Hamblin & Dahl
[2010] FMCAfam 514
•24 May 2010
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HAMBLIN & DAHL | [2010] FMCAfam 514 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property – de facto relationship – jurisdiction – length of relationship – aggregation of periods of relationship. WORDS & PHRASES – “total of the periods….of the relationship” s.90SB(a). |
| Family Law Act 1975, ss.4AA, 90RD, 90SB(a) Family Court Act 1997, s.205Z |
| L and C [2005] FCWA 23; (2006)DFC 95-327 Cody v JH Nelson Pty Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 629 Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370 |
| Applicant: | MS HAMBLIN |
| Respondent: | MS DAHL |
| File Number: | LEC 108 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Demack FM |
| Hearing date: | 18 May 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 18 May 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 24 May 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Ms McDiarmid |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | GJ Legal Solicitors |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Gordon |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | BL Crane & Associates |
ORDERS
That pursuant to s.90RD(1) of the Family Law Act, it is declared that a de facto relationship of at least two years existed between the Applicant and the Respondent.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Hamblin & Dahl is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
LEC 108 of 2010
| MS HAMBLIN |
Applicant
And
| MS DAHL |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Between March 1994 and December 1998, and then again between April 2008 and October 2009, the applicant and the respondent were in a de facto relationship. They disagree how they should categorise their relationship for the in-between years, other than from May 2006 to April 2008 when they agree that the applicant was in a de facto relationship with another person.
The parties disagree as to whether the Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened.
The relevant section of the Family Law Act 1975 reads s.90SB(a):
A court may make an order under section 90SE, 90SG or 90SM, or a declaration under section 90SL, in relation to a de facto relationship only if the court is satisfied:
a) that the period, or the total of the periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years;…
The applicant’s argument
In the absence of any qualification contained in the relevant provisions, the words “…that… the total of the periods… is at least 2 years” must be given their plain meaning. Any other outcome than the one sought by the applicant is a nonsense. The first and second periods of the de facto relationship were with the same person.
These amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”) were clearly drawn to ensure that all classes of de facto relationships would be included and to provide for access to the full range of property adjustments that married couples had long had access to.
The fact that the applicant had formed a de facto relationship with another person is of no moment in determining this question of jurisdiction. The Act contemplates two de facto relationships occurring concurrently.[1]
[1] See s.4AA(5)(b) of the Act
To litigate under the fiction of two separate de facto relationships is to ignore the central issue that it is the same two parties to both relationships. However the period is categorised in-between the de facto relationships and whether it is said that there was an end to the relationship or a breakdown of the relationship, ignores the plain reading of the Act which allows for de facto relationships to have more than one part or time by use of the expression “total of the periods”. As beneficial legislation, it should not be read down.
The respondent’s argument
Each case must be decided on its facts. The facts here include that there was a ten year gap between the first de facto relationship and the second de facto relationship. Further, and importantly, the relationship (however described as it was in 2006) was wholly severed or disrupted by the applicant entering into a new de facto relationship with another person.
The applicant took no steps to bring proceedings within the limitation period after the end of their first relationship. That would have been the proper time to bring such an application. The second relationship was too short to enliven the jurisdiction. It is unfair to the respondent that, after all this time, with the passage of years, with no steps being taken by the applicant, that the respondent should now be called upon to respond to an application for property adjustment. The injustice is highlighted by the fact that the applicant sought a property adjustment following the ending of the intervening de facto relationship and to that end, was aware of her rights.
There is no case law on point. If a de facto relationship has broken down, that is the end of the de facto relationship. If the same people commence a de facto relationship in the future, it is a separate de facto relationship if the facts of the matter demonstrate that to be the case. In this case, a ten year gap and a separate de facto relationship by one of the parties combine to achieve two separate de facto relationships. The application, it is submitted, should be dismissed.
Procedural history
The application was commenced on 25 February 2010 in the local Magistrates Court. An interim order made in the [B] Local Court on
26 February 2010 is presently the subject of appeal.
The respondent filed her material on 23 March 2010 and sought as a final order that the application be dismissed.
On 27 April 2010, I ordered that the discrete issue of jurisdiction be heard on 18 May 2010 and made consequential directions for the filing of documents.
On the morning of 18 May 2010, Counsel for the applicant submitted that the jurisdictional point could be dealt with on the papers. The argument proposed was on two alternate basis: per s.90SB(a) (“…total of the periods….. is at least two years”) and per s.90SB(c) (“…substantial contributions … and … failure to make the order….. would result in serious injustice …”).
Counsel for the respondent was content for the “total of the periods” argument to be determined on the papers, but for viva voce evidence from a witness attending under subpoena. The alternate basis (“substantial contributions” and “serious injustice”) would require cross examination.
On that basis, I determined to have the argument on the “total of the periods”, and following the determination of this issue, I will make directions for the further progression, if any, of the matter.
The evidence
Other than one witness, the hearing has been conducted on the papers. There are many areas of dispute between the parties and I will do my best not to stray into those areas.
The applicant, Ms Hamblin, was born in 1953 and is presently aged 57 years. She is a business owner with experience in [omitted]. She has one adult child.
The respondent, Ms Dahl, was born in 1951 and is presently aged 58 years. She is a business owner, with experience in [omitted]. She seeks to purchase a [omitted] business. She has adult children, plus grandchildren, for some of whom she has provided primary care.
The parties commenced a de facto relationship in either March or May 1994. In December 1999, they ceased to share the same house, when the applicant moved from the respondent’s house in Property R, [B] [B]to a house[2] on Property M, [L]. A relationship in some form continued. The women spent time together, particularly regularly on Sundays, at each other’s homes or at other places.
[2] Which she later came to purchase in 2002.
In February 2005, the applicant met Ms M[3]. They commenced a relationship in March 2006, and on 20 October 2006, the applicant left [L] having sold her home there. The applicant lead Ms M to understand or believe that the relationship that she had with the respondent was over, having ‘run its course’.
[3] The witness under subpoena who gave evidence. Exhibit 1 also refers.
The de facto relationship between the applicant and Ms M ended in April 2008.
In April 2008, the applicant and the respondent commenced living together in a de facto relationship. They separated finally in either October or December 2009 and on 7 January 2010 the applicant moved out of the respondent’s house at Property R, [B], having caused a caveat to be place over the property.
The application was filed on 25 February 2010.
The legislative framework
Section 4AA of the Act relevantly provides:
De facto relationships
Meaning of de facto relationship
(1) A person is in a de facto relationship with another person if:
(a) the persons are not legally married to each other; and
(b) the persons are not related by family (see subsection (6)); and
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of their relationship, they have a relationship as a couple living together on a genuine domestic basis.
Paragraph (c) has effect subject to subsection (5).
Working out if persons have a relationship as a couple
(2) Those circumstances may include any or all of the following:
(a) the duration of the relationship;
(b) the nature and extent of their common residence;
(c) whether a sexual relationship exists;
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between them;
(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of their property;
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;
(g) whether the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory as a prescribed kind of relationship;
(h) the care and support of children;
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
(3) No particular finding in relation to any circumstance is to be regarded as necessary in deciding whether the persons have a de facto relationship.
(4) A court determining whether a de facto relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case.
(5) For the purposes of this Act:
(a) a de facto relationship can exist between 2 persons of different sexes and between 2 persons of the same sex; and
(b) a de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in another de facto relationship.
A Court may declare that a de facto relationship existed under s.90RD(1):
Declarations about existence of de facto relationships
(1) If:
(a) an application is made for an order under section 90SE, 90SG or 90SM, or a declaration under section 90SL; and
(b) a claim is made, in support of the application, that a de facto relationship existed between the applicant and another person;
the court may, for the purposes of those proceedings (the primary proceedings ), declare that a de facto relationship existed, or never existed, between those 2 persons.
and may declare the period or periods of a de facto relationship, per s.90RD(2):
(2) A declaration under subsection (1) of the existence of a de facto relationship may also declare any or all of the following:
(a) the period, or periods, of the de facto relationship for the purposes of paragraph 90SB(a);
(b) whether there is a child of the de facto relationship;
(c) whether one of the parties to the de facto relationship made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c);
(d) when the de facto relationship ended;
(e) where each of the parties to the de facto relationship was ordinarily resident during the de facto relationship.
An order altering the property interests of parties is made pursuant to s.90SM of the Act.
The Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened by s.90SB:
When this Division applies--length of relationship etc.
A court may make an order under section 90SE, 90SG or 90SM, or a declaration under section 90SL, in relation to a de facto relationship only if the court is satisfied:
(a) that the period, or the total of the periods, of the de facto relationship is at least 2 years; or
(b) that there is a child of the de facto relationship; or
(c) that:
(i) the party to the de facto relationship who applies for the order or declaration made substantial contributions of a kind mentioned in paragraph 90SM(4)(a), (b) or (c); and
(ii) a failure to make the order or declaration would result in serious injustice to the applicant; or
(d) that the relationship is or was registered under a prescribed law of a State or Territory.
Any of those provisions established on their own will enliven the jurisdiction.
The only point being agitated presently before me is pursuant to s.90SB(a) of the Act.
Aggregation
The use of the expression “the total of the periods” invites a discussion about aggregating periods. Despite the Explanatory Memorandum[4] asserting that the section is “derived from equivalent provisions operating under state law”, that isn’t precisely correct. It is certainly the case that each state provided for similar notions in attracting jurisdiction. Either:
a)there was a child of the relationship; or
b)the relationship had lasted for a particular length of time; or
c)a party had made substantial contributions and a failure to make an order would result in serious injustice.
[4] Explanatory Memorandum, Family Law Amendments (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) Bill 2008.
Further, there was a geographical nexus with the state that often had to be satisfied.
Here, I am only interested in the time consideration. And the states were not all at one with what was required:
a)Queensland[5], Australian Capital Territory[6] and Victoria[7] require “a period of not less than 2 years”;
b)Northern Territory[8] and New South Wales[9] require “at least 2 years”;
c)Tasmania[10] requires “a continuous period of not more than 2 years”;
d)South Australia[11] requires “at least 3 years”; and
e)Western Australia[12] requires “at least 2 years” and then goes on to relevantly provide at s.205Z(2):
(2)In deciding whether there has been a de facto relationship between the partners for at least 2 years, the court must consider whether there was any break in the continuity of the relationship and, if so, the length of the break and the extent of the breakdown in the relationship.
[5] Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s.287
[6] Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) s.12
[7] Relationships Act 2008 (Vic) s.42
[8] Defacto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) s.16
[9] Property (Relationships) Act 1994 (NSW) s.17
[10] Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) s.37
[11] Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA) s.9
[12] Family Court Act 1997 (WA) s.205Z
Neither the “Explanatory Memorandum” nor the “Second Reading Speech”[13] makes any mention of what might be meant by “total of the periods”.
[13] 25 June 2008 House of Representatives Hansard pp.5823-2825
It is clear from the differing state provisions that Tasmania seemed intent on excluding the aggregation of different periods and that, other than Western Australia, the other states were silent as to aggregation.
The only Western Australian authority to which learned Counsel referred was L and C [2005] FCWA 23; (2006) DFC 95-327. Although Western Australia has s.205Z(2) of the Family Court Act 1997 and the facts in question included the parties having separated for a time, Thackray J found it unnecessary to decide the matter with reference to s.205Z(2).
That case, decided in 2005, was the first Western Australia case on the point[14].
[14] Per paras.8 & 9
Thackray J determined the point by adopting a beneficial interpretation on the first part of the section:
205Z . Where court may make order under this Division
(1)A court may make an order in relation to a de facto relationship only if satisfied —
(a) there has been a de facto relationship between the partners for at least 2 years;
His Honour considered that the first reference to “a de facto relationship” didn’t need to link with the second reference to “a de facto relationship” His Honour considered the use of the indefinite article to be significant. If there was a relationship after the commencement of the Western Australia Act then jurisdiction was enlivened.
There is of course a distinct difference between the Western Australia provisions and the Commonwealth provisions: the definite article (“the”) is used in place of the indefinite article (“a”). The reasoning Thackray J used in his discussion about Western Australia’s s.205Z(1)(a) wherein he considered the use of the indefinite article pertinent, is not applicable to the Family Law Act 1975, and indeed the use of the definite article would mean that the legislature was referring to the same relationship and not a relationship.
Thackray J then embarked upon a further analysis directed to an argument as to whether there was one relationship or two between the parties. The facts in that case included that the parties had been in a de facto relationship from August 1997 to June 2002 and then from January 2003 to May 2004. The relevant provisions of the Western Australia Act had come into force in December 2002.
The discussion commenced at para.29:
29 I suspect it would only be a lawyer (or Judge) who would be tempted to think [the mother] and [the father] had two different de facto relationships. Anyone else who knew them would simply have seen them getting back together and resuming their original relationship. To use the words of Master Macready of the NSW Supreme Court in McKone v Maretta (1999) DFC 95-213, “In one sense having resumed their relationship one might regard it as a continuance of what was the former de facto relationship which existed…”.
30 However, in Lipman v Lipman (1989) DFC 95-068 Powell J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales had occasion to consider a dispute between parties to a failed de facto marriage, who had separated for five months during what otherwise would have been a relationship of more than 12 years duration. His Honour said:-
“First, one must determine whether the relationship between the parties is to be regarded as having been but one “de facto relationship” or as having involved two discrete de facto relationships''.
Although I accept that the concept of “a de facto relationship” does not involve the notion that the parties to it must always be together under the same roof, so that such a relationship may continue to subsist notwithstanding the absence of one party from “the matrimonial home”, and although I do not discount the possibility that “a de facto relationship” may properly be regarded as continuing notwithstanding that the parties may have separated only temporarily while they attempted to work through some difficulty which they had encountered in their relationship, I am quite unable to see how such a relationship can be said to continue in a case, such as this, in which the “de facto husband” requires the “de facto wife'' to leave the “matrimonial home” and instals another in her place. As Mahoney J.A. said in Hibberson v. George ((supra) at p. 75,766):
"The essence of the present relationship lies, not in law, but in a de facto situation. I do not mean by this that cohabitation is essential to its continuance: holidays and the like show this. But where one party determines not to “live together” with the other and in that sense keeps apart, the relationship ceases, even though it be merely, as it was suggested in the present case, to enable the one party or the other to decide whether it should continue.”
I therefore conclude that, in this case, there were two discrete “de facto relationships''.”
31 Powell J’s approach is of considerable persuasive value, but not binding upon me. With the greatest of respect to him, it may be that his Honour posed the wrong question. It is not necessarily helpful to consider whether the de facto relationship was “continuing” during the period when the parties were living apart In the context of Part 5A, the important question is whether the relationship has “ended”. The answer to that question may depend on when it is asked.
32 Legal marriages usually “end”, in popular parlance, when a couple separate. But as a matter of law, such marriages “end” only when a Court dissolves them. Human relationships are very complicated. Many married couples separate, often on more than one occasion. Frequently this occurs without any thought of “working through some difficulty”, to use Powell J’s expression. In such cases it appears at the time that the marriage is over – it has “ended”. However, after the elapse of time – in some instances a very long time - some married couples get back together. No one suggests they have had two marriages, unless of course they have been through the formal process of divorce and subsequent remarriage.
33 These formal, public options are not available to those who live in de facto relationships. Those living in such ex-nuptial relationships, in my view, should be treated in the same way as their married neighbours – after a separation they simply resume their former “marital” relationship – they don’t start another one.
34 Portion of what Powell J had to say in Lipman was cited with approval by his brother, Young J, in Badger v Badger (1990) DFC 95-078 at 76,104. However, Young J did not refer to the conclusion reached by Powell J concerning the existence of two discrete de facto relationships. Indeed his Honour went on to refer, with approval, to Hibberson v George (supra) where Cohen J had said:
"The use of the words “living or having lived together as husband and wife on a bona fide domestic basis” suggest a degree of permanence which will not cease merely because one party separates for the purpose of going on holidays or going on business. Nor would it cease if, after an argument, one party moved out and stayed elsewhere for a short while or went home to his or her family, if there was an intention to return and if there was a reasonable indication of that intention. …
It must be a question of fact whether on separation one party intended that there should be an end to the relationship or whether the parties or either of them acted in such a way as would indicate that that intention existed. Once that intention or indication is found to exist then, as occurred in McRae v. McRae [(1967) 68 S.R. 361], the relationship will only be renewed when the parties actually return and live together. It would not be sufficient merely to form an intention to enter into an agreement to resume life together." (my emphasis added).
35 Although the remarks I have highlighted are only obiter, I consider they point to a better way to conceptualise cases in which there is a break in the continuity of a de facto marriage relationship. Although the de facto marriage may appear to have ended when one party withdraws from the relationship, later events may demonstrate that the relationship was not, in fact, at an end. Instead the parties resume or - to use Cohen J’s word - “renew” their de facto marriage relationship.
36 I conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, that the de facto marriage relationship between [the father] and [the mother] did not end when [the mother] left the home on the first occasion. There was a break in the continuity of the relationship, but their original relationship was resumed when they got back together in late 2002/early 2003. Aggregating the two periods of cohabitation, their de facto marriage lasted much more than two years and ended after the commencement of Part 5A, thereby providing an alternative basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction.
Thackray J made a brief comment about s.205Z(2). At para.38, he stated:
38 That provision is expressly designed to deal with cases where the issue is whether the parties were actually in a de facto marriage relationship for at least two years. Its likely application will be in matters where the beginning and end of the relationship span more than two years, but there is a break in the continuity of the relationship, which, if excluded from the calculation of time, would result in a finding the relationship did not last two years.
That analysis has no bearing on the facts of the case before me. The provision is quite different and in any event, the facts in this case provide for a relationship potentially of over 6 years.
The purposeful difference between the Western Australia legislation and the 2008 amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 is the inclusion of the words “the total of the periods”.
There is a further mention in the Act of de facto relationships including more than one period, per s.90RD(2)(a)[15]:
[15] The provision examined in this decision.
(2) A declaration under subsection (1) of the existence of a de facto relationship may also declare any or all of the following:
(a) the period, or periods, of the de facto relationship for the purposes of paragraph 90SB(a);
Is there something less than plain about the expression “total of the periods of the de facto relationship”?
The applicant argues that the expression is plain and simple. If the legislature had intended to place any parameters around the quantity or quality of the periods, then it was open to the legislature to do so. It didn’t, and so neither should the Court. There being a plain and ordinary meaning of the words, they should be adopted. Certainly there is powerful authority for this proposition – see Dixon J Cody v JH Nelson Pty Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 629 at 647.
The plain meaning is that one simply adds up the periods to make the total.
That argument is strengthened by the application of the rule that if there any ambiguity in beneficial provisions, then any ambiguity should be resolved in the favour of the intended beneficiary: see discussion of this rule by Isaacs J in Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) (1913) 17 CLR 370.
I am satisfied that the provision in s.90SB of the Act is intended to be beneficial. The section is establishing the classes of person who may bring a property application arising from a de facto relationship. It uses either the quantity of the relationship (subs.(a)), or the quality of the contributions (subs.(c)), or the recognition provided by other legislation (subs.(d)) or the binding fabric of a child of the relationship (subs.(b)). Each on their own would be sufficient.
A relationship may be short, but if there is a child or substantial contributions, then that is sufficient to commence proceedings. Or a relationship may be longer or registered under state law and that too would be sufficient.
The twice expressed notion of a relationship being divided into “periods” would invite the beneficial interpretation that a de facto relationship may include periods of separation or other separateness. A marriage may also include such periods. A marriage may have greater hallmarks for determining beginning and end. It is, I suggest, no easier to conclude when final separation has occurred in matters of factual argument for either a marriage or a de facto relationship.
Certainly the introduction of the legislation which expanded the Family Law Act 1975 to include property proceedings in de facto matters in the referring states was, according to the Second Reading speech, done to[16]:
[16] Op.cit, p.5823
provide greater protection for separating de facto couples and simplify the laws governing them.
The Attorney-General went on to say:
....
The reforms will also bring all family law issues faced by families on relationship breakdown within the federal family law regime. The federal family law courts are the specialist courts in Australia with vast experience in relationship breakdown matters. They also have procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms which are more suited to handling family litigation arising on relationship breakdown.
These reforms were designed to keep de facto property matters in the family law jurisdiction.
If the respondent’s approach is correct, on the facts of the case, the applicant is statute barred under the New South Wales Property (Relationships) Act 1994 for the first (part of the) de facto relationship between 1994 and 1998 and would need to seek leave to commence proceedings out of time and for the second (part of the) de facto relationship she would have no recourse under the Family Law Act 1975 unless she could satisfy the provisions of s.90SB(c), limited in time to the eighteen month continuance of the relationship at that time.
The outcome contended for by the respondent would have the parties litigating two separate matters, in two separate Courts, with the attendant costs, financial and otherwise, in both matters.
The outcome contended by the applicant would have litigation confined to the Federal Family Law Courts, where issues to do with commencement and ending of the de facto relationship, including any periods of separation, along with issues which are disputed such as the quantity and quality of the parties separate contributions could be determined.
If one was to approach the provision beneficially the latter interpretation would have to be preferred.
But what if the separation was so marked and lengthy, and included one of the parties having a de facto relationship with another person? If there a complete breakdown in the relationship, how can different time periods be classified as one relationship?
Those questions are best answered through the second discussion Thackray J undertook in L and C as set out from paragraph 41 above.
In essence, it seems to me, that if two people commence or renew a relationship, then absent something extraordinary, they are renewing or recommencing the same relationship they had earlier. It would appear to be a fiction to suggest that two earlier intimates commenced a new relationship, rather than entering a new phase of their lapsed or previous relationship. And it would seem, that within the realms of human experience, having another intimate relationship for either a short or longer time, in the midst of another relationship, is not of itself extraordinary[17].
[17] As could be inferred from the inclusion in the definition section the provision in s.4AA(5)(b):
In this case, it should be remembered that although the parties ceased sharing a common residence in December 1999, from that time until the applicant commence her new de facto relationship with Ms M in 2006, the parties had maintained a relationship of some description. It is not a matter for this decision to clarify that relationship, but some relationship persisted during that time. In so much that it persisted, it provided an on-going link between the earlier and later periods of cohabitation that a ten year gap may not imply.
I cannot see that either the gap between periods of cohabitation, or the intervening de facto relationship between the applicant and Ms M have any extraordinary features which would draw me to the conclusion that these were two separate relationships.
I am satisfied that a plain reading of the provisions should be preferred. The total periods of the relationship exceeded two years. This Court has jurisdiction to determine the matter. Pursuant to s.90RD(1) of the Family Law Act, it is declared that a de facto relationship existed between the Applicant and the Respondent of at least 2 years.
I do not propose to make any findings of fact with respect to the commencement dates nor the dates of separation. Those will be matters for determination, as necessary, at the final hearing.
The parties must now attend to disclosure and the litigation must run its course, which will, of course, include compulsory alternative dispute resolution participation.
I will hear from the legal representatives with respect to directions for the further conduct of the matter.
I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Demack FM
Deputy Associate: A Goodridge
Date: 24 May 2010
“a de facto relationship can exist even if one of the persons is legally married to someone else or in another de facto relationship”
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