HALL & HALL

[2014] FamCA 40

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HALL & HALL [2014] FamCA 40

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Interim Orders – with whom a child spends time with – mother stopped children’s supervised time with father following allegations of violence – father sought compliance with orders – mother sought suspension of supervised time, preparation of a further report and introduction of an independent supervisor.

FAMILY LAW – EVIDENCE – Admissibility – Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – tendency rule – more prejudicial than probative.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 68Q, 69ZT
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

APPLICANT: Ms Hall

RESPONDENT: Mr Hall

INTERVENOR:

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER:

FILE NUMBER: ADC 3671 of 2013

DATE DELIVERED: Friday, 24 January 2014

PLACE DELIVERED: Adelaide

PLACE HEARD: Adelaide

JUDGMENT OF: Berman J

HEARING DATE: Friday, 24 January 2014

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr N J Ackman QC

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Barnes Brinsley Shaw Lawyers

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Richards

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: David Burrell and Co

Orders

1. The application in a case of the mother filed 13 January 2014 is dismissed.

2. The application in a case of the father filed 14 January 2014 is dismissed.

3. The father file an affidavit from Ms N within 14 days of this date.

4. The matter is adjourned for further consideration to 9.15 am on 30 January 2014 with a liberty to vacate.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hall & Hall has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE

FILE NUMBER: ADC 3671 of 2013

Ms Hall

Applicant

And

Mr Hall

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. Before me today are two applications in a case.  The first application in time is filed on behalf of the mother on 13 January 2014.  That application relates to the parenting arrangements, but in particular the time and the conditions on which the two children of the marriage, namely K, born in December 2003, aged 10 and D, born in December 2005, aged 5, should spend with their father. 

2. There is considerable history to the matter, and whilst to some extent there has been some movement in terms of the nature of the orders being sought by the mother, it’s appropriate to commence these reasons by setting out in full the orders as sought by the mother at the commencement of the hearing:- 

   (1)That until further order, the children’s time with the father pursuant to order 9 December 2013 be suspended;

   (2)That a further report prepared by Dr [A] with respect to the children, [K] and [D] be prepared;

   (3)That the children’s time with the father be supervised at all times by an independent supervisor.

3. Whilst there is some uncertainty as to the catalyst for the application, I think it is reasonable to say that the matter has its genesis in the event or incident that allegedly occurred on 29 December 2013, involving the father and the children on his time with them.  The mother in support of the orders, filed a case outline document and to some extent the orders proposed in that document are different or at least potentially different to the intent of the orders in the application.

4. At first instance, I was of the view that what the mother was seeking to do was to suspend the time that the children spend with their father pursuant to the order of 9 December 2013, and that there be a further report prepared by Dr A.  To give that some context, the family consultant has prepared and published a report on or about 5 December 2013 in respect of an earlier order of this court. The father’s time be suspended until such time as an independent supervisor was able to supervise his time with the children. 

5. I do not understand the inter-relationship between those matters and the application because it now appears that the mother’s real position is that she is not seeking to stop the father spending time with the children, but rather that she seeks the condition of supervision to be changed from that which appears in the order of 9 December 2013 to someone that is described in the application as an “independent supervisor”.  It’s common ground that what is intended by an independent supervisor is someone not being a member or an associate of the father or his family, but rather a person who would be a separate and outside contractor.  Mr Ackman QC used the examples “[J Supervisors]” or “[O Supervisors]” but in any event, someone who would undertake the task professionally and for a fee. 

6. The mother in her affidavit places a slightly different emphasis on the matter in the sense that she seeks an order, as set out in paragraph 14 of the affidavit, that the children consult with Dr A for the purpose of the preparation of a further report in relation to the incident between the father and K on 29 December 2013.  The import of that is that the mother seeks now as part of any ongoing order that there be a further interview process between the children and Dr A, specifically directed to matters of 29 December 2013. 

7. As a matter of some further complexity, counsel now tell me that the matter is to come back before Dawe J on 18 March 2014 for a reassessment of orders that her Honour made on 9 December 2013 and during that period, there is to be an update report. I am told today that appointments have been made for that process to commence on or about 24 February 2014.  I do not know whether it is intended that report process as already arranged is going to satisfy the mother in her request for a further report or whether it’s contemplated that, in fact, in addition to the process already in place, there is to be a further report. 

8. The father brings an application in the case filed on 14 January 2014, being the day after the mother’s application in the case.  He seeks that by way of enforcement of orders on 9 December 2013, that in effect – my words not his – that the mother comply with those orders, and he also seeks that there be some further or make-up time as is described in terms of the periods of time that the father has not seen the children since the mother’s unilateral termination of the arrangement following the events of 29 December 2013. 

9. Whilst I have had something to say across the course of the day as to the manner in which I deal with this matter, I would be likely not to be receptive to make up time. The indication I gave is that the difficulty with make-up time is that its focus, whilst easy to describe as make-up time, is nonetheless a parenting order and it would be therefore a matter requiring separate consideration to be given as to what those arrangements would be, how they would impact upon the children and what would be the effect in terms of the overall arrangements currently in place. 

10. As indicated, the proceedings before the court commenced by the filing of respective applications in a case by each of the parties, but in addition, and helpfully, the mother has filed an affidavit filed on 13 January 2014 which sets out the narrative of some of the issues in respect of the time that has been spent pursuant to the order of 9 December 2013 and also matters raised by the children, but in particular with the focus resting upon issues arising out of what the children have told their mother occurred between K and the father on 29 December.  That document is a narrative and, with respect, nothing remarkable about it in terms of its presentation of the evidence. 

11. The mother also filed a case outline document which provided a summary of the mother’s case and also sought to rely upon a further affidavit of the mother filed on 22 January 2014.  At the commencement of these proceedings and whilst the parties were seeking some time to see if an agreed position could be reached, I raised with counsel in the presence of the parties what I was to do with and how I was to bring to account this further affidavit. 

12. The affidavit was, relatively speaking, short on narrative.  Again, it is not intended to be a criticism because its main purpose was as a vehicle to annexe and bring to the court’s attention three things.  The first, being annexure AH1, was a copy of a transcript of a hearing in the Magistrates Court on … December 2013.  That transcript appears to be against the background of a private application taken by the mother in the Magistrates Court seeking intervention orders. 

13. I asked Senior Counsel for the mother, what I was to do with the transcript, and I was told that it was not a matter that needed to concern me and that there would be no submissions made in respect of the matters that arise from it.  I have no difficulty in ignoring the document, save that it did however result in the second annexure, being AH2, which is not a document that I am able to ignore. I am obliged under the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) in particular in respect of the parenting provision to bring to account matters relating to orders of family violence or intervention.

14. The transcript was the ex parte evidence given by the mother in the Magistrates Court which led to an interim intervention order being made on … December 2013, and it’s noted that there is an adjourn date, being … February 2014.  I do not know the fate of it.  I do not know whether the father intends or does not intend to defend the action, but in any event, for the purposes of the exercise, the orders made under intervention create a significant difficulty for this court.  The prime feature of this intervention order is based to some extent on the history that, following the separation, the mother had obtained an intervention order as between she and the defendant father. 

15. The significant difference between that process – and which is of course relevant because it falls into the category of matters relating to family violence and matters that I must give significant attention and weight to, but the difference is that this private intervention order application sought to include the children as part of the order.  The mother was successful in obtaining the order, and the difficulty is the order provided, in order 10, rather than simply an exemption from the provisions of the order in circumstances where orders of the Family Court require there to be contact, communication and involvement between the parties, usually for the purposes of effecting orders for the children to spend time with one or other of the parties, unusually, order 10 has a level of detail which mirrors word for word, the orders that were made by Dawe J on 9 December 2013. 

16. I raised this with counsel, not because it was unusual and therefore what I might describe as a curiosity, but it has a very real issue that flows from it, namely, that, if I am to make an order, either on the case of the mother or on the case of the father, then I have a concern that the only way I could make such an order is if I am prepared to make an additional order also, under section 68Q of the Act, which would see an order of this Court override an Order of Intervention. Whilst that’s not an impossibility, I consider it to be a difficulty and in any event, it’s a matter that needs to be given some consideration.

17. It may be that there is a level of pedantry in the manner in which this particular order was drafted, because, quite obviously the parties assume that there may be a change in the orders, when the matter comes back before Dawe J on 18 March 2014, either in orders that the mother may seek or, indeed, in orders that the father may seek.  In either case, it seems to me her Honour would need to be asked to make a declaration changing this order or, indeed, the mother will need to make a further application to the Magistrates Court to vary the rigour of this particular order. It potentially creates a problem.

18. There is a further relevance, in terms of these proceedings and that is that there is now an Intervention Order which includes the children as “protected persons”.  I’m not told what was the catalyst for the mother to include the children in the order on … December 2013, in circumstances where significant and substantial orders had been made by this Court on 9 December 2013.  There doesn’t appear to be any allegation or assertion of misadventure between that date and … December but, in any event, that may be a matter for another day.

19. All I am concerned about at the moment is the difficulty that may be created by the manner in which the order is drafted, in terms of any orders that I may make or, indeed, any future orders that may need to be made by this Court, but also, again, importantly, that the children are both considered protected parties.

20. The final annexure to that document is, frankly, a matter that I would have thought would have required virtually no comment, but it assumed a significant and substantial importance.  It appears to be email communication sent from the mother to her solicitor on 9 December 2013 at 6.35 am, which appended correspondence or communication by email between the mother and Ms P, who is an adult child of the father.

21. When I considered the affidavit material in respect of the mother’s case, I had difficulty in understanding the purpose of this affidavit and how it was to be used. I raised this issue with senior counsel for the mother at the commencement of the proceedings.

22. I have to be frank; I still don’t know what purpose I’m to put this to.  It may or may not, technically, be inadmissible under the tendency rule, in respect of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and I accept the submission of Mr Ackman QC that falling, as it does, in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) under Part 3.6, the rules of evidence, as to Part 3.6 do not apply, pursuant to section 69ZT, unless the Court decides that they do.

23. Given I embarked upon that exercise at the commencement of the hearing, perhaps that was an error on my part in not ruling, but in any event, even were it not to be offensive in terms of the tendency rule, that is, not inadmissible at first instance, it is a document that is not responsive, as far as I’m able to ascertain, to any matter that I have to decide today. 

24. It is a document of peripheral connection to the issues of 29 December 2013 and, even were to go to some level or extent of corroboration of the mother’s allegations of domestic violence between the parties, in earlier times, I don’t believe that this document could even at the highest possible interpretation go to that point.  It is a document, if anything, that was intended to be prejudicial rather than probative and it provides, frankly, no assistance in terms of the matters that I’m obliged to consider.

25. Indeed, the manner in which the letter is presented, where it demonstrably is as a result of communication passing between the mother and possibly the mother’s solicitors and Ms P and not annexed to the affidavit, renders the document unhelpful, save and except for one issue.  A significant part of the mother’s case is that she has lost confidence – my words, perhaps not as strongly put as the submissions by Senior Counsel for the mother, with the ability or the preparedness of the supervisors in paragraph 4 of the orders of 9 December to abide their proper obligations.

26. It’s for that reason that the mother seeks that there be an independent supervisor, namely, someone who the mother can be entirely satisfied will have an obligation, simply because that person is being paid to do so, to advise, report and undertake the supervisory role at a level that the mother would be satisfied with.  The issue, of course, is that paragraph 4.5 of the order provides that one of the proposed supervisors is, indeed, the adult child Ms P. 

27. She is clearly a person about whom the mother has some confidence, perhaps demonstrable both in the language, in the fact that there’s been ready communication and also in terms of the use to which the mother would immediately have thought this document of assistance.  This document is dated 29 October 2013.  I have indicated when the orders were made.  I’m uncertain whether the existence of this document and the level of interrelationship between Ms P and the mother was a matter made known to the parties when the consent orders were made on 9 December 2013, but, at the very least, it would have to be said that the mother may have some better confidence in respect of Ms P than she would otherwise suggest.

28. The issue, then, comes back to the orders made by Dawe J on 9 December 2013.  The very short chronology is that the parties separated in late September 2013.  The proceedings in this Court were issued on 2 October 2013, that there were amending documents on 23 October 2013 and the first significant tranche of orders that involve parenting issues took place on 23 October 2013. 

29. It was proposed and understood that there needed to be a further hearing and that that hearing would be based upon matters, or at least partly based upon the report of the Family Consultant.  Whilst it is not necessary for the determination of this matter, for completeness, I note that the Court file reflects that there were some further proceedings, in respect of the appointment of Dr A.  Initially, the position of the mother was it was resisted.  The father’s position was that he was prepared to have Ms A involved and her Honour made an order that Ms A was to prepare a report.

30. The report is comprehensive and it is from the recommendations in that report that the orders then provide for the future pathway leading to the next attendance before her Honour on 18 March 2014.  The orders, in relation to issues that bring the parties to Court, are set out in paragraph 3 of the orders made on 9 December 2013 and provide, during school term, that the children spend time with the father each alternate weekend on Sunday from 9 am to 7 pm and each Friday from the cessation of school to 8 pm.  During the Christmas school holidays, there was a slight increase, in the sense that the children were to spend time with the father each Sunday from 9 am to 8 pm, unless otherwise agreed in writing and there was some time on Christmas Day, but that is not germane to these matters today.

31. Importantly, and the subject of significant submissions today, is paragraph 4, which provides that the time the children spend with their father is to be supervised by those persons set out in subparagraphs 4.1 through to 4.7, inclusive.  A further condition was placed upon those supervisors in that, before they were able to act as supervisors, they had to file an appropriate affidavit, which provided in the usual terms, a document which they undertook to read, presumably with the implication that they understood their obligations as supervisors.

32. Each of the supervisors filed an affidavit in that regard and it is on the basis of those orders that time continued with the father.  Whilst there have been some issues raised by the mother, in terms of earlier or previous occasions that the father saw the children, there was an issue raised about the father’s intervention in cutting or trimming D’s hair.  The mother objected and said that she had only taken the children to have their hair cut on 10 December 2013 and she uses that as an example of the father’s controlling behaviour and inability to understand his obligations.

33. A further issue arises, in terms of an allegation by the mother that, notwithstanding the provision in the order for the children to have access to their mobile phones and be permitted to contact the mother, if an urgent issue arises, the mother alleges and the father agrees that there was an occasion when the phones were taken away from the children.

34. They, however, again, are not really the issues that bring the proceedings urgently before the Court.  The issue is what occurred on 29 December 2013 where pursuant to the orders made on 9 December 2013, the children came into the care of the father and under the supervision of his sister, Ms N.  When the day concluded, the children returned to their mother and at paragraph 9 of her affidavit she reports a conversation she had with D where he’s alleged to have said “Baba – (and by that I mean the father) – got angry at [K] at breakfast”. 

1. The mother asked D what happened at breakfast and D told the mother that the father had hit K.  The mother then turned to K and the recitation of that is set out at paragraph 10, but, effectively, there was a dispute between K and his father in respect of breakfast, that he didn’t like the food, that it was different to what he expected he ordered, and that the father became angry, told him he had to eat it because he’d paid for it.  When the father apparently insisted upon K eating the food and K continued to refuse, the father hit the child with his hand across his left eye and cheek. 

2. The mother reports that K said the incident occurred suddenly and unexpectedly, and that his eye was sore afterwards and that he had to keep blinking.  Of relevance is the further matters by K and D that at all relevant times the supervisor, namely, Ms N, was present.  There was a mark and to that extent there are photographs, being annexures A and B, which are difficult to determine, but the best that I can do is suggest that it shows a redness in respect of the child’s eye. 

3. A number of issues arise: whether or not this perceived injury was sufficient for the mother to have seen it at first instance or whether it was only apparent upon closer examination by the mother following D raising the matter of this alleged altercation.  I do not know.  What I do know is that thereafter a process was undertaken where the child was the subject of a photograph or photographs in respect of it.  The mother then stopped time pursuant to the order, and since 29 December 2013 the father has not spent time with the children. 

4. The timing of all of this, was difficult, it occurring at Christmas.  Solicitors’ offices were closed.  Other issues intervened.  Even the ability of the parties to access the Court at short notice may have had some level of compromise about it, but, in any event, the position is that the father hasn’t seen the children.  I have indicated already that the first position of the mother was that there should be a suspension of time between the father and the children until Dr A had prepared a further report in relation to the incident. 

5. That would appear to be axiomatic from a reading of paragraph 14 of her affidavit.  But, in any event, I am now told that the mother’s position is not quite so proscriptive and that time can continue, providing a separate and independent supervisor is available.  The father, in terms of his presentation today by counsel, initially sought that the proceedings be the subject of an adjournment. The purpose of that was to seek from the supervisor Ms N, an affidavit.  On 4 January 2014, Ms N apparently departed Australia for Lebanon.  I am uncertain whether that’s her home or not, but, in any event, that’s where she is. 

6. There were some timing issues.  Mr Richards for the father concedes that whilst it would have been extraordinarily difficult, it may have been possible for an affidavit to have been prepared by Ms N.  But, in any event time was short between the date of the incident and the date she departed and I do not draw any adverse inference in respect of any perceived or alleged delay in that occurring.  Importantly, Mr Richards makes it clear that it is the intention of the father to file an affidavit from Ms N as to the events that occurred on 29 December 2013. 

7. The father’s application is that I in effect do nothing to interfere with the current operation of the orders, but simply adjourn the matter for a period of two weeks on the basis that then an affidavit will be available.  I’m of the view that that, frankly, is an unnecessary step in these proceedings in circumstances where there will be further Court proceedings on 18 March and there will also be further involvement between the parties and the Family Consultant in respect of the family assessment of 24 February 2014.  That’s not to say, however, that the affidavit should not be filed. 

8. I think it should, because it may need to be considered in the context of future conduct of the matter, the further report, if I’m right in assuming that the further report will now include something about 29 December 2013.  But I do not consider that that issue alone should result in an adjournment of the proceedings simply for that to occur.  It is important, in my view, that there be no confusion about what this is really all about.  Very properly, the mother instructed Senior Counsel to put to the Court that she is not seeking to adversely impact upon the children’s time with their father and, importantly, she concedes that the children are prepared to see their father and that there is nothing about the incident of 29 December 2013 which impacts upon that.  They are prepared to go. 

9. That is an important concession and so, to a very large degree, this seems to be about two issues:  the first is to ensure that the children are protected and that there is not an unacceptable risk presented by the father in terms of the time that the children spend with him pursuant to the interim orders;  and secondly, as far as the mother is concerned, she puts to me that it’s almost as important that she feel comfortable about what’s going in, in order that she can better promote the time and the relationship between the children and their father.

10. I raise those matters because the first comes down to a matter of risk and whether or not the current orders and the provisions in the current orders provide sufficient and appropriate protection for the children.  If I find that they do not, then obviously that impacts significantly on the orders that I make.  The second, is what weight I place on how the mother feels and whether the orders as they currently are framed give the mother some level of comfort that she apparently needs. 

11. The latter is a secondary issue and, in my view, less important, but raised by the mother because she asserts that the incident on 29^th December is a further example of the father’s previous behaviour.  In short, the mother says the father has been domestically violent, he acts in a way that is uncontrollable, the children have been struck, she’s been struck, and therefore the Court should be resolute in the orders that it makes necessary to provide appropriate protection for the children.  Whilst there is a significant affidavit material on the file and I have had the advantage of looking at it, substantial submissions were based upon the report of Dr A.  I was referred to paragraph 55 by Mr Ackman QC:-

    Whilst this is important progress for the children, based on the assessment, risk management needs to be considered in the best interests of [K] and [D].  An important risk factor is that each parent made accusations about the other parent’s inappropriate and abusive parenting and perpetration of family violence.  Whilst the entrenched inter-parental conflict may have been one of the triggers for violent incidents, both parents’ description of family violence included misuse of power, control including intimidation, denying, blaming, asserting privilege, and involvement of the children.

12. The father, as I understand it, does not concede the allegations of the mother, but to some extent I don’t need to trouble myself about that.  What I think is important in terms of the report is the observations of the family consultant in respect of the interaction between the children and their mother and their father.  It is not to suggest that the family consultant was unimpressed with the father; in fact, the family consultant indicated that he presented as an intelligent man who desperately wants to restore his relationship with the children. 

13. Importantly, the observations were that the children were keen to spend time with their father and I form the view, generally, that there is a strong and proper relationship between the children and their father.  K impressed the family consultant as being a person who was intelligent, confident and very articulate.  It’s reported by the family consultant that he impressed as having good comprehension and awareness of his own emotions, thoughts and positive self-esteem;  he had positive school reports which showed overall satisfactory scholastic achievement, with some improvement in his ability to concentrate and learn; and he was well-mannered. 

14. The child spoke willingly and properly in respect of the relationship between he and his parents, and he indicated that he was happy that the parties were divorcing, because he now experienced no stress.  At paragraph 38 he talks of his relationship with his father and that he initially expressed that he enjoys seeing the children of one of dad’s friends and that “his father lets us play what we want”.  He also reflected that he, the father, is really kind, sometimes really mad; and K described his father’s unpredictable mood swings that made K feel weird and anxious about what the father will do.

15. He talks of an incident where he suffered some bruises and he was dragged by the arm by the father.  D also impressed as an intelligent, friendly and sensitive child and importantly, was articulate.  These are children who are able to report clearly and in a way that is lucid, but also they are to be the subject of further assessment in the not too distant future.  Again, the orders of 9 December take into account matters raised in the report of Dr A, and the only reason I have reference to it is because the position adopted by the mother, namely that the children are willing and prepared to see their father, dovetails with the family consultant’s observations of the relationship between the father and the children, namely that whilst there are some difficulties, it is a relationship that ought to be fostered and supported.  The orders of 9 December 2013 provide for a further period of assessment to be undertaken, with a court review on 18 March.

16. The father puts forward in his affidavit what he said were the events on 29 December, and in summary he asserts that there was an incident between the father and the child K, that it was entirely benign and that it resulted from an accident of movement which caused the child’s hand to strike the child’s own head.  The father then says that the rest of the day was a perfectly happy and proper day.  The children enjoyed themselves, and the father says, in fact, that the day, being 29 December 2013, was the best day that he had enjoyed with the children to date. 

17. The father’s affidavit refers to separate interaction between Ms N and the mother after 29 December 2013 where Ms N, on the basis that she was intending to fly out on 4 January, sought to spend some extra time with the children – I would assume, in her own right.  I do not know what the mother says about that communication and whether or not she raised issues of concern about 29 December or not. 

18. In all the circumstances, I consider the issue is really one of protection.  Whilst I understand that the mother would wish to be comforted and would wish to have circumstances that she feels removes any or all doubt, I’m not able to make a clear finding of what happened on 29 December 2013, and without hearing the parties and having evidence it would be difficult to do that today, and I don’t propose to embark upon that exercise. It is important that the children have a willingness to return to their father and see him and if it is then all about risk, I think I’m entitled to focus on what level of protection is set out in the orders of 9 December 2013.

19. The parties reached agreement.  The order was a consent order.  And whilst each of the parties seek to thrust upon the other the consequences of the consent order in terms of what each of them must have understood they were consenting to, I cannot go behind that, but what I am prepared to find is that whatever the issue may have been in respect of Ms N I do not find that her actions, even were it to be proven that there was a lack of diligence on her part, affect the appropriateness of the supervision provided by order 4 in terms of those persons, being 4.1 through to 4.6 inclusive – indeed, even including the father’s daughter, Ms P, have compromised their position.

20. I find that those supervisors have complied with the order.  They have provided proper and appropriate affidavit material as was required, and there is nothing put before me other than the concern, the fear or the feeling of the mother that she has in respect of those parties which would suggest that they will not understand and diligently apply their obligations, as they clearly did, in respect of the parties’ consent to paragraph 4 of the orders.

21. The matter is under close scrutiny by this court.  Again, all parties are to attend for further assessment before Dr A in the month of February.  The matter is back before the court on 18 March.  The children are the subject of a restraining order – an intervention order – as protected parties.  The court is obviously well apprised of the matter.  The issues have been well and properly joined across the whole of today, and there is no circumstance where I can understand that I ought to have a doubt in respect of the proper presentation of the supervisors, being 4.1 to 4.6.

22. It was put to Mr Ackman QC that even upon the filing of an affidavit from Ms N it is unlikely the mother would accept what she says occurred.  It may be that Ms N should not be a supervisor.  I do not  need to concern myself about that because Mr Richards tells me, that Ms N is in Lebanon, that she won’t be returning and the only further involvement there will be from Ms N is that she will complete an affidavit.

23. I make orders as set out at the commencement of these reasons.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven (57) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Berman delivered on 24 January 2014.

Associate: 

Date:  5 February 2014