Hall v Hall

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60 CLR 375

RESPONDENT. RESPONDENT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Divorce-Desertion-Continuance for statutory period-Intervening suit-Matri-

monial Causes Act 1899 (N.S. W.) (No. 14 of 1899), sec. 13 (a).

A married person cannot by filing a petition for divorce terminate or suspend a period of desertion already commenced by that person, and the mere pen- Rich, Starke, dency of such a petition does not preclude the innocent spouse from presenting and maintaining a petition for divorce based on that desertion.

Gidley v. Gidley, (1926) 43 W.N. (N.S.W.) 191, and Oxenham v. Oxenham, (1931) 48 W.N. (N.S.W.) 168, overruled.

Fremlin v. Fremlin, (1913) 16 C.L.R. 212, at pp. 238, 239, discussed and explained.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Edwards A.J.) reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

A petition was filed on 1st December 1937, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, by Weaver George Blythe Hall for the dissolu- tion of his marriage with Muriel Joyce Hall on the ground that she had without just cause or excuse wilfully deserted him and without any such cause or excuse left him continuously SO deserted during three years and upwards. The wife did not defend the suit.

60 CLR 376

The parties were married on 26th October 1925. According to evidence given by and on behalf of the husband he and his wife lived together until February 1931, when he, at her request, following upon a period of unhappy domestic relations, left the home and took up residence at a nearby residential hotel with a view, as he alleged, of returning later if he were able to effect a reconciliation. The parties never again lived together.

On 20th March 1931 the wife filed a petition in which she prayed for a dissolution of the marriage on the grounds, firstly, that her husband had during three years and upwards been an habitual drunkard and had habitually been guilty of cruelty towards her, and, secondly, that during the same period he had been an habitual drunkard and had habitually left her without means of support. In that suit the husband duly entered an appearance, and, on 20th April 1931, filed an answer denying the charges. The issues were settled, and on 22nd August 1931 the suit was set down for hearing at the then sittings of the matrimonial causes court. On 11th June 1931 a notice of motion was taken out by the solicitors acting for the wife for an order that the husband should provide certain moneys on account of the costs of suit of the wife. This motion was opposed by the husband. It appeared from the affidavit filed by the husband in opposition to the motion that the wife was a wealthy woman, whilst he was almost penniless.

The motion came on for hearing before the registrar on 22nd June 1931, when it was stood over till 26th June 1931. On this latter date it was dismissed and no costs of the…

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Details
Case
[1938] HCA 42
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales regarding a husband's petition for divorce on the grounds of his wife's desertion. The parties had separated in February 1931, and the husband alleged that his wife had wilfully deserted him without just cause or excuse from that date. However, the wife had filed her own petition for divorce in March 1931, which was subsequently struck out in November 1932 and never formally dismissed. The trial judge dismissed the husband's petition, finding that the wife's desertion had been suspended from the commencement of her divorce proceedings in March 1931, meaning the statutory period of three years had not elapsed.

The High Court was required to determine whether the institution and pendency of a divorce petition by one spouse could suspend or terminate a period of desertion already commenced by that same spouse, thereby preventing the other spouse from relying on that desertion for their own divorce petition. Specifically, the court had to consider the application of previous decisions, including *Gidley v. Gidley* and *Oxenham v. Oxenham*, which had interpreted statements by Isaacs J. in *Fremlin v. Fremlin* to mean that a pending suit by either party suspended the matrimonial relationship and thus any period of desertion.

The Court held that a married person cannot terminate or suspend a period of desertion already commenced by filing a petition for divorce. The mere pendency of such a petition does not preclude the innocent spouse from presenting and maintaining their own petition based on that desertion. The Court reasoned that allowing a deserting spouse to suspend desertion by filing a suit would enable them to frustrate the other spouse's remedy. The decisions in *Gidley v. Gidley* and *Oxenham v. Oxenham* were overruled, and the Court clarified that the statements in *Fremlin v. Fremlin* should be limited to situations where the prior petition was filed by the same party seeking relief in a subsequent suit on the grounds of desertion.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the wife's desertion, if established by the evidence, continued uninterrupted by her own subsequent petition. The case was remitted for a new trial to determine the facts regarding the desertion.

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