Haines, Re M.F. Ex Parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy

Case [1986] FCA 305


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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRXIA

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J

OIVISIOM

GENERAL

)

NO. 596 of 1986

)

BANKRUPTCY

DIS RICT

OF

)

)

THE STATE OF VICTORIA

)

RE ;

MICHAEL

FREDERICK

HAIMES

Bankrupt

M PARTE: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

Applicant

THE COURT: Sweeney J.

: 8 July 1986

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This is an application to review

a

decision of

a Deputy

Registrar who refused to grant

an application for the adjournment

of a section 69 exammation of the bankrupt in this case. It was

pressed upon her as it has been pressed upon me that she should

have granted that application because to continue it would be to

expose the bankrupt to preJudice whereas to adjourn it would not

prejudice the trustee.

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The adjournment was sought following the lodging by the

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applicant of an appeal against an order made by

me on 12 June 1986

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that the date

of the period at the expiration

of

which the

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ob~ection

dated 22 May 1984, entered under paragraph 149(3)(c)

of

thc Bankruptcv Act 1966

("the Act") will lapse, be

20 March 1987.

The applicant submitted that if the appeal is upheld then the

bankrupt would be discharged from bankruptcy as

at and from

25

June 1986 pursuant to the operation of s.149 of the Act.

- prior

to the date of the examination.

Reference

was

also

made

to

the

undeniable

fact

that

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considerable time had elapsed after

2 February 1983 when the

examination of the bankrupt under section 69 was adjourned until

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its resumption by notice given at the beginning

of

this month.

That delay is real and

is,

I think, relevant. However, it was

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clear to the Deputy Registrar, because she had conducted the

examination of a bank manager under section

81. that there was an

allegation that the bankrupt had been operating a bank account

under a name other than his

own which account had been very active

and through which large sums of money had passed.

In the exercise

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of

her

discretion

the

Registrar

refused

to

make

an

order

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?

adjourning the

examination.

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I entertain some doubt myself whether the fact that

a person

is discharged by

operation of law under section

149 takes that

:

person out of the reach of section

69 which provides that:

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:

"The Official Receiver

or the trustee of the estate

of a

bankrupt may, at any time, make an application, in

writing, to the Reqlstrar

for the examination of the

bankrupt, on oath as to the conduct, trade dealings.

property and affairs of the bankrupt".

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The word “bankrupt“ is def

lned In sect

Ion 5 of the Bankruptcy

Act In these terms:

“Bankrupt means

a person -

(a) against whose estate a sequestration order has been

made; or

Lb) ....I’

That definition is wide enought to Include within its reach a.

person who has been dlscharged by operation of section

149. That

meanlng, if given to the word “bankrupt“ in section

69, is a

meaning that may be regarded as being consonant with the general

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objects

of

the

Bankruptcy

Act

and

the

bankruptcy

law.

The

legislature might well have thought that, if it became

known to a

trustee after the time of the discharge of

a person by operation

of section 149 that there were matters upon which an examination

of that person might be desirable in the interests of creditors

or

of the persons who had dealings with the bankrupt, or indeed

in

the interests of commercial morality generally, a trustee should

not be shut out from havlng an examination

of that person.

However, as this matter has arisen quite suddenly and the

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representatives of

the parties have not had

an opportunity to

consider that aspect of the matter in any depth and put considered

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submissions on it, and the court itself has had but scant

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opportunity to consider

it,

I would prefer not to base my

own

decision upon an attempted answer to that question.

I

prefer

rather to take my stance upon the following propositions

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(a)

that what the Deputy Registrar had before her was an

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order of the court which.

so long as it stands, produces

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the result that the bankruptcy in question continues;

(b)

d notice of appeal having been glven does not give rise

to any stay of that order; and

(c)

in exercising her discretion it seems to me it was

perfectly

proper

for

her

to

refuse

to

grant

the

adjournment that was sought, even given full allowance to the circumstances which Mr Scerrl has put in favour of the bankrupt's case. I find no error in what she has

done and

I would not interfere with her decision.

I herefore

leave

the

decision

of

the

Deputy

Registrar

standing and direct that the examination be continued before her.

I

certify that this and the

preceding three ( 3 ) pages are a

true copy

of the Reasons for

Judgment

h reln

of

The

Honourable

Mr.

Justice

Sweeney

!

........ ...

Associate

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Details
AGLC
Haines, Re M.F. Ex Parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1986] FCA 305
Case
[1986] FCA 305
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, the Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, sought a review of a decision made by a Deputy Registrar who had refused to grant an adjournment of a section 69 examination of the bankrupt, Michael Frederick Haines. The examination was being conducted to investigate the conduct, trade dealings, property, and affairs of the bankrupt. The application for review was brought before Sweeney J in the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issue that the court had to decide was whether the Deputy Registrar had erred in refusing to adjourn the examination. The court had to consider whether the fact that the bankrupt had been discharged by operation of law under section 149 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 took the bankrupt out of the reach of section 69, which allows for the examination of a bankrupt. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the delay in conducting the examination was a factor that should influence the decision to adjourn.

The court found that the term "bankrupt" as defined in section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act was broad enough to include a person who had been discharged by operation of section 149. However, the court preferred not to base its decision on this interpretation, given the lack of opportunity for the parties to consider the issue in depth. Instead, the court focused on the fact that the Deputy Registrar had an existing court order that, as long as it stood, continued the bankruptcy. The court also noted that a notice of appeal did not automatically stay the order. Therefore, the court found that it was within the Deputy Registrar's discretion to refuse the adjournment, and the court saw no error in the decision.

The court ultimately decided not to interfere with the Deputy Registrar's decision and directed that the examination be continued before her. The court certified that the provided pages were a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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