Haines v Bendall
[1990] HCATrans 163
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S32 of 1990 B e t w e e n -
TREVOR WILLIAM HAINES
Applicant
and
DENNIS BENDALL
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 6 AUGUST 1990, AT 3.26 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Haines | 1 | 6/8/90 |
MR A.R. ABADEE, QC: If it please Your Honours, in this
matter I appear with my learned friend,
MR P.R. GARLING, and my learned friend, MR
R. GAMBI, for the applicant. (instructed by Paul J.
McGahen).
| MR C.R.R. HOEBEN: | May it please the Court, I appear for the |
respondent. (instructed by Abbott Tout Russell
Kennedy)
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Abadee?
| MR ABADEE: | May it please the Court, there are two points of |
public importance which, in our respectful
submission, arise in respect of this application.
The first question is whether the receipt of
lump sum compensation under the workers
compensation legislation of New South Wales and
indeed, similar legislation in other States and the
Commonwealth, should be taken into account in determining the amount of interest that should be
awarded in respect of past general damages in an
action for damages at common law.
The second point of public importance is
whether the decision of this Court in Batchelor v
Burke, where the Court held that in the computation
of interest in respect of past economic loss one
should have regard to weekly compensation paid
under workers compensation legislation, is a
principle that applies to other forms of
compensation or other forms of damage apart from
damages for past economic loss.
I hand to the Court a photostat copy of the
decision of the Court's judgment in Batchelor v
Burke. May I also hand to the Court a document
headed "Calculation of Interest" which will
indicate the economic importance of the questions
generally.
If I may proceed to the document described as
"Calculation of Interest", 1. represents the
factual matrix of the particular case in
hand; 2. represents what the situation would have
been in terms of interest in the event that the
lump sum compensation had been paid within six
months of the occurrence of the accident, and that
might indeed occur from time to time where there
is, in fact, a clear loss of function or use that
has manifested itself either at the time of injury,
for example, an amputation or alternatively, within
a short period of time of the happening of the
injury. 3. is a calculation taking, for example,
not the facts of this case, but a tabled injury for
loss of eyesight in certain circumstances; and
| Haines | 2 | 6/8/90 |
4. represents what the amount of interest would be
on a lump sum payment in a situation where there is
a loss of one leg in the circumstances postulated
by the example.
The injury to Mr Bendall occurred on
5 December 1979. It is common ground that on or
about 1 April 1985 in respect of his subject injury
which affected the spinal cord and manifested
itself in terms of partial loss of the use of the
lower limbs, and also some partial loss of the use
of the left arm, the section 16 payments on
1 April 1985 in accordance with the statute were inthe sum mentioned of $49,000.
On 14 October 1988, His Honour entered
judgment for the plaintiff and then proceeded to
calculate an interest payment in respect of past
general damages. The past general damages were in the sum of $75,000 and the award of interest in
respect of past general damages was the sum of
$52,800. The amount of interest, however, in respect of the section 16 payment between the date of the payment and the date of the trial would, on the approach that His Honour adopted, namely of
allowing 8 per cent, have been in the sum of almost
$14,000. Had the relevant section 16 payment been made within six months of the happening of the
injury, then the amount of interest on that
section 16 payment component between the date of
injury and the date of trial would have been in the
sum of $32,678.
The provision, section 16, has, however, been
amended in 1987 pursuant to the amendments
incorporated in that Act. However, the table of
injuries in respect of which a lump sum can be
awarded has been retained, and there is in additiona further entitlement for a specific head called
"Pain and Suffering". The point that we make is
that section 16 is still a live provision in terms
of its counterpart.
There are counterpart provisions in the State
Acts throughout the Commonwealth. Indeed, the Acts
show that there is a general pattern of Australian
compensation schemes for lump sum compensation in
addition to other entitlements to workers
compensation payments. The relevant equivalent provisions of section 16 are section 11 of the
Victorian Act, section 14 of the Queensland Act,
section 10 of the Ordinance of the ACT - - -
| MASON CJ: | We need not trouble you further at this stage, Mr |
Abadee. We will hear what the respondent has to say.
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| MR ABAOEE: If the Court pleases. |
MR HOEBEN: | Your Honours, we have nothing to say in relation to the general application of the principle. | What |
we do say is there is no error disclosed in the
findings of the Court of Appeal. But what my
learned friend is attempting to do is to compareoranges with apples, that there is no Batchelor v
Burke correlation between a section 16 payment and
a payment of general damages such as is dealt with
here.
The concept of section 16 deals with a
permanent loss of function of various parts of the
body dealt with in a schedule. General damages,
however, is a much broader concept. It deals with
pain and suffering, loss of amenity, loss ofenjoyment of life, and there is a quite useful
expansion of that concept in the Court of Appeal
judgment, for example, discomfort, inconvenience.
I think they specifically refer to there the loss
of pleasure derived from various activities. It is
a very broad concept.
TOOHEY J: But is not the point, Mr Hoeben, that the workers
compensation payment is subsumed in some way in the
award of general damages? The fact that one is
greater than the other does not necessarily answer
the applicant's proposition.
| MR HOEBEN: | Your | Honour, in our respectful submission, the |
area of overlap is so small as to not really involve very much in the way of correlation. For example
McHUGH J: Well, the legislature seems to think it does
because it requires you to pay the money back, not
require that you repay a proportion of your lump
sum payment. But if you get a common law award of
damages you have to pay the lot back. I mean, just as a matter of justice it just seems extraordinary
that interest should be payable on this portion of
the award when the plaintiff has already had the benefit of the money.
MR HOEBEN: Well, Your Honour, in relation to that, the
question of justice or injustice really, although
to some extent this was dealt with in Batchelor v
Burke, it is not really any injustice perpetrated
on the tortfeasor here because it did not pay the
money. It is seeking to take advantage of a payment made by a third party but that, I
appreciate, is not a complete answer to
Your Honour's point. But Your Honour - - -
McHUGH J: And that is what Their Honours said in Batchelor
v Burke.
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MR HOEBEN: Indeed, they disregarded that aspect.
TOOHEY J: Well, would the point hold good if the tortfeasor
was the employer?
| MR HOEBEN: | The injustice point that Mr Justice McHugh has |
referred to would certainly have much more force,
in our respectful submission. But Your Honour, there is another answer we wish to make to that
particular proposition and it is this. A section 16 payment is a payment for permanent loss of
function, and it involves a -
TOOHEY J: It used to be "a fit use". Is it still that?
| MR HOEBEN: | I think it has been expanded, Your Honour, but |
it is "use" or "loss of function" - it is defined
in subsection (5) of section 16. But Your Honour,
it involves both a past and future element. It is
a payment made for the loss at the time of the
assessment. The general damages against which it
is sought to be offset by my learned friend is an
allowance made by the court for "past". And so again, Your Honour, it is a distortion, in our
respectful submission, to follow the approach urged
by my friend, and that is to simply look at the
payment and say, "Well, that has to be deducted
from those general damages applied to the past".
But that really is our attack on the point,Your Honour, that really the level of overlap - and
there is some - is so slight as to really not be a
matter which this Court ought to concern itself
with.
For example, there are situations where there
is no, or almost no overlap. We can take two extremes. You could have the coma situation where a person could have an entitlement to section 16
which was very high indeed, but his entitlement to general damages, it being a subjective assessment,
would be very low because his consciousness orappreciation of what he has lost and suffered would
be low.
Alternatively, there is the example that
Mr Justice Carruthers used in his judgment, that
one could have an award of general damages which
was extremely high for psychiatric injuries and
damage, but the section 16 award would be nil
because there was no physical loss. So,
Your Honour, it is our submission essentially - - -
| McHUGH J: | But in that case you would not have had any |
payment under section 16, would you?
MR HOEBEN: Well indeed, Your Honour, but the concepts is
what we are dealing with. We say where there is an
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overlap it is slight, and they really do deal with
different things. They are our submissions, Your Honours.
| MASON CJ: | The Court need not trouble you, Mr Abadee. |
| MR ABAOEE: | Thank you, Your Honour. |
MASON CJ: There will be a grant of special leave in this
case.
AT 3.38 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
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Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Civil Procedure
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Negligence & Tort
Legal Concepts
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Damages
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Appeal
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Statutory Construction
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Remedies
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