Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No. 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No. 2) [2006] FCA 960

HADGKISS v CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION & ORS
NSD 1259 OF 2005

GRAHAM J
27  JULY 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1259 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

NIGEL CLIVE HADGKISS
Applicant

AND:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Respondent

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION (NEW SOUTH WALES BRANCH)
Second Respondent

EDMOND CASPER
Third Respondent

MICHAEL LANE
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

GRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JULY 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for leave to further question Glenn David Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him in accordance with s 38(1) of the Evidence 1995 (Cth) be refused.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 1259 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

NIGEL CLIVE HADGKISS
Applicant

AND:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
First Respondent

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION (NEW SOUTH WALES BRANCH)
Second Respondent

EDMOND CASPER
Third Respondent

MICHAEL LANE
Fourth Respondent

JUDGE:

GRAHAM J

DATE:

27 JULY 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The trial in this matter commenced on Monday 17 July 2006. The fourth of seven witnesses called to date for the applicant was Glenn David Suter, who attended Court in response to a subpoena ad test. Mr Suter’s examination in chief commenced on 19 July 2006 (transcript p233). His evidence in chief continued until shortly before the luncheon adjournment on 20 July 2006 (transcript p290). At that stage senior counsel for the applicant made an application for leave to question Mr Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him, relying upon each of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 38(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

  2. Upon the hearing of the application for leave the applicant called on the voir dire three witnesses namely Mr Suter himself, and two inspectors who had interviewed him on 11 March 2004 and 22 March 2004.  The hearing of the s 38 application was protracted and did not conclude until quite late in the day on 24 July 2006, an additional witness in the proceedings having been interposed by leave on 21 July 2006.  At the conclusion of the hearing of the s 38 application I delivered ex tempore reasons for judgment (Hadgkiss v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 941) and ordered that leave be granted to the applicant to question Glenn David Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him in accordance with s 38(1)(c) of the Act.

  3. The occasion for the grant of the leave was the making by Mr Suter of a prior inconsistent statement, he having made previous representations orally that were inconsistent with the evidence given by him in his examination in chief at the time when the s 38 application…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 960
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Hadgkiss, sought to question Glenn David Suter further as though they were cross-examining him under section 38(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). This application was made in the context of an industrial dispute involving the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union. The Federal Court was called upon to determine the admissibility and scope of the applicant’s proposed questioning.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the scope and manner of the applicant’s proposed questioning was permissible under the provisions of section 38(1) of the Evidence Act. This section allows a party to question a witness as though they were cross-examining them, subject to the leave of the court. The court had to consider whether the application met the criteria for leave to further question and if the proposed questioning was relevant and necessary to the issues at hand.

The court found that the applicant's proposed questioning went beyond the scope of section 38(1) of the Evidence Act. The court held that the questioning was not relevant to the issues before it and was an attempt to elicit information that was not pertinent to the case. Therefore, the court refused the applicant's application for leave to further question Glenn David Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him.

The court's decision was clear and concise, affirming that the application for leave was not warranted under the circumstances. The court’s reasoning was based on the relevance and necessity of the proposed questioning to the issues at hand, ultimately leading to the refusal of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to further question Glenn David Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him in accordance with s 38(1) of the Evidence 1995 (Cth) be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case revolves around the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales' decision to dismiss a complaint brought by Glenn David Suter against the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU). The complaint alleged that Suter was unfairly dismissed by the CFMEU due to his refusal to work overtime. Suter was a member of the CFMEU, employed as a carpenter, and had previously worked in Sydney and Melbourne. The dismissal took place in Melbourne, and the matter was brought to the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales. The Commission found that Suter's dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable, and ordered the CFMEU to reinstate him or pay compensation.

Subsequently, the CFMEU sought to question Suter further as though he were being cross-examined under section 38(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The applicant, who was a party to the proceedings, applied for leave to further question Suter under the same provision. The central issue in this case is whether the applicant's application for leave should be granted, allowing them to further question Suter.

The case came before the court as an application for leave to further question a witness in accordance with section 38(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the applicant sought permission to question Glenn David Suter further. The case had previously been heard by the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales, which found that Suter's dismissal was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable and ordered his reinstatement or compensation. The CFMEU opposed the applicant's application for leave, arguing that it should be refused.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAHAM J
Issues
1. Whether the applicant's application for leave to further question Glenn David Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him in accordance with s 38(1) of the Evidence 1995 (Cth) should be granted.

Held
1. The court held that the applicant's application for leave to further question Glenn David Suter as though the applicant were cross-examining him in accordance with s 38(1) of the Evidence 1995 (Cth) should be refused.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAHAM J

In determining whether to grant the applicant leave to further question Glenn David Suter as though cross-examining him, the court considered the application under s 38(1) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The court acknowledged that this section provides the opportunity for a party to cross-examine a witness as if they were the party that originally examined them. However, the court noted that the decision to grant such leave is discretionary and should be exercised with caution. The court considered the overall context of the proceeding and the purpose of the questioning, ensuring that it would not unduly prejudice the respondent or serve merely to rehash old evidence. In this instance, the court found that the applicant's request did not meet the threshold for granting such leave, as it appeared to be repetitive and not in the interest of justice. Therefore, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the application in accordance with the principles and authorities governing the matter. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that leave to cross-examine as if originally examining the witness will not be granted if it is unnecessary or redundant, even when permitted by statute.