Hall v Development Assessment Commission & Ors (No 3) No. Scciv-01-299

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HALL v DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION &
CITY APARTMENTS PTY LTD (No 3)
[2001] SASC 183

Land and Valuation Division

  1. DEBELLE J.          On 28 March 2001 I published reasons for my decision upholding the plaintiff’s application for judicial review.  I informed the parties that I proposed to make an order setting aside the grant of provisional development plan consent and the subsequent grant of development approval to the second defendant, City Apartments Pty Ltd (“City Apartments”).

  2. The decision granting provisional development plan consent had been made by the Development Assessment Commission (“the Commission”).  The decision granting development approval had been made by the City of Burnside (“the Council”).  However, the Council was not a party to the plaintiff’s application for judicial review.  I adjourned the proceedings to enable the plaintiffs to apply to join the Council.

  3. The hearing resumed on 5 April 2001.  The plaintiffs had applied to join the Council.  The Council consented to the application but on condition that it not be liable for costs.  It was not appropriate to accede to the Council’s conditions.  The Council was joined as a party.  I then heard argument as to costs.  I then made the following orders:

    “1     That the City of Burnside be joined as a party to this action.

    2An order in the nature of a declaration that the development application 180/393/00/DC lodged by the second defendant with the City of Burnside is for a category 3 development.

    3An order in the nature of a declaration that the relevant planning authority was the City of Burnside and not the second defendant.

    4An order quashing the provisional development plan consent issued by the first defendant to the second defendant in respect of development application 180/393/00/DC.

    5An order quashing the development approval issued by the City of Burnside in respect of development application 180/393/00/DC.

    6That the second defendant pay the plaintiffs’ costs of and incidental to this appeal as taxed or agreed.”

    My reasons for the orders as to costs are stated in Hall v Development Assessment Commission(No 2) [2001] SASC 181.

  4. Before the order had been perfected, the solicitors for City Apartments made an application that the matter be listed for further submissions as to the terms of the order.  That application was heard on 18 April.  Mr Besanko QC appeared for City Apartments.  He pointed to the fact that the effect of the judgment was that the Council would be considering and determining City Apartments’ application for provisional development plan consent.  He submitted that, as the Council had reported to the Commission recommending that the application be refused, the Council had publicly stated its position in respect of the application.  That, he said, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension that the Council had prejudged the matter and might not bring an impartial mind to its consideration of the application of City Apartments.  The matter should, he submitted, be heard and determined by the Commission.

  5. There is an obvious difficulty with Mr Besanko’s submission.  I will deal with…

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Details
Case
[2001] SASC 183
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hall v Development Assessment Commission & Ors (No 3) No. Scciv-01-299, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the decisions made by the Development Assessment Commission and the City of Burnside concerning the approval of a development application. The plaintiff argued that the Commission had erred in granting provisional development plan consent and that the City of Burnside had also erred in granting development approval. The City of Burnside was subsequently joined as a party to the action.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the City of Burnside should be disqualified from considering the development application due to a reasonable apprehension of prejudgment. The court also had to determine the appropriate authority to consider and determine the development application, given the conflicting decisions made by the Commission and the Council.

The court considered the principle of necessity, which applied when there was no alternative decision-maker. The court found that the City of Burnside was the relevant planning authority for the development application, as per the Development Act 1993. The court also noted that the decision of the City of Burnside would not be the final decision, as it was subject to appeal. This appeal provided a safeguard and an opportunity for a full hearing on the merits of the proposed development.

The court dismissed the application of City Apartments, holding that the City of Burnside was the appropriate authority to consider and determine the development application. The court also noted that the capacity to appeal provided both a safeguard and an opportunity for a full hearing on the merits of the proposed development.

The court ordered that the City of Burnside be joined as a party to the action, that the development application was for a Category 3 development, and that the City of Burnside was the relevant planning authority. The court also quashed the provisional development plan consent issued by the Commission and the development approval issued by the City of Burnside. The court ordered that City Apartments pay the plaintiffs' costs of and incidental to the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Hall v Development Assessment Commission & City Apartments Pty Ltd (No 3) No. Scciv-01-299 involved an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Development Assessment Commission to grant provisional development plan consent and subsequent development approval to City Apartments Pty Ltd. The City of Burnside, which was the relevant planning authority, had initially recommended refusal of the development consent to the Commission. Following the Commission's decision to grant consent, City Apartments applied for development approval, which was subsequently granted by the City of Burnside. The plaintiffs, who were not identified in the provided excerpt, sought judicial review of these decisions. The court upheld the plaintiffs' application and set aside both the provisional development plan consent and the development approval. The plaintiffs were granted an order declaring the development to be a Category 3 development and that the City of Burnside, not City Apartments, was the relevant planning authority.

The case continued with City Apartments seeking further submissions regarding the terms of the court’s order. Their solicitors argued that the City of Burnside, having previously recommended refusal of the development consent, might prejudge the matter and not bring an impartial mind to its reconsideration of City Apartments' application for provisional development plan consent. The court acknowledged that both the City of Burnside and the Commission had made decisions on City Apartments' application, suggesting that a reasonable apprehension of prejudgment might exist if either entity were to reconsider the matter. However, the court concluded that there was no alternative decision-maker available under the Development Act 1993, and the principle of necessity applied, necessitating that the City of Burnside proceed with the consideration of the application. The court also noted that the City of Burnside's decision was not the final word and was subject to appeal, which provided a safeguard and an opportunity for a full hearing on the merits of the proposed development. Consequently, the application by City Apartments to have the matter heard by the Commission was dismissed.

The matter before the Court in Hall v Development Assessment Commission & Ors (No 3) involves a judicial review application challenging decisions made in relation to a development application by City Apartments Pty Ltd. Initially, the plaintiff's application for judicial review was heard and upheld by the Court on 28 March 2001. The Court issued orders setting aside the provisional development plan consent and the subsequent development approval granted to City Apartments. The provisional development plan consent had been issued by the Development Assessment Commission, while the development approval had been granted by the City of Burnside, which was not a party to the initial application for judicial review. The proceedings were adjourned to allow the plaintiff to apply to join the City of Burnside as a party, which was subsequently done on 5 April 2001. The Court then heard arguments on costs and made orders declaring the nature of the development application, identifying the relevant planning authority, quashing the provisional development plan consent and the development approval, and ordering City Apartments to pay the plaintiff's costs. Following this, City Apartments applied for further submissions regarding the terms of the order, which was heard on 18 April 2001. The application was dismissed on the basis that there was no alternative decision-maker and the ability to appeal the Council's decision provided a safeguard and opportunity for a full hearing on the merits of the proposed development.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DEBELLE J
Issues
1. Whether the City of Burnside was the relevant planning authority for the development application 180/393/00/DC.
2. Whether the Development Assessment Commission’s grant of provisional development plan consent was lawful.
3. Whether the City of Burnside’s grant of development approval was lawful.
4. Whether the principle of necessity applies to require the City of Burnside to consider and determine the development application, despite potential prejudgment concerns.
5. Whether the City of Burnside's decision on the development application is subject to appeal under the Development Act 1993.

Held
1. The City of Burnside was held to be the relevant planning authority for the development application 180/393/00/DC, as per the Development Act 1993.
2. The Development Assessment Commission’s grant of provisional development plan consent was quashed, as the court found it unlawful.
3. The City of Burnside’s grant of development approval was quashed, as the court found it unlawful.
4. The principle of necessity was applied to require the City of Burnside to consider and determine the development application, despite potential prejudgment concerns.
5. The City of Burnside's decision on the development application was found to be subject to appeal under the Development Act 1993.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DEBELLE J

In the case of Hall v Development Assessment Commission & Ors (No 3), the court examined several critical issues related to the City of Burnside's handling of a development application. Firstly, the court determined that the City of Burnside was indeed the relevant planning authority for the development application 180/393/00/DC. This conclusion was based on the provisions of the Development Act 1993, which specified that the City of Burnside was the appropriate planning authority unless exceptions listed in section 34(2) applied. The court found that none of the exceptions were pertinent to this case, thus affirming the City of Burnside's role.

Secondly, the court addressed the legality of the Development Assessment Commission's (the Commission) grant of provisional development plan consent. The court found that the Commission's decision was flawed, primarily because the City of Burnside, as the relevant planning authority, should have been the body to consider the application. The court set aside the provisional development plan consent as a result of this misidentification of the relevant planning authority. This ruling underscored the importance of adhering to statutory mandates in planning processes to ensure lawful and fair outcomes.

Thirdly, the court scrutinized the City of Burnside's grant of development approval. Given the earlier determination that the City of Burnside was the correct planning authority, the court had to assess whether the City had the requisite powers and followed proper procedures in granting the approval. The court upheld the City of Burnside's authority to grant development approval, but it nullified the specific approval in question due to the procedural missteps identified in the earlier stages of the planning process.

Fourthly, the court tackled the principle of necessity, which pertains to the obligation of the City of Burnside to consider and determine the development application despite concerns about potential prejudgment. The court acknowledged that both the City of Burnside and the Commission had already made decisions on the application, creating a reasonable apprehension of prejudgment. However, the court ruled that the principle of necessity required the City of Burnside to proceed with its consideration of the application, as no alternative decision-maker was available. This ruling emphasized that the availability of appeal processes provides a safeguard against potential prejudgment.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the City of Burnside's decision on the development application was subject to appeal under the Development Act 1993. The court confirmed that the decision was appealable, as per section 38 of the Act, which allows for appeals to the Environment, Resources and Development Court. This appeal mechanism serves both as a safeguard for the applicants and an opportunity for a comprehensive review of the merits of the proposed development.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the City of Burnside, as identified by the court, was the relevant planning authority for the development application, and its decisions must adhere to the statutory frameworks outlined in the Development Act 1993. The court's decision also underscored the principle of necessity, affirming that despite potential prejudgment concerns, the relevant authority must proceed with its decision-making role. Additionally, the court reinforced the importance of the appeal process as a means to ensure fairness and legality in development planning decisions.