DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Hadfield v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 223
PARTIES:
RICHARD JOHN HADFIELD
(Appellant)
v
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(Respondent)
FILE NO:
DC No 897 of 2024
DIVISION:
Appellate
PROCEEDING:
Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Magistrates Court at Brisbane – Unreported, 6 March 2024
DELIVERED ON:
13 December 2024
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
14 October 2024
JUDGE:
Moynihan KC DCJ
ORDER:
In relation to the Notice of Appeal filed on 3 April 2024:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The order of the Magistrate is confirmed.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL – APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION – WILFUL DAMAGE – BONA FIDE CLAIM OF RIGHT – where the appellant was convicted after a summary trial of a single count of wilful damage pursuant to s 469(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) – where the appellant contends the Magistrate failed to consider s 22 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld).
LEGISLATION:
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld)
Justices Act 1886 (Qld)
Biosecurity Act 2014 (Qld)CASES:
Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118
R v Kelleher [2024] QCA 99
R v MEB [2024] QCA 188COUNSEL: M L Longhurst for the appellant
K J Simpson for the respondent
SOLICITORS: Sibley Lawyers for the appellant
The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the respondent
The Conviction
On 6 March 2024, in the Magistrates Court at Brisbane, the appellant was convicted after a summary trial of a single count of wilful damage pursuant to s 469(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) (the Code).
The learned Magistrate ordered that the appellant pay a bond in the sum of $250 on the condition that he be of good behaviour for a period of three months. No conviction was recorded.
The grounds of the appeal against the conviction
The appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 3 April 2024, appealing his conviction on the following grounds –
“1. The Learned Magistrate erred in convicting the Appellant for the charge of Wilful Damage, as the verdict was unreliable or unsafe;
and/or
2. The Learned Magistrate erred in law in finding that there was ‘damage’ to the property.”
On 31 May 2024, the appellant filed an outline of submissions in which he sought leave to add the following grounds of appeal –
“Ground 3 That the particularised charge was bad for latent duplicity, resulting in miscarriage of justice.
Ground 4 That the Magistrate failed to adequately consider [s 22] of the Code (Bona Fide Claim of Right).”
At the hearing of the appeal the appellant abandoned grounds 1, 2 and 3.
The respondent was granted leave to add ground 4.
The Act
The appellant appeals his conviction under the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) (the Act). The Act relevantly provides –
“222 Appeal to a single judge
(1)If a person feels aggrieved as complainant, defendant or otherwise by an order made by justices or a justice in a summary way on a complaint for…
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- Case
- [2024] QDC 223
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the evidence and concluded that the elements necessary for the defence of a claim of right under section 22 were not sufficiently raised by the evidence presented. The court found that there was no reasonable doubt that the defence had not been negated by the prosecution. The court held that a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could not have found that Hadfield honestly believed he had a right to cut the branches under the circumstances. The court emphasised that the burden was on the Crown to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the proposition that Hadfield was acting under such a belief. The court found that the evidence did not support a reasonable doubt that the defence had been negatived.
The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Magistrate. The reasoning was that the evidence did not raise the defence of a claim of right to a degree that would require it to be considered by the jury. The court held that the Magistrate did not err in not considering this defence, and therefore the conviction stood. The appeal was dismissed, and the order of the Magistrate was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
In relation to the Notice of Appeal filed on 3 April 2024:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The order of the Magistrate is confirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant submits that – “… the evidence before the presiding Magistrate fairly raised the prospect that the Appellant was acting in accordance with a belief in the state of the law such that he was entitled to control (by way of trimming) the invasive species in accordance with a foreseeable risk under the Biosecurity Act, in addition to his right of abatement.Notwithstanding that the defence of s.22 was not explicitly relied on by the Appellant at first instance, it is respectfully submitted that the weight of the evidence required His Honour to engage with the application of s.22.The failure to engage with s.22 resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”Consideration The relevant legal principles to be applied to determine whether a defence should have been considered are set out in R v Kelleher [2024] QCA 99 by Bond JA, with whom Morrison JA and Crow J agreed, said at p.2-4 [8]-[13] (see also R v MEB [2024] QCA 188) – “[8] It is settled law that if there was evidence which fairly raised any of the defences suggested by the ground of appeal, the legal or persuasive burden was on the Crown to exclude beyond reasonable doubt the proposition that the accused was acting in circumstances giving rise to the defence – that is, to exclude any reasonable possibility that that proposition was true.[9] As to whether any of the suggested defences were fairly raised on the evidence such that they should have been left to the jury, the question for the trial judge was whether, on the version of events most favourable to the accused that was suggested by the evidence, a properly instructed jury acting reasonably might fail to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in circumstances giving rise to the defence. Or, to put it another way, the question for the trial judge was whether, on such a version of events such a jury could be left with a reasonable doubt as to whether the defence had been negatived.[10] It should be emphasised that the question for the trial judge – and for the appellate court where it is suggested that the trial judge erred – is a question of law on which there can be only one correct answer. The question posed in the previous paragraph is not to be answered by a prediction of what the trial judge (or the appellate court) thinks that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably would do. The enquiry is as to what such a jury could do.[11] That said, the proper analysis must necessarily act on the basis that a properly instructed jury acting reasonably will form logical conclusions by logical reasoning and not by mere speculation. Thus in R v Clarke when considering whether an innocent explanation posited for the first time on appeal should have been left to the jury, Hunt CJ at CL remarked that the jury could not act upon “some fanciful supposition or possibility not reasonably to be inferred from the facts proved”.[12] Finally, it is important to appreciate that where a posited defence has both subjective and objective elements, both elements must be considered. If, for example, a defence would exist if the accused relevantly acted while holding a particular belief on reasonable grounds, then the defence would not be fairly raised on the evidence unless there was evidence which fairly raised both the subjective aspect of the hypothesis (namely that the accused actually held the relevant belief when the accused relevantly acted) and the objective aspect of the hypothesis (namely that the belief, if held, could be regarded as held on reasonable grounds). If the evidence fairly raised the defence, the ultimate legal onus on the prosecution would be to prove beyond reasonable doubt either that the accused did not hold the belief or that any such belief was not held on reasonable grounds.[13] Thus in R v Markovski, where the issue was whether the defence of aiding in self-defence under s 273 of the Criminal Code together with the excuse of mistake of fact under s 24 of the Criminal Code should have been left to the jury, Bowskill CJ observed (footnote omitted):“In determining whether such a defence should be left to the jury, the question to be asked is whether there is evidence, direct or inferential, which, taken at its highest in favour of the accused, could lead a reasonable jury, properly instructed, to have a reasonable doubt that the defence had been negatived (that is, to legitimately conclude that there existed a reasonable possibility that the accused held the honest and reasonable, but mistaken belief). But, as was said in CTM v The Queen (2008) 236 CLR 440 at 447 [8]: “The concept of evidentiary onus itself needs to be understood in the light of the subject matter to which it applies; here, honest and reasonable belief, a concept that has a subjective element of a kind that ordinarily is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, and an objective element that must be capable of being measured against the evidence by a tribunal of fact.” As already noted, evidence of the relevant state of mind may be derived by inference; but “inference must not be confused with speculation”. Whether described as an evidential onus or not, the requirement to point to evidence which raises the issue of mistaken belief for the jury’s consideration is not discharged by reference to speculation or “suppositions about mere possibilities” – there must be some foundation for it. …” (All footnotes omitted).