Halmi & Halmi
[2025] FedCFamC1F 551
•19 August 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Halmi & Halmi [2025] FedCFamC1F 551
File number(s): SYC 3560 of 2025 Judgment of: CHRISTIE J Date of judgment: 19 August 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – HAGUE CONVENTION – Children brought to Australia from Singapore by the mother – Where it is uncontroversial that the children were habitually resident in Singapore – Where the father seeks a return order – Where the mother opposes any return order on the basis of a grave risk/intolerable situation arising – Where the applicant father has committed family violence against the mother over the length of the relationship – Where the father has a history of alcohol abuse – Where there is a risk of the mother's mental health deteriorating if a return order is made – Where expert evidence says this mental health deterioration would impact upon the children – Where the intolerable situation/grave risk of harm of the children cannot be adequately ameliorated by conditional orders – Discretion to return not exercised – Husband’s application dismissed. Legislation: Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth), r. 16(3)(b), r. 15(1)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s. 111B
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Cases cited: DP v Commonwealth Central Authority; JLM v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (2001) 206 CLR 401; [2001] HCA 39
McDonald & Director-General, Department of Community Services NSW (2006) FLC 93-297; [2006] FamCA 1400
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 115 Date of hearing: 11 - 12 August 2025 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Ms E. Mallett KC with Mr P. Guterres Solicitor for the Applicant: Lander & Rogers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr S. Williams KC with Ms R. Horsley Solicitor for the Respondent: Pearson Emerson Family Law Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr J. Harris Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Legal Aid NSW ORDERS
SYC 3560 of 2025 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR HALMI
Applicant
AND: MS HALMI
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
CHRISTIE J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Form 2 Application filed 29 May 2025 is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHRISTIE J:
These proceedings concern two children, X aged four and Y aged two. This is an application for their return to Singapore pursuant to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction signed at The Hague in 1980 (“the Hague Convention”). The applicant is the father of the children. The respondent is the mother of the children. The interests of the children in the litigation are represented by an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) who acknowledged that the best interests of the children were a relevant but not paramount consideration in this proceeding.
In May 2025 the children travelled to Australia with the mother (and the parties’ nanny). They were scheduled to return. The mother retained the children in Australia without the father’s consent. It is not controversial that the children were habitually resident in Singapore at the time of their retention nor is it in dispute that the father was exercising rights of custody.
I was asked by the father to find that the mother had knowingly used X’s medical needs as a ruse to remove the children from Singapore in order to commence proceedings in Australia. In aid of that conclusion, it was submitted that the rapid filing of her Application in this Court was consistent with the conclusion, as was the availability of appropriate treatment in Singapore. It is conceded by the mother that her retention was wrongful. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that whether the decision was made before or after she left Singapore bears on the disposition of this application (except in so far as it was submitted that it impacts on her bona fides) to which I will return later.
By her Answer, the mother resists the making of a return order in reliance upon the defences in Regulations 16(3)(b) (grave risk/intolerable circumstance) and 16(3)(d) (contrary to human rights/fundamental freedoms) of the Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations 1986 (Cth) (“the Regulations”). No submissions addressed the Regulation 16(3)(d) defence and accordingly, I will proceed to determine the application on the basis that only Regulation 16(3)(b) is pressed.
If I find that the mother has established the matters required by either defence, I may nonetheless exercise my discretion to make an order for return.
These proceedings were listed with expedition. When the material was filed, it was plain that the parties were at issue about the nature and extent of family violence between them and accordingly, cross-examination was permitted.
CONSIDERATION
This is not a decision on the merits as to what orders would be in the best interests of the children. It is accepted, and the supervised contact reports confirm, that these children love and are loved by both their parents and, as the Hague Report writer commented, if they are safe then it is in their interests to see and spend time with both parents.
The Regulations provide that the discretion to dismiss an application for return is enlivened where it is established that:
c) there is a grave risk that the return of the child under the Regulations would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation (reg 16(3)(b));
(emphasis added)
The focus is on the impact of the return on the child. There are a number of parts to the Regulation. In effect it deals with two circumstances:
(1)A grave risk that return of the child would expose the child to:
a. Physical harm; or
b. Psychological harm;
OR
(2)A grave risk that return of the child would expose the child to an intolerable circumstance.
Grave is a qualitative term: DP v Commonwealth Central Authority;JLM v Director-General, NSW Department of Community Services (2001) 206 CLR 401 (“DP v Commonwealth Central Authority”). It requires a finding not that the children will be exposed to physical or psychological harm but rather that there is a grave risk that, upon return, the children will be exposed. Accordingly, it calls for an assessment of future risk in reliance on findings about past and present circumstances.
The issues which the mother submitted give rise to a grave risk of psychological harm or otherwise place the children in an intolerable situation include:
(a)A history of family violence perpetrated by the father towards her over the entirety of the parties’ relationship;
(b)The mother’s mental health and well-being as a consequence of the family violence;
(c)A history of alcohol (and potentially steroid) misuse by the father over a lengthy period of time;
(d)The lack of family and other support for the mother in Singapore;
(e)The reliance upon the father for her immigration status in Singapore;
(f)The impact of the mother’s mental health on her parenting capacity.
The mother carries the onus of establishing that the defence for which she contends is established.
To the extent that it was submitted on behalf of the father that the mother’s conduct in retaining the children in Australia is precisely the type of conduct which the Hague Convention is designed to address, I agree. However, it does not circumscribe the outcome, because a proper reading of the Convention requires that I give attention to the Convention as a whole, which plainly requires a rigorous evaluation of whether the mother has discharged the onus to establish a defence.
Family violence
The mother outlined a lengthy history of family violence starting in 2010 and ending upon separation in 2025. The father agreed that he has engaged in “physical altercations” but denied having hit, choked, kicked or punched the mother. In respect of matters occurring between 2010 and 2017, the father’s position was that he does not recall the events about which the mother gave evidence but said they were “possible”. The father filed an affidavit in reply to the mother’s allegations.
The parties married in 2010. The mother said that on their honeymoon, the father screamed at her and choked her. The father said he did not recall but this may have happened. I accept the mother’s evidence on this issue.
On a date in 2011 the mother said the father repeatedly hit her in the face, and she went to stay with her parents. While the evidence of the maternal grandfather was general in nature, he recalled the mother staying with him on 3-4 occasions between 2011 and 2017 with visible bruising and scratches. The father said in cross-examination that he did not recall the 2011 incident, but he accepted it could have happened. I accept the mother’s evidence.
In mid-2012 the mother said she and the father had an argument in a taxi during which he slammed her head into the taxi window. The father said in cross-examination that he could not recall the incident, but it could have happened. In those circumstances I accept the mother’s evidence.
In 2015 the mother said she and the father had an argument during which he punched her multiple times, leaving a bruise on her right arm. The father said he had not punched or struck the mother but did not recall the incident. He accepted that an incident may have occurred where the mother was injured in the manner depicted in the contemporaneous photograph annexed to her affidavit – showing a bruise to her right arm. I accept the mother’s account.
On 18 June 2016 the mother said that the father hit her with his fists on her head and body, kicked her repeatedly and smashed her phone screen after guests left their home. He had been drinking and resisted her requests that he slow down his consumption. The mother took a taxi to the home of her parents. This event is one which the father said he does not recall but accepts it may have occurred.
On 19 July 2016 the mother raised with the father, via WhatsApp, the fact that the bruises on her face had just faded in the context of her requests that he drink less. It is clear from context that she was referring to the assault in the previous paragraph. The father’s responses themselves are dismissive and abusive. When cross-examined about this event, the father accepted that his alcohol consumption in 2016 was a real problem in the marriage and would lead to events where he was physically abusive of the mother. I accept the event occurred as described by the mother.
On 23 July 2016 the mother said that the father punched her head and body and kicked her repeatedly. After the assault she vomited. She took photographs of her injuries which were included in her affidavit. A few days later, she texted the father to say that she thought she may have been concussed. He responded: Talk later. Prefer not to discuss on tezt [sic] Can you get dry cleaning? When cross-examined about this event, the father accepted that he perpetrated violence on the mother that resulted in bruising. I accept the mother’s evidence.
On 29 July 2017 the mother said the father hit her and squeezed her arm. He was intoxicated.
On 1 December 2017 the mother said the parties fought and as the father was running towards her, she threw a water bottle at him. The mother said the father then kicked her leg repeatedly and pushed her onto the road. The mother attached several photographs of her injuries to her affidavit. The mother raised the assault with the father by text the following day. I accept the incident occurred as the mother deposed.
In early 2018 the mother said the father kicked and punched her while they were both overseas for a friend’s wedding. After this incident the father promised to address his behaviour in therapy. The father accepted that the mother likely raised the violence in family therapy.
The parties attended therapy together. The mother said it ended because the father was not comfortable with the therapist addressing his violence. The father said he left one session early because he was angry the mother had hid his testosterone. It is plain that the father accused the mother of taking his testosterone. He later conceded he had mislaid it.
While the father maintained during his oral evidence that he had not hit the mother, this was inconsistent with the parties’ contemporaneous correspondence. On 4 March 2018 the father sent the mother a message which read in part: “I wish I never hit you.” The father’s affidavit also conceded that while he cannot recall the January 2018 event, he does not deny that it occurred. I accept the mother’s evidence.
On 30 April 2019 and 1 May 2019, the mother said the father was intoxicated and pushed, hit and kicked her. When she was on the floor and, according to the mother’s account, pleading with him to stop, he repeatedly kicked her. The mother said these assaults were followed by an apology and promise to change. The father gave no evidence about this occasion and I accept it occurred.
On 13 July 2019 the mother said the father was intoxicated, grabbed her and threw her to the floor, where she hit her head causing a bump. Again, the mother said the father apologised and promised to change. The father’s inability to recollect hitting or harming the mother does not persuade me that it did not occur.
On 4 August 2019 the mother said the father returned intoxicated from the casino about 2.00 am or 3.00 am. When the father got undressed, redressed, then undressed again and attempted to call uber eats and turned on all the lights. The mother said she told him to go to bed. In response he began to hit her in the head. She said the father hit her and pushed her to the ground. The father said he did not scream, hit or push the mother to the ground but accepts they argued. The mother sent the father a text message in which she described him as being “barely able to stand.” The father asked the Court to accept that because the mother’s messages did not explicitly list the details of his physical abuse, I should conclude that it did not occur. I accept it occurred.
I am not satisfied that the father’s denial has weight, given his likely level of intoxication (and his incapacity to remember other assaults he concedes possibly occurred).
In 2019 the father was intoxicated and the mother said they argued about his drinking and he punched and kicked her repeatedly. She said as she curled up on the floor in a ball with her hands over her head to protect it, the father continued to hit and kick her. The following day was the mother’s birthday, and she said she spent 45 minutes with makeup to cover her bruises.
The parties exchanged text messages after this incident:
Father: U didnt feed me!!
[Mr B] coming but reckons he wasnt invited
Mother: Are you fucking kidding me? You covered my face and body with bruises, maybe you should be more worried about that
Father: Sorry
Should we go get your flowers now while they are fresh?
Mother: You do whatever you want. I’m getting on a flight home.
Father: Chicky
Its your birthday party
Dont let me ruin it
Lets go before it gets hot
Mother: [photo of her eye socket]
This is icing it for the past 2 hours. Eye was closed over before
Father: I can get flowers if u like? Just need pics of what u want?
Mother: It’s over
(as per the original)
The father’s affidavit conceded the mother suffered physical injuries. In messages, the father said to the mother “yes hitting you was dumb”. The father’s messages to the mother on 23 and 24 September 2019 also acknowledged hitting the mother. I accept the mother’s account.
In 2020 the mother said the father’s drinking was less during COVID restrictions and the assaults became infrequent. She became pregnant with X at this time. When she was 5 months pregnant, she became concerned that the father had returned to drinking to excess and began to avoid him so as to protect herself and her pregnancy. She asked a mutual friend to raise the issue with the father as her entreaties had been unsuccessful and she moved into the spare room.
The mother texted the father from behind the locked door of the spare room in early 2021 when she said he had been intoxicated on three occasions in one week. She told him explicitly that she was not coming out to protect herself and the pregnancy (Exhibit 4).
The mother said that when she was 7 months pregnant with X the father’s drinking was significantly problematic, that she avoided him particularly when he was drinking again and trying to kick down the door of the room in which she had locked herself. She called upon friends for support. She texted to ask if the father could stay at their place. The response was: “ [h]e can stay of course but I would rather not get in the middle of what’s going on. But I’ll support you guys of course.”
The mother reached out to the paternal grandfather in April 2021 to intervene when the father had been drinking and she had been locking the door to ensure her safety. She did so again in March 2023 and then in October 2023.
When X was 4 weeks old, the father returned home sufficiently intoxicated that he had urinated in his clothes. The mother discovered the father had been taking steroids.
The father’s evidence before this Court is that the steroids were prescribed by his doctor for low energy and fatigue. This is inconsistent with his text messages to the mother where he said they were not prescribed for him by his doctor and they were not working for him anyway and it was a “dumb idea” to take them.
In early 2023 when Y was about a month old the father returned home at 12.30 am. The mother videoed him at about 3.30 am urinating under the TV. She said the parties’ therapist had recommended videoing the father’s conduct as he said he could not recall his conduct when intoxicated. The mother sent the video to the father’s parents. When the father became aware the mother had sent the video, he jumped on her and hit her arms and body repeatedly until she deleted the video. The parties exchanged text messages in which the father said he could not recall hitting the mother. The mother’s text message referenced the fact that she still had the bruises. The father said he recalls an argument but does not recall hitting the mother. I accept that this incident occurred as she deposed.
On 19 November 2023 the father pushed the mother into a cupboard while she was holding Y. The mother took the children into the bedroom and locked the door. The father banged on the door causing the children to cling to the mother and cry. Later the father began yelling again, kicked a childproof gate and damaged the wall. The mother said she photographed injuries including bruises to her leg, back and palm (and attaches those on her leg and body). The mother said the father promised to cease using testosterone. The father’s affidavit addresses this incident only obliquely and I accept the evidence which the mother gave on this topic over the father’s denial.
On 23 and 24 June 2024 the father’s screaming caused the children to cry. The mother sent the father a text:
You exploded again this morning. In front of the kids. Even [X] yelled back at you. You blow up at the kids. You blow up at your parents. No one else does, just you. Blaming me for your behaviour is just deflecting rather than owning the fact you have an anger issue. Please see a therapist this week. Please.
In the latter part of 2024, the mother chronicled several occasions on which she says the father screamed at her in the children’s presence. The father acknowledged arguments in the children’s presence but not the extent of their frequency, intensity or impact on the children.
On 30 October 2024 the father smashed the mother’s laptop after an argument.
An incident occurred on 8 December 2024 which was the subject of significant attention at trial. The father was intoxicated and the mother challenged him about who he was speaking to on his mobile phone on the balcony. I have evidence from the mother, the father, the parties’ nanny and two videos taken by the mother. The events occurred in two distinct parts.
The mother’s affidavit said: “I went to take his phone and he lunged at me, pushed me to the floor, pulled at my hair and pushed my face into the ground, throwing my phone across the room.”
The mother then said 30 to 60 minutes later, she again asked the father to whom he was speaking, after which, the following occurred:
He then pushed me to the floor. As I got up, he proceeded to put his hands around my neck choking me and pushing me against the wall. I screamed. At that moment, our helper, [Ms C], came into the room and she told him she would call the police if he did not stop.
The father gave some general evidence about an incident in December in his affidavit filed on 3 July 2025. From context, it appears as though it may address the incident on 8 December. While the father recounts the mother asking to see his phone and recording their interaction, he does not directly engage with the mother’s serious allegations in his affidavit.
The parties’ nanny says the following in her affidavit filed on 26 June 2025:
[35] I heard [Mr Halmi] and [Ms Halmi] arguing. I heard [Mr Halmi] say: “I’m just calling my mum” and [Ms Halmi] responded: “show me”. I stayed in my room. The argument continued for a bit. Then I heard loud banging noises and [Ms Halmi] screaming in pain. I quickly got out of bed and ran to the lounge room where I saw [Mr Halmi] choking [Ms Halmi] in a standing position. [Ms Halmi] looked terrified and like she was in pain. I yelled at [Mr Halmi] “stop it! I will call the police now” and [Mr Halmi] responded “are you fucking serious [Ms C]!” This is the first time [Mr Halmi] had ever yelled at me and I was scared. He stopped hurting [Ms Halmi].
In broad terms, video 5 (Exhibit 1) depicts the mother repeatedly asking the father to whom he was speaking on the balcony and the father repeatedly telling her to “fuck off”. It is taken at about 8.00 pm Singapore time. It is not clear that it records an assault.
Video 6 (Exhibit 1) begins with the father on the balcony speaking on his phone and the disembodied voice of the mother saying: “Why are you trying to choke me, Mr Halmi?” It is clear that the mother is not describing events which are currently occurring but asking the father about why he has done something. The father tells the person with whom he is speaking: “[s]he is going nuts.”
The latter part of video 6 depicts an incident between the parents. Although it is not depicted on screen, it appears to involve a physical encounter which the father describes as him trying to leave outside. The mother says: “Stop shoving me into walls.”
The parties exchanged text messages the following day. The mother said, “You smashed my phone, tried to choke me, smashed my hand.” The father replied, “Ditto.” The mother continued, “Pushed me to the floor”.
The father said in response: “I’m sorry for my behaviour in self defence to you screaming at me and trying to take my phone/You came at me. I was in bed or on the balcony. Don’t forget that…”
I accept that the mother’s inquiries precipitated the father’s response. However, as the father acknowledged in the witness box, responding with violence was not justified.
The text exchange between the parents the day after the incident is lengthy, but the following excerpt is significant:
Mother: So it’s ok to push someone to the ground?
Father: I was fine. You approached me and attacked me. I had no issue with you. You had issue with me.
Mother: Grab their throat and hold them against the wall?/ I did not attack you on the balcony [Mr Halmi]
Father: How can you accuse me of being the instigator here. You were screaming at me.
(as per the original)
I accept the mother’s inquiries about the father’s telephone call instigated the argument, but that is significantly less material than the father’s response.
The parties are at issue about whether the incident involved the father placing one hand around the mother’s throat and holding her against the wall. The mother and the parties’ nanny said that this is what occurred. The father’s affidavit is silent but, by his King’s Counsel’s cross-examination and his general denial, he challenged that the incident involved choking. I accept I cannot see on the video the father with his hands on the mother’s throat, but I do not conclude that this is definitive.
I am persuaded that the account given by the parties’ nanny is accurate. She was at pains in her affidavit and her oral evidence to give a non-partisan account. She said and I accept that she has not spoken to the mother about the events. She texted the father on 26 May 2025 and said:
So far I know is all about violence you did to mam sir n screaming infront of kids Ihv remind sir many times slow your voice infront of kids but sir always says I don’t care. Sir always follow your anger. Now this happens comes even sir choke mam I see before. I don’t know why sir hate mam so much. I’m not a side each of you sir. I just tell you what I hv been seen between you n mam.
(Exhibit 9) (as per the original)
On the balance of probabilities, I accept her account. Consequently, I accept that, contrary to the father’s denial, he placed his hands on the mother’s throat and pushed her against the wall. However, even if I am wrong about this, the incident involved physical violence and is another example in a long set of examples about the father’s intoxication and consequent violence.
The long history of assaults also needs to be placed in the uncontroversial context that the mother had been, since at least 2016, entreating the father to cease or reduce drinking and to refrain from assaulting her. She had asked him to seek professional assistance. He had, at least initially, agreed that he would heed her requests. He has not.
To the extent that it was submitted on behalf of the father that the mother’s bona fides in representing that her trip to Australia was for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment for X called into question her evidence more generally, I am comfortably satisfied that any duplicity on her part does not undermine the cogency, consistency and reliability of her evidence about family violence.
The mother provides a coherent account supported by contemporaneous records which demonstrate a long history of physical violence perpetrated by the father towards her. I reject the father’s denials as being inconsistent with the injuries chronicled in the mother’s photographs and with the various messages from the father to the mother, which tacitly or explicitly accept that the physical violence has occurred.
I have considered the father’s evidence that the mother’s injuries were sustained during mutual physical altercations where he was acting in self-defence to restrain or control the mother in an effort to de-escalate the situation. He has told his family this account. The father did not particularise his contention that the mother had hit him, placed herself in his way or thrown objects at him. The father’s King’s Counsel did not put any specific allegation to the mother. The father’s evidence in this regard sits uncomfortably with his concession that he cannot actually recall what occurred on multiple occasions over a long period of time. Accordingly, while I accept that the mother challenged the father, including by yelling at him or using derogatory language about him when he had been drinking or violent, I do not accept that the father’s actions were a response to family violence by the mother.
Given the level of the father’s drinking, there is a credible basis for him not to recall what has occurred but that does not permit him to deny the mother’s account.
It is not the mother’s case that the father has physically hurt the children, however, the evidence establishes that the children were exposed to family violence.
In the affidavit of the parties’ nanny, she sets out conversations with the parties’ son X. She records at [42] X saying “lots of times ‘daddy hit mummy”.
In February 2025, according to the text from the parties’ nanny to the parties, X would tell neighbours in the elevator: “[y]ou know my mami n daddy fighting all the time shouting my ear ouchi.”
The parties’ nanny raised her concern about the impact of the father’s shouting on the children via messages dated 25 January 2025 (Exhibit 9). The messages demonstrate the nanny cancelling her own plans to make sure that the children have the benefit of her care when she is concerned they may be exposed to the father’s drinking or to fighting.
In the supervised contact report dated 9 August 2025 (Exhibit 11), the supervisor recorded the following interchange between Y and the father: “…[Y] asked the Father, “Why did you hit Mummy?” The Father responded, “Who told you that?” Y replied, ‘Mummy’.” The mother denied having had a conversation in those terms. She said that she has spoken to her psychologist about how to explain the separation from the father and their absence from Singapore and said she has told the children words to the effect: “Mummy is safer in Australia” (in reliance upon advice from her psychologist). In circumstances where the evidence (from videos and the parties’ nanny) establishes, independently of either parent, exposure of the children to family violence, the children raising this issue with the father may or may not be as a consequence of a conversation with the mother and, in the context of these proceedings, is of limited relevance to the determination of whether the mother has satisfied the onus.
The children were witness to extreme verbal aggression. The father acknowledged this but gave evidence that the parties were both engaged in the abuse.
The evidence in the nanny’s messages to the mother is to the effect that she tried to persuade the mother not to confront the father when he had been drinking because of the predictable consequences. The mother was not always capable of following this sound advice.
In early 2025 the parents were arguing about the fact that the mother had attended the father’s gym. According to the parties’ nanny, the father screamed to such an extent that the child Y was scared and hid his face in the nanny’s armpit. In a similar vein, she recorded that in her observation the father was more angry and violent after drinking and the children cry and call out for her when the father is intoxicated and shouting.
In addition to physical assaults, the father was verbally abusive of the mother and conceded same. The videos attached to the mother’s affidavit contain examples, including the father calling the mother a “fucking idiot” who “listens to idiots” and, in relation to her parents “what are they going to do for you now…they’re not even fucking in the same country…like it’s hilarious your parents don’t even want to come here.” I have not set out all of the examples in the mother’s affidavit where she says the father was verbally abusive including while drunk. The father asks that I find that the parties verbally abused one another. I accept that the mother challenged the father and, from time to time, used strong language when so doing. In the context of the father’s behaviour, I am not prepared to conclude that this was verbal abuse on the part of the mother.
The father engaged in behaviour whether by design (or otherwise) functioned to manipulate, control or punish the mother. For example, when they had been fighting, she declined to join him and a third party for dinner. The father sent the mother a text saying that “will be worse tomorrow if u don’t come now as well.” He said, during cross-examination, this was not a threat.
When the mother confronted the woman with whom the father had - to use the words in his affidavit - “inappropriately texted”, at the gym in early 2025, the father told the mother that the maternal grandmother could no longer spend the night at the parties’ apartment. When texting with the parties’ nanny, the father explained that the mother’s actions have to have consequences.
It was submitted in the father’s case that the mother is, in effect, claiming to fear the father in order to defeat the application for return. In support of the submission, the father’s King’s Counsel gave the following examples:
(a)The mother permitted the father to parent post-separation in her absence (with the assistance of the nanny and his family);
(b)The mother did not remain in Australia on her first visit post-separation.
The difficulty with those submissions is that whether the mother was subjectively afraid (of the father or what he may do) at a given point in time does not override my responsibility to evaluate the evidence objectively to determine whether the father’s conduct posed a grave risk, and prospectively, poses a grave risk. I am comfortably satisfied that the father’s violence to the mother was chronic, uncontrolled and serious.
I make the above findings conscious of the fact that Singapore has a sophisticated legal and police system which is well-versed in domestic violence. In this case there are a number of factors which persuade me that the existence of a legal system is not the whole answer to the position in which these children find themselves.
The father did not admit acts of serious violence over a long period of time (but acknowledged that they may have occurred). The father’s stance creates a concern that such conduct may be repeated. Many of the events described by the mother and accepted by me as having occurred took place when he was sufficiently intoxicated that he was unable to recall the events themselves. The father conceded that he was unable to control himself at times. A restraining order is of limited value if a person lacks control over drinking and consequent violence.
It is also significant that the father has a long history of alcohol misuse which has not been addressed by him. Between February and April 2024, the father attended a course. During that period he did not consume alcohol. At the conclusion of the course, he resumed drinking and gave evidence that he has used it as a coping mechanism.
The father contended that, the parties having separated, the risk of physical violence has abated. The period after separation was brief (and for a large part the parties were in separate countries). I accept that since the parties no longer share the same household, the opportunity for violence being witnessed by the children is lessened. However, absent a proper acceptance by the father of past conduct, intimate partner violence in a subsequent relationship or family violence perpetrated against the children’s mother cannot be excluded.
I conclude, for the reasons expressed above and those which I will discuss below under the heading ‘mother’s mental health’, that return to Singapore would expose the children to an intolerable situation, namely their mother being required to return to live in reasonable proximity to the children’s father who has perpetrated significant family violence over a lengthy period of time and continues to minimise and deny its extent and significance. Further, the mother is aware of the father’s conduct while intoxicated which has posed a significant threat of physical and verbal abuse to her in the past – which has been witnessed by the children. The mother would be required to remain in Singapore – where she is without family support in circumstances where the expert opinion identifies a significant risk of deterioration in her mental health and wellbeing and consequent impact on her parenting capacity.
Mother’s mental health
The mother commenced receiving her own psychological assistance in Singapore in 2024 and has engaged with a psychologist in Australia. The mother commenced taking anti-depressant medication in 2024 and on a more consistent basis from April 2025.
The mother relied on a report by a forensic psychiatrist, Dr D. Dr D concluded that the mother meets all diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), or alternatively Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. He expressed the opinion at [127] of his report that a return to Singapore would:
…present clinical risks to [her] mental health and, by extension, to her parenting capacity. The environment in Singapore was the site of multiple, repeated traumatic events, including physical assaults, psychological abuse, and coercive control. [Ms Halmi] has previously experienced heightened hypervigilance, dissociation, and physiological arousal in that setting, including episodes of impaired functioning when navigating daily life due to the fear of encountering her husband. The anticipated exposure to trauma-related triggers in that context is clinically significant and would likely precipitate an exacerbation of PTSD symptoms.
Dr D said the risk was elevated both because of the trauma which would be occasioned by exposure to triggering locales, events or people but also because of a lack of support in Singapore. Exacerbation of symptoms such as anxiety, hyper-vigilance, panic attacks and dissociation were anticipated and the risk of such occurrence described as high.
The father submitted that Dr D’s conclusions were undermined by a failure on the part of the mother to establish the factual underpinning. Two examples were given: (i) the mother’s conduct in attending at the gym used by the father being inconsistent with avoidant behaviour and (ii) the mother’s failure to utilise the opportunity to leave earlier. King’s Counsel for the father did not explicitly put those two scenarios to Dr D to permit him to consider whether they changed his conclusion. Accordingly, I am unable to discount his diagnosis on this basis. In any event I am not confident that the mother’s failure to leave Singapore in early April 2025 is at all material, given my findings that she had remained in a relationship with the father in which she experienced family violence over a period of fifteen years.
A return to Singapore comes with significant uncertainty for the mother. Her dependent pass cannot be renewed after the parties’ divorce becomes final. The father has proffered, as a condition of return, his preparedness to consent to an order restraining him from cancelling the mother’s dependent pass. I accept that it is likely she would be permitted to remain in Singapore until proceedings conclude in that forum. Uncertainty would remain about her longer-term eligibility.
The mother does not want to return to the parties’ home. Dr D’s evidence supports the reasonableness of the mother’s reluctance from the perspective of retraumatisation. The evidence establishes that there is no legal impediment to the mother obtaining rental premises nor is there any financial barrier.
The mother told the ICL in cross-examination that the area in which the parties lived was a small expatriate community where she had already encountered the father post-separation.
The lay evidence about the mother’s functioning in the first half of 2025 comes from three sources: the mother, the parties’ nanny and the maternal grandfather.
The mother’s affidavit described worry, anxiety, panic, stress, difficulties in concentration and upset. She said she is terrified and physically sick when she considers return to Singapore.
The mother described spending a lot of April 2025 lying in bed as a consequence of the deterioration in her mental health. The father submitted that I would reject that evidence because, in cross-examination, the parties’ nanny said that the only change she noticed to the mother’s parenting in April was that she was more often out in the evening. The proposition that the mother spent more time in bed in April was not squarely put to the nanny nor was the mother challenged about her evidence. I accept that she was experiencing symptoms of depression in April which made her less available to the children.
The parties’ nanny described that the mother appeared stressed and not eating in Singapore and has observed a positive change in these behaviours in Australia.
The maternal grandfather described having become increasingly concerned about his daughter’s level of distress and mental state in the six months prior to May 2025, describing her as appearing “to be in a depressed mood”. In his oral evidence he said the mother was prescribed an anti-depressant because of her lack of sleep, low mood and because she did not seem happy. In April 2025 her mood was still low and the maternal grandfather described the mother as anxious. He noticed improvements in May including that she was playing with the children more.
The material produced on subpoena, including the mother’s medical records, described a patient history which includes “[a]nxiety, depressed mood, insomnia.” She told her psychologist in June 2025 that when she wakes in the night, she struggles to return to sleep (Exhibit 4).
The father gave evidence about five occasions on which the mother drank to excess in 2023-2025. The mother accepted that the father’s general account was accurate, though she disputed certain details. I am unable to make a finding about whether or not the mother has continued to use alcohol to excess after separation but there is no evidence to suggest an incident after separation. Assuming this to be the case, that is to the children’s advantage.
However, it is not the risk of deterioration of the mother’s mental health , as detailed above, so much as the impact of same on the children which is relevant to my determination.
The Hague Report writer noted that the children presented as “somewhat vulnerable children.” I have found that the children were exposed to family violence. It follows that the observations of the Hague Report writer about the consequences of such exposure underlie their vulnerability. The report says at [53]:
If the Court were to find that the mother’s allegations of family violence occurred as alleged, the children have been exposed to significant adverse childhood experiences that place them at a significantly higher likelihood of longer-term negative outcomes, including poorer educational outcomes, relationship challenges, emotional regulation issues, increased antisocial behaviour in adolescence and young adulthood and poorer general health. Were they to return to a living environment in which they are exposed to further or cumulative incidents of family violence, the risk of negative adverse outcomes for the children disproportionately increases, including posing a risk of children experiencing complex childhood trauma. Given that the children are reported to have exhibited symptoms associated with trauma responses, it would be highly likely that these symptoms would only intensify were the children exposed to further unsafe and abusive circumstances. Children exposed to family violence are considered victims of child abuse and exposure to family violence is well known to have longer term and significant impacts on a child’s overall development and destroys a child’s right to a physically and emotionally safe environment. Family violence, particularly cumulative or repeated exposure of children to family violence, is considered a grave risk to a child.
The Hague report writer outlined the potential impact of a deterioration in the mother’s mental health on the children as follows:
Children who are cared for by parents suffering with significant, prolonged or crises mental health challenges are at increased risk of exposure to emotional neglect and abuse. Mentally unwell parents are more likely to be preoccupied with the often-significant emotional demands of mental ill health, leaving them cognitively and emotionally less able to mindfully prioritise their children. It is noted that the children may experience some reassurance from this potentially intolerable situation with the continuation of [the parties’ nanny] caring for them. However, if the mother does significantly deteriorate in her mental health, the children are unlikely to escape the circumstance without any impact. They may, even were [the parties’ nanny] to remain caring for the children, potentially experience worry about their mother’s function, concerns about her safety and they may take on greater responsibility to ‘fix’ their mother, for instance, help with aspects of care, support and routine that they perceive their mother unable to do (parentification).
It is uncontroversial that the mother’s support network in Australia is conducive to the cautiously optimistic prognosis which Dr D anticipates should the mother remain in Australia. The mother’s parents have demonstrated support for her, providing housing and emotional support. The evidence establishes that the mother has no family in Singapore and would be highly reliant on the parties’ nanny who cannot, as an employee, be expected to provide emotional support. The mother’s friends have been hesitant to get involved according to the mother’s reports to her psychologist and the mother’s text message evidence discussed above.
Accordingly, as previously noted, I am satisfied not only that there is a risk the harm will occur, but also a risk that the children will be exposed to that harm (DP v Commonwealth Central Authority at [42]).
Having reached the conclusion that the mother has established a defence, I must consider whether the risk could be ameliorated by conditions. Regulation 15(1) provides for the making of conditions to give effect to the Convention.
The father offers undertakings to this Court through his affidavit. He said he would undertake not to approach the mother or the apartment in which she resides.
The father also proffered an undertaking not to consume alcohol for 24 hours prior to or while the children are in his care (pending the making of orders in Singapore).
The father said changeover of the children could take place via an intermediary.
It is necessary for me to consider whether those conditions are capable of enforcement and function to ameliorate the identified risks.
In DP v Commonwealth Central Authority, their Honours Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ said at [40]:
So far as reg 16(3)(b) is concerned, the first task of the Family Court is to determine whether the evidence establishes that “there is a grave risk that [his or her] return … would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation”. If it does or if, on the evidence, one of the other conditions in reg 16 is satisfied, the discretion to refuse an order for return is enlivened. There may be many matters that bear upon the exercise of that discretion. In particular, there will be cases where, by moulding the conditions on which return may occur, the discretion will properly be exercised by making an order for return on those conditions, notwithstanding that a case of grave risk might otherwise have been established. Ensuring not only that there will be judicial proceedings in the country of return but also that there will be suitable interim arrangements for the child may loom large at this point in the inquiry. If that is to be done, however, care must be taken to ensure that the conditions are such as will be met voluntarily or, if not met voluntarily, can readily be enforced.
There is no obvious means by which an undertaking to an Australian Court can be enforced in Singapore.
The Full Court in McDonald & Director-General, Department of Community Services NSW (2006) FLC 93-297 at [29]:
It seems to us that if conditions are to be imposed to alleviate what would otherwise be a grave risk for the return of the child, then those conditions need to be clearly defined and be capable of being objectively measured as to whether or not the conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions need to be met before the return can take place. In the event that they are not met, the order needs to contain a mechanism that clearly recognises the return is no longer required to take place. All this needs to be done within a tight timetable to meet the requirements of the Convention that is founded upon the concept that prompt return to the place of habitual residence is appropriate to protect a child from the harmful effects of its wrongful removal or retention.
The father proposed a number of conditions in a Minute of Order (Exhibit 20):
4. That the order for the children’s return to Singapore shall be conditional upon:
4.1. The Applicant causing to be filed within 7 days, in proceedings before the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore, an application by which he shall seek interim orders with the following effect (and pending a judicial determination regarding access and custody of the parties' children):
4.1.1That he will not approach or attend any place that the Respondent and children may reside without the Respondent's written consent or pursuant to a court order;
4.1.2That the parties shall not consume alcohol during any period that the children are in their care nor for 24 hours prior to the children coming into their care
4.1.3That the parties shall not consume medication other than in accordance with medical advice during any period that the children are in their care nor for 24 hours prior to the children coming into their care;
4.1.4That parties shall appoint an agreed third party to facilitate any access between the children and the Applicant and each party shall ensure the parties do not come into contact;
4.1.5That the parties shall not expose the children to any form of family violence;
4.1.6That the Applicant shall not do anything to terminate, alter or otherwise affect the Respondent's dependent pass or immigration status in Singapore;
4.1.7That there shall be no direct communication between the parties other than in cases of emergency in relation to the children;
4.1.8That the proceedings be expedited.
4.2 That the Applicant shall serve the Respondent with a sealed copy of such application forthwith and, in any event, prior to the children's return to Singapore;
4.3 That the Applicant shall maintain the employment of [the parties’ nanny] for such period as [the parties’ nanny] is available for employment unless otherwise agreed between the parties and pending further order of the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore;
4.4 That upon a request being made by the Respondent within 14 days of this order, the Applicant shall make available to the Respondent the parties' former place of residence in Singapore for the Respondent and children to reside and the Applicant shall permit the Respondent sole occupation of that property pending and subject to any order of the Family Justice Courts of the Republic of Singapore;
4.5 That upon the children's return to Singapore, the Applicant shall facilitate and permit the Respondent to retrieve any personal belongings or items for the children which remain in the Applicant's possession.
On the basis of the evidence of the single expert Mr E, I am satisfied that the laws of Singapore provide a regime whereby the mother could seek and obtain orders for personal protection and seek that the father’s time with the children be subject to condition.
There are two bases upon which I have concluded that the making of conditions will not sufficiently ameliorate risk. Firstly, because I remain concerned that the father’s conduct in the past occurred in circumstances where he was unable to exercise restraint. As a consequence, I am concerned that protective orders are not a complete answer to future risk. However, much more significantly and decisively, the existence of orders cannot address the consequences of exacerbation of the mother’s mental health presentation, such that I could be satisfied that the children would not be returned to an intolerable situation. This was the primary basis upon which the ICL submitted a return order ought be refused. I agree.
Even though I am satisfied that the evidence establishes a defence, I must nonetheless consider whether, in the exercise of my discretion, a return order should still be made. Fundamentally, the very facts which persuade me of risk speak strongly against return. An additional factor which persuades me to dismiss the return application is the parties’ plans to return to Australia in any event. While I accept the parties may have changed their mind, particularly post-separation, they had embarked on renovations and school arrangements to effect a return at the end of 2026.
Given the above findings, it follows that the father’s application will be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifteen (115) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Christie. Associate:
Dated: 19 August 2025
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