Halls v Police - [2010] SASC 283

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
HALLS v POLICE
[2010] SASC 283
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone
1 October 2010
MAGISTRATES - APPEALS AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
Appellant convicted and fined following trial in the Magistrates Court - appeal against conviction and imposition of fine and costs - contended that magistrate erred in approach to and evaluation of the evidence - contended that the sum of the fine and costs manifestly excessive.
Held: appeal against conviction and penalty dismissed.

HALLS v POLICE
[2010] SASC 283
Magistrates Appeal

VANSTONE J. The appellant was charged on complaint with entering an intersection governed by traffic lights showing an amber traffic light, contrary to r 57(1) Australian Road Rules. He was tried on that charge before a magistrate. There, as in this court, he represented himself. He gave evidence to the effect that the traffic lights were green at the time he entered the intersection and turned to yellow as he proceeded through it. The magistrate found the case against him proved, giving ex tempore reasons. A penalty was imposed. It consisted of a fine in the sum of $320. Additionally, a court fee of $177, a victims of crime levy of $80 and prosecution costs of $200 were imposed.
The appellant’s notice of appeal was filed some eight days after the elapse of the relevant time period. I am told that the delay occurred because Mr Halls was awaiting the Registrar’s decision on an application for remission of lodgement fees. In the notice of appeal, the appellant contends that the magistrate was simply incorrect in finding that the appellant’s vehicle entered the intersection against a yellow traffic light. He also contends that the penalty imposed was excessive.
The offence occurred at the junction of Hanson Road and Ridley Grove, Woodville Gardens, on 28 July 2009. The appellant did not dispute that on that day at about 1.30 pm he was travelling south along Hanson Road in his silver Ford Falcon station wagon.
The prosecution case consisted of the evidence of two police officers, who were also travelling south on Hanson Road at that same time, in separate police fleets. Constable Smelt said in evidence that he was travelling in a marked police vehicle in the right hand lane for south-bound traffic. Senior Constable Parkinson was, by chance, roughly abreast of Constable Smelt’s vehicle and travelling in the same direction, but in an unmarked vehicle. They were aware of each other’s presence.
Constable Smelt told the magistrate that he was about 80 metres from the junction of Ridley Grove when he saw the traffic lights governing that junction change from green to amber. At that time, the only vehicle in front of him was the appellant’s Ford, which he estimated was travelling at about the “posted sign speed” of 60 kilometres per hour. He said the brake lights on the Ford did not illuminate and it continued through the junction at the same speed. He said that “just as the vehicle has gone over the white line by about one car length the lights then turned to red”. Constable Smelt said that in his experience the amber light would operate for about four seconds before the signal became red. The lights appeared to be operating correctly on this day. He said he kept the Ford in sight during the time when he was stopped in obedience to the red light. He then caught up with the Ford and stopped it. He spoke to the driver, whom he identified in court as the appellant. The appellant denied to him that he had committed the offence.
Senior Constable Parkinson said that he was about 60 or 70 metres from the junction when he saw the green light turn to amber. Like Constable Smelt, Senior Constable Parkinson said that he saw no brake light on the Ford in response to the amber light and that he estimated that it was travelling at about 60 kilometres per hour. Senior Constable Parkinson said that “[a]s the Ford went past the traffic lights and the stop line [the lights] were amber and changed to red as he entered the intersection”. He said that the Ford was approximately a car length into the intersection when the lights turned red. He said there was no communication between himself and Constable Smelt, but both police cars stopped at the red light and afterwards he saw Constable Smelt accelerate away to catch up with the Ford. Realising that Constable Smelt intended to stop and speak to the driver, Senior Constable Parkinson stopped his police vehicle “as a matter of officer safety”.
The appellant gave evidence in his defence. He said that as he approached the relevant junction he was travelling at “about approximately (sic) 45 to 48 kilometres per hour”. He said that the traffic lights were showing a green signal as he approached the junction and that they did not turn amber until he was “just past the stop line or through the signals”. The appellant was closely pressed in cross-examination on this point, because, prior to the evidence commencing, the magistrate had asked the appellant to identify the issue under dispute. In essence, the magistrate attempted to establish whether the defence would be based on a perceived inability to stop safely before reaching the stop line, or on a contention that the traffic light was green at the time the stop line was reached. From the transcript it appears that the appellant accepted that he had entered the intersection with the amber light showing. In evidence however, the appellant ultimately asserted that the front of his car was past the stop line at the point when the lights turned from green to amber.
Upon the appeal hearing, Mr Halls sought to put before me several items of fresh evidence. These included the original expiation notice, recent photographs of the road junction under consideration and material relevant to “stopping distances”. I declined to receive these items. By reference to the expiation notice, Mr Halls sought to support his contention that Senior Constable Parkinson was not, at any stage, a witness to this incident. In my view the document was incapable of throwing light on that issue. The photographs were designed to show that at a distance of 80 metres, the stop line marking the entrance to the junction could not be seen. In my view, a determination whether it could or could not be seen would not affect the reliability of the police officers’ evidence. In any event, such an assertion, if relevant, should have, and could have, been put to each of them at trial. The question of stopping distances was not an issue identified by the evidence at trial. That might have been relevant if the defence had been that Mr Halls could not have safely stopped before reaching the stop line. But, as seen, the issue was otherwise. Before this court, Mr Halls also mounted arguments based on affidavits sworn by the two officers. These were not put into evidence at the trial, although Mr Halls did undertake some cross-examination based on them. At this point the affidavits do not advance the matter.
The argument in support of the appeal has amounted to a reiteration of the factual matters asserted in the appellant’s defence before the magistrate. No point has been made which causes me to have any misgivings about the magistrate’s acceptance of the police evidence. On the contrary, having read all the evidence, I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the prosecution contentions. The evidence of both officers reads well; there is no inherent inconsistency, nor any contradiction of even minor significance. The magistrate was unimpressed by the appellant’s evidence. He gave reasons for the poor impression he formed. The basis for that impression is readily discernible by reference to the transcript. No error in the approach of the magistrate, or in his evaluation of the evidence, is made out.
I find that the appeal against conviction is without merit and that the application for an extension of time within which to appeal should, for that reason, be refused.
In terms of the penalty imposed, it is apparent that the amount imposed by way of fine was equivalent to the original expiation fee. The fine could not realistically have been set at any lower amount. The court fee was unexceptional and the victims of crime levy was set by statute. The prosecution costs were, according to the transcript, in the sum of $200. (It appears that the court record erroneously shows those costs as being in the sum of $25.)
There is no merit in the appeal against penalty.
The orders are:
1. permission to extend the time for commencing the appeal is refused;
2. the appeal is dismissed.