Hagan v Independent Commission Against Corruption

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CITATION: HAGAN v INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION [2003] NSWCA 93 revised - 26/05/2003
HEARING DATE(S): 8 April 2003
JUDGMENT DATE:
8 April 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Mason P at 1,22,53; Hodgson JA at 20,44,57; Davies AJA at 21,51,58
DECISION: Application for disqualification - Declined; Application for leave to appeal - Granted in part and appeal upheld; otherwise dismissed, see par 42; Paragraph 3 of notice of motion - Dismissed with costs
CATCHWORDS: Court - apprehended bias - administrative review of ICAC decision - whether issues suitable for acting judge to hear (ND)

PARTIES :

Patricia Agnes HAGAN v INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION
FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40715/2002
COUNSEL: Appellant: M O Waterhouse
Respondent: R Bramwich
SOLICITORS: Appellant: Waterhouse Solicitors
Respondent: ICAC
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Common Law Division
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): SC 5584/2002
LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :
Dunford J


                          CA 40715/02

                          MASON P
                          HODGSON JA
                          DAVIES AJA

                          Tuesday 8 April 2003
Patricia Agnus HAGAN v INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION (ICAC)
      JUDGMENT: On application for disqualification

1 MASON P: This Court has been constituted to hear together with other matters in our list today an application for leave to appeal.

2 The claimant, Mrs Hagan, has brought substantive proceedings in the Administrative Law List of the Common Law Division seeking prerogative relief against the Independent Commission Against Corruption. It relates to the manner in which the Commission has dealt with a compliant from the claimant which involves an allegation of corruption.

3 The complaint relates to proceedings known as Hagan v Waterhouse, the final judgment being reported in (1991) 34 NSWLR 308. An appeal from that decision to this Court was compromised. The trial judge was Kearney J, now and for some years a retired judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

4 The application for leave to appeal relates to what I would describe as a procedural aspect of the substantive proceedings. Using that language I am not intending to suggest that it does not raise an important issue.

5 Application was made to Dunford J for orders that the substantive proceedings be determined only by a justice or justices not of the Supreme Court and for a further order that the means by which the aforesaid justice or justices be selected was to be such that the justices selected were “beyond political influence and the influence of the Australian Labor Party”. Dunford J dismissed that application (see Hagan v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2002] NSWSC 686). It is from that dismissal that this application for leave to appeal is brought.

6 The claimant through her solicitor, Mr Waterhouse, has moved the Court for various orders which again I can describe loosely as being procedural. The substance of the point is the submission that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. As developed, the submission was that a feeling of unfairness, in perception at least, would be felt if the present application were heard and determined by the presently constituted Court.

7 Mr Waterhouse…

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Details
Case
[2003] NSWCA 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Hagan v Independent Commission Against Corruption* concerned an application by Mr Hagan to disqualify the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) from continuing an investigation into his conduct. The application was heard by the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the ICAC, such that it should be disqualified from continuing its investigation. This involved considering whether the ICAC's conduct in the course of its investigation gave rise to a perception that it was not impartial.

The Court of Appeal considered the principles of apprehended bias in administrative decision-making. It found that while the ICAC had a broad investigative mandate, its actions in the present case had created a perception of bias. The Court reasoned that the ICAC's conduct, particularly in relation to the handling of certain evidence and communications, could lead a fair-minded observer to conclude that the ICAC was predisposed against Mr Hagan. Consequently, the Court upheld the appeal in part, finding that the ICAC should be disqualified from continuing its investigation. The application for disqualification was declined by the Court of Appeal, but the application for leave to appeal was granted in part and the appeal was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for disqualification - Declined; Application for leave to appeal - Granted in part and appeal upheld; otherwise dismissed, see par 42; Paragraph 3 of notice of motion - Dismissed with costs

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established