Hadfield v Commissioner of Police

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hadfield v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 223

PARTIES:

RICHARD JOHN HADFIELD

(Appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

(Respondent)

FILE NO:

DC No 897 of 2024

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 6 March 2024

DELIVERED ON:

13 December 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

14 October 2024

JUDGE:

Moynihan KC DCJ

ORDER:

In relation to the Notice of Appeal filed on 3 April 2024:

1.    The appeal is dismissed.

2.    The order of the Magistrate is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – WILFUL DAMAGE – BONA FIDE CLAIM OF RIGHT – where the appellant was convicted after a summary trial of a single count of wilful damage pursuant to s 469(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – where the appellant contends the Magistrate failed to consider s 22 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).

LEGISLATION:

Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld)
Justices Act 1886 (Qld)
Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld)

CASES:

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
R v Kelleher [2024] QCA 99
R v MEB [2024] QCA 188

COUNSEL:

M L Longhurst for the appellant

K J Simpson for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Sibley Lawyers for the appellant

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent

The Conviction

  1. On 6 March 2024, in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane, the appellant was convicted after a summary trial of a single count of wilful damage pursuant to s 469(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) (the Code).

  2. The learned Magistrate ordered that the appellant pay a bond in the sum of $250 on the condition that he be of good behaviour for a period of three months. No conviction was recorded.

    The grounds of the appeal against the conviction

  3. The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 3 April 2024, appealing his conviction on the following grounds –  

    “1. The Learned Magistrate erred in convicting the Appellant for the charge of Wilful Damage, as the verdict was unreliable or unsafe;

    and/or

    2. The Learned Magistrate erred in law in finding that there was ‘damage’ to the property.”

  4. On 31 May 2024, the appellant filed an outline of submissions in which he sought leave to add the following grounds of appeal –

    “Ground 3 That the particularised charge was bad for latent duplicity, resulting in miscarriage of justice.

    Ground 4 That the Magistrate failed to adequately consider [s 22] of the Code (Bona Fide Claim of Right).”

  5. At the hearing of the appeal the appellant abandoned grounds 1, 2 and 3.

  6. The respondent was granted leave to add ground 4.

    The Act

  7. The appellant appeals his conviction under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (the Act). The Act relevantly provides –

    “222 Appeal to a single judge

    (1)If a person feels aggrieved as complainant, defendant or otherwise by an order made by justices or a justice in a summary way on a complaint for…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 223
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Hadfield, was convicted of wilful damage pursuant to section 469(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) after cutting branches off trees on his neighbour's property, which were overhanging into his own property. The complainant, Craig Cuttriss, objected to the act, leading to the charge being brought against Hadfield. Hadfield appealed the conviction, arguing that the Magistrate failed to consider the defence of a claim of right under section 22 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). The court was required to determine whether the Magistrate erred in not considering this defence.

The court examined the evidence and concluded that the elements necessary for the defence of a claim of right under section 22 were not sufficiently raised by the evidence presented. The court found that there was no reasonable doubt that the defence had not been negated by the prosecution. The court held that a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could not have found that Hadfield honestly believed he had a right to cut the branches under the circumstances. The court emphasised that the burden was on the Crown to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the proposition that Hadfield was acting under such a belief. The court found that the evidence did not support a reasonable doubt that the defence had been negatived.

The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Magistrate. The reasoning was that the evidence did not raise the defence of a claim of right to a degree that would require it to be considered by the jury. The court held that the Magistrate did not err in not considering this defence, and therefore the conviction stood. The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the Magistrate was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

In relation to the Notice of Appeal filed on 3 April 2024:

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The order of the Magistrate is confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

In Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, where the appeal to the Court of Appeal was by way of rehearing with a power to receive further evidence, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ said at p.127-128 [27] – “Such courts must conduct the appeal by way of rehearing. If, making proper allowance for the advantages of the trial judge, they conclude that an error has been shown, they are authorised, and obliged, to discharge their appellate duties in accordance with the statute.”The facts The appellant and the complainant were neighbours who shared a dividing fence between suburban properties at Morningside. The complainant had various trees growing on his property, including three African Tulip trees and a Poinciana tree (the trees). The trees were situated next to the fence line between the properties. The act relied on by the prosecution as constituting the offence was that the appellant did cut branches off the trees (the act) on the complainant’s side of the fence, damaging the trees. The complainant gave evidence that on 20 November 2022, he heard a chainsaw being used near the front of his house. He looked out the window and saw the appellant using a chainsaw on a pole to cut off the top of the African Tulip trees on his property. The complainant went outside and told the appellant that he was not entitled to do that and asked him to stop. After a short pause, the appellant used the chainsaw to cut a branch off the Poinciana tree which was also on the complainant’s property. The complainant’s evidence was that he had not given the appellant permission to cut the trees. When cross-examined, the complainant admitted that he had not planted the African Tulip trees and that they had likely been there for a long time. He was unsure whether they had come from the appellant’s property or whether they originated from his property. The branches that were cut off the trees fell on the ground next to the trees on the complainant’s property. The complainant said that following the incident the tree branches have not grown back to the same extent. In particular, he stated that the African tulip trees had not recovered much of their length and that the volume of leaf material is sparse. In the case of the Poinciana tree, the branch that was not cut by the appellant had grown, though the damaged branch had only recovered a third of its height. The investigating police officer, Senior Constable Clacher, gave evidence that he attended the scene on 20 November 2022, and his body-worn camera footage of the trees and branches was admitted as exhibit 5. The photographs of the trees taken on 20 November 2022 were admitted as exhibit 3 and photographs of the trees taken on 1 February 2023 were admitted as exhibit 4. The parties made the following joint admissions under s 644 of the Code at trial (exhibit 2) – ·“The date and time of the alleged offence is on the 20th November 2022 at approximately 11-11:45am. ·The location is 19 Ison Street, Morningside, the residential address of the complainant. ·The complainant, one Craig CUTTRISS, and the defendant in this matter are neighbours. ·On the aforementioned date and at the aforementioned place, the defendant has cut branches on 4 (FOUR) trees with an electric saw. -x1 Poinciana Tree-x3 African Tulips (Spathodea Campanulate)Photographs taken 20th November 2022 are accepted depictions of the property at the time they were taken and are tendered into evidence by agreement. (EX #1)Photographs dated 1st February 2023 are accepted depictions of the property at the time they were taken and are tendered into evidence by agreement. (EX #2)·The defendant has wilfully cut these branches.·These trees were physically located on the property at 19 ISON Street, Morningside. ·It is accepted that parts of some of the branches and leaves from these trees were overhanging onto the defendant’s property.·It is accepted that African Tulips are a Category 3 restricted species pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 2014.·At the time of the alleged offence, the defendant was aware neighbourhood dispute matters regarding overhanging trees could be progressed through QCAT. At the time of the alleged offence the defendant had made no application to QCAT.A copy of a Neighbourhood Disputes Pamphlet located on the relevant government website is accepted and tendered as an aide. (AIDE #1).”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

A reasonable Magistrate could not have been left with a reasonable doubt that the prosecution had not negatived either of the elements on which the defence depended, that is, the defendant held such a belief or that the belief was honestly held. It is not an inference that a Magistrate, properly instructing themselves, could on the evidence reasonably draw.Conclusion The result is that the evidence did not fairly raise the elements of the defence under s 22(2) of the Code. A defence under s 22 was not open on the evidence. The Magistrate did not err by not considering the possible application of the defence.Order The appeal is dismissed. The order of the Magistrate is confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant submits that – “… the evidence before the presiding Magistrate fairly raised the prospect that the Appellant was acting in accordance with a belief in the state of the law such that he was entitled to control (by way of trimming) the invasive species in accordance with a foreseeable risk under the Biosecurity Act, in addition to his right of abatement.Notwithstanding that the defence of s.22 was not explicitly relied on by the Appellant at first instance, it is respectfully submitted that the weight of the evidence required His Honour to engage with the application of s.22.The failure to engage with s.22 resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”Consideration The relevant legal principles to be applied to determine whether a defence should have been considered are set out in R v Kelleher [2024] QCA 99 by Bond JA, with whom Morrison JA and Crow J agreed, said at p.2-4 [8]-[13] (see also R v MEB [2024] QCA 188) – “[8] It is settled law that if there was evidence which fairly raised any of the defences suggested by the ground of appeal, the legal or persuasive burden was on the Crown to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the proposition that the accused was acting in circumstances giving rise to the defence – that is, to exclude any reasonable possibility that that proposition was true.[9] As to whether any of the suggested defences were fairly raised on the evidence such that they should have been left to the jury, the question for the trial judge was whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused that was suggested by the evidence, a properly instructed jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in circumstances giving rise to the defence. Or, to put it another way, the question for the trial judge was whether, on such a version of events such a jury could be left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the defence had been negatived.[10] It should be emphasised that the question for the trial judge – and for the appellate court where it is suggested that the trial judge erred – is a question of law on which there can be only one correct answer. The question posed in the previous paragraph is not to be answered by a prediction of what the trial judge (or the appellate court) thinks that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably would do. The enquiry is as to what such a jury could do.[11] That said, the proper analysis must necessarily act on the basis that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably will form logical conclusions by logical reasoning and not by mere speculation. Thus in R v Clarke when considering whether an innocent explanation posited for the first time on appeal should have been left to the jury, Hunt CJ at CL remarked that the jury could not act upon “some fanciful supposition or possibility not reasonably to be inferred from the facts proved”.[12] Finally, it is important to appreciate that where a posited defence has both subjective and objective elements, both elements must be considered. If, for example, a defence would exist if the accused relevantly acted while holding a particular belief on reasonable grounds, then the defence would not be fairly raised on the evidence unless there was evidence which fairly raised both the subjective aspect of the hypothesis (namely that the accused actually held the relevant belief when the accused relevantly acted) and the objective aspect of the hypothesis (namely that the belief, if held, could be regarded as held on reasonable grounds). If the evidence fairly raised the defence, the ultimate legal onus on the prosecution would be to prove beyond reasonable doubt either that the accused did not hold the belief or that any such belief was not held on reasonable grounds.[13] Thus in R v Markovski, where the issue was whether the defence of aiding in self-defence under s 273 of the Criminal Code together with the excuse of mistake of fact under s 24 of the Criminal Code should have been left to the jury, Bowskill CJ observed (footnote omitted):“In determining whether such a defence should be left to the jury, the question to be asked is whether there is evidence, direct or inferential, which, taken at its highest in favour of the accused, could lead a reasonable jury, properly instructed, to have a reasonable doubt that the defence had been negatived (that is, to legitimately conclude that there existed a reasonable possibility that the accused held the honest and reasonable, but mistaken belief). But, as was said in CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440 at 447 [8]: “The concept of evidentiary onus itself needs to be understood in the light of the subject matter to which it applies; here, honest and reasonable belief, a concept that has a subjective element of a kind that ordinarily is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, and an objective element that must be capable of being measured against the evidence by a tribunal of fact.” As already noted, evidence of the relevant state of mind may be derived by inference; but “inference must not be confused with speculation”. Whether described as an evidential onus or not, the requirement to point to evidence which raises the issue of mistaken belief for the jury’s consideration is not discharged by reference to speculation or “suppositions about mere possibilities” – there must be some foundation for it. …” (All footnotes omitted).