Halifax and Halifax (No. 2) - [2021] FamCA 477

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Halifax & Halifax (No. 2) [2021] FamCA 477

File number(s): BRC 622 of 2009

Judgment of: KENT J

Date of judgment: 6 July 2021

Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Whether unacceptable risk of harm – Where the father made threats and statements to an older child of the relationship who is now an adult and gave evidence at trial – Whether the father poses an unacceptable risk to the child if the child’s time with him is unsupervised – Where the father has a lack of insight as to the effect of his threats and statements – Where the father has demonstrated a commitment to the child and to his relationship with the child over an extended period at considerable cost – Where there are constraints upon the child’s relationship with the father by the imposition of supervision – Where a progression to unsupervised time would be consistent with the child’s views – Where in the circumstances unsupervised time would not pose unacceptable risk.

Legislation:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, ss 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 64B, 65L, 68L

Cases cited:
Betros & Betros [2017] FamCAFC 90

Halifax & Halifax [2020] FamCA 312

Harridge and Anor & Harridge and Anor [2010] FamCA 445

M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68

N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC
92-655; [1995] FamCA 139

NEAT Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449; [1992] HCA 66

B. Mahendra, ‘Psychiatric Risk Assessment in Family and Child Law’ (2008) 38 Family Law 569

Number of paragraphs: 154

Date of hearing: 28–30 April 2020;
and 9–10 November 2020

Place: Brisbane

Counsel for the Applicant: Ms Chekirova

Solicitor for the Applicant: A P Hodgson & Associates

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Lyons

Solicitor for the Respondent: Cherry Family Lawyers

Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Dodd

Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Stewart Family Law
ORDERS

BRC 622 of 2009

BETWEEN:
MS HALIFAX

Applicant

AND:
MR HALIFAX

Respondent

AND:
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:

KENT J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 JULY 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The following parenting orders shall apply for the child, X born … 2008.

Parental Responsibility
2.Except as otherwise stated, the mother shall have sole parental responsibility for the major long term issues for X.
3.The parents have equal shared parental responsibility concerning any decision for X to undertake any international travel and any decision to obtain any passport or travel document for X for the purpose of X undertaking any international travel.

Exchange of Information
4.The mother and father shall:
(a)keep the other parent informed at all times of their residential address;
(b)keep the other parent informed of the names and addresses of any treating medical or other allied health practitioners who treat X and authorise those practitioners to provide the other parent with information that they are lawfully able to provide about X;
(c)inform the other parent as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue or significant illness suffered by X and authorise any treating medical practitioner to release X’s medical information to the other parent.

Living Arrangements for X
5.X shall live with the mother.
6.Pending the commencement of X spending unsupervised time with the father as provided for in Order 7, X continue to spend time with the father at the M Contact Centre, Suburb N (“the contact centre”) in accordance with the orders made on 24 October 2019 provided that:
(a)the parents do all acts and things reasonably required to facilitate with the contact centre provision for the supervised time occurring in a single block period of three (3) hours per fortnight on a Saturday or a Sunday, in lieu of the times provided in the 24 October 2019 orders; and
(b)the father continue to be responsible for all costs associated with X spending time with him at the contact centre.

7.Commencing Friday, 8 October 2021 X spend time with the father:
(a)each alternate weekend from after school Friday until before school Monday to continue fortnightly;
(b)this Order shall be suspended for the weekends during any school holiday period (which shall be deemed to include the first weekend after the school term ends and the weekend before school recommences) and to recommence on the weekend after the school term recommences determined as if the sequence had not been interrupted.

8.Commencing in the school holiday period commencing in December 2021, X shall live with her parents for school holiday periods as follows:
(a)being the first half of the Autumn, Winter, Spring and Summer school holidays in even numbered years with the father and in odd numbered years with the mother; and
(b)the second half of the Autumn, Winter, Spring and Summer school holidays in odd numbered years with the father and in even numbered years with the mother;
(c)for the purpose of these Orders, the school holiday time shall commence:
(i)when a parent’s time falls in the first half of the holidays from after school on the day the school term finishes and conclude at 5.00pm on the day calculated to be half of the holidays;
(ii)when a parent’s time falls in the second half of the holidays from 5.00pm on the day calculated to represent half of the holidays when contact shall end at 5.00pm on the day before the school term recommences;
(iii)school holidays shall be deemed to commence at close of school on the day the school term finishes and conclude at 5.00pm on the day before X returns to school and the number of nights in each school holiday period is to be used to calculate one half of the school holiday period and if there is an uneven number of nights the father shall retain the additional night.

9.Notwithstanding any previous Orders, X shall spend time with her parents on special occasions as follows:
(a)for Christmas Day:
(i)from 5.00pm Christmas Eve until 2.00pm Christmas Day in even numbered years with the father and in odd numbered years with the mother; and
(ii)from 2.00pm Christmas Day until 5.00pm Boxing Day in odd numbered years with the father and in even numbered years with the mother.

(b)on X’s birthday (with the parent she is not living with on the day):
(i)if a school day, from after school until 6.00pm;
(ii)if a non-school day, from 1.00pm until 6.00pm;

with that parent to be responsible to collect and return the child.
(c)with the father on the Father’s Day weekend and in the event that is a non-contact weekend, the father shall forgo the following weekend of contact;
(d)with the mother on the Mother’s Day weekend and in the event that is a non-contact weekend, the mother shall forgo the following weekend of contact.

Collection and Delivery
10.Except as otherwise ordered, the changeover point for the transition for X between the households shall be the school of X and if changeover is to occur out of school time then at the residence of the parents and for that purpose:
(a)the parents may collect X in person or by their nominee provided that the nominee is an adult who is known to X and the other parent;
(b)each parent shall be punctual in attending the changeover and if there is to be a delay shall advise the other parent by text message;
(c)unless otherwise agreed neither parent shall approach the other and shall remain near their cars so as to enable X to move readily between the vehicles.

11.Each parent shall deliver and return X’s clothing, school supplies and belongings and X’s clothing shall be returned in a clean condition.

Section 65L Orders
12.Pursuant to s 65L of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) a Family Consultant be appointed by the Director of Child Dispute Services to assist the mother and X in complying with these orders and in particular as regards the progression to X commencing to spend unsupervised time with the father from October 2021.
13.The mother shall comply with all reasonable requests of the appointed Family Consultant including as to any arrangements to be made for X to attend upon the Family Consultant as requested by the Family Consultant.
14.The appointed Family Consultant shall be permitted access to a copy of these reasons for judgment and any material contained on the Court file including available transcripts of evidence for the purpose of providing such assistance.

Counselling
15.The mother shall be at liberty, in the exercise of her parental responsibility, to engage X in counselling assistance or support from a qualified provider both prior to and subsequent to October 2021, and for that purpose the mother be at liberty, pursuant to s 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), to provide a copy of these reasons for judgment and orders to any professional provider of counselling support to X.

Discharge of Independent Children’s Lawyer
16.Subject to any appeal, in which event this order shall not take effect, the Independent Children’s Lawyer be discharged.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.Pursuant to s 65DA(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Halifax & Halifax has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
KENT J:

Mr Halifax (“the father”) and Ms Halifax (“the mother”) have an extensive history of conflict concerning parenting issues dating back to more than a decade ago following their final separation in about 2008.
As the family consultant, Mr D, notes in his April 2019 family report there have been prior family reports undertaken in association with parenting proceedings in 2010 and 2015 as well as a Child Inclusive Conference Memorandum to Court in August 2015.[1]
[1] Affidavit of Mr D filed on 9 April 2019, Annexure “B”, report dated 5 April 2019, paragraph 6.
The current dispute concerns the parenting orders[2] to be made only with respect to the parents’ youngest child, X, who was born in 2008 and is now aged 13 years. The parents’ now adult daughter, Ms B, is 20 years of age having been born in 2000. Their now adult son, Mr F, is 18 years of age having been born in 2002. Y, born in 2006 and now 14 years of age, is X’s maternal half-sister, the product of a relationship between the mother and another man during an approximate ten month period when the mother returned to Country G, her country of origin, whilst the father remained in Australia caring for the two older children. Y is not the subject of the current proceedings.
[2] Pursuant to Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
X’s interests in the proceedings are independently represented by a lawyer appointed for that purpose (“the ICL”).[3]
[3] Pursuant to s 68L of the Act.
The litigation history includes that on 5 July 2010, following a contested trial, a Federal Magistrate made parenting orders in the then Federal Magistrates Court concerning all four of the children referred to. Notwithstanding that those orders were obviously intended to finalise parenting issues, further substantive parenting proceedings ensued, particularly between 2015 and 2017.
In summary, the 5 July 2010 orders provided for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the children; the children to live with the mother; and for the children to spend time with the father on alternate weekends and for half of school holiday periods.
On 19 November 2013 further proceedings resulted in final parenting orders being made by consent discharging the orders made on 5 July 2010 in relation to Y. Those consent orders further provided for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for Y and authorised the mother to cause Y’s surname to be changed to that of her biological father. Those consent orders made no provision for Y to spend time or communicate with the father.
Significant difficulties in the relationship between Mr F and the mother resulted in Mr F electing to live with the father. That is, despite the terms of the orders of 5 July 2010, Mr F commenced to live full time with the father and orders were made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“the Federal Circuit Court”) on 3 September 2015 (Order 10) discharging the orders of July 2010 with respect to Mr F and providing for Mr F to live with the father and spend limited time with the mother.
A series of orders subsequently made in the Federal Circuit Court in 2015 appear to be directed to counselling as between Mr F and the mother in an attempt to repair their fractured relationship. However, those proceedings culminated in orders being made in the Federal Circuit Court on 27 March 2017 providing for the father to have sole parental responsibility for Mr F; for Mr F to live with the father; and for Mr F to spend time with the mother “at his own choosing”. Mr F has chosen not to spend time with or communicate with the mother.
At the core of the current dispute concerning X, and determinative of the parenting orders now to be made in X’s best interests,[4] is whether X spending unsupervised time with the father poses an unacceptable risk to her welfare. This issue arises primarily from a series of threats and statements the father exposed Ms B to during 2018, as will be further discussed. That exposure ultimately led the mother to institute these proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, which proceedings were subsequently transferred to this Court.
[4] Within the meaning of s 60CA of the Act.
Whilst the evidence surrounding the father’s threats and statements to Ms B will be discussed in some further detail, suffice to note at this point that the content of them is gravely troubling and it is clear that they had a profoundly deleterious effect upon Ms B. In summary and paraphrased form, the father’s threats and statements to Ms B were of an extreme nature and included:
(a)The threat to shoot the mother in the head;
(b)Threats or statements to the effect that that father had actively contemplated the murder of the entire family;
(c)The threat or statement that the father would drive a vehicle through the mother’s house;
(d)Statements to the effect that the father had planned to kill the Federal Magistrate (the judicial officer who presided over the 2010 trial and made the 5 July 2010 orders) and that the plan had not been put into effect only because the Federal Magistrate had died of natural causes in the preceding week; and
(e)Plans to “drive a concrete truck through the Court building with a bomb” and discussion about bomb making.
Ms B reported these threats to her school counsellor and to a psychologist whom she had been seeing since 2016. There followed police involvement and interviews of the children.
As noted, the mother instituted the current proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court in 2018 and on 1 November 2018 a Federal Circuit Court judge made orders that all orders which provided for Ms B and X to spend time with the father be suspended (Order 1). By the same orders, the Federal Circuit Court judge transferred the proceedings to this Court.
In this Court, orders were made by a Senior Registrar on 11 April 2019 which included an order by consent that X spend time with the father at a contact centre. Further interlocutory orders were made in 2019 concerning, inter alia, X spending supervised time with the father at a contact centre. These remained the operative orders as at the trial of these proceedings.
BIFURCATED TRIAL
The trial of these proceedings was initially set down for four days commencing on 28 April 2020.
As is reflected in the interim orders made in the lead up to trial, Dr C, consultant psychiatrist, was engaged as the single expert psychiatrist to undertake a psychiatric assessment of each of the parents. An affidavit of Dr C attaching his medico-legal report was filed on 29 July 2019 and Dr C was called to give oral evidence on the third day of the trial.
An important development in the trial occurred prior to Dr C being called to give oral evidence. In the lead up to the trial, the father had adamantly denied Ms B’s evidence concerning the subject threats and statements Ms B attributed to the father. The father’s trial affidavit is replete with denials of Ms B’s specific allegations and indeed in both his affidavit evidence and his initial oral evidence at trial on this topic the father attributed to the mother, and her influence over Ms B, as the relevant dynamic for these allegations to be forthcoming from Ms B.
As a consequence, when Ms B was called to give oral evidence at the trial, she was subjected to counsel for the father’s cross-examination founded on the contention that her evidence was not true.
Likewise, in his initial oral evidence at trial, the father maintained his denials as to the threats and statements Ms B attributed to him.
It was only when, in cross-examination by counsel for the mother, the father was directed to the fact that Mr F had confirmed to investigative authorities that the father had made the threats and statements reported by Ms B, that the father finally relented and acknowledged the truth that the threats and statements were in fact made by him as reported by Ms B.
This turn of events had an obviously profound effect upon the credibility of the father. Aside from the father’s credibility being irreparably damaged, there is obviously significance in the feature that the father would allow Ms B to be subjected to being called as a witness in these proceedings and then to be challenged under cross-examination by counsel for the father when, in the end result, the father acknowledged the truth of Ms B’s evidence.
All of this produced for Dr C the conclusion at the first stage of trial that a forensic risk assessment of the father would need to be undertaken before this Court could finalise parenting orders. No party, including the father, took any objection to the course proposed consequent upon Dr C’s evidence that a forensic risk assessment of the father was required.
It had been anticipated that such forensic risk assessment could be undertaken within a couple of months and for the trial to then be resumed. This was subject to the identity of the psychiatrist who undertook the forensic risk assessment and the funding of the further report to be forthcoming. Thus, for the reasons delivered on 30 April 2020,[5] the trial was adjourned

part-heard.
[5] Halifax & Halifax [2020] FamCA 312.
In the event, Dr C undertook the forensic risk assessment and provided a further report in that respect.
Aside from the forensic risk assessment undertaken by Dr C, the father gave evidence of a willingness to undertake, separately, counselling with his own treating psychiatrist. In the result, the father engaged with Dr H, treating neuropsychiatrist. The need to have affidavits from each of Dr C and Dr H had the result that the trial could not be resumed until 9 November 2020 and the trial then proceeded for a further two days to its completion on 10 November 2020.

Although it will be cold comfort to the parties, I here record my sincere apology to them for my delay in finalising this judgment in circumstances where the last day of trial was in November 2020. I have sought to address any consequences of delay that might otherwise result by, in advance of finalising these reasons for judgment, re-reading the affidavit evidence and documentary exhibits tendered at trial as well as reviewing the transcript of the oral evidence given over the course of the bifurcated trial.
THE PARTIES’ PROPOSALS
Whilst earlier maintaining a position that orders be made for no time or communication between X and the father, by the stage of final submissions at the trial on 10 November 2020, the mother joined in seeking the orders sought by the ICL. Those orders are predicated upon the contention by the ICL that X spending unsupervised time with the father would expose her to unacceptable risks to her welfare. Thus, the orders proposed by the ICL contemplate that the risk of harm posed by the father be addressed by a continuation of a regime of supervised time at a contact centre, a regime that has been in place, as already noted, since interim orders were made by a Senior Registrar of this Court on 24 October 2019.
The orders advanced by the ICL, joined in by the mother, do not include any “sunset” provision with respect to supervision of X’s time with the father at a contact centre. That is, there is no mechanism advanced by the ICL or by the mother that would see X’s time with the father revert to a more normalised regime such as was the case with the 5 July 2010 orders.
On the contention that he poses no relevant risk of harm to X, the father’s primary proposal by the stage of final submissions at the trial was for orders for an equal time/week about arrangement. Alternatively, the father sought orders that X spend alternate weekends in his care, effectively the position which operated with the 5 July 2010 orders.
Whilst not advanced as a proposal, the father sought that in the event the Court determined, contrary to his position, that supervised time was to continue, that such time occur in a block period of three hours per fortnight, rather than in accordance with the current regime which splits that time. Neither the mother nor the ICL raised any issue with that.
As to parental responsibility,[6] whilst the father had earlier maintained the position that there ought be an order for equal shared parental responsibility, by the stage of final submissions at the trial, the father by his counsel acknowledged that equal shared parental responsibility would not be “practicable or workable”.[7] The father proposed an order for the mother to have sole parental responsibility save in respect of X’s schooling, her name and overseas travel.[8]
[6] Within the meaning of s 60B of the Act.
[7] Transcript 10 November 2020, p.78 lines 17–18.
[8] Transcript 10 November 2020, p.78 lines 1–4.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As already noted, the parents finally separated and divorced more than a decade ago. Likewise, more than a decade has passed since the parents’ engaged in the trial resulting in the parenting orders made in the then Federal Magistrates Court on 5 July 2010, as earlier referred to. Only the youngest child is now the subject of these proceedings.
These basic facts, together with the central issue of whether or not X would be exposed to risk by spending unsupervised time with the father, renders it unnecessary to traverse in complete detail the full and lengthy history of disputation between the parents, either prior to or subsequent to their final separation in about 2008.
For example, the father has historically agitated a range of complaints about the mother’s mental health, her physical abuse of the children and in particular Mr F, and her misuse of alcohol. At least some of the historical subpoenaed records of the Queensland Police Service and of the Department of Child Safety contained within documents in a tender bundle compiled by the ICL give some credence to at least some of the historical allegations advanced by the father against the mother. For example, there is historically clear evidence of property damage caused by the mother to the father’s property and clear evidence of historical drink driving offences by the mother.
That noted, the mother relied upon affidavit and oral evidence from each of her general medical practitioner (Dr J); her mental health social worker (Ms K) and her consultant psychiatrist (Dr L) to establish, as I accept to be the case, that the mother engages appropriately with mental health professionals as needed.
For her part, the mother has historically advanced a range of serious allegations concerning the father’s conduct towards her, including in the period prior to their final separation in 2008, such conduct including coercive and controlling behaviours and abusive behaviours.
In my judgment, the resolution of many of these historical allegations by one parent against the other or resolution of numerous disputed issues of historical fact is unnecessary to the determination of current parenting orders which meet X’s best interests. A summary of centrally important facts providing the relevant context of the current parenting issues concerning X is all that is necessary.
The father was born in 1966 and is now aged 54 years. As at the commencement trial, he was self-employed.
The mother was born in Country G in 1983 and is now aged 38 years. As at trial, she was engaged in full-time employment as a supervisor.
On the father’s account to the family consultant,[9] in 1999 or 2000 on a visit to Country G the then 33 year old father met and pursued a relationship with the then 15 or 16 year old mother. The mother relocated to Australia to live with the father in 2000 and the parents married here in 2000. As already noted, their relationship produced three children, namely Ms B, Mr F and X. The mother’s daughter and X’s half-sister, Y, was historically treated as a child of the parent’s marriage. The mother was only 17 years of age when Ms B was born and only 19 years of age when Mr F was born. The mother was only about 24 years of age by the time she had four children under the age of seven.
[9] Affidavit of Mr D filed on 9 April 2019, Annexure “B”, report dated 5 April 2019, paragraph 14.
Whilst the mother contends that the parents finally separated in 2006,[10] the family consultant records in his report, and I accept, that during the mother’s pregnancy with Y, and following her birth in 2006, the parents had an “on and off” relationship.[11] As already noted, X was born in 2008. However, on any view of the evidence, the parents did finally separate in 2008, when all of the children were still very young.
[10] Affidavit of the mother filed on 26 February 2020, paragraph 10.
[11] Affidavit of Mr D filed on 9 April 2019, Annexure “B”, report dated 5 April 2019, paragraph 15.
All four of the children, namely Ms B, Mr F, Y and X, were the subject of the disputed parenting proceedings which went to trial in 2010 and of the orders made on 5 July 2010. In summary, those orders provided for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the children; the children to live with the mother; and for the children to spend time with the father on alternate weekends and for half of school holiday periods.
It is to be noted that when the 5 July 2010 orders were made, providing as they did for the children to spend substantial and significant time in the father’s care, the children were still all very young. Ms B was nine, Mr F was seven, Y was three and X was two. As Ms B confirmed in her oral evidence, from July 2010 onwards until the current difficulties arose in 2018, parenting arrangements had generally proceeded in conformity with the 5 July 2010 orders, subject of course to the changes that were subsequently effected, as earlier discussed, concerning Y and Mr F respectively.
Notably, the change with respect to Mr F involved him moving to live permanently with the father shortly before Mr F turned 13 years of age. The point of emphasis in this context is that, for all of the tensions and conflicts that obviously existed between the parents, the father maintained a role of continuing to undertake substantial parenting responsibility over the years following the 5 July 2010 orders being made, in addition to his self-employment.
Of course from X’s perspective, living in the primary care of her mother in a household including her sisters Ms B and Y is what X has always known. Ms B gave evidence, which I accept, that X and Y have an extremely close sibling relationship. It would plainly not be in X’s best interests for that relationship to be disrupted.
It ought be recorded here, with respect to Mr F’s move to live with the father, that whilst the evidence reflects that Mr F was certainly aware of and affected by the conflict between his parents, it could not be concluded that his move to live with the father was the product of malevolent influence of the father. To the contrary, there is an abundance of evidence concerning Mr F’s adverse response to the mother’s methods of disciplining Mr F that caused obvious conflicts in their relationship, and recorded complaints by Mr F in the subpoenaed material as to the quality of parenting or lack of parenting assistance he received from the mother.
It is clear that the mother had problems with disciplining Mr F and in dealing with him. Without being exhaustive, perhaps the most significant example of this is the involvement of the Queensland Police Service in an interview of Mr F on 22 August 2012 when Mr F was yet to turn 10 years of age. Tendered into evidence is the relevant record of the interviews that the Queensland Police Service conducted with each of Mr F, Ms B and the mother. That record records that the mother’s punishment of Mr F on that occasion was to wet his knees and require him to kneel on the floor in the laundry on paper that was covered in rock salt whilst holding objects above his head for a period variously estimated at between half an hour and one hour. This occurred whilst his three sisters were present.
In her interview, Ms B confirmed Mr F’s version of what had occurred and indeed in her interview, the mother likewise confirmed this incident. The mother acknowledged to the Police that her actions were wrong and expressed remorse for what had happened. The point of emphasis here is that it is clear that the mother has substantially been the author of her own misfortune in terms of her relationship with Mr F or, more accurately, the fact that Mr F has elected not to have a relationship with the mother.
A most unfortunate consequence of the history concerning Mr F is that, from X’s perspective, Mr F’s disengagement from the mother has included all members of the mother’s household and has had the consequence that X (and Ms B and Y) have had no meaningful relationship or communication with Mr F over the past several years. I note here that the father at least at one stage sought that Mr F be included in a supervised visit with X at the contact centre, but the mother refused to allow that to occur out of fear that X might be subjected to Mr F’s negative views of the mother.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Part VII of the Act provides the statutory framework in which the Court’s jurisdiction, power and discretion to make parenting orders (as defined in s 64B) is exercised.
The objects of Part VII are expressed in s 60B(1). Of particular relevance to the issues in this case as to the benefit to X of a meaningful relationship with both of her parents, and protecting a child from risk, are objects (a) and (b) which provide:
The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:
(a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
…
Those respective objects find reflection in the two primary considerations set out in s 60CC of the Act which sets out the primary considerations and the additional considerations by which a Court determines what is in a child’s best interests. Relevantly, s 60CC(2) provides:
Primary considerations
(2) The primary considerations are:
(a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
(b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
Section 60CC(2A) requires the Court to give greater weight to (b).
It can be seen that in this case each of the two primary considerations in s 60CC(2) assume determinative significance upon X’s best interests concerning any orders for time spent with her father.
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
In this context it is to be noted that s 60CC mandates that in determining what is in the child’s best interests the Court must consider each of the matters set out in subsection (2) (the primary considerations) and subsection (3) (the additional considerations). It will be understood that discussion about, and findings in relation to, the central questions in this case will obviously resonate with one or more of those considerations. Conversely, those being the central questions having determinative significance about what is in this child’s best interests, specific discussion in these reasons about each and every of the considerations is unnecessary. In summary, whilst I emphasise that I have considered each and every of the s 60CC considerations, I do not intend to include within these reasons any detailed discussion, in a formulaic way, of any of those considerations not at the forefront of this determination.
Section 60CG is a statutory requirement to ensure that a parenting order does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence and empowers the Court to include in the order any safeguards that it considers necessary for the safety of those affected by the order.
In this case neither of the parents, nor the ICL, identify within their respective final proposed orders that an order for equal shared parental responsibility would be in the best interests of X. Each party ultimately seeks an order for the mother to have sole parental responsibility as meeting X’s best interests. In any event, there are reasonable grounds to believe in this case that the parents of X have engaged in family violence. It follows that the presumption in s 61DA of equal shared parental responsibility when making parenting orders does not apply in this case by operation of subsection (2). Such presumption would, in any event, be rebutted by the best interests considerations as is referred to in subsection (4) of that section, as will be clear from these reasons.
In a case where, as here, orders as proposed by the ICL and the mother for indefinite supervision of X’s time with the father are to be contemplated the undesirable, though sometimes warranted, imposition which supervision entails needs to be given careful consideration.
In Betros & Betros [2017] FamCAFC 90 the Full Court observed at [13]:
It has long been recognised that the permanent imposition of supervision upon the interaction between children and a parent is undesirable, though sometimes warranted (see Slater & Light (2013) 48 Fam LR 573 at 583–584; Champness & Hanson (2009) FLC 93-407 at [209]–[215]; Moose & Moose (2008) FLC 93-375 at [119]; H & K [2001] FamCA 687 at [40]–[41]; B and B (1993) FLC 92-357 at 79,780). Consideration should usually be given to whether orders can be created to avoid the permanence of the supervision or, if that is not practicable in the circumstances of the case, whether the orders for permanent supervision are instead best made unconditionally, leaving the supervised party to decide if and when he or she might bring fresh proceedings to vary the orders upon proof of changed circumstances, in the manner envisaged by Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725, as s 65D(2) of the Act ordinarily allows (see Gorman & Huffman and Anor [2016] FamCAFC 174).
As already noted, the mother and the ICL mount a case to the effect that X is at risk of emotional and psychological harm in her father’s unsupervised care. That is analogous to a case where positive findings are urged upon the Court as to, for example, physical abuse and particular care needs to be taken in relation to such findings.
Aside from the provisions within Part VII itself “family violence” is defined in s 4AB(1) of the Act in the following terms:
For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.
(Emphasis in original)
Section 4AB(3) provides that “[f]or the purposes of this Act, a child is exposed to family violence if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence” (emphasis in original). Examples of situations or behaviour that may constitute a child being exposed to family violence are given within s 4AB(2) and s 4AB(4).
In my judgment it is readily apparent that each parent has historically engaged in “family violence” as defined. Without being in any way exhaustive, the father’s threats and statements to Ms B readily meet the definition whilst, in the mother’s case, her excessive disciplining of Mr F likewise meets the definition.
THE STANDARD OF SATISFACTION REQUIRED
Section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides as follows:
(1)In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2)Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a)       the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b)       the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and
(c)       the gravity of the matters alleged.
In NEAT Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449 the majority of the High Court stated:
The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary “where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found”. Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct…
(Footnotes omitted)
The notion of unacceptable risk
Authorities guide what constitutes an “unacceptable risk” and also the relationship of any such identified risk with the orders that the Court is contemplating.
In N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655 (“N and S”) in a well-known passage at 82,713-4 Fogarty J said:
Thus, the essential importance of the unacceptable risk question as I see it is in its direction to judges to give real and substantial consideration to the facts of the case, and to decide whether or not, and why or why not, those facts could be said to raise an unacceptable risk of harm to the child. Thus, the value of the expression is not in a magical provision of an appropriate standard, but in its direction to judges to consider deeply where the facts of the particular case fall, and to explain adequately their findings in this regard.

In M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 the High Court had occasion to consider the approach in Family Court proceedings, albeit in the context of sexual abuse of a child. The High Court observed (at 76):
Viewed in this setting, the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court’s consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse. The Family Court’s wide-ranging discretion to decide what is in the child’s best interests cannot be qualified by requiring the court to try the case as if it were no more than a contest between the parents to be decided solely by reference to the acceptance or rejection of the allegation of sexual abuse on the balance of probabilities.
In Harridge and Anor & Harridge and Anor [2010] FamCA 445 (“Harridge”) at [73] Murphy J, having referred to N and S, proceeded to adopt the following list of enquiries in relation to risk assessment (which are taken from B. Mahendra, ‘Psychiatric Risk Assessment in Family and Child Law’ (2008) 38 Family Law 569):
(1)      What harmful outcome is potentially present in this situation?
(2)      What is the probability of this outcome coming about?
(3)      What risks are probable in this situation in the short, medium and long term?
(4)      What are the factors that could increase or decrease the risk that is probable?
(5)What measures are available whose deployment could mitigate the risks that are probable?
CENTRAL ISSUES
Cross-referenced to provisions within Part VII of the Act, and in particular the s 60CC considerations relevant to determining parenting orders in X’s best interests, the central issues which present as at the final submissions stage of the trial would appear to be these:
(a)The benefit to X of having a meaningful relationship with both of her parents and how that is to be achieved (s 60CC(2)(a));
(b)Whether there is a need to protect X from harm or from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence from either or both parents (s 60CC(2)(b));
(c)X’s views (s 60CC(3)(a));
(d)Any family violence involving X or a member of X’s family (s 60CC(3)(j)); and
(e)The likely effect of any changes in X’s circumstances, including whether or not the mother’s capacity to care for X would be affected by X spending unsupervised time with the father (s 60CC(3)(d)).
In summary, for reasons already stated, and for the reasons which follow:
(a)I am satisfied that X would benefit, and continue to benefit, from having a meaningful relationship with both of her parents. In my judgment that is best achieved by X continuing to live primarily with the mother but, subject to risk issues being addressed, having expanded opportunities for time with the father;
(b)There is a need to protect X from risks of the kind experienced by Ms B via the threats and statements she received from the father. Orders allowing for X’s further maturity and for safeguards to be put in place accommodate the relevant risk;
(c)A progression of X’s time with the father to expand to timeframes similar to those ordered on 5 July 2010, and which has been X’s experience prior to 2018, would be consistent with X’s views or at least more consistent than supervised time;
(d)There has been family violence in this case as discussed;
(e)A reversion, in effect, to a parenting regime similar to that which operated following the 5 July 2010 orders would not herald a profound effect or change for X given her familiarity with it previously, albeit that it would be a significant change to the present regime. The mother ought have sufficient opportunity to enlist professional support for X and for herself before unsupervised time re-commences.
EVIDENCE OF RISK
Ms B details in her affidavit[12] the series of threats or statements made by the father to her during 2018. Ms B was 17 years of age at the time. On any reasonable view, the statements and threats are of a gravely serious kind and are confronting to read. They were no doubt confronting for Ms B to receive directly from the father.
[12] Affidavit of Ms B filed on 26 February 2020.
The most relevant parts of Ms B’s affidavit bear repeating as follows:[13]
[13] Affidavit of Ms B filed on 26 February 2020.
5. In around August 2018, I was talking to my father after he was not able to contact [X] as per the court order. He said that he was very close to ending it all by driving through my mother’s house.
6. A couple of weeks later, I was again talking to my father about his frustrations with not being able to contact [X]. He said words to the effect of “there's only so much one person can handle”.
7. He then said that either he would, could, will or might (I cannot recall the exact wording) “shoot her in the head”, referring to my mother.
8. My father owned firearms and had them at the property at the time.
9. I told him that these comments were not okay or acceptable, and to consider how they would make me feel. He said that he did not care.
…
16. About a week or two later, we again had a discussion about his frustrations about [X] not being able to contact him. The week prior, I had to facilitate a phone call between [X] and him, as my mother was at work. I have told both my parents that I do not want to be involved with facilitating their time with [X]. I therefore initiated this conversation with my father and said that I was disappointed to be put in the middle.
17. He said, words to the effect, “it’s lucky you answered the phone as I was this close to doing something about it. I would have shot you all to end it” and further, “if I can't have [X], no one can”.
18. He then started talking about [S Group] and how [many] fathers a week have killed themselves or their families due to the stressors of the court proceedings. He said, words to the effect, “I don't want to be one of those fathers but the situation makes it so hard for me to cope”.
19. He then mentioned that he had been gun shopping recently.
20. He asked whether I wanted to know how close he has been to acting out, and I said “sure”.
21. He said, words to the effect, that “I had a plan to kill the first judge who made the parenting orders. I knew the judge's schedule but he died the week before I was going to do it”.
22. He also said, words to the effect, “I also planned to drive a concrete truck through the court building with a bomb”. He listed the specific chemicals and ingredients he would use to make a bomb. I don't not recall the ingredients he listed exactly. He then said, words to the effect, “I couldn't do it because of the concrete road blockers out the front of the Family Court. They are filled with titanium”.
(As per the original)
Ms B gave evidence in a balanced way in that whilst disclosing highly serious matters about the father, she also included, both in her affidavit and oral evidence, many positive statements about the father. For example, she deposes to the fact that prior to August 2018 she found the father to be “supportive, generous and friendly with [her]”.[14] She describes them as being “good friends”.[15]
[14] Affidavit of Ms B filed on 26 February 2020, paragraph 30.
[15] Affidavit of Ms B filed on 26 February 2020, paragraph 30.
Ms B further deposes that the father “worked hard to have money to be able to provide for us. He is very generous financially”.[16]
[16] Affidavit of Ms B filed on 26 February 2020, paragraph 41.
I found Ms B to be an impressive witness. She displayed a level of maturity beyond her years. Her evidence was all the more impressive because of the balance she brought to bear in respect of describing both positives and negatives about both of her parents. For example, with respect to the mother, Ms B readily acknowledged that the mother had historically been inappropriate in her disciplining of Mr F but gave evidence that the mother had improved significantly after having attended a Triple P Parenting Program.
Ms B acknowledged that the mother had previously (prior to August 2018) told her about the father making threats of harm to the mother herself, but Ms B had dismissed these at the time as, effectively, part of the propensity of both parents to involve her in their dispute and to make exaggerated claims. However, receiving directly the threats and statements of this degree of seriousness first hand caused Ms B to have a different view about the mother’s previous statements. She accepted that the mother had been accurately stating the content of very serious threats of harm to the mother made by the father.
One entry in the material produced on subpoena by the Queensland Police Service records content seemingly at odds with the contention that Ms B had never before received directly from the father a threat by him to kill the mother. There is a record entered on 6 July 2018 and the “informant” referred to must be a reference to Ms B. The report also contains a record of what was said by the mother. It relevantly reads:
The informant is a 17 yr old child of the named persons. She stated that [the father] made comments to kill [the mother] whilst she was staying at his house on the 04/07/2018.
Informant did not want to make a formal statement about the incident and stated that [the father] has been making these kind of threats for the past 9 years.
Police spoke with [the mother] who also stated that [the father] has been making threats for the past 9 years, and she states they are empty threats and does not feel afraid or in fear of her safety.
It is to be noted that the Queensland Police Service records the mother as being dismissive of the threats, in terms of the mother not apparently taking them seriously, a position the mother also expressed to the school counsellor.
Ms B was cross-examined at trial by counsel for the ICL about this entry. Her oral evidence did not dispel the proposition that Ms B may have in the past received some stated threats from the father, although it seems she had not experienced threats to the same extent or degree of seriousness as the subject threats and statements. Ms B’s evidence when taken to the content of the note was as follows:[17]
[17] Transcript 29 April 2020, p.139 lines 18–39.
[COUNSEL FOR THE ICL]: And it says that you were spoken to by the police, and says that:
The informant is a 17 year old child with a known person. She stated [the father], made comments to kill the mother while she was staying at his house on the –
It says on 4 July:
The informant did not want to make a formal statement about the incident, and stated that her father had been making these kinds of threats for the past nine years.
So that’s what the police records indicate?
[MS B]: Yes.
[COUNSEL FOR THE ICL]: Is that something that you remember saying that to the police?
[MS B]: Yes. Because that – the comment of driving through our house wasn’t one that I was – that wasn’t a new kind of comment. It was alarming because I hadn’t heard it in a few years, but those sorts of comments when tensions were high and court cases and those sorts of things were quite frequent when I was younger.
[COUNSEL FOR THE ICL]: And, to be clear, those are comments that he had made to you; is that right?
[MS B]: Yes. Just in general, in passing – yes.
(Emphasis added) (As per the original)
It is clear from Ms B’s evidence that prior to August 2018 she enjoyed a positive relationship overall with her father. She gave evidence to the effect that she spent significant periods of time living with the father in the early part of 2018, partly driven by the father having difficulties coping with his own mother’s death and Ms B’s perception that the father and Mr F would benefit from her involvement in that household at a difficult time for the father.
Whilst the topic of politics was overall a source of conflict between Ms B and the father, given their divergent political beliefs generally, Ms B acknowledged in her evidence that at times, when the discussions were mutually respectful, the discussions were positive and engaging experiences.
Most fundamentally, it is obvious that Ms B loves her father and had many positive things to say about him. It is equally obvious that Ms B readily acknowledged the strength of the relationship between X and the father. On Ms B’s evidence there cannot be any doubt that X seeks to have a relationship with the father, and indeed an expanded relationship. Ms B acknowledged that X had expressed a view to the effect that she would like to share her time between her parents. Importantly, Ms B was clear in her evidence that X is unaware of the threats and statements made by the father. It is unknown what effect upon X’s views would result from her being made aware of the subject threats and statements.
It is clear from Ms B’s evidence that her experience of witnessing these threats and statements by her father in 2018 had a very serious and deleterious effect upon her. Whilst Ms B explained that she had commenced receiving assistance from a psychologist in 2016, it seems that confronted with the seriousness of these threats and statements made by the father in 2018, she had to resort to significant reliance upon psychological support and experienced significant difficulties in attending to her studies, including with respect to her university degree.
Ms B emphasised the need for X to have a relationship with the father, but that such a relationship must be “safe”. On Ms B’s evidence there would be an inherent risk for X in spending unsupervised time with the father. The relevant risk would be X being exposed to, for example, the father’s strongly negative views of the mother and his perceived grievances concerning what he has experienced in the “family law system”, about which he has no hesitation in vocalising criticisms.
Accepting as I do the force of Ms B’s evidence, it follows that her evidence gives corroboration to the evidence of the mother in terms of the numerous threats of harm to herself that the mother has historically received from the father.
As already noted, despite earlier disputing the veracity of Ms B’s evidence and attributing fault to the mother as the origin of this evidence being forthcoming, the father ultimately conceded in cross-examination that he could not contest the accuracy of Ms B’s evidence as to the threats and statements. I have earlier observed that the father’s change of position with respect to Ms B’s evidence brought about by his being referred to Mr F’s statement to authorities about the accuracy of Ms B’s reporting, fundamentally damages the credibility of the father as a witness.
EXPERT EVIDENCE RE: RISK
Dr H, father’s treating neuropsychiatrist
When the trial was adjourned part heard in April 2020 there appeared to be at least some cause for optimism that the father would, given his evidence, engage in a concerted way with his treating neuropsychiatrist to address the issues identified by Dr C in his report and oral evidence. There was therefore some reason to be optimistic that the forensic risk assessment undertaken ultimately by Dr C would be wholly favourable to the father and eliminate the risk issue.
Unfortunately, whilst the father commenced engaging with Dr H in April 2020 and had some five consultations prior to Dr H preparing a short report for, and giving oral evidence at, the resumed trial in November 2020, Dr H confirmed that it was only belatedly in October 2020 that he first became aware about the subject issues at all, and that was only by correspondence received from the father’s solicitors.
In fairness to the father about this, it would appear that the father’s primary concern in engaging Dr H was to gain assistance in improving his relationship with Mr F and assistance for Mr F himself. Moreover, the father gave evidence to the effect that it was his understanding that Dr C would attend to the risk issue. In other words, the father did not appreciate that he needed to engage with his own treating medical professional to address the risk issues.
As a consequence of the belated notification, Dr H gave evidence the he really had not had the opportunity to provide an opinion because he would need to undertake his own psychiatric assessment of the father to address the subject issues.[18] Dr H emphasised that his area of expertise was to undertake a neuropsychiatric assessment to explore whether there might be underlying medical issues as a cause for a person making inappropriate statements.
[18] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.8 lines 31–35.
Dr H gave this evidence in an exchange with counsel for the mother:[19]
[COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER]: And, Doctor, also in your report, you say that full neuropsychiatric assessment in your opinion is necessary. What would that involve?
[DR H]: Well, what I do in a neuropsychiatric assessment is take the complete history myself and then read between the lines of what medical illnesses might be leading to what I’m seeing in front of me. If I happen to have a person in front of me who’s making inappropriate statements or he’s – or he’s not able to pick up on – on – on the – on the implications of statements and so forth, whilst there may not be an overt DSM-5-type of diagnosis at hand, what I’ve got to pick up is is there anything here indicating any other illness that may be leading to this. For example, I might have somebody who talks to me in a very confrontative way making outlandish statements, but which somehow feel that insight and judgment is somewhat lacking. Now, what I might be searching for is a – is – is a pathology involved in the frontal lobes of the brain. I may be searching for another illness onboard that may be affecting the person’s capacity and so forth to understand what – to – that – that affects the person’s ability to understand what the issues are around him. That’s what I mean by neuropsychiatric assessment. So, for example, many people who are sent to me, I pick up issues like tumours, encephalitis, epileptic seizures, subtle other medical issues that causes pathology.
(As per the original)
[19] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.9 lines 1–17.
Dr H expressed complete agreement with the observations made by Dr C in his reports as to the father’s lack of insight and inability to reflect upon his conduct.[20] There was this exchange with counsel for the mother on the question of insight and risk:[21]
[COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER]: In terms of risks that have been identified in [Dr C’s] material, are you able to comment on what’s the possibility of somebody who, say, made threats to actually act on them from your perspective?
[DR H]: Well – well, given that they have poor insight, I’m – I’m really worried, just as [Dr C] is. We haven’t even had a chance to directly discuss those risks with him, because we haven’t had that time since the report was given to me. Secondly, I did realise that insight was poor. There was a meeting where he – where he spoke to me and said he was going to read out a statement about how he felt about all of this, which showed me that his insight was actually very poor. I think the difficulty with this case is how one relates to [the father] to explain to him that we’re not here to – we’re here to try and understand where he’s coming from. But, however, he has also got to understand that these particular threats and so forth – which he has never raised with me, by the way, because we haven’t had time to raise them directly – are things that are – that – that are – that are not permitted by – by – are not permitted at all. And that’s what I mean. I haven’t had a chance to be able to address all these issues with him to see what his response will be and what his response is coming from.
(Emphasis added) (As per the original)
[20] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.9 lines 25–36.
[21] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.10 lines 18–33.

Dr H was unable to express any concluded prognosis for the father, as evidenced in this exchange:[22]
[COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER]: What’s your prognosis?
[DR H]: My prognosis is – is guarded. But remember I don’t know what’s driving the lack of insight yet. See, I’ve had patients with encephalitis who don’t have insight. And then I treat them with intravenous haemoglobin and they get insight. So until I determine where the lack of insight is coming from, I can’t give you a definitive answer. However, given the number of people that I’ve seen, yes, when there is lack of insight, the prognosis is very, very guarded.
(Emphasis added) (As per the original)
[22] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.11 lines 11–16.
In cross-examination by counsel for the ICL, Dr H confirmed that he was only belatedly made aware of the threats and statements the father had made to Ms B and that he had not had the opportunity to explore those threats and statements with the father.[23]
[23] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.11 lines 35–41.
Dr H confirmed that the threats and statements the father made to Ms B were rightly regarded as “extreme statements” for which there might be an underlying pathology, but short of a psychiatric assessment, that could not be determined.[24]
[24] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.14 line 20.
Put simply, Dr H expressed no disagreement with the opinions of Dr C and shared Dr C’s concerns about the father’s lack of insight as to the effect of his threats and statements. I accept the evidence of Dr H.
Dr C, single expert psychiatrist
As already noted, Dr C provided a report in advance of the first part of the trial and gave oral evidence on the third day. For the purpose of completion of the trial, Dr C provided a detailed and extensive report comprising a forensic risk assessment and gave further oral evidence with respect to that report when the trial resumed in November 2020.
It can be seen from Dr C’s forensic risk assessment that numerous factors are identified as being necessary to factor into the risk assessment and, in his oral evidence Dr C confirmed or highlighted the “fluid or variable nature of the risk”, highlighting that there are some negative points but also some positive points. Having noted that the father had, what Dr C described as a “very serious history of threatened physical harm”,[25] there was this exchange between counsel for the mother and Dr C:[26]
[COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER]: Yes. Doctor, in terms of threats that were made by [the father] and your risk assessment recently conducted, what can you say, or what opinion can you offer in terms of how likely it is for somebody like [the father] to actually act on the threats?
[DR C]: What I’ve attempted to do in the risk assessment is highlight the fluid or variable nature of the risk and highlighted that there are some negative points, but there are also some positive points. And I think the analysis of likelihood depends on [the father’s] efforts to reduce negative elements that are highlighted in the assessment, and then to embrace what might be called positive aspects and most importantly, seek effective, insightful and fully informed assessment and support for the very clear psychological challenges that he has been facing in the long history of post-separation parenting difficulties. And I made the point on line 46, on page 16, of the importance of the consultant psychiatrist appraised of these issues. And on that point, I will make a note as well, that the independent children’s lawyer has sent me an affidavit of treating psychiatrist, [Dr H], on Friday, which I’ve studied on Friday and again today, and note that [the father] has indeed commenced visits on 14 April 2020 and has had three more visits since I assessed him; in July, September and October 2020, as outlined by the doctor in his statement. So using words like high, medium, low, I’ve not done in my report because it does depend. It could be high on one day and less of concern the next day, depending on the appraisal by the Honourable Court of the negatives and positives that might be occurring for [the father] at any particular point in time.
(Emphasis added) (As per the original)
[25] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.34 lines 37–38.
[26] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.34 line 40 to p.35 line 13.
Dr C confirmed in his oral evidence that in terms of the nature of the relevant risk of harm potentially to X there are two aspects. First is the risk of the father actually acting out on one or other of the threats of harm that he has made and the second aspect is the risk that X might be exposed to the same risk as experienced by Ms B, namely exposure to threats and statements of violent conduct towards the mother and family members which would be damaging to X’s emotional and psychological welfare.[27]
[27] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.37 lines 1–9.
Dr C emphasised in his evidence that the kind of assistance the father required, or the process involved in terms of the father addressing the negative parts of his risk assessment, would be a process involving “not weeks or months but in fact, at least some years. A couple of years, before a very guarded prognosis could move to an improved prognosis, or indeed, the best answer in terms of prognosis would be a good prognosis in these circumstances”.[28]
[28] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.38 lines 7–10.
In addressing the question of risk until medical intervention of the kind described by Dr C had occurred, there was this exchange between counsel for the mother and Dr C:[29]
[COUNSEL FOR THE MOTHER]: And Doctor, up until those measures that you’ve just touched upon have been successfully established, would you say that there are risks in the respect of unsupervised time with – between [the father] and [X]?
[DR C]: I think the risks, with respect to emotional and psychological and/or physical harm to [X], remain unchanged in the absence of sufficient quality psychiatric involvement and support to address the negative issues outlined in the risk assessment, and that the treating doctor believes that the supervised parenting plan and the evidence of experts who have monitored the supervised parenting arrangement, in addition to the positives that come from the therapeutic engagements, combine to change what has been a very guarded prognosis, from a medical point of view. And so therefore, as I say, in summary, the risk in terms of the concerns as outlined in the negative elements persist. And as I’ve said in the management section of the report, I support a review at six monthly reviews of whether there has been any clear evidence of change in that timeframe.
(As per the original)
[29] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.38 lines 15–28.
In the course of Dr C’s cross-examination by counsel for the father, some further positives to those noted by Dr C in his report were revealed about the risk assessment. That is, further to the positives recorded in Dr C’s psychiatric risk assessment report. First, it was put to Dr C that documents produced by the contact centre in response to a subpoena revealed that supervisors had not reported anything untoward being said by the father to X and that in addition the contact between the father and X was appropriate at all times. Dr C expressed that to be a very positive aspect and a positive and pleasing element of the history. Dr C described this as “a risk-reducing sort of experience and a very positive one”.[30]
[30] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.39 line 5.
I interpolate here that review of the notes of observations taken by supervisors at the contact centre reveal very positive interactions between the father and X. One example, which seems to be representative of many, is the following entry for 30 June 2019:
[The father] was observed to have greeted and farewelled [X] in a warm and friendly manner, including initiating hugs and kisses.
[The father] was observed to ask questions and seek information about [X’s] day-to-day life, including interests, hobbies, friends, school and activities. [X] was observed to respond to [the father’s] questioning, often sharing information and engaging in conversation about the topics mentioned above.
When [the father] was not in discussions with [X] regarding their family and pets, they interacted playing board games. [X] shared a cake with [the father] at the coffee shop, [R Café] and then later had lunch.
Activities were age appropriate and demonstrated an understanding of [X’s] developmental stage and individual interests (For example, UNO, CONNECT 4, ball games, play doh and a walk to the [P Show] Ground to have a look at the car show).
[The father] has engaged positively with interactions between himself and [X], whereby [X] has also appeared to respond well by laughing, chatting comfortably, and demonstrating a willingness to engaging in activities with him.
(As per the original)
It is to be borne in mind that there has been an extended period of X spending time with the father in a supervised setting at a contact centre since contact in that form was re-established by orders made in 2019. Obviously then, the observation notes produced on subpoena are extensive. There is no suggestion that these were available to Dr C in advance of him preparing his report, nor in advance of him giving oral evidence at the second instalment of the trial. In my judgment Dr C’s assessment of this positive element needs to be seen in the context that over a lengthy and extensive period and in numerous instances there are positive reports of the father’s interactions with X in that setting and, moreover, nothing untoward noted about the father’s interactions in terms of him exposing X to anything in the nature of emotional or psychological harm.
I interpolate here that a corollary of this is that the father has demonstrated a commitment to X and to his relationship with X via his funding of, and attendance at, supervised time over an extended period at considerable cost. I accept that the financial burden of funding supervision has been significant. In the course of cross-examination of the father by counsel for the ICL there was this exchange:[31]
[COUNSEL FOR THE ICL]: And you can continue paying that for at least, say, a period of time?
[THE FATHER]: I – I haven’t paid my rent. I haven’t paid the two school fees for a year. So, you know, I will just do whatever I’ve got to do. If you want 1000 bucks or 500 bucks or 300 bucks a week, I will pay it. I need to see my daughter. Okay. So if that’s what is ordered, that’s what’s ordered. It’s unnecessary. But if that’s what’s ordered, it’s ordered.
(As per the original)
[31] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.24 lines 23–28.
The further aspect addressed in cross-examination of Dr C by counsel for the father in this bracket of evidence was the father’s involvement in establishing and promoting a group known as “Q Group” calling for change with respect to the family law system. In relation to that, there was this exchange between counsel for the father and Dr C:[32]
[COUNSEL FOR THE FATHER]: Just finally, Doctor, the father gave evidence this morning to say that despite the fact he has started this parent’s group start up, it’s not something that he would discuss with [X], given – full stop. And secondly, that the purpose of the organisation is to support parents and make some change, but did not mention in a violent way. Now it was a change the system way. Does that ameliorate that risk?
[DR C]: Yes, it does. These are positive points and if this approach to parenting and contact with [X] and with supporting in an empathic, understanding way, people – gentlemen or others involved in these processes, this could be a worthwhile and altruistic pursuit.
[32] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.40 lines 39–46.
In cross-examination by counsel for the ICL, Dr C gave further evidence expanding upon the nature of the relevant risk in the following exchange:[33]
[COUNSEL FOR THE ICL]: Do I take that, that that high risk relates to both of the, can I say, layers of risk that his Honour outlined to you? Which is firstly that the father will act out on the threats that he has made to [Ms B]?
[DR C]: The high risk concerns the recurrence of aggressive and/or threatening ideas. The risks that – in the context of alcohol intoxication, there will be utterances that [X] may here that may be addressed towards the mother and/or persons involved in the process, including myself, and that there is a risk that if these processes persist and that there are other like-minded individuals involved or aware of these matters, that there could be actions to see these sorts of behaviours achieve fruition.
[COUNSEL FOR THE ICL]: Well if I could put it another way, in relation to the two layers of risk that his Honour outlined, which is firstly the possibility or probability or whatever it may be, that the father will act out on the threats; and secondly, that [X] will be exposed to the utterances that you refer to, do you differentiate those, and if you do, how, with respect to the level of risks in relation to either of those?
[DR C]: I’m not able to differentiate, from what I know, the first part of the risk of acting out, as opposed to the concerns about the risk of emotional and/or psychological harm towards [X], except to say this: I don’t believe that the father’s difficulties have been directed directly towards X, the child. [X] is seen, in my mind, more as a bystander to the father’s difficulties and would be a participant or experiencing difficulties because of the father’s expressions of these sorts of concerns and therefore, [X] would be distressed because of the realisation in her mind, that the father may be expressing angst and rage and aggression and threats towards [X’s] mother. And the separate concern, there’s various other factors that could lead [the father] to act on any of his threats towards officials or the Court does depend more on, I think, social supports and other factors. And as I’ve said as well, the frustration that he might have had that he’s not able to have quality and regular time with his child, whether it be in contact centre or elsewhere…
[33] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.41 line 46 to p.42 line 26. x
In answer to several questions posed by me during the course of cross-examination by counsel for the ICL, Dr C identified a number of factors militating against the assessment of risk being “high”. These include:
(a)That the father has never acted out on any threats, there being no suggestion that he has been convicted of any breach of the criminal law in any relevant respect;
(b)That on the evidence X reports her love of her father and her wish to spend more time with him, and indeed would choose a 50/50 time arrangement if possible; and
(c)That despite Ms B receiving the relevant threats and statements, she would like to see X continue her relationship with her father, albeit with the caveat about X being safe.[34]
[34] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.43 lines 1–10.
To the above list, Dr C added that “I’ve not found a past history of any clear diagnosis of a major mental disorder and I did not find evidence on mental state examination of features of any major mental disorder on two occasions separated by some months”.[35]
[35] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.43 lines 16–19.
Nevertheless, Dr C maintained that there was an unchanged risk of exposure to X to emotional and psychological harm if the protection of supervision was removed. Dr C confirmed that in terms of a way forward for the father that lay in engagement with his treating psychiatrist and psychological support of counselling.[36]
[36] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.43 lines 34–45.
Mr D, family consultant
Mr D provided a detailed family report dated 5 April 2019.[37] In advance of providing oral evidence in November 2020 Mr D confirmed that he had reviewed further material including Dr C’s psychiatric risk assessment of the father and relevant transcript of evidence from the first instalment of the trial.
[37] Affidavit of Mr D filed on 9 April 2019, Annexure “B”.
Mr D expressed concern that the father denied to him during the father’s interview with him having made the threats and statements in the presence of Ms B, but then ultimately conceded at trial that he had in fact done so.
In relation to the father’s role in the group, Mr D expressed concern in these terms:[38]
[MR D]: …perhaps there’s been an externalisation in the focus of [the father] in looking at a political movement or a pressure group movement so I see that as taking his focus from his family and what he can do within his family to looking at something of a macro response which doesn’t necessarily lend itself to putting his energy into himself, his children, his situation. And that – that concerns me in terms of diluting, perhaps, where the more primary focus needs to be which is his children and responsibility to them.
(As per the original)
[38] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.47 lines 24–31.
Having regard to the further material Mr D had reviewed in advance of giving oral evidence at trial, including Dr C’s psychiatric risk assessment, Mr D offered the opinion in terms of orders that would meet X’s best interests the following answer:[39]
[MR D]: … I’d have to respond that it would appear all indications are that there are less marked uncertainties, less unreasonable risks if the father’s dealings with [X] are in some way supervised, managed, oversighted by others.
[39] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.47 lines 43–46.
When it was put to Mr D that on one view of the evidence it was X’s wish to live with the father or spend time on a 50/50 basis with her parents, Mr D offered this opinion:[40]
[MR D]: Yes. So how to give her a relationship with her father at the same time as being safe. I would have to answer it would appear that supervised is – is necessary, at least at this juncture.
[40] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.48 lines 11–13.
In answer to questions posed of him by counsel for the ICL, Mr D identified that supervision of time is “not an environment which is in any way ideal”.[41] Mr D offered the opinion that, if it came to a choice, there ought be supervised time rather than no time in X’s best interests.
[41] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.48 lines 32–33.
In this context Mr D also emphasised the potential need for X to have some counselling sessions in relation to the context in which her relationship with the father proceeds.[42]
[42] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.49 lines 1–26.
During cross-examination by counsel for the mother, Mr D confirmed that an order affording the mother sole parental responsibility would best meet X’s interests.[43] I accept that evidence and, as already noted, there is no longer an issue between the parties about this, save for issue of name, school and overseas travel as will be further addressed.
[43] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.49 line 42 to p.50 line 3.
In cross-examination by counsel for the father, Mr D confirmed, having reviewed some of the observational notes of the contact centre, that nothing untoward had occurred in the engagement between the father and X in that setting.[44]
[44] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.50 lines 26–29.
Counsel for the father sought from Mr D an opinion as to commencement of a

“book-ending” type contact described as the father presenting at the contact centre at the commencement of contact, X spending time with him for a few hours outside of the contact centre and then returning for “perhaps half an hour” with the supervisor at the end of the session.[45] That drew the following response from Mr D:[46]
[MR D]: … I’m not sure how much to invest in the market of hope at the moment because I know I’ve sat with this matter, as I’m sure a lot of people have, for 10 years. The children, I think, were two or three when I was first involved. It’s hard to have hope when there’s so much despair anchored to – to the past 10 years of how this matter has not progressed. So I – I appreciate and I respect your point and I’m not in any way devaluing it but I would find it hard to invest in that hope.
[45] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.51 line 46 to p.52 line 2.
[46] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.52 lines 2–8.

Mr D confirmed in his evidence that in his opinion X has a good relationship with her father and that she loves her father. Importantly, Mr D confirmed that if the reality of the father’s position was that he was unable to continue to pay for supervised time, X ceasing to spend any time with the father would be an extremely negative outcome. I accept that to be so.
The other important aspect of Mr D’s opinion is that, as referred to at paragraphs 68 and 69 of his report, X seeks to avoid being the one to have to choose what happens in terms of her care arrangements.
Mr D rejected the proposition that X living with the father and spending time with the mother was a position he could support.[47] I accept Mr D’s opinion that such an outcome would not be in X’s best interests.
[47] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.54 lines 27–31.
ASSESSMENT OF RISK
The combined effect of the above expert evidence is that removal of the safeguard of supervision of X’s time with the father carries some risk that X will be exposed to potential psychological and/or emotional trauma or harm of the kind experienced by Ms B by being exposed to extreme threats or statements made by the father, or, as described by Dr C, expressions of “angst and rage and aggression and threats towards X’s mother”.[48]
[48] Transcript 9 November 2020, p.42 line 21.
With respect to the first enquiry about risk assessment identified in Harridge, if that risk materialised the outcome obviously may be potentially harmful to X.
As to the second and third enquiries identified in Harridge, directed to assessing the probability of the risk materialising, including in the short, medium and long term, I have given these questions anxious consideration, particularly in light of Dr C’s opinion earlier referred to as to it being, in effect, a matter for the Court to assess in light of all of the evidence, and the expert evidence more generally.
The principle factors militating in assessing the risk as more probable have been identified by the experts including, in particular, the father’s demonstrated lack of insight and his not yet having done anything meaningful to address his deficits via expert medical assistance.
In my judgment, the principle factors militating as positives, in terms of assessing a low degree of probability or risk, include the following:
(a)Whilst he was obviously not accepting of the judgment rendered by the Federal Magistrates Court on 5 July 2010, there is no evidence of the father acting in any significant way contrary to the terms of the orders then made. That is, despite the father’s own rejection of the concept that the 5 July 2010 orders were in fact in the best interests of the children, the father has nevertheless complied with them over a substantial period of years following the making of the orders.
(b)Over the period from when the final orders were made on 5 July 2010, until the threats and statements were made to Ms B in August 2018 leading to the suspension of X’s time with the father, a period of some eight years, there is no evidence of the father directly exposing any of the children to extreme threats or statements of this kind. Taken from Mr D’s family report, the children had no doubt about the views each parent holds of the other or of the underlying parental conflict. However, that is not the same thing as extreme threats and statements of the kind under discussion. As noted, there is simply no evidence of that having occurred at any time over that lengthy period despite the children spending substantial and significant time with the father pursuant to the 5 July 2010 orders.
(c)As Dr C identifies in his report, the father has no serious past history of actual or attempted physical harm to other persons and therefore does not have a history of forensic concern for that relevant risk factor.
(d)Dr C also confirms that he has not found any past history of any relevant actual or attempted anti-social behaviour on the part of the father.
(e)Dr C confirms that the father’s occupational history does not raise any significant historical concern as a risk factor.
(f)Likewise, the father does not have a history of any diagnosis of a major mental disorder. Dr C did not assess the father as a person presenting with serious problems with cognitive functioning.
The positive aspects relating to Dr C’s psychiatric risk assessment of the father are set out from page 22 of his report. To this may be added, without repetition, what has earlier been referred to as identified in the course of Dr C’s cross-examination as further aspects or positives in the father’s presentation. Of particular significance, in my judgment, are the numerous positive observations made about the interaction between X and the father in the contact centre observation notes.
In my judgment, a factor which would decrease any relevant risk is allowing some further time to elapse between now and the removal of supervision, for X to be assisted to a position for her to be able to raise concerns about the father if anything untoward arises, once the constraint of supervision has been lifted. I will return to this topic shortly.
Likewise, in my judgment measures available to mitigate against the risks include not only X’s further development and maturity but a faculty for her to be able to report any concerns that might arise in the future and for the father to thus face the prospect, if supervision were to be lifted, of supervision being reimposed at some later time or indeed contact ceasing should any risk actually materialise. The father must now be well aware of the consequences of his conduct.
In my judgment, the risk of X being subjected by the father to the kind of extreme threats or statements he made to Ms B in 2018 is not, balancing the evidence overall, a high risk or probable. It is nevertheless a risk which cannot be categorised as non-existent or fanciful. I do not consider that an immediate removal of supervision would be a reasonable response to the risk. The critical question, it seems to me, becomes whether there are sufficient safeguards that can be put in place to guard against or mitigate the risk to render it an acceptable risk.
I am mindful that X will turn 14 years of age on her next birthday in 2022. The final school term for this year commences in October, only some four months short of X turning 14. Whilst I do not suggest for a moment that a child attaining the age of 14 years provides the child with some form of automatic immunity from harm, my focus must be on the probabilities of risk and features that may mitigate against that risk or its effects if it materialises. An important element of mitigation, in my judgment, is X having achieved a level of maturity that enhances her capacity to negotiate her relationship with the father should he make further similar or other threats or statements, including by X feeling readily able to seek appropriate professional support or assistance, and indeed notifying others about the father’s conduct if necessary.
Section 65L of the Act contains provision for the Court to make orders which involve a family consultant supervising or assisting compliance with any parenting orders made. As it seems to me, that provision ought be utilised in this case for the purpose of it being explained to X, in a professionally sensitive and child focussed way, a move to unsupervised time in October of this year and the ability of X to raise or notify any concerns she has about the father’s conduct once supervision is lifted.
There is also, of course, the ability of the mother to access professional assistance or support for X between now and October of this year to achieve the same objective in terms of readying X for unsupervised time and as an ongoing outlet for X to obtain any assistance she may need in future.
That time period also allows the mother to obtain any assistance she requires in coming to terms with a resumption of X spending unsupervised time with the father. During the trial the mother gave evidence to the effect that she would not or could not cope with the prospect of X spending unsupervised time with the father and that if this was the outcome she would or may “walk away”.[49] Whilst I am mindful of that evidence, I am not persuaded by it. That is, I am by no means convinced that the mother would abandon X. I do not think there is any real prospect of that occurring. I am fortified in these conclusions by the expert evidence of the mother’s various treating medical professionals. Their evidence shows that the mother has a clear capacity to access support when needed and that the mother adheres to recommendations for treatment.
[49] Transcript 28 April 2020, p.81 lines 6–13.
The further mitigating factor is the father having experienced what has occurred as a result of his conduct. He clearly wishes to maintain a relationship with X. He cannot now be in any doubt that he risks interruption to that relationship by conduct contrary to X’s best interests.
RESOLUTION
I am well satisfied that a continuation of X living in the primary care of the mother meets her best interests. That has been X’s position for the whole of her life. X is obviously attached to her mother as her primary carer. As already observed, living in the mother’s household provides X with the important support of her strongest sibling relationship, that being Y, the sibling closest in age to X. She also has the benefit of the ongoing support of her oldest sister Ms B.
In my judgment the importance of sibling relationships for children whose parents are in conflict is obvious. I am satisfied on the evidence, including that of Mr D, that X has a strong and secure attachment with the mother and with Ms B and Y.
I am well satisfied that X benefits from having a meaningful relationship with each of her parents. The constraints upon X’s relationship with the father by the imposition of supervision are obvious. It bears repeating that X’s experience from the time the 5 July 2010 orders were made until August 2018 was to spend substantial and significant (alternate weekend and half school holidays) time with the father. The report of Mr D reveals that X was confused about why it was that her time with the father was interrupted in 2018.
X was not spending time with the father at the time that Mr D prepared his report. At paragraph 68 of his report Mr D records that X expressed the view that she would like to see her father again “every fortnight…for weekends…and holidays and to call him”. She then proposed a move to week about shared care and Mr D records the conclusion from X: “I don’t really get involved in every family situation. I’m young…and I haven’t had to choose…and I don’t want to choose” with which parent to live, which to love and which to believe.
The evidence of Ms B confirms that X seeks to have an expanded relationship with the father and that is a view which she has apparently expressed to Ms B in the context of X spending supervised time with the father. This comes subject to the caveat that X is apparently unaware of the content of the extreme threats and statements the father made to Ms B.
I am satisfied that a progression to X spending unsupervised time with the father would be consistent with X’s views and the benefit to her of a meaningful relationship with the father. The corollary is that, in my judgment, it would be inconsistent with X’s expressed views to leave the imposition of supervision being imposed as a permanent condition on her time with the father without any end date or “sunset” provision.
In my judgment the need to protect X from harm, relative to the risk posed by the father referred to, can be met by steps taken between now and the commencement of the final school term in October of this year and by the fact of X’s ever developing level of maturity. In this context it bears repeating that Mr F effectively gave expression to his views from about the age of 13 by moving to live primarily with the father and choosing not to have a continuing relationship with the mother.
Reference has already been made to the fact that at the stage of final submissions of the trial the parties were in agreement that there ought be an order for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for X, save in respect of three issues from the father’s perspective.
First, it was submitted that the mother ought not have sole parental responsibility on the question of X’s schooling. This seems to have been a historical point of conflict. However, X has been attending the same school as Y and nothing in the evidence suggests that the mother proposes to make any fundamental changes concerning X’s schooling. I do not consider there to be a reason to impose some constraint on the mother’s exercise of sole parental responsibility in this respect.
Second, it was contended that there ought be some reservation to the father of parental responsibility concerning X’s name. Again, however, there is no evidence to suggest that the mother has any intention of altering X’s name. The mother herself continues to bear the surname Halifax, as does X. There is therefore no reason to limit the mother’s exercise of sole parental responsibility in this respect.
Third, a restriction was sought in relation to the mother travelling overseas. Again, it seems it was a historical concern of the father that the mother might return to her country of origin. However, again, there is no specific evidence of risk in this respect. The mother gave evidence that she does not have a current passport for X and her evidence is that she has no plans to travel. However, it would thus not appear to be any imposition upon the mother for her to obtain the father’s consent to international travel, or to approach the Court for an order permitting it. It removes a potential source of ongoing friction or concern of the father in this respect to provide for shared parental responsibility for international travel.
As earlier noted, the father sought that if supervised time was to continue that it occur in a three hour block each fortnight, rather than being split. No objection was taken to that by either the mother or the ICL so I will include in the orders provision for the father’s time between now and October of this year to be supervised in a block period of three hours per fortnight if that can be achieved with the contact centre.
In final submissions counsel for the father raised the prospect of orders being made for telephone communication. This has been, historically, a fundamental point of significant conflict between the parents. Indeed it can be seen that in some of the threats or statements made by the father to Ms B the prime trigger point was the father’s perception that his telephone time was being thwarted by the mother. In my judgment, it would not be in X’s best interests to make orders for telephone time with the father given the prospect that these would only serve to provide a source of significant conflict between the parents in the future as has occurred in the past.
I am satisfied that orders ought be made for there to be a continuation of supervised time, albeit with the alteration earlier referred to, until October of this year. From October of this year there ought be orders for X to spend time with the father effectively in the same or similar terms as those which prevailed in the 5 July 2010 orders. I am satisfied that such orders meet X’s best interests.
I otherwise propose to include in the orders, as foreshadowed, an order pursuant to s 65L of the Act.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty-four (154) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Kent.
Associate:
Dated: 6 July 2021

File number(s):	BRC 622 of 2009
Judgment of:	KENT J
Date of judgment:	6 July 2021
Catchwords:	FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Whether unacceptable risk of harm – Where the father made threats and statements to an older child of the relationship who is now an adult and gave evidence at trial – Whether the father poses an unacceptable risk to the child if the child’s time with him is unsupervised – Where the father has a lack of insight as to the effect of his threats and statements – Where the father has demonstrated a commitment to the child and to his relationship with the child over an extended period at considerable cost – Where there are constraints upon the child’s relationship with the father by the imposition of supervision – Where a progression to unsupervised time would be consistent with the child’s views – Where in the circumstances unsupervised time would not pose unacceptable risk.
Legislation:	Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt VII, ss 4AB, 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 64B, 65L, 68L
Cases cited:	Betros & Betros [2017] FamCAFC 90 Halifax & Halifax [2020] FamCA 312 Harridge and Anor & Harridge and Anor [2010] FamCA 445 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69; [1988] HCA 68 N and S and the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-655; [1995] FamCA 139 NEAT Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449; [1992] HCA 66 B. Mahendra, ‘Psychiatric Risk Assessment in Family and Child Law’ (2008) 38 Family Law 569
Number of paragraphs:	154
Date of hearing:	28–30 April 2020; and 9–10 November 2020
Place:	Brisbane
Counsel for the Applicant:	Ms Chekirova
Solicitor for the Applicant:	A P Hodgson & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Lyons
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Cherry Family Lawyers
Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Mr Dodd
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer:	Stewart Family Law

BRC 622 of 2009
BETWEEN:	MS HALIFAX Applicant
AND:	MR HALIFAX Respondent
AND:	INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

ORDER MADE BY:	KENT J
DATE OF ORDER:	6 JULY 2021