Haines v Bendall - [1991] HCATrans 32

A ~,, AUSTRALIA ~

-->»~)) .. ~~,,._(.'-!

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry

Sydney No S93 of 1990
B e t w e e n -
TREVOR WILLIAM HAINES

Appellant

and
DENNIS BENDALL

Respondent

MASON CJ
BRENNAN J
DEANE J

DAWSON J

TOOHEY J
GAUDRON J

McHUGH J

Haines(2)

7/2/91

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 1991, AT 10.03 AM

(Continued from 6/2/91)

MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Allsop.

MR ALLSOP:

Thank you, Your Honour.

To answer or deal with

the matter raised by Justice Brennan late yesterday afternoon, the application of Redding v Lee to this
legislation is in part satisfied, at least as to
principle, the principal moneys of compensation, by
the clear intention of the Act that those moneys
payable as compensation under the Workers
Compensation Act do not in any way reduce the
amount of common law damages. That much is clear
because they have to be repaid and His Honour the
former Chief Justice Gibbs in Redding v Lee at
page 125, 151 CLR, after referring to
Espagne's case, says at page 125:
The test suggested is a general one, and it
requires the court to consider the nature of the benefit which the defendant seeks to set
off against the damages, and to inquire
whether the person or body supplying the
benefit intended that the plaintiff should
enjoy it in addition to whatever damage he
might recover from the defendant. In the case
of a benefit provided under statutory
authority, the intention of the legislature,
in providing the benefit, must be gleaned from
the statute itself as a matter of
interpretation. If the statute expressly
provides (as some statutes relating to
workers' compensation have done) that a
plaintiff who has recovered damages shall
repay the amount of the benefit it will be
clear that the receipt of the benefit must be
disregarded in the assessment.

Now, as to principle, if I can use that expression,
of the compensation, so much is clear. If one can
take from section 64 something further that the
payment of compensation is to be entirely
disregarded in the question of assessment of

damages, then that leads to the necessary
conclusion that Batchelor v Burke was wrongly decided, because it did not pay regard to the intention of a Parliament if the intention goes so
far as to utterly and totally disregard the payment
of compensation in assessment of damages which
involves, of course, the calculation of interest
thereon.
So, Your Honour, if that is the full intent

and complete intent within section 64 and the
necessity to repay that it is totally disregarded,
then it leads to the necessary conclusion that Batchelor v Burke is actually wrongly decided.

Haines(2)

7/2/91

If it is not wrongly decided, Your Honour, and

in my respectful submission, all the provisions
such as section 64 and section 63 do, in relation
to adjusting the relationship between the common
law compensation…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Haines v Bendall

Details

AGLC: Haines v Bendall [1991] HCATrans 32
Case: [1991] HCATrans 32
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter came before the High Court of Australia concerning an appeal by Trevor William Haines against a decision relating to damages. The core of the dispute revolved around the interplay between statutory workers' compensation payments and common law damages awarded to an injured party.

The legal issues before the court included whether statutory workers' compensation payments should be taken into account when assessing common law damages, and specifically, whether the repayment obligation under the relevant legislation meant that such compensation should be entirely disregarded in the calculation of damages, including interest. The court was required to consider the legislative intent behind provisions governing the relationship between these two forms of compensation.

The court's reasoning, as articulated by Mason CJ, drew upon established principles from cases such as *Redding v Lee* and *Espagne's case*. The principle applied was that the intention of the legislature, as gleaned from the statute, dictates whether a benefit provided under statutory authority should be enjoyed in addition to damages. In this instance, the legislation stipulated that workers' compensation payments were to be repaid from any common law damages recovered. This repayment provision, coupled with the legislative intent to disregard such compensation in the assessment of damages, led the court to consider whether the decision in *Batchelor v Burke* was correctly decided. The argument presented was that if the statute intended for compensation to be utterly disregarded, then *Batchelor v Burke* was wrongly decided. The court also considered the practical substance of the compensation received, examining whether the injured party had, in reality, been deprived of the money for which they sought interest.

Orders