had sought the same compensation.  On 19 March 2001 the Appellant Employer wrote to the Respondent Worker’s solicitors declining to pay compensation.  Unfortunately that letter does not refer to the date of the Respondent Worker’s claim, and the Respondent Worker’s claim letter is not in the possession of the Commission. 

1. While the claim that led to the current appeal is a new claim, the earlier claim led to the production of a certificate dated 16 April 2003 issued by a Medical Panel (see paragraph 8 above).  The effect of legislative amendments commencing on 1 January 2002 was that new claims matters were no longer appropriate for referral for assessment by a Medical Panel.  An approved medical specialist (‘AMS’) was to be used instead. 

1. Despite that, clause 227 of the Workers Compensation Regulation 2003 provides that a certificate by a Medical Panel issued on or after 1 April 2002 is effective, provided the medical dispute to which the certificate relates was referred to the Medical Panel before 1 April 2002. The material before the Commission does not include the document of referral to the Medical Panel in this case. However, I find that the referral did occur prior to 1 April 2002. As a matter of commonsense, it is highly unlikely that the Commission would have referred a dispute to a Medical Panel on or after 1 April 2002 if the certificate that would issue as a result were to be inoperative. The referral would have been to an AMS. I further note that neither of the parties has raised the validity of the Medical Panel Certificate as an issue in their submissions.

1. Section 122 of the 1998 Act therefore applies and operates as follows:

·     There must be a “medical dispute” that the Registrar of the Commission can refer to a Medical Panel (section 122(2)).

· One type of medical dispute is a disagreement between a worker and the employer as to the worker’s condition (section 122(1)). There is in this case such a dispute. Section 122(12) provides that, where there is disagreement between a worker and the employer as to whether, or to what extent, the incapacity of the worker is due to the injury, the section applies as if the question were one as to the condition of the worker. Although section 122(12) refers to a dispute as to an “incapacity” as the basis for there being a medical dispute, section 122 applies also to a dispute regarding permanent impairment. Armitage J confirmed this in Kegg v Bankstown City Council (2001) 22 NSWCCR 486 where he held that the expression “medical dispute” in relation to a “worker’s condition” in section 122 of the 1998 Act refers to a dispute about a worker’s entitlements under section 66 of the 1987 Act.

·     Where such a dispute exists the Registrar must refer it to a Medical Panel if either the worker or employer applies for such a referral (section 122(2)).  It appears from the papers that the Respondent Worker so applied in this case and the Registrar arranged the referral.

·     Whereas the Registrar can in some circumstances refer the dispute to a medical referee, this is prohibited where the dispute, as here, concerns the extent of a loss, or further loss, of hearing due to boilermaker’s deafness or any deafness of a similar origin (section 122(3)).  The referral must be to a Medical Panel.

·     The Medical Panel is to give a certificate as to, in this case, the worker’s condition (section 122(5)).  The certificate in this case was dated 16 April 2003.  The contents of the certificate are summarised above in paragraph 8.

·     Any such certificate of a Medical Panel “is conclusive evidence as to the matters certified” (section 122(6)).  Some exceptions appear but do not apply here.  This means that the certificate is conclusive in stating that the Respondent Worker suffered 19.6% binaural hearing loss on the deemed date of injury and that he does not suffer from any loss of hearing of either ear due to a condition or conditions other than the condition known as boilermaker’s deafness or any deafness of the like origin.

1. However, the Appellant Employer has submitted that there is authority that a certificate from a Medical Panel is not always binding.  The case of Kelly (paragraph 18 above) requires consideration. The court in that case considered a claim for compensation for binaural hearing loss where the claimed benefits were weekly payments and hearing aids. It was not, as here, a non-economic loss case. A “medical board certificate” was admitted into evidence but, as His Honour held in paragraph 22, “All parties agree that the certificate is not binding in view of the fact that the applicant’s claim is only for weekly payments rather than for a lump sum for industrial deafness under s 66 of the [1987] Act.”

1. I therefore find that the Kelly case is unconvincing as an authority in the present case.  The Medical Panel certificate is conclusive as regards the percentages of hearing loss in each of the Respondent Worker’s ears and as regards his binaural hearing loss.  Further, as the Compensation Court of New South Wales held in Smith v Norton (1996) 13 NSWCCR 227, a Medical Panel certificate does more than simply certify the degree of physical impairment the worker is suffering at the time of the Medical Panel’s assessment. The certificate is also conclusive as regards the aetiology of the disease.

1. There is authority also that the certificate of a Medical Panel relates to the condition of the worker as at the date of injury.  As will be seen below, the deemed date of the Respondent Worker’s injury is the date when he ceased employment with the Appellant Employer, which in this case is 6 December 1985.  In Australian Iron and Steel Pty Ltd v McAuley (1984) 1 NSWCCR 33 (‘McAuley’) Mahoney JA noted that the Compensation Court judge accepted the finding of the medical board made on 10 August 1983 as establishing that the worker's loss of hearing as at 18 November 1974 was 20%.  This assumed that the medical board's finding in 1983 could be taken to establish what was the loss in 1974.  The judge accepted that this was appropriate and Mahoney J did not think that exception could be taken to that finding in that appeal.  In that case, as in the current case, the worker had not been exposed to any industrial noise after the deemed date of injury. 

1. This provides a pointer to the resolution of the matter discussed above in paragraph 20. Regardless of the status of any opinion of a medical referee under the 1926 Act, the 1987 Act requires all claims as of 1 July 1987 to be determined in accordance with the 1987 Act, subject to the effect of any transitional or savings provisions in the 1987 Act. Clause 4 of Part 12 of Schedule 6 of the 1987 Act provides that a certificate or report from a medical referee or Medical Panel given before the commencement of operation of the medical assessment provisions in the 1987 Act, provisions now located in the 1998 Act, are deemed to have been given under the corresponding provisions of the 1987 (or 1998) Act. As the summary of section 122 of the 1998 Act in paragraph 26 above indicates, the certificate of a Medical Panel is preferred over that of a medical referee.

1. In Electricity Commission of New South Wales v Mifsud (1986) 7 NSWLR 730 (‘Mifsud’) McHugh J, as he then was, in the Court of Appeal, referred to the McAuley case.  He rationalised the McAuley decision (paragraph 29 above) by noting that the worker was paid compensation in 1974 on the basis that he had lost only 18.8% in his left ear. However, the medical board in 1983 assessed the true level of loss at 20% as at the notional date of injury, 18 November 1974. The transitional provision which, in that case, had the same effect as in the current case, did not defeat the worker because he had not received the compensation prescribed by section 16 of the 1926 Act.

1. This was essentially the analysis that the Arbitrator in this case adopted.  In my view he committed no error in doing so.  Relying on the remarks of McHugh J in Mifsud (paragraph 31 above) I see no reason to move away from an interpretation of the Medical Panel’s certificate to the effect that the Respondent Worker suffered from an impairment in the nature of binaural hearing loss at a level of 19.6% as at the notional date of injury, 6 December 1985, as explained in paragraph 30 below.  Having received compensation for only 12.8% binaural hearing loss the Respondent Worker remains to be compensated for the additional 8.8% required to match the Medical Panel’s assessment of a 19.6% loss.

1. The notional date of injury is established in section 17 of the 1987 Act. Section 17 applies to an injury involving a loss of hearing caused by a gradual process. That was the case in the Respondent Worker’s situation. Section 17 applies despite it being in an Act passed after the Respondent Worker left the noisy employment. Clause 1 of Part 2 of Schedule 6 of the 1987 Act provides that Part 2 of the 1987 Act (which contains section 17) applies whether the injury was received before or after the commencement of Part 2 of the 1987 Act.

1. Section 17 has the effect that the deemed date of injury for hearing loss, caused by a gradual process, is the date when the worker gives notice of the injury if he or she is, at that time employed in the employment that caused the injury (section 17(1)(a)(i)) or, if the worker has left employment, on the last day on which the worker was employed in an employment of the type that caused the injury (section 17(1)(a)(ii)).  The Respondent Worker did not give notice of his injury until 1986, after he had left the employment of the Appellant Employer.  Sections 17(1)(a)(ii) therefore applies and the deemed date of injury was 6 December 1985. 

Did the Arbitrator err in deciding that the Transitional Provision did not stand in the way of the Respondent Worker receiving compensation under section 66 of the 1987 Act?

1. Clause 3 of the Transitional Provision is headed “Compensation for loss not payable if awarded or paid under former Act – occupational diseases” and provides that compensation is not payable to a worker who has suffered a loss of a thing mentioned in the Table to Division 4 of Part 3 (ie sections 65 – 73) of the 1987 Act, being an occupational disease within the meaning of section 71 of the 1987 Act, if compensation for the loss was awarded to the worker, or the worker received or agreed to receive compensation for the loss, in accordance with section 16 of the 1926 Act.

1. At first sight this provision applies to the Respondent Worker in that he was paid compensation under section 16 of the 1926 Act in respect of hearing loss, an item referred to Division 4 of Part 3 of the 1987 Act in sections 69A and 69B.  Section 71 of the 1987 Act has been repealed.  However, in Callaby v State Transit Authority (NSW) (2000) 21 NSWCCR 216 Neilson J decided that an occupational disease within the meaning of section 71 of the 1987 Act ought to be construed as “an occupational disease” within the ordinary meaning of that expression. The result is that, despite the repealing of section 71, workers with industrial deafness whose deemed date of injury was prior to the commencement of the 1987 Act may be compensated in accordance with Schedule 6, Part 6, clause 3A of the 1987 Act if the conditions of that provision are met. The Respondent Worker’s deemed date of injury predated the commencement of the 1987 Act.

1. However, clause 3, on the reasoning in paragraphs 27 and 28 above, does not apply to debar the Respondent Worker from the benefit of the findings of the Medical Panel because technically he was not compensated under the 1926 Act, as he should have been. The matter would be different if he had received compensation for hearing loss equivalent to a binaural hearing loss impairment rated at 19.6% or above. Clause 3 would then apply to prevent any further payment under section 66 of the 1987 Act.

1. Other clauses in Part 6 of Schedule 6 affect the Respondent Worker’s compensation entitlement. Clause 3A(2) provides that, in determining the lump sum compensation payable under section 66 of the 1987 Act, where, as here the hearing loss occurred before the commencement of section 66 and was not compensated before the commencement of section 66, then the amount of compensation payable is to be determined as if the relevant maximum amount under section 66(1) was $80,000, the maximum in force on the date of commencement of section 66. The Arbitrator used this figure and correctly applied the statutory formula in determining that the Respondent Worker was entitled to compensation pursuant to section 66 in the amount of $10,192.00 with a deduction of $2,506.00 for the amount paid in 1986.

1. Schedule 6, Part 6, clause 2 of the 1987 Act prevents any payment in respect of pain and suffering under section 67 of the 1987 Act where, as in the present case, the date of injury precedes the date of commencement of section 67. However, the Respondent Worker has not claimed compensation under section 67 so there is no issue here on that matter.

1. The requirement in clause 9 of Part 6 of Schedule 6 of the 1987 Act, that a worker seeking compensation for permanent impairment resulting from industrial deafness must have at least a 6% binaural hearing loss due to the industrial deafness, is satisfied in the present case, noting that the Respondent Worker’s loss has been assessed at 19.6% binaural hearing loss.

Summary

1. In paragraph 18 above I summarised the seven submissions made by the Appellant Employer.  I am satisfied that the Arbitrator’s decision was not affected by any legal, factual or discretionary error and in relation to those submissions I find as follows:

·     I have already found in paragraph 21 above that the Arbitrator gave proper reasons for his decision and this ground of appeal fails.

·     I have found in paragraph 38 above that the Arbitrator did not err in law. He properly applied the law and came to the correct conclusion.

·     The Arbitrator did not err in his discussion of the deemed date of injury.  He identified that date in paragraph 3 of his reasons for decision, referring to, and applying the correct statutory provision.

·     The Arbitrator dealt appropriately with, and correctly applied, the Transitional Provision.  He reached the same conclusion as I have done and for similar reasons.

·     The Arbitrator did not deal inappropriately with the opinion of Dr Seymour.  Dr Seymour addressed the question of whether industrial deafness can become worse after the affected worker is removed from the noisy employment environment.  Dr Seymour’s opinion was that the condition would not become worse.  The Respondent Worker was not, however, arguing that the industrial deafness had worsened.  His case was that its extent had been underestimated in 1986.

·     The Arbitrator was correct in considering himself bound by the Medical Panel’s certificate for reasons set out in paragraphs 24 and 25 above.

1. The Respondent Worker’s submissions were summarised above in paragraph 19.  As is clear from a reading of those submissions and the conclusions I have reached, I have accepted those submissions in their entirety.

DECISION

1. The decision of the Arbitrator is confirmed.

COSTS

1. The costs of the appeal are to be paid by the Appellant Employer, as agreed or assessed.

Michael Sassella

Acting Deputy President  

7 November 2005

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF MICHAEL SASSELLA, ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.

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