Hall v Carney (No 3)

The appeal concerned the administration of a deceased estate, brought by the appellant claimant against the executors. The dispute centred on the executors' application for a barring order under section 29(2) of the *Trustee Act 1936* (SA) to prevent the claimant from pursuing certain claims against the estate. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was required to determine whether to uphold the barring order made by the primary judge.

The court considered the scope of the discretionary power conferred by section 29(2) of the *Trustee Act 1936* (SA), which allows a court to extend time and mould barring orders as it deems just. While acknowledging that the onus is on the trustee or representative to justify a barring order, the court observed that a claimant who fails to withdraw or prosecute claims within the prescribed six-month period bears an evidentiary onus to demonstrate why such an order should not be made. The court also examined the principles governing the administration of deceased estates, emphasizing the public interest in avoiding undue delay and the need for administrations to conclude.

The Full Court reasoned that the appellant had engaged in prolonged and unexplained delay in pursuing his claims, even after being afforded reasonable opportunities and considering his personal circumstances. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's claims were not reasonably arguable, or at least had not been demonstrated to be so. Even if the claims possessed merit, the significant delay was a substantial factor weighing against the appellant. Consequently, exercising its discretion, the court deemed it just to make a barring order in respect of the notified claims to bring the administration of the estate to a conclusion. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to bear half the costs incurred by the executors in responding to his unreasonable inquiries.